

FREEDOM AND SUSTAINABILITY:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PLANNED AND SPONTANEOUS
SETTLEMENT IN TOGO

By

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To

Ronald Cohen
my eternal mentor and friend

and to my parents

all of whom guided me
toward my own independence and freedom
through trust, enduring support,
tolerance, and example.

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PREFACE

What is the appropriate role of the state in rural development in Africa today? What degree of directed government assistance versus spontaneous farmer initiative best ensures sustainable community development combined with stewardship and responsibility toward the natural resource base? These are the fundamental questions directing this research. My goal in this research is to examine the processes that lead to understanding real needs for more incorporation or more disengagement of individuals with the state and vice versa. The longer-term goal of such research is to understand how to develop more responsive and effective state institutions which incorporate a participatory approach.

The contribution that case-study, local-level analysis of the effectiveness the state in rural development in current Africa should not be underestimated. Theoretical understanding of state-society relations is gained through examination of the degree and incorporation of participatory versus top-down models in actual development programs. In this study, the research design relies on empirical research of state-society relations by comparison of cases of spontaneous and planned settlement in Togo, West Africa. In illustrating dramatic differences of state control on rural settlement, I then analyze their immediate and long-term results. My aim is to

interpret and explain outcomes of the two settlements to garner key lessons from each which inform future policy toward settlement, migration, and development at large.

Organization of the Dissertation

Organization of this dissertation is comprised of three main sections: (1) Introduction; (2) Research findings; and (3) Conclusion. Section one includes three chapters: (1) an examination of the theoretical focus of this research study (including a review of "residues" from former perspectives leading to my own theoretical framework), and an introduction to key issues in settlement studies relevant to this research; (2) Background to the Kabye (primary settler group), the Mo plain (spontaneous settlement), and the FED project (planned settlement); and (3) an account of methods applied in conducting and analyzing findings from this research. Section two includes five chapters, each comprised of data presentation and analysis comparing sites. These chapters concern: (4) state support regarding infrastructural development and government presence; (5) relations between settlers; (6) relations between autochthones and settlers; (7) agricultural and natural resource management systems (including agroeconomic outcomes); and (8) levels of satisfaction among settlers, and their prospects and intentions toward the future. Section three is comprised exclusively of a final summary and conclusion.

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Failure of the African state, manifested in increasing economic, political and environmental problems, has drawn researchers to rethink state-society relations, particularly the society factor in the equation. The focus of this research is an examination of the effects of varying degrees of incorporation of rural people into structures of the modern state. Scholars differ in their perspectives of the appropriate role of the state, ranging from the state-centric, centralized model, to one of classic liberalism assuming uncertainty in development. Although scholars debate the most effective role of the African state in terms of economic, political and social outcomes, there is little research on the detailed effects of state control on rural farmers.

By examining farmers relocating to new lands under varying degrees of government intervention, one a spontaneous settlement, the other, a government-planned agricultural settlement, both in Togo, West Africa, this research focuses on

the extent of farmer articulation with the central government resulting in development successes and failures to identify appropriate conditions wherein government assistance leads to empowerment, autonomy, and sustainability.

Findings of this research indicate that a participatory approach to development, and settlement in specific, ensures the greatest degree of settler investment and permanence leading to long-term stewardship and sustainability of the environment. Where settlers maintain greater responsibility and decision-making power over the social and physical conditions and development of their landscapes, they are better prepared to confront uncertain and challenging difficulties common to rural farmers in Africa. In contrast, where authoritarian governments limit farmer participation by providing "total" environments largely sponsored and designed by Westerners, overly rigid, unresponsive, often inappropriate projects ensue, preventing farmer initiative and flexibility essential for sustainable development.

This research illustrates that marriage between state-support and farmer autonomy is the most effective means to sustainable growth and development in Africa. When state assistance is conceived in collaboration with local populations, it should result in appropriate long-term benefits for infrastructure, environmental protection, and agricultural development. The legacy of overly centralized dirigisme provokes project failures and dependency; farmer freedom generates creative energy for problem-solving and success.

CHAPTER 1

RESIDUES TOWARD FREEDOM: THEORIES OF AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT APPLIED TO STUDIES OF SETTLEMENT

The utility of any theory is to make sense out of otherwise random events (W.F. Ilchman, *Rising Expectations and the Revolution in Development*, 1965:321).

Even if the government thinks it knows what ought to be done, it will try to do so in the worst possible way, which is to say uniformly, systematically, politically and ignorantly. The last is an argument for localizing—even for privatizing—the management of welfare and other social programs, on the notion that encouraging a variety of approaches is the best hope for learning what works in any particular place. But it is also an acknowledgement that we haven't learned it yet (William Raspberry, *Gainesville Sun*, January 4, 1995:8A).

Theories of African Development

Introduction

What exactly should be the role of the state in Africa is hazy in both detail and even macro ideological terms. It is still poorly understood primarily because of the haziness of actual state-society relations. I believe this is largely due to researchers' use of assumptions based on ideologically informed approaches that have obscured real world conditions of state-society interdependence. The state has not been realistically considered.

Failure of the African state (Wunsch and Olowu 1990), manifested in increasing economic, political, and environmental problems, has drawn researchers to rethink state-society relations, particularly the society factor in the equation. Among scholars, there is little consensus on the appropriate role of African populations in state governance. Although scholars have been debating the most effective role of the state in terms of economic and political factors and outcomes, there is limited actual research on the detailed effects of state control on society, of societal use of state resources, or the nexus between the two.

Former theories and perspectives on African development that have stood the challenge of time and hard criticism serve as residues informing current state-society models. In this chapter, I analyze how former theories have addressed and contributed to debates over state-society relations. I ask the question: What have been their perspectives, what are their theoretical weaknesses and flaws, how can we improve upon and contribute to their analyses to gain greater insight of current state-society relations in Africa?

I follow this lofty theoretical analysis with a real-world application. I introduce the direction of this research by providing essential background to the study of settlements,¹ presenting key elements of settlement operations, and discussing overall settlement weaknesses and concerns held among scholars of settlement.

¹ Not surprisingly, key findings and issues which emerge from my own research coincide with the main foci of studies on settlement.

Theoretical Residues

In this section, I analyze perspectives of state-society relations from four broad theories of African development: modernization theory, dependency theory, Marxism, and liberalism. In reality, these theories are not mutually exclusive, but rather similar and overlapping, particularly dependency and Marxism. I have nonetheless distinguished the four as separate to gain analytical depth and clarity in this discussion.

Modernization theory. The central theme of modernization theory was built upon the belief that growth through industrialization equalled development (Rostow 1960). A new, autonomous African independent nation was to emerge through creating a more rational economic system and modernized social and cultural people. This goal was to be achieved by promoting import substitution through industrialization and export agricultural production. Industrialization was to expand in effort to increase exports (including agriculture and commercial goods), thus increasing foreign revenue to stimulate the internal economy.² During this period, in consequence, a number of large-scale agricultural programs were initiated (such as settlement schemes) for export cash-crop production using the philosophy and technologies of modernization.

The recipe for industrialization required social and political institutional changes as well as changes in economic policy. The modern industrial work environment required a behavioral shift from the traditional African work style, one

² Modernization theorists assumed (falsely) that food production in Africa was self-sufficient and capable of expanding to support increased urban populations created by modernization. This would drain off the underemployed, leaving rural producers to increase efficiency and gain greater income. Greater urban food needs would also benefit rural sectors and be paid for by industrialization (Lipton 1976).

of intermittent, varied intensity and often collective and shared labor, to a more Western industrial system characterized by regularity, consistency, dependability, punctuality, and individual work (Apter 1965; Inkeles and Smith 1974; Lerner 1958). To be modern was not just a set of dynamic conditions, but a state of mind. Social change held a personal meaning for individuals. The "modern man" (Inkeles and Smith 1974) was expected to shed former behaviors and attitudes to adopt a progressive, modernizing work ethic that was believed to be necessary in stimulating the growth of the national economy.³

Modernization theorists viewed development and growth as the release and growth of productive forces in society. The role of the state, therefore, was to provide the conditions to "enable" the capacity for growth and progress in both rural and urban areas (Apter 1965). Rural areas, however, bore the pains of national economic growth. Little government incentive or concern was directed toward understanding the actual state of rural conditions. Emphasis on industrialization and urbanization created a bias against the rural sector causing inequities and injustices in the name of "development" (Lipton 1976). This created discrimination against rural sectors, squeezing rural poor into worsened conditions, while urban migration lead to further imbalance (Lipton 1976).⁴ Allocated resources, available through export

³ The rural farmer viewed as a program beneficiary, or executor, of project goals is one result of this perspective.

⁴ Rural taxation, artificially suppressing prices to producers for food production, and minimum infrastructural development (except to ensure food transport to the urban centers) are examples of strategies applied by urban-based political elites to economically squeeze rural farmers in favor of satisfying the more critical, potentially threatening, urban populations.

revenues or foreign assistance, were rarely directed toward rural areas (as was well illustrated in the Mo plain).⁵

National integration and unification became the dominant theme of many African nations during the modernization period (such as Tanzania, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, Togo) (Ake 1967; Emerson 1962; Hodgkin 1957). Extensive state involvement in all national affairs led by a political elite was believed to provide the appropriate economic and social atmosphere leading to industrial modernization (Huntington 1987).⁶ The political system of modernizing nations was, following the model of the colonial rule, authoritarian and structured into a unified one-party regime (defended as culturally African because it was "communitarian," rather than democratic). Although the political system of nationalization was cloaked in African dress, it bore the skeletal framework of former colonial rule. Traditional, familiar, deep-rooted African cultural symbols and beliefs were used by politicians to "promote" new, national economic goals. Yet for most rural African farmers, the state appeared unchanged. It maintained the same dominant, intervening, imposing character that the colonial regime had formerly held.

Identification and association with ethnicity, lineage, and region were to be secondary to nationhood.⁷ The individual was to transform into the "modern person."⁸

⁵ Urban food prices were kept low and stabilized from price fluctuations by government policies and regulations, such as marketing boards.

⁶ The strength and fervor of the nationalization effort was largely motivated by the personal interests of members of the political elite and urban populations, many of whom were Western-trained.

⁷ Phrases such as "die for the clan, live for the nation," used by the first President of Cameroon, Ahmadu Ahidjo, reflect the atmosphere during this period of development and modernization.

Through greater awareness and exchange of ideas, people were to develop opinions about government and society. Formulation of opinion would stimulate people's greater participation in politics. People's values regarding traditional cultural practices and beliefs, however, were to change. Ideas about community, family, and gender roles were to be reshaped. Modern man was to be liberated from traditional bonds by becoming more mobile, individualistic, and empathetic toward other modern individuals (exemplified in the persona required of settlers who entered the FED scheme). Increased education and exposure built expectations among people to capture better opportunities and improve their lives. Unmet expectations lead to disillusionment and frustration.

To attempt to minimize or erase the reality of pre-existing identities and values and build a unified, umbrella nation-state was ineffective and unrealistic. Groups formed by state authorities (such as those in the planned settlement) were often inoperative because they were unfounded. The strength of indigenous associations and weaknesses ("softness") of government hindered the progress and further development of industrialization and modernization. During this period, Third World dependence on financial and technical assistance from developed countries, seen as a necessary "temporary" step toward greater autonomy and independence, was an assumption seriously challenged by dependency theorists whose work also began to emerge at this time.

⁸ Reshaping the individual through the spread of literacy and media were considered critical elements to the modernization progression (Lukeles and Smith 1974; Lerner 1958).

Dependency theory. In opposition to the modernization perspective, dependency theorists challenged the concept of the African nation as isolated and independent, and placed the blame for Third World poverty, dependency, and unattained goals on external factors outside the new nation-state (Cardoso 1972; Fanon 1963; Frank 1969; Leys 1975; Myrdal 1969; Rodney 1972). The causes of poverty, according to dependency theorists, lie in power differences between wealthy core and peripheral poor countries. Exploitation through resource extraction and unequal trade prices have allowed richer, more powerful developed countries to dominate and control the economic life of less developed Third World nations for their own interests.⁹ This unequal relationship has existed for centuries, argue proponents of dependency, which makes a break with core-peripheral relations all the more revolutionary and difficult, yet necessary.

In order to cut the tie, Third World nations needed to gain greater autonomy through self-sufficiency and reduced foreign dependence. African nations needed to be liberated from foreign dominance (Fanon 1963; Myrdal 1969; Rodney 1972). Rather than imperialistic foreign-owned and -operated, the dependency theorists enthusiastically supported increased control and ownership of banks, industries, and

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According to dependency theorists, agricultural export based on the concept of "comparative advantage" was a false notion, placing the less developed nations in severe economic straits. Western countries captured control of the world market to maintain cheap prices of goods and food imported from Third World nations. By selling exports high and importing cheap, Western nations were able to maintain an unequal, exploitative balance of trade between themselves and less developed nations.

larger business operations by the state.¹⁰ As the only viable and capable institution to manage national affairs, they believed the state must be the lead player in barring foreign exploitation and stimulating internal growth.

Ironically, dependency theorists paralleled modernization theorists by considering the state the most powerful and effective source able to change and improve national and international conditions. The state was seen as dedicated to "real" development (meaning welfare as well as growth), while the private sector was by definition oriented to growth alone.¹¹ Political elites gained increased opportunities to entrench the one-party state regime and further build on the foundations of a centralized controlling state already set in place by modernization proponents.

I hasten to point out that scholars have identified both positive and negative outcomes of capitalist penetration of the urban and rural sectors (Warren 1980; World Bank 1981). Although it is true that groups have remained peripheral or not captured by capitalist investments and state welfare policies, it is invalid to suggest that little or no development or growth occurred in Third World nations during this period. Foreign investment increased Third World development by increasing cash crop production, improving urban and rural welfare conditions, including improving health conditions, providing infrastructural support through roads and water supplies.

¹⁰ State parastatal agencies were thought to provide effective means to overcoming foreign-dominated enterprise.

¹¹ In parallel, cultural imperialism was combatted with an "indigenization" of African values and behavior. "Africanization" of society was to override the Western influences which had penetrated during the modernization period.

Marxist-Socialism. Fundamental to the Marxist perspective in Africa was that elimination of capitalism would allow for Marxist state control, for example, through Marxist-Leninist socialist governments which would create a development polity ensuring social justice and prosperity in the interest of the masses (Young 1982). This centralized planning would entail nationalization of most sectors and activities in society, including agriculture, business, banking, transportation, education, and social services, including health care. The critical element to Marxist nationalization is the one-party state where the party represented the people. The notion of traditional African society conveniently fit into the Marxian class-based model.¹² Similar to the dependency school, one expression or branch of Marxist thought, Marxist-Leninism, in Africa meant a strong and ruling state (administered by an elite political class).

The Marxist state is a bird's eye perspective. It follows a top-down, scientifically planned and operated blueprint approach to government. In the Marxist state, the polity has synoptic knowledge of societal activities, capable of directing all national activities from central state headquarters. In attempting to remove itself from society, however, the state loses communication, understanding, and control of society, and becomes increasingly paranoid and vulnerable to corruption (see Beetham 1994 on positives and negatives of this approach).¹³ State leaders cannot respond effectively to local needs when they are not in position to hear them.

¹² For Marx, class "consciousness" is essential to class action. A class must be of and for itself to act as a unit.

¹³ Authoritarian, centrally controlled polities are highly exposed and vulnerable to going "soft" (corrupt and inefficient) due to waste, corruption, inefficiency, and poor planning.

The strong role of the state has been considered ineffective in providing for "all" members of the nation. The welfare state was to provide for the collective needs of all, but many people, particularly the rural poor, did not always receive adequate support.¹⁴ Overly authoritarian state control is myopic, resulting in top-down, inoperative states reflecting little of actual state-society conditions. The state-centric approach not only inhibits growth of local initiatives. Too often it also increases coercion and injustice. Coercive means of control limit the spontaneous responses to information and opportunities required for development and economic growth.

The absence of secured welfare has led people to focus on meeting their own minimal needs through traditional, widely diverse groups and associations based on relations lying outside state control. The powerful strength and persistence of these traditional networks, what Hyden (1980) calls the "economy of affection," largely lies in the secondary, parallel, informal economy. These relations, it has been shown (Hyden 1980; Rothchild and Chazan 1988), provide a more secure means of survival for many rural peoples who find it easy to use their isolation and lack of state effectiveness to carry on a semi-autonomous way of life within states unable to implement their mobilization policies (relations among farmers of the spontaneous settlement particularly function in this manner).¹⁵

¹⁴ Results of Marxist governments have been mixed: economic growth has shown to be below levels of other, capitalist-oriented, African states; Marxist rhetoric to create equality has largely eluded Marxist states; human rights violations and generally coercive regimes have been found to be as repressive and unjust as in other African states; and overall capacity and performance of the Marxist state has led to over-developed governments and corrupt, predatory regimes (Young 1982).

¹⁵ President Julius Nyerere's Tanzania Ujaama villagization program (Hyden 1983) exemplifies how a nationalization effort of centralized settlement fell short of its goal of peasant incorporation to the state

By admitting the failure of state-directed programs, the societal factor could no longer be ignored. The complexity of societal groups was seen to complement or even bypass state rule. The state was no longer believed to be a unifying and centralized institution, but rather a porous political system comprised of individuals and specific groups vying for power and authorized control within and outside of the official political arena (Migdal 1987).

The failure of the state in Africa has been analyzed recently by scholars such as Hyden and Bratton (1992), Rothchild and Chazan (1988), and Wunsch and Olowu (1990). They conclude that the strong centralized African state paradigm is ineffective and in crisis. Personal and group interests, plus the marketability of state decisions (Cohen 1988) combined with diminishing available resources, have led political actors to deceit and corruption. Economic crises have led in turn to a crisis of legitimation, a fundamental questioning of the effectiveness, acceptability, and moral rectitude of the African state.

In parallel, increasing international interdependency among nations (including developing nations) has encouraged an opening up of political systems and a turn to more dialogue between nations. Centralized regimes obstruct the participation, free movement of goods and people, and creativity by members of society which are theorized to be necessary for growth and development. Certainly, at a gross or macro-level this is an emerging assumption of the 1990s (as witnessed in the "opening" of centralized nations, notably Russia or South Africa).

due to farmers' continued employment of an exit option where a "dual or parallel economy" expanded beyond the reach of the central state.

Western liberalism. A fundamental contrast between conceptions of the liberal and the Marxist-Leninist centralized state lies in the varying degree of control and planned state intervention which occurs in each. Liberal state leaders do not assume that progress demands control and synoptic knowledge over society. Marxian-oriented leaders, in contrast, believe in a common Weltanschauung, the possibility of absolute penetration of ideology and regulation to form a one-party, unified state (Lindblom 1977). According to liberals, society is not a homogeneous unit, but a conglomerate of differentiated, autonomous units which lie in, outside, and cut across the formal divisions between state and society (Almond 1960).

The internal interacting elements of society consistently undermine efforts at state control because they are both enduring and spontaneous formations based on traditional relationships, contemporary groupings, self-initiative, and mutual adjustment among individuals and groups whose multitudes of interactions are so numerous and so complex as to defy anything like complete control (Hayek 1960). In effect, the state cannot ever fully regulate many of the traditional and intermittent structures of society (such as kinship, religion, trades networks, and so on). Nor can they ever be totally assimilated into the state.

Liberals argue that people and interest groups act based on their own volition. Individuals in the liberal state are free and unpredictable (Beetham 1994). Individuals actively search for their own particular solutions to immediate and long-term constraints through self-initiative, and creativity and processing of information required (Hyden's "uncaptured peasant"). They are not merely passive, monistic, or

easily regulated, as demonstrated by settlers in both sites. On the other hand, like molecules in a crystal formation, they (individuals) do maintain limited and adapting patterns of action from the past and from aggregating agreements on rules of order (Hayek 1960).

Because the liberal democratic state assumes incomplete knowledge and uncertainty over society (Lindblom 1977), it is not rigid and fixed, stifling spontaneity and initiative. Liberalism allows for openness, flexibility, pluralism, and diversity. It maintains open pathways of communication linking the interpenetrating and multidimensional strata and sectors of society, both vertically and horizontally. Thus information is not truncated, but widely spread and shared among individuals in the liberal state. According to Beetham (1994) liberal democracy is always an unfinished process.

Fluid communication channels in society offer individuals and groups opportunities to collect and absorb information appropriate and essential to their specific needs. Increased information channels allow for greater amounts of knowledge to be shared among both the polity and society and lead to more effective and accountable policy in decision-making (Inkeles and Smith 1974). Greater ease and use of communication among groups determines a more efficient, effective society, economy, and state. This is the key ingredient, according to Almond (1960), to effective state-society boundary maintenance and/or "relations" in more contemporary terms.

Problem-solving allows for conflict, disagreement, and criticism. Opposition of all kinds, especially legitimate political parties, is fundamental to liberal democratic states. For Hayek (1944), individuals' interests, freedom, values, and needs should guide state action. Diversity, increased participation, shared resources, and power characterize the democratic liberal state. "To turn the whole of society into a single organization built and directed according to a single plan would be to extinguish the very forces that shaped the individual human minds that planned it" (Hayek 1960:37).

The liberal paradigm, in contrast to the Marxist-socialist orientation, calls for greater degrees of freedom in society and in the economy by a reduction of the state through the divestiture of parastatals, plus increased local participation and democratic political practices. Increased freedoms allow for free association and greater participation without fear. The presence of more national equity, justice, and political accountability is fostered through liberalization, the competitive opening up of political and economic activity (Kennedy 1994).

In a liberal capitalist system, guidelines drawn by state authorities are used to regulate or assist, but not control economic (market forces), political, and sociocultural activities. Strategies of liberal states are based on incremental feedback operations which generate decentralization of control, fragmentation of responsibility, decisions, and influences. As Aron (1967) argues, planned and spontaneous forces should dictate the liberal democratic social agenda and its ordered existence.

Economic development should enable and protect real freedoms to emerge in a liberal democracy. A dialectic between democracy and authority creates a tension where

minimum rules and dependency coincidentally exist with pluralism and initiative (Kennedy 1994).¹⁶

According to capitalist liberals, maximum rationalization is achieved through a competitive, capitalist market economy.¹⁷ Penetration of Western capitalism is meant to foster and facilitate greater indigenous economic activity already existing in the informal, parallel economy (Almond 1960; Callaghy 1988; Dei 1993; Essombe-Edimo 1993; Hyden 1980; MacGaffey 1988). In place of the strong state dogma, a more democratic and eclectic approach to economic growth is now the focus of many African states. As the formal market expands into less formal, parallel economies, a more diverse array of actors will participate in, and have greater access to formal market opportunities and goods (Bernal 1994). A number of scholars agree that participation and democracy are inseparable (Beetham 1994; Pateman 1970), so as economic liberalism expands, so in turn will democratic practices. I agree with Warren (1980), capitalism correlates with democracy and some operative balance between both state regulation and societal dynamism is essential to a liberal political order.

Residual theory. In sum, the state-centric (Marxist) paradigm remains limited in theory and practice. The state alone cannot provide society with basic needs and services. Its own financial constraints and its inability to identify real needs in

¹⁶ It is often overlooked that Marx also recognized the necessity for this as an avenue for establishing a socialist state with a respect for democracy and a developed economy (Warren 1980).

¹⁷ Because the state cannot create the nation's wealth, privatization, competition, and foreign investment are encouraged to stimulate the much-needed growth.

complex, plural societies from its birds' eye vantage point limits its capacity to realize its declared objectives for effective government. By inducing development through imposed, top-down programs, the state prevents the expansion of local capacities. Comparatively rigid, centrally controlled state regimes undermine their own legitimate power by denying external participation. Rather than obstructing local initiatives, the state should encourage and buttress indigenous organization, aiding growth and therefore, ultimately, differentiation.

Today, the term "strong states" implies a capability for confronting diversity (within and beyond national borders) without threat or loss of independence. State effectiveness means eclecticism, accommodation, and appropriateness (through learning) of government activities and interactions. Liberalization demonstrates state strength, power, and desire for growth and development.

As Migdal (1987) and others have said, the state has now been removed from its lofty position where it was separate from societal activities, and becomes one actor among others vying for power, control, and benefits. The state and society nexus is now more visible and fluid. If, in fact, the state aims to guarantee individuals human rights and justice, opportunities, and optimal freedom within a normative order, and if the state aims to assist in improving the welfare and lifestyles of the population, then greater power and autonomy must be shared between the state and the society it governs.¹⁸

¹⁸ Questions concerning the state-society balance continue to resonate and challenge political figures today. In Florida, for example, an editorial included the following: "Chiles spoke of the need to change the very nature of state government—from an entity that initiates programs and issues, new laws, rules and regulations, to an agent that acts as a catalyst to bring together people, local governments, not-for-profit

Some degree of order is necessary to maintaining a stable state. In a liberal capitalist system, restraint over state power and control is effected by ordering mechanisms in society itself. Through representation and local advocacy, people's participation in social, political, economic and environmental policy-making harnesses state authority and power. Conflict and opposition are pillars of the liberal state. Open communication and access to information and education are necessary prerequisites to a effective participation.

As governments become more responsive to people's demands and decentralization, local governments increase in power, and state control from the center decreases. Honest government, legitimacy, is assured by people's genuine interest, concern, and participation with local, regional, and national governmental activities (Hyden and Bratton 1992). As people acquire more control over their own lives, national growth and development progresses as a function of their capacity to increase rational choices while government helps through experimenting with regulation and interventions that enhance local initiatives and incentives. Groups, associations, and local institutions based on traditional social networks and relations are strong and important sources for social, political, and economic well-being (Burgess 1994; Mann et al. 1989).¹⁹ State leaders need to build upon these traditional

[groups], and others to try to solve problems we have. 'Our problem is that we tend to expect government to solve our problems,' Chiles observed. 'It can't. But our unique and wonderful constitution gives us the opportunity to design a framework whereby people can participate to solve problems'" (Editorial, *Gainesville Sun*, January 4, 1994:10A).

¹⁹ Numerous Togolese government leaders confirmed that stability in the economy and in national politics relied on ancient structures of traditional leadership (including village and canton chiefs).

organizations to stimulate growth and development. Rather than impose newly created groups or "classes" on local populations, the state should make use of existing organizations (Burgess 1994; Dei 1993; Massaro 1994).

Likewise, development can foster conservation of the environment (Ingram 1994; World Bank 1989). Indigenous knowledge systems incorporated with Western scientific systems for agriculture and natural resource management can provide creative and long-term benefits and sustainability (Biggs 1980; Ingram 1994; DeWalt 1994; Richards 1985; Thurston 1992). Sustainability and social development are interdependent, the erosion of one leads to erosion of the other. For example, encroachment of marginal lands and mining of the natural resource base are due to population pressure and increased poverty. Similarly, accelerating deforestation is caused by increased wood extraction to meet rising urban demands. These damaging environmental effects are due to the natural increase in population and development initiatives which are myopic in lack of planning for long-term sustainability (Altieri et al. 1983; Hunter and Ntiri 1978; Ingram 1994; Little et al. 1987).

To institutionalize democratic principles and practices in an African state political system, to "make government work for the people," focus should begin with grassroots participation in local activities. According to some scholars, a bottom-up, rather than top-down approach is essential to designing effective strategies and principles for economic and political growth (Burgess 1994; Moris 1981). Participation includes self-initiated, local-level activities with responsive state intervention. Concomitantly, participation requires people's access to information and

their capacity to express opinions and viewpoints without threat. Liberal notions of development, such as "optimal ignorance" (Uphoff 1986), "hiding hand" (Hirschman 1967), "incremental changes and development" (Lindblom 1959), and other concepts of small-scale, learning processes (Korten 1980), are the predictable foundations of a newly emergent liberal capitalist states.

To conclude, for scholars purporting a liberalist approach, local participation is not an alternative to state control, but a vital component determining the degree and kind of state assistance required for changes brought on by development. They claim that participatory, local-level self-development assisted by liberal-oriented state support may be the most effective approach to development and growth of Third World nations (Hirschman 1984). Liberalism and participation through compromise and adjustment between state and society may be the next step toward reaching the precarious balance in Africa today. Theories have helped and hindered. They always will. Somehow we must search for ideas, concepts, and relations that take out of the enormous confusion of development sufficient insight to push the process forward. State and its relation to society must now be studied in a more fine-grained manner. Macro theories will result. But micro-macro knowledge of real world conditions is the necessary next step.

Directions for Research

The buffer zone between the polity and people can be analyzed and "measured" according to its functional performance (Almond 1960). Through

empirical analysis, the interstices between the two must be clarified. From analysis of these intersections (supported by quantitative and qualitative data), scholars can begin to assess the most appropriate role for the state as provider of regulation and welfare by identifying the costs and benefits over time of state engagement and disengagement with society and economy. As Chazan (1988) remarks, individuals and groups vacillate in their encounters with the state according to their interests. For them, the state is both oppressor and ally. As recognition of the failure of the African state increases (Wunsch and Olowu 1990), research will focus more on the real and changing nature of state-society relations. Research must focus on both the effects of state intervention on rural and urban populations, and, in turn, the options and outcomes resulting from people either incorporating or disengaging from state activity.

Greater understanding and insight into state-society relations can be attained through context-driven, inductive research of local state-society interactions (Burgess 1994; Dei 1993). According to Chazan (personal communication, 1990), the value of local-level research "lies in precisely the possibility of disaggregating what the state means at the local level, how it operates, who its emissaries are, how they are perceived, and with what results." With greater understanding of state action on the local level, state initiatives to promote development on the local level will become more effective.

Research of state-society relations entails unpacking the state-society model to analyze each of their functions, motivations, allies, perceptions, behavior under

changing conditions, internal struggles, and so on. Use of open-ended, flexible inquiry rooted in eclectic, multi-modal research produces an understanding of the matrix of conditions which affect state-society relations in Africa (Cohen 1988). Local level, empirical research requires in-depth case study analysis. Understanding where and how people organize themselves and work toward self-development is key to creating more effective state-society relations.

My own research design is an example of the kind of research needed if we wish to further this intellectual thrust in understanding state-society relations. Through in-depth qualitative and quantitative analysis comparing two settlement areas under varying state control, I aim to isolate specific similarities and differences in terms of the effects of more state initiated versus more autonomous settlement. To begin, I introduce background to the study of settlements by presenting their main elements, and issues which challenge their long-term success and sustainability.

Key Issues in Studies of Settlement

Introduction

Relocation of rural peasants, through spontaneous migration, planned settlement, and forced involuntary removal are not new to Africa (Cernea 1988; Cernea and Guggenheim 1993; Christodoulou et al. 1967; Hansen and Oliver-Smith 1982; Harrell-Bond 1986; Lewis 1954; Netting 1968, 1989; Zachariah and Condé 1979). Settlement schemes for development goals (often succeeding forced settlement)

currently play an important role in development and growth in Africa. They are increasing in number and magnitude and gaining greater financial and human resources from the developing world (Goering 1978; Scudder 1985a). They are not a thing of the past (Lowman 1993). Goering (1978) reports that recent estimates indicate a global rate of settlement of four to five million hectares annually, about one-quarter of which is planned, or government assisted. Below, I examine key elements garnered from literature of development-oriented settlement schemes.

Settlement Costs

Government-directed resettlement, as in the case of FED, is more expensive than assisted or spontaneous settlement, as in the case of Mo. Large-scale financing is often preferred by donor agencies in order to economize on administrative and planning costs (Hulme 1987:426). Despite evidence showing that low-cost projects are often more effective and ultimately more beneficial to rural populations than larger programs which foster dependency, donors have favored large-investment programs to profit from economies of scale (McMillan 1995).²⁰

The record of high-investment settlement schemes have been discouraging and criticized by agriculturalists, economists, and sociologists for inefficiency and cost ineffectiveness. Returns on investments in settlement schemes have been disappointing while costs per family increase (Chambers 1969; Scudder 1984). Cost reduction has

²⁰ Examples abound of high-investment settlements such as the World Bank's Bura Irrigation Scheme in Kenya (\$40,000 per settler family) or the rainfed Cape Rodney Scheme in Papua, New Guinea (\$20,000 per family).

been a concern for such donor agencies as the World Bank, USAID, EEC, and others. Consequently, more equitable distribution of financing over longer time periods, as well as less ambitious approaches to settlement have been conceived, notably, the concept of "assisted" rather than controlled settlement (McMillan et al. 1990a:31; Scudder 1984).

Cost recovery, requiring farmers to reimburse a portion of invested public funds, is a requirement found in many settlement schemes. Funds from repayment may be channeled into many different operations, including credit collection from agricultural equipment, marketing boards, or regularly scheduled deposits on loans. Cost recovery has been a problem for many settlement schemes for a variety of reasons, both voluntary and involuntary. Insufficient settler incomes, insecurity of continued reliable infrastructural maintenance during and after the funding period, and settler evasion, for example, have been noteworthy obstacles to cost recovery (World Bank 1985:50).

Donor control. African host countries rely heavily on outside assistance to implement large-scale settlement programs (McMillan et al. 1990b).²¹ This generally implies significant donor power and control over settlement planning and maintenance. In some cases, for example, the Gezira scheme in the Sudan, donors undermine host country government control and maintain full authority over settlement programs (Gaitskell 1959). In other cases, such as the AVV in Burkina

²¹ Donor agency authority and everyday power and control over settlement goals, design, and implementation is common to many schemes (the World Bank in the Onchocerciasis Program; USAID in the Mahaweli schemes; FED in Togo; the British government and private manufacturers in Gezira; and a number of other examples described in Chambers 1969).

Faso (McMillan 1983), donors and host governments collaborate in planning and administering the program by either sharing responsibilities or delegating specific tasks to each player involved. Sometimes, as in the FED project (Painter 1990) a number of outside donors and agencies (bilateral, multilateral, and PVOs) are involved simultaneously with the settlement program and negotiate and juggle control and authority over responsibilities.²²

To the extent that Third World host countries rely on donor assistance for capital, technology, management, and other inputs, they are also accountable and responsive to the perspectives, guidelines, and goals determined by the donor. In consequence, donor involvement in settlements often creates a higher efficiency and effective management system than in projects lacking required accountability.²³ Although this scenario appears top-heavy and imposing, and can pose dependency problems in developing countries, theoretically, in the short run it can also provide incentive for settlement management to increase efficiency (Koenig 1988b; Painter 1990).²⁴

²² For example, in the FED scheme, FED provides financial support and general assistance, USAID and the Peace Corps provide training and equipment for animal traction, Aide et Action (a French NGO) and other international volunteer services (German and Japanese) provide other, more specific, services such as schools, health facilities, and so on. (Painter 1990 and personal observation).

²³ Scrutiny by outside observers compels scheme administrators to conduct periodic evaluations and to utilize standard measures and indicators of growth and progress such as GNP, income distribution, health indicators, and others (Chambers and Moris 1973; Koenig 1988b).

²⁴ Administration on these projects is commonly done by semi-autonomous or totally independent agencies working within, yet separate from, one of the national ministries (Chambers and Moris, 1973; Koenig 1988a,b; McMillan 1983). As semi-independent parastatals, settlement agencies are known to be cost effective relative to the mainstream ministerial and sectoral administrations because of the settlement agencies' high degree of autonomy, in particular, escaping the ubiquitous bureaucratic red-tape typical of African administrations.

In contrast, one problematic outcome of donor influence on settlement programs is that of inappropriate settlement design. Donor priorities and interests (such as profit) often differ from host-country national or local interests and concerns (welfare).²⁵ Where donor interests do not coincide with local needs, the program may not "fit" with local needs, resulting in less than optimal results, even scheme failure.

Inappropriate settlement programs are also generated by unintentional factors. Despite genuine efforts, donor agencies are often incapable of adequately understanding the complexities of the local context. Donor agencies are seated in highly developed countries far removed from the physical conditions and cultures effected by settlement. In spite of good intentions, donor agencies may not be well-positioned or staffed to take the lead role in scheme programming. Distance obscures awareness of local conditions. To summarize, regardless of donor capacity and willingness to develop appropriately designed settlements, outside actors can dangerously misdirect the goals and management of the schemes (de Wet 1994; Scudder 1985a).

Donor management style. Donor-host country relations commonly favor a top-down, authoritarian, blueprint style of management on settlement schemes. To be cost effective, efficient, and responsive to the international community, scheme managements most often acquire an imposing, inflexible, disciplinarian control over the settlement (Chambers and Moris 1973; Roider 1973). In some cases, senior

²⁵ For example, the World Bank, first and foremost a bank, relies on secure and profitable loans and investments for its own survival. High-level production leading to profits are of critical concern to the bank, whereas host country and/or local concerns may center on improving socioeconomic conditions and welfare for local populations as was the case in Gezira (Gaitskell 1959).

administrators assert that this dogmatic, militaristic approach and attitude to management is necessary given the nature of settlement production.²⁶ Because of an essential strict hierarchy of control or because of personality features, management style in settlements often attracts and fosters authoritarianism (Chambers and Moris 1973; Gaitskell 1959).

Top-down management style in settlement schemes inhibits management's ability to respond to deviances or "ruptures" in the system and creates a loss of information and understanding of bottom-level, local-settler conditions. A centralized management authority, such as in the Mwea settlement, lacks contact and communication between top managers and settlers, and even to some degree with lower-level staff, because management believe they have synoptic, comprehensive knowledge of the project.²⁷

Training of lower staff particularly has low priority on most settlement scheme planning agenda and is either quite minimal or inappropriate to the settlement context.²⁸ Staff often dislike the remoteness in which settlements are located, and comparing their own jobs to those of their friends conclude that settlement work is a

²⁶ In irrigation systems, for example, managers claim that centralized, disciplinarian regimes are necessary to coordinate and perform technical complex tasks (Chambers and Moris 1973; Scudder 1985a).

²⁷ Without leadership, monitoring, and encouragement from senior staff, junior staff become less motivated and turn easily to ritualized work performance. Lack of dedication from above and poor accountability allow junior staff to "go through the motions."

²⁸ Scudder (1985a) reports that extension services on World Bank-funded resettlement projects were rated "poor" for 41 percent of the projects, "only fair" for 14 percent of the projects, and none was rated as "very good to excellent." Lack of time and financial resources are mentioned by Gaitskell (1959) in Gezira and Roider (1973) in Ilora as major constraints to adequate staff training.

punishment station! Rapport between staff and senior management may be tense, and their relations with settlers are usually neutral or even hostile.²⁹ Staff are widely viewed with suspicion because, no matter what their rank, they represent the potential for settler eviction (see Koenig 1988a for an excellent discussion of this point). Settlement staff are often neglected and underestimated as key actors insuring the regularity in settlement activities and overall success.

Although many settlement efforts appear comprehensive, well-defined, and neatly packaged, uncertain conditions, errors, changes, and fluctuations inevitably occur (Hirschman 1967; Hulme 1987; Lindblom 1959; Scudder 1985a). Settler innovation and adaptation to new surroundings can easily pass unnoticed by over-centralized management. Management then loses the capacity to build on settler initiative and problem-solving. Cutting off such information creates long-term rigidity, short-term frustrations for those at the bottom, and managers drift further from understanding the real-world conditions of the settlers.³⁰ Worse, the scheme as a whole becomes less responsive to its own implementation issues, problems, and possible solutions. The top-down, rigid, and hierarchically based administrative structure and management style, common to most settlement schemes in Africa, limits settler initiative and the utilization of their adaptive capacities based on greater

²⁹ For example, in Manantali, Koenig (1988a) observed tensions and overtly hostile behavior between settlers and staff, often manifested indirectly in forms such as settler housing adjustments or "private" settler meetings. In 1990 in Togo's FED settlement, I observed staff behavior and attitude toward settlers to be arrogant, condescending, and sometimes disdainful.

³⁰ On many settlements, senior staff are expatriates and prefer to live with their families in capital cities or, failing that, separate from the settlement scheme. Should a senior manager live on site, he is often isolated from the settlement, living removed in far more comfortable and Western-style surroundings.

information from the ground level operations. Likewise, it fosters settler dependency on scheme authority.

Agricultural package design. Increasing agricultural production through intensified and modernized systems are common goals of settlement schemes (Chambers and Moris 1973; Gaitskell 1959; Koenig 1988a; Roeder 1973; Scudder 1985a). This has required the introduction of a "total system" of packages within, and organization of marketing outside of the settlement. Settlements have been introducing improved cropping patterns (such as interplanting, rotation agriculture, cropping systems) in order to reach maximal production levels. The introduction of advanced technology, including mechanization, irrigation, and animal traction, is an integral part of this design (Chambers and Moris 1973; Gaitskell 1959; McMillan 1983, 1986b; McMillan et al. 1990a; Painter 1990; Roeder 1973). Monocultural cropping systems have overridden traditional and ecologically sound multi-cropping systems (Palmer 1974; Scudder 1985a).³¹ In combination with technology and mechanization, increased agricultural inputs (fertilizer, insecticides, and pesticides) have been introduced in settlement schemes through preprogrammed packages. The end result is an increased extraction of capital and human resources from government and outside donors (Goering 1978; Scudder 1985a).

In most cases, settlers are obliged to adopt and rigidly follow the package as a condition for membership on the scheme. The package is almost always compulsory

³¹ Agricultural packages are designed most often by Western-based, technically oriented agricultural scientists. Settlement staff are socialized by the development industry to believe that these techniques and practices are superior to indigenous ones.

(Roider 1973; Painter 1990). Should the settler deviate from the package, eviction is possible. If settlers should change guidelines to improve production by adapting packages to their own personal farming and environmental conditions, project management may be unforgiving. In effect "packages" create the possibility of significantly increased production, and provide the material basis for authoritarian management and organization.

It is important to recognize that there are both costs and benefits to people and the environment when implementing agricultural packages in settlement schemes. In many cases, intensified scheme-based agricultural production technology produces economic benefits and improves rural lifestyles of settler families (Chambers and Moris, 1973; Goering 1978; Hulme 1987; Painter 1990; Scudder and Colson 1982). Benefits from settlement programs are well documented (Goering 1978; Koenig 1988; McMillan et al. 1990a,b; Scudder 1985a).³²

Despite these advantages, settlers do not necessarily keep their part of the bargain made with the administration (Scudder 1985a). Studies show that rather than following the package and scheme regulations, settlers tend to "rationalize" the centralized production system for their personal needs. Settlers vacillate in their use and adherence to the official guidelines and structures on the scheme and conform when necessary or when they see benefits.³³ Settlers prefer to diversify rather than

³² These include increased settler production levels, increased use of tested agricultural inputs, animal traction, and mechanization, better access to credit, timely input delivery, organized cash crop purchases, and guaranteed stable prices ensured by marketing and transport systems within the settlement. There are more in terms of infrastructure, schools, water quality, and the like.

³³ For example, settlers "extensify" rather than intensify their fields (McMillan 1986b; Painter 1990); they do not implement or incorporate the strict agricultural guidelines demanded by settlement staff and

cultivate a single cash crop (Scudder 1985a). The planned agricultural package therefore is not strictly adhered to and, correlatively, projected production levels may not reach expected rates. More importantly, lack of compliance and lack of consistency with the package, along with demographic pressures from increased settler population, create land-use and environmental problems produced by settlement schemes' enhanced capacities for exploitation (McMillan et al. 1990b; Painter 1990; Scudder 1985a).³⁴

Environmental conditions of settlement sites and their surroundings have been reported by scholars as worsening due to both intentional and unintentional causes. A number of "project killers," such as decline in soil fertility, loss of ecological resilience, decline in species diversification, wastefulness of resource allocations, and destruction of natural resources, commonly pervade settlement schemes and destroy the delicate balance in formerly less exploited ecosystems (Hanson and Dickenson 1987; see also the excellent environmental overview of settlements in Latin America by Nelson 1973). In describing settlement schemes of the Shimba Hills in Kenya and in Niger, Palmer (1974) writes that monocultural production, emphasizing only one or very few crops, changes ecosystem stability and shocks the environment through exploitation and over-extraction of particular resources. He argues that settlement is a

extension agents, such as crop rotations (Painter 1990); they do not always apply the inputs as required, but prefer to save and economize on fertilizer (Gaitskell 1959); and they do not plant designated crops and trees as required by scheme management (McMillan 1986b; Painter 1990) and may even save seed for resale or for food (Cohen, personal communication, 1994).

³⁴ For example, Painter (1990) reports that many settlers in the FED settlement remarked that land "fatigue" was rapidly increasing, forcing them to enlarge farm size to maintain adequate levels of production. The use of animal traction and fertilizer presented a dangerous risk of rapid overuse of land resources leading to long-term infertility, degradation, and erosion.

form of "ecological imperialism" which destroys indigenous ecological systems (see also Hyden 1988).

Similarly, Messerschmidt (1987) opposes the commonly used "interventionist" approach to settlement production systems and considers it destructive and inappropriate to local conditions. In contrast, an "innovationist" approach, he argues, ensures environmental sustainability and development by being people-centered, while incorporating indigenous ethnoecology models using and adding ethnoecology and scientific technology. Combining traditional and advanced technologies in land-use management are slowly being accepted as essential to settlement scheme sustainability and development. The high costs in terms of environmental degradation, loss of indigenous technology systems, agricultural diversity, and off-farm economic enterprises, and even settler health are often quite severe and, in some cases, irreparable.

Recently, settlement planners are designing schemes with increasing interest toward insuring land protection (and a more rational use of land). Today it is widely accepted that agricultural growth and development must coincide with environmental sustainability (Brokensha and Castro 1984).³⁵ Scudder suggests that "devoluting" decision making power to settlers as much as possible by requiring a handing over of responsibility to local organizations on the settlement would ensure sustainability. Because management has assumed most of the responsibility and control over land use in settlements, however, settlers see it as irrelevant and have little interest or concern in environmental preservation (Roider 1973; Kibreab, personal communication, 1991).

³⁵ Current agricultural development programs now require environmental impact statements and plans for program monitoring.

Land tenure. If settlers do not view themselves as "owners" of the settlement, they will have little personal investment or concern with natural resource conservation or even in project survival, and adopt little responsibility for the settlement and its success. For many settlers, the scheme is a temporary opportunity to learn, practice, and profit from modern production techniques. Land tenure on settlements is characterized typically by a total lack of security of settler land ownership. Land acquisition on settlement schemes generally have been without any form of agreement, consent, or compensation to settlers or local inhabitants of the area by settlement authorities or national governments (Koenig 1988; McMillan et al. 1990b; Painter 1990; Scudder 1984, 1985a). The schemes are viewed as government programs, controlled by and primarily benefiting government interests (not dissimilar to colonial plantation schemes).

Without a stake in land, settlers feel impermanent and are less motivated to invest in land conservation practices, such as tree planting and crop rotations (Goering 1978; Scudder 1984; Van Raay and Hilhorst 1981). Without permanent ownership over land, settlers have limited interest in implementing sustainable land-use practices (Painter 1990).

Lands may be sparsely settled, or appear neglected, but they are seldom unclaimed by local farmers. In declaring project land as government property, some authorities demand local inhabitants to either join the schemes or relocate. In some cases, such as the Manantali scheme (Koenig 1988a), authorities resort to forced relocation of local inhabitants and offer little if no compensation for relocation. Many schemes prohibit off-scheme farmers from using scheme services, often resulting in

settler-autochthon disputes and conflict. (Morsink 1966; Scudder 1985a; Van Raay and Hilhorst 1981). In other, less negative cases (FED project), local farmers surrounding the scheme are allowed and even encouraged to participate and make use of scheme benefits. In this case, the spread of technology and improved lifestyle conditions into the surrounding area provides for a more open, less isolated environment, which, according to many scholars (Kiekens 1988; McMillan et al. 1990b; Painter 1990), accelerates scheme success and overall regional development.

Income diversification. Another often neglected element generating settlement success and regional development is the creation of opportunities for income diversification. Few possibilities for employment or income generating opportunities are incorporated into settlement planning. For example, on the Nigerian Ilora farm settlements, planners did not include the important role of Yoruba women as entrepreneurs and independent wage earners in the household (Spiro 1985). Nevertheless, women hired themselves out as wage labor, established petty trade networks, produced and sold beer, and were able to sell what little production they harvested themselves to maintain for their personal incomes. Grimm (1988) reports that in Manatali, temporary work made available to settlers caused an increase in local incomes, but they were impermanent. When the contract was completed, most jobs left little behind in terms of off-farm opportunities and diversified self-development employment options for local populations. Despite planners' lack of attention to off-farm activities, many settlers use traditional approaches and diversify household incomes by a combination of wage labor and small-scale activities, such as

local handicrafts and a wide range of trading activities, such as livestock (McMillan 1995; Scudder 1985a, 1985b).

It is myopic to imagine that participation in the scheme would somehow lead to the wholesale abandonment of customary income generating activity. Lack of opportunity and potential for deeply ingrained and customary income generation can ultimately lead to severe discontent and settler desertion (McMillan 1986b; Roeder 1973; Spiro 1985). Settlements which discourage or overtly prevent settlers from applying their ingenuity and initiative to diversify income strategies (through marketing, wage labor or other income-generating activities) break up and frustrate normal economic life.

Regional integration. Contrasts in amenities between settlements and the surrounding region are often dramatic. The settlement clearly represents a distinct zone of improved living conditions and regional development created by project investment and its maintenance. Created as isolated enclaves, self-sufficient and separate from regional institutions and activities, most settlements have not successfully integrated into their surroundings (Kiekens 1988; McMillan 1995; Scudder 1985a; Van Raay and Hilhorst 1981). Lack of scheme planning for collaboration and coordination with regional institutions and agencies has resulted in extremely high settlement costs in terms of time, resources, and management. Government services on settlements overlap rather than complement regional services, and commonly create settler-host population segregation and animosity.

Rather than linking existing local and regional market systems to settlement, planners too often create markets for projects and discourage the participation of

outsiders (Kiekens 1988).³⁶ Settlement management of market systems either discourages settlers from selling outside, or demands a share of the crop to pay for inputs. In many cases, prices are kept artificially low so that selling surreptitiously is profitable. In most settlements, harvests are either monitored or cashiered (up to 50 percent) by management to achieve a minimum level of sales aimed for national export (McMillan 1986b for an example of off-settlement sales). Local markets are created by planners and staff with little input from settlers. When schemes are less responsive and effective in providing for settler needs (subsistence crops and certain commodities), settlers nonetheless, have initiated their own networks and systems of exchange and bartering outside of scheme authority. In some cases, this has been the only form of settler survival during low-harvest seasons.

Isolation of settlement schemes results in limited growth and development for the scheme and region (Kiekens 1988; McMillan et al. 1990b; Morsink 1966; Scudder 1985a; Van Raay and Hilhorst 1981). These authors suggest that projects lacking incorporation into their region will be difficult to sustain. Furthermore, dependency on settlement authorities, combined with little encouragement from settlement staff for settler organization and initiative, results in fragile social and economic systems hardly sustainable.

Settler integration. According to Scudder and Colson's (1982) classic four-stage settler development framework, settlers initially tend to be risk-averse,

³⁶ Research shows that marketing is tied to roads, available trucks and drivers, and petrol (Kiekens 1988; McMillan et al 1990b; Painter 1990; McMillan 1986a). Often, roads and bridges reflect needs of management but not those of settlers (FED, Painter 1990, and personal observation; Cohen, personal communication, 1994).

responsive, and vulnerable in their new environments (Chambers and Moris 1973; Scudder and Colson 1982).³⁷ Settlers commonly take little initiative during the early stages of adjustment to settlement, and concentrate on conforming to project requirements and providing for their families (Scudder 1985b). Integration into local communities and networks of trade, politics, or culture is either secondary or, more often, non-existent.

Relocation is a transitional process that normally generates stress which abates over time. As a simple example, settlers undergo stress in adapting to new neighbors on the scheme, even to autochthones in the surrounding area with whom they may have minimal contact. Some settlements try to cope by relocating settlers with their own kin or at least ethnic groups (Grimm 1988; Koenig 1988b; McMillan et al. 1990b; Scudder 1984). More often than not, however, settlers are relocated indiscriminately increasing their stress. In effect, loss of cultural environment is associated with increased stress.

A predictable decline in health conditions also has been reported under some settlement situations, particularly among elderly people (with a higher vulnerability to stress) (Chaiken 1983; Garfield et al. 1989; Prothero 1965). The meeting of two previously separated populations creates increased vulnerability to eruptions of epidemic diseases. This is especially true for migrants compared to autochthones

³⁷ Scudder and Colson (1982) suggest that there are four general stages through which settlers can evolve to reach self-control and responsibility over their own lives in settlements. These are recruitment, transition, potential development, and handing over/incorporation. Should the scheme not get beyond recruitment, settlers remain less than independent with continued reliance on scheme management to provide the basis for a successful livelihood. Settlers unable to advance toward open-ended, risk-taking initiatives and activities lack or have decreased success, and are vulnerable to low morale and aberrant physical and psychological conditions.

(Linda Jackson, personal communication, 1991). Increases in disease can occur also when there is a simplification of otherwise diverse and complex ecosystems. Simplified ecosystems can facilitate the process of disease transmission through parasitic and infectious vectors such as schistosomiasis, malaria, or worms (Feierman 1985). As noted above, settlers are more susceptible. The social cost of production on settlement schemes, according to Feierman (1985), is therefore shifted from management to settlers (particularly the poorest and weakest) and not sufficiently checked by government services (also suggested by Palmer 1974).

Over time, settlers will either retain risk-averse, conservative attitudes or gain a sense of empowerment and control in their new environment. Predictably, most settlers search for opportunities to improve their economic and sociocultural conditions.³⁸ In some instances, observers have noted a powerful, open-ended, proactive attitude once settlers overcome the initial problems (Hansen, personal communication, 1992). A key determinant to settler integration and satisfaction is acceptance and integration with local autochthonous populations.

Settler-autochthonous relations. Autochthonous populations can be either hostile or benign. Planning and implementation are decisive factors in determining the direction of settler-autochthonous relations. Thus lack of integration of the settlement to the local area increase the gap already existing between settlers and autochthones. Planners who exclude autochthones regarding land use and ownership, agricultural production practices, and natural resources essentially override local land rights and tenure

³⁸ Despite the difficulties posed by relocation, successful adaptation means learning to constantly ask questions (Brokensha and Castro 1984; Colson, personal communication, 1991).

practices (McMillan et al. 1990b; Painter 1990; Scudder 1984, 1985a). Undefined or unclear land tenure and land-use rights commonly result in disputes and hostilities between settler and autochthones.³⁹

Conversely, when autochthones-settler relations are benign, settlers and autochthones view each other as allies rather than enemies. Compatibility thus facilitates settler adjustment. The settlement is less isolated from its region in this situation, and autochthones can benefit from the services and infrastructural support provided by the scheme. In this case, the region at large benefits from the settlement, and increased growth and development for a wide range of populations is possible (Scudder 1985a).

Evaluation and Monitoring

Settlement success clearly depends on iterative incorporation of outcomes, but what variables and measures indicate success remains unresolved. There is, as yet, no definitive answer to the question, "What makes for settlement success." Prior to 1980, there were very few longitudinal studies focusing on people and cultures undergoing settlement (Colson 1971 is an exception), but the perspective is changing.⁴⁰ Now, the longitudinal vantage point is recognized as needed to understand

³⁹ For example, sorcery attacks have been noted between settlers and autochthones in FED in disputes over uncertain land use and land rights (Painter 1990).

⁴⁰ Most evaluations are "one shot," short-term visits, rapidly conducted to collect data to either support or expose shortcomings of the goals and objectives of the scheme (Scudder 1985a).

the processes and development of settlements and in gaining thereby a more comprehensive knowledge of the ingredients of success. According to one of the foremost scholars of settlement, the most important criterion for improving settlement schemes is a longitudinal vantage point (Scudder, personal communication, 1991). Without this, he believes planners cannot understand the transitions and processes experienced over time by settlers, nor begin to determine what makes for "success" in government policies.⁴¹

Most settlement evaluations concentrate on agricultural (export) and infrastructural progress, under-emphasizing careful examination of the "social costs" of human and social adjustment (examples of social cost studies include: Feierman 1985 on health; Conti 1979 on women; Palmer 1974 on environment; Moris 1981; Scudder, personal communication, 1991). Instead of measures with a "human face," miles of roads laid, houses and buildings constructed, and tons of crops sold almost completely dominate settlement evaluation reports (Goering 1978). The human factor has typically not been considered key to settlement progress and success, and only recently has become a focus and concern in the development community (McMillan et al. 1990b; Scudder 1985a).

Meanwhile, settlement studies are still deficient in quantitative data, including demographic statistics (including migrations), land use information, population census, environmental conditions and changes (including tree loss and wood use), statistics on numbers and effects of pastoralists and cattle grazing, water use, and so on. There are

⁴¹ Longitudinal settlement studies such as McMillan's work on AVV (1983 to present) or Colson's on the Gwemba Tonga (1971 to present) are excellent examples.

few known current rates of settler entries and desertions on many schemes. These data are vital for determining land-use capacity and thus for recommendations concerning land-use practices and regulations (Painter 1990; Scudder 1985a,b).

If success is uniquely indicated by GNP rates and financial growth, and there is no evaluation of changing environmental conditions, degradation of natural resources is a promissory note that will come in time (Brokensha and Castro 1984; Hanson and Dickenson, 1987; Painter 1990; Scudder 1985a; Spears 1980). Similarly, if reasons for settler satisfaction and permanence versus defection are not carefully discerned and analyzed, evaluations of settlement will be hollow in terms of defining what makes success and sustainability of settlements.

Participatory Approach

Planning and evaluation of settlements requires a local-level, people-centered longitudinal approach that incorporates the settler as a vital and active participant in the decision making process. Without settler participation, the settlement will remain a top-down, donor-operated program, continuing dependency and limiting settler independence and self-development.

Local groups and associations (or those initiated by settlement management) must become active participants in the working and running of the settlement (Painter 1990; Scudder 1985a). Ultimately, as Scudder and Colson (1982) advise, settlements should be handed over to local settler communities and former associations for management and control of the scheme operations. There is a need for emphasis on local settler leadership and settler responsibility in the planning and implementation

stages of settlement from the start. Settlements will retain high costs in terms of environmental and social variables, and will remain dependent-oriented, short-lived programs catering Third World populations if a priority is not placed on local empowerment.

Settlement in Togo

What degree of directed or spontaneous settlement best ensures sustainable community development combined with stewardship and responsibility toward the natural resource base? This is a fundamental question that settlement scholars only recently are beginning to broach and to which this study will profoundly contribute. The nature and impact of Kabye migrations into planned and spontaneous settlements of southern Togo has been examined closely by scholars (notably Gu-Konu 1983, Lucien-Brun 1987, and Pillet-Schwartz 1987). However, little of this material explains or analyzes in specific what hinders or helps settlement sustainability and development. It fails to ask directly: what is the appropriate role of the state? With this in mind, I now turn to review historical and current reasons for the Kabye migration from the Kara Region in northern Togo and introduce the Mo plain and FED project (sites of spontaneous and planned settlements, respectively and the two foci of this research). Throughout the following chapters, the reader should refer to Figure 1-1 to identify locations of the FED project (A), the Mo plain (B), and the mountain region location of Kabye home villages (Kara).




Figure 1-1. Settlement sites in Togo. (Source: Painter (1990) Land Settlement Review: Country Case Study Togo.)

CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND TO SETTLERS AND SITES

The integration of localized, empirical research with theoretical generalized studies demands that researchers begin to accord some importance, not only to country-specific research, but also to research studies that explore grassroots-level understanding and perceptions of human problems and local strategies to problem-solving. Research should explore the impact of national policy changes on rural communities and, particularly, on various constituencies, such as women, age groups, and specific socioeconomic groups. While community or locality studies by themselves are insufficient to offer a comprehensive understanding of society, they nevertheless provide relevant data needed to ground our theoretical discussions of the everyday lived experiences of people. Such studies provide opportunities for willing researchers to hear what people at the grassroots level have to say and how they make meaning of their social world" (George J. Sefa Dei, "The Women of a Ghanaian Village: A Study of Social Change," 1994:141; emphasis mine).

This chapter provides background information integral and vital to understanding the following chapters on research findings and conclusion of this research. It is comprised of three sections: Part One consists of the geographic, historical, and demographic conditions of the Kabye ethnic group, the central actors of this study. I also review Kabye subsistence and sociopolitical systems practiced in their homeland. Background of indigenous Kabye lifestyle prior to resettlement

provides a framework in which to compare each settlement to indigenous lifestyle, and to one another. Also, in this section, I examine factors which have led to mass relocations of Kabye to southern Togo.

This discussion leads to a specific focus on Kabye spontaneous migrations to the Mo plain (the spontaneous settlement site and first of two foci of research) in Part Two. In this part, I introduce the Mo area by examining its geography and ethno-history, features particularly relevant to this study. In Part Three, I describe the FED project, the planned settlement scheme and second foci of research. First, I examine the project philosophy and intentions underlying the planning and implementation of the scheme. I briefly review project objectives, specifically regarding agricultural and sociopolitical development, and review the basic components of the settlement environment (including design, layout, and operations).

The Kabye

In this section, I describe Kabye biophysical and demographic conditions, features underlying Kabye migrations to southern Togo. Given these conditions, I then describe indigenous Kabye farming systems, specifically highlighting agricultural techniques enabling sustained productivity under challenging conditions. Inclusive in the discussion is a review of the history of Kabye migrations south and their sociopolitical outcomes. The vibrant continuation of migration, illustrated by the case of the Mo plain, is the focus of the section which follows.

Geographic Determinants of Kabye Existence

Topographical features. Spanning nearly the full length of northern Togo are the Atakorien mountains. They are punctuated by two major ranges of significant altitude and spread, the more northern range of Lama, with Mount Kalakpa looming at 779 m, and the southern range of Lama-Dissi, with Mount Assire at 679 m. The Kabye reside in the sudano-savanna region of Kara, of pronounced mountain elevation between 9.30 and 10°N (refer to Figure 1-1). The Atakorien series presents highly variable soil structures and qualities, from ferruginous to vertisol types. In the Kabye region, water retention is high, and the rain-flood runoffs from the mother rock which occur during the tropical storms of the rainy season, provide a sandy-clay, red-brown soil, rich in chemical nutrients. This soil is arable and has good retention of top-soil. In areas surrounding the peaks, on the plains, the soil is less arable and aerated, more susceptible to packing and hardening. On the plains, soils are often gravelly, or in some areas, sandy, shallow, nutrient-poor and generally of less quality. The degree of variability of soils is caused by the variable decomposition of rock materials largely dependent on and continuously effected by rainfall. The rich, clay soil types most preferred by local Kabye farmers are found in the mountains, generally in depression or fault areas (GOT/MPI 1987; Lucien-Brun 1987; Sauvaget 1981).

Soils. The contrast between mountainous soils and those of the plain can be seen in the variability of the natural vegetation. Despite the vast removal of primary forests, evidence leads historians and geographers to believe that the mountains were once occupied by dense forest, typical of sudano climate (Sauvaget 1981).

Standing secondary forests, legends and oral histories of "profondes forets," and accounts of the Lama ("people of the forest"), the alleged ancestors of the Kabye forest, suggest the importance of former tree cover spreading across the northern mountain range and its environs. Loss of this dense vegetation and forest cover is most likely due to degradation over time caused by climatic and human conditions, including bush fire and the use of intensive agricultural practices (Lucien-Brun 1987; Sauvaget 1981). In the Kabye area, Gu-Konu (1983) has remarked that a clear correlation exists between tree growth and population density. Today, the increased population in the region has largely stripped it of its arboreal life. This in turn limits the diversity of tree and plant species.¹

Rain. Rainfall measures in the Kabye mountain region average 1400 mm, higher than surrounding areas, in part due to the mountain chain that effects cloud movement and precipitation levels. The region has one rainy season annually, beginning around April lasting until November, and peaking around July. Fifty-three percent of rainfall occurs between July-August (Gu-Konu 1983). Annual temperature ranges range from 20 to 32°C.

Kabye Farming Systems

Farming practices. The geographic and climatic conditions of the Kabye region have largely determined their farming systems practices. Mountainous terrain

¹ Common species currently found in the region are mostly located near the major rivers, particularly the Kara, and on the plains and, less so, in the mountains. These species include the nere, (*Parkia biglobosa*) baobab (*Adansonia digitata*), ronier (*Borassus flabellifer*), and the oil palm (*Elaeis guineensis*).

and dense population limit preferred arable land available for cultivation. Only 11.6 percent of the total area of the region farmed by Kabye is considered apt for cultivation, of which 80 percent is entirely cultivated (population density is estimated at a minimum of 100 p/km² (GOT/MPI 1987:81). Data collected in 1971 by Sauvaget (1981) in the area of Boua shows the average total farm exploitation measured at 3.3 ha, and total land farmed by an average household at any one time, 2 ha. In separate and later studies, data from the Ministry of Rural Development (MDR/Nouvelle Strategie 1985) reports the average total exploitation surface area in the Kara prefecture at 1.40 ha per household, and from the Ministry of Plan (GOT/MPI 1987), in the Koza Prefecture at 0.71 ha per household. Studies by Akibode (1987, 1989) echo this smaller statistic (under 1 ha). Despite limited surface area available for cultivation, the Kabye are renowned throughout Africa for having developed sophisticated, labor-intensive, "rational" methods of soil conservation, including anti-erosion measures, soil regeneration, and soil improvement, which are also high-yielding.

Production potential. For decades, overall potential for agricultural production in the Kabye region has been reputedly poor and unfavorable. Primary constraints to increased production are purportedly due to poor soil texture, rocky and hard-packed soil surfaces, nutrient-deficient soils, and steep terrain. High population density exacerbates the nutrient deficiency and soil degradation. Nonetheless, specific areas do hold high agricultural potential; adequate environmental conditions combined with the extremely productive farming systems practices and management strategies applied

by Kabye farmers allows for sufficient, and even surplus, production of food crops to feed the population.

Despite its poor agricultural reputation, Gu-Konu (1983:892) believes that this region may be the most carefully cultivated and exploited land in the entire sudano zone. Appropriate farming techniques allow for its unusually high density settlement patterns among farmers (Enjalbert 1956). The claim that poor physical environmental features necessitate the removal and resettlement of Kabye farmers does not seem scientifically justified, Gu-Konu (1983) asserts, and may reflect, political or personal objectives, rather than actual local agricultural production.

A number of impressive land management techniques are employed by the Kabye to produce crops and maintain soil fertility. The Kabye possess a great capacity for agricultural adaptiveness and know-how. As described by Froelich (1949) in Gu-Konu (1983), Kabye mastered impressive soil and water management systems under difficult environmental conditions. For example, to prevent water and soil runoff on steep slopes (up to nearly 40 percent grade), rocks are removed and carefully placed to the side, either haphazardly or as channels to direct torrential water flow. Contour terracing of rock walls of up to 10 meters wide have been constructed for erosion control (Sauvaget 1981). Carefully designed micro-catchment systems comprised of rock placements at small intervals are built to retain water and topsoil (personal observation, 1992). In the most extreme cases, seeds are dropped between carefully placed rocks to ensure individual plant growth on steep slopes. In many cases, rain

torrents are channeled around planted fields by small soil-built edifices, reinforced with vegetation, trees, rocks, and other natural products.

Given the limited availability of land, soil fertility improvement is of critical concern for Kabye farmers. Multiple methods of soil fertilization are practiced by the Kabye, including application of manure, cinders, stubble, vegetable debris (compost), and the practice of fallow. Other examples of soil management include: spreading manure from animal husbandry over fields in proximity to the household (women are known to carry manure also long distances of over 2 km from the household); burning dry weeds, stalks (those not used for household fuel), and vegetation in the fields and with the cinders incorporating them into the soil by the hoe; leaving green manure (such as groundnut leaves and other stems) on the soil surface to rot then burying them as organic fertilizer; designating particular fields of cereal monocropping for nutritive-rich human excrement (albeit considered impure); building compost pits with rock bottoms near the house where organic waste and animal manure are collected throughout the year then annually spread over particular parcels at the start of the rainy season. In general, there are few chemical inputs, such as fertilizer or insecticide, used in the traditional Kabye farming system (Akibode 1989; Sauvaget 1981).

Kabye continuously fine-tune their agricultural production systems to gain greatest production levels, maximum food security through diversity, and minimum soil depletion and degradation. They carefully plan and observe crop rotations and fallow periods are integral components of the farming system. Alternations of fallow-

cultivation are practiced, particularly on the most distant fields, known as tare, to allow for soil rejuvenation. Rotations generally start with yams, followed by sorghum associated with other cereals such as groundnuts or manioc, then groundnut again, and fallow until yam production reoccurs.

Selection of field placements depends on multiple factors, including the variation of soils, abundance of rocks, slope, and distance from the household (Akibode 1987). The traditional Kabye field layout for crop production is organized by a tri-partite system. First, land cultivated close to the house, called desida, are fields continuously under cultivation, usually seeded first in the season, and planted most often with sorghum, maize, and millet. Rare fallow practiced on these fields is compensated by the application of ample organic matter. Second, the fields furthest from the house, the tare, are usually planted with yams, followed by sorghum and groundnut. This area undergoes ample fallow, more than other fields, and is the least meticulously managed. These fields are most often lent out to other farmers. Third, and perhaps most important to household survival, is the densely planted household kitchen garden. This garden area, tended predominantly by women, is planted with nutritive crops such as calabashes, condiments, and fruits and vegetables (tomatoes, green leafy vegetables, taro, sorghum, maize, and tobacco) and is located closest to the household for easy access for women (Akibode 1987). The other two fields are managed and cultivated primarily by men, although seeding, weeding, thinning, and harvesting are the responsibilities of women.

Labor patterns. Despite efforts to minimize labor demands, Kabye farmers exert enormous energy and time in preparing and maintaining fields for cultivation. Slash and burn clearing for planting is performed by all household members. Women and girls are responsible for burning trees and clearing vegetative debris. This is followed by the preparation of yam mounds, uniquely men's work because of its outstanding labor intensity. Field preparation is mostly performed by men while planting seeds of cereals is performed by women and children. Traditional field preparation consists of breaking the yam mounds and, either with or without forming lines, placing seeds in pockets, then covering them. Women will weed the fields once or twice during the growing season, for weed removal and soil aeration. If a following season is planted, for example of cereals in association with groundnuts or rice, lines may be drawn by women for planting of the seeds. As in many cropping systems of Third World conditions, many crop management practices are performed intermittently throughout the growing season. These include soil aeration, soil elevation around the foot of cereal plants, placement of stakes for the yam plants, weeding, thinning, and insect and wild animal and bird deterrence. These labor-intensive and highly time-consuming tasks are performed predominantly by women and children.

To release the pressure of peak labor bottleneck periods, Kabye farmers form work associations for mutual assistance. There are two primary types of groups. One work group, the hada, is a rotating work group most often formed among members of the same family, nearby households, or other social ties. Hada may be requested for

specific work in the fields (such as clearing or planting), construction (such as storage granaries or a house), or any other specific task needing a large effort of many helping hands. Men and women participate in hada, depending on the work accomplished. A prestation in the form of gift or offering of gratitude for the day's work is usually presented in local beer and a modest offering of food (Mauss 1967). Hada is an indigenous social security plan allowing farmers the opportunity to request assistance from other community members without any specific reciprocal obligation other than the day's nourishment. The hada system not only solves constraints of labor scarcity, but also encourages solidarity in the community by ensuring a type of welfare for its members.

The second work association, egbare, is a system of inter-aid among a smaller and defined group of farmers, usually around six persons, who rotate to each other's fields during high labor periods to accomplish needed tasks. Generally, men and women have separate egbare groups. During times of heavy work loads where time is limited, women (having extreme time constraints due to multiple tasks in the household) and, less frequently, men will send a representative household member (usually a young woman) to fulfill the egbare obligation. The concept of egbare is thus a household, rather than individual, investment, where all members participate.

During the low- or off-season months, "saison morte," between November and April, deferred tasks are accomplished, such as tool making, household construction and refurbishment. Ceremonial rites are conducted and large numbers of young

farmers, nearly all men, immigrate south or to neighboring countries to work (usually for cash) as temporary laborers on plantations of coffee, cocoa, and cotton.

Production. Principal subsistence crops in the Kabye farming system are yam and sorghum; secondary crops include groundnut, maize, bean, the local bean, "vondzou," and millet, among others. Sauvaget (1981) found in his study of the Kabye village Boua, that outside of the 40 percent of the total family fields in fallow, the remaining total surface was planted: 42 percent in cereals; 31 percent in yams; 25 percent in cereals with groundnut; and 2 percent in groundnut and other secondary crops. Except for sorghum (and, in lesser quantity, rice and some groundnut), monocropping is less practiced (about 25 percent total surface area planted) than associations, of which bean is the most versatile crop in association, followed by groundnut (Sauvaget 1981). There is a large diversity of associations practiced by the Kabye; most common are sorghum and groundnut or bean, and yam, sorghum, maize, and bean intercropping. Yams and cereals are often intercropped to maximize the surface cover, timing, and varying depths of soil penetrated by plant roots. Kabye are well aware of the advantages of intercropping to best utilize soil horizons, improve soil quality, and, most important, to produce a diversity of crops for subsistence security and nutritional value. Intercropping and field rotations are scrupulously practiced by the Kabye for maximum nutrient and soil surface benefits, as well as conservation and refertilization of the soil.

Crop yields in the traditional Kabye household farming system have been measured as early as 1947 by Froelich. According to national statistics (GOT/MPI

1987:92), in 1983, average maize production yield was reported to be 500 k/ha, sorghum-millet is reported at approximately 1 ton per hectare (t/ha), yam at 9 t/ha, manioc at 10 t/ha, beans at 10 t/h, groundnuts at 1 t/ha, rice at 500 k/ha, and vondzou at 700 k/ha. Kpowbie's study (1982) of traditional mountain Kabye household production levels are much lower estimates than the Kara regional levels of production. According to his findings, in 1980, of an average Kabye household landholding (at less than 1 ha per family), annual average farm production levels of primary crops include: yams-340 kg, millet-247kg, sorghum-225kg, cassava-225kg, groundnuts-90kg, and maize-84kg. These results seem much more accurate than government estimates, which report production ranges over an entire decade, present monocrop rather than traditional associated-crop systems, and fail to explain data collection methods.

Traditionally, storage of harvests is minimized by keeping some of the crop in the fields, either retained in the soil (such as yams) or harvested and protected on the farm by a straw enclosure until required. Nonetheless, the largest quantity of the harvest is carried by women to the household, dried by the sun, and placed in protective storage (granaries) at the household. Studies (GOT/MPI 1987; Sauvaget 1981) report that all crops are primarily produced for subsistence, while some of these, specifically the groundnut and, to a lesser extent, yam, are also sold in the market. Ninety-seven percent of crops produced are for subsistence, primarily cereals (79 percent) and tubercles (18 percent). The second most common use of the harvest production after household consumption is not for sale, however, but rather for gifts,

(particularly sorghum, yam, groundnut, and beans) most often offered during work groups of *hara* or *egbare*. The only crop considered a market or cash crop would be groundnut, and to a lesser degree, cotton as well (Sauvaget 1981).

The importance of Kabye subsistence agriculture can be traced back to origins of early settlement patterns and historical influences, subjects to which I now turn.

History of Kabye Land Scarcity

In addition to bio-physical topographical influences, historical events also explain the "reduit Kabye," which according to the French historian Froelich (1949) created extremely dense population patterns in the Kabye mountains and surrounding villages. High population density, not a recent phenomenon in the Kabye area, dates back to seventeenth-century combat over claims for territory and control. The Lama (believed to have originated in the sky in God's creation) are regarded as the paleonigritique ancestors of the Kabye. Invasions of Lama were launched by Voltaique populations from the north, including Mossi, Gourma, Bi Tyambi, Dagomba, Bariba, and others. Joined by the Logba, a Benin group fleeing the Bariba, the Lama sought refuge in the protected heights of the Binah mountains and remained protected, hovering above other groups fighting and vying for territorial control below (Lucien-Brun 1987). This retreat led to dense settlement, but in patterns of dispersed and interdependent homesteads, what Piot (1992) refers to as a "fragile whole" (Lucien-Brun 1987).

Lower plains of the region, settled both by Kabye and other related groups, most importantly, the Lamba (originating from northern mountain areas) and the Voltaïque Naoudeba are less populated (Lucien-Brun 1987; Piot 1992; Sauvaget 1981).² The Naoudeba, related to the Losso group, occupy the prefecture of Doufelgou, including the early settlement town and burgeoning market center of Niamtougou. Less rich in nutrients and of lower quality texture than the mountain soils, the ferruginous tropical soil of Niamtougou is nonetheless of good quality for production (given there is adequate fallow and organic, or chemical, fertilization). This area is identifiable by its cover of oil palm trees. The Lamba group, in contrast, have spread west and northeast, occupying the plain bordering the Kara river (site of the FED project), and more northern mountainous zones of the Defale area.³

Ethnicity. Historical alliances and current similarities between the Kabye, Lamba, and Losso have led scholars to study these groups, particularly concerning migration, as a single population (Akibode 1987; Cornevin 1969; Lucien-Brun 1987; Pauvert 1956; Pillet-Schwartz 1980, 1986a, 1986b, 1987).⁴ Relatively similar and comparable in demographic patterns (notably land scarcity), agricultural systems, historical origins (which Pillet-Schwartz [1986:320] identifies as "l'étiquette de paléonigritiques"), and current migration practices, the Kabye-Losso distinction is not

² Pillet-Schwartz (1980:2) writes that the Losso, originally Voltaïque, have assimilated to paleonigritique due to their habitation amidst Kabye and Lamba.

³ Soil variability exists among quite arable alluvial and hydromorphic soils along the river beds and less preferred, low cultivatable, nutrient-deficient soils of sometimes hardpan, granulated quality.

⁴ According to Lucien-Brun's (1987) historical research, largely based on work by Froelich et al. (1963) and Froelich (1968), Kabye encompasses Losso ethnicity.

always clear (Pillet-Schwartz 1980, 1986b). Losso origins are believed to encompass the Naoudum, Lama, and Lamba groups, who share very common traits (including language and origin) with the Kabye. For purposes of this research study, I intend to adopt the conventional approach to Togolese migrations used by scholars. I shall therefore refer to the Kabye-Losso groups as a single ethnic unit. Therefore, from hereon, I use Kabye to denote the Kabye-Losso-Lamba populations, except where further specificity is required.

Traditional Kabye Land Tenure System. Land tenure among the Kabye reflects their belief in possessing inalienable rights to the land on which they live and farm (Lucien-Brun 1987). They cannot "sell" their land in secular terms, they believe, because it belongs to their ancestors who are its eternal protectors. Ceremonies over land are to reinforce and imprint upon society, particularly the young, the importance and respect for ancestral homage. Land tenure is consequently based on a system of rights of usufruct. Accordingly, "faire valoir" ("to give value to") earns a Kabye a right to land. These practices are common throughout rural regions of Africa.

Rights of land-use among Kabye follow patrilineal lines in a virilocal residence system (Piot 1991). The teto, a given land area (including fields and households), is thus claimed by a large clan group descending from the same ancestor (but still is considered a use right rather than ownership). The "keeper" of the family teto is generally the authority-holding elder or "père de famille" whose responsibility it is to allocate and administer the teto among family members. Kabye tradition ascribes the youngest male in the family to remain on the teto to assume lineal responsibility

(other sons and daughters are permitted to leave). Lending and borrowing of land is commonly practiced among Kabye and, less frequently, with farmers of other ethnic groups. Farmers will use (and in turn lend) fields of others' *teto* for a variety of reasons, such as illnesses, particular soil qualities, distance, and location of fields. The types of agreements between farmers can vary (payments, durations, and specific rules regarding such things as trees and harvests) and are negotiated (Akibode 1987).

In 1974, a change in the traditional Kabye tenure system occurred due to the national agro-tenure reform, ordinance no.12. This ordonnance stipulated that unless land is actually farmed, that is, in use (and not in fallow or reserve), the land will not be "of" the acclaimed "owner." This meant that Togolese farmers were forced to actually cultivate all land they believed was theirs, and that if the land was not used within the allotted time period, they risked losing their land to the government. This ordinance redefined the meaning of ownership for Togolese farmers nationwide. It overrode and undermined particular, indigenous systems and practices of land tenure by establishing one official, over-arching, national law.

This law allowed the government to legally assume control over land allocated for numerous government schemes such as the FED settlement. Many Togolese have opposed the law, accusing the government of using it to gain access, often unjustly, to more and preferred land throughout the country for political and personal ends. As we shall see below, national legal control does not trump or resolve local land disputes. Indeed, rather than clarify these issues, it has exacerbated them. One primary reason

causing the land ordinance legislation was government's increasing insecurity over land access brought on by population growth.

Demography

Typical of developing nations, Togo is undergoing a high population growth rate, estimated at 3.4 percent annually in 1989 (compared to 2.9 percent in 1981, 2.6 percent in 1970, and 2.1 percent in 1960) (INRS 1991).⁵ Population growth is not equally distributed nationally however. Large inter- and intra-regional discrepancies in population increase and density exist among the five regions in Togo, in particular between the Central and Kara regions, and within the region of Kara (see Table 2-1). Where no less than 95 percent of the Kabye population are farmers (compared to the national average of 80 percent) these statistics of high density raise serious concern regarding sufficient land availability for Kabye farmers in their homeland (GOT/MPI 1987). One result of the severity of land scarcity in the agricultural zones of the region is emigration.

Emigration. Analysis of national and regional demographic statistics give evidence to high emigration in the Kara region (tables 2-1 and 2-2). Typical of Third World nations, the Togolese population is young. However, composition of age by sex in the Kara region compared to the national figures illustrates the importance of emigration of young male Kabye farmers. National demographic structure by age and sex reports that 50 percent of the population is under 15 years of age, and 43 percent

⁵ Total population of Togo in 1990 is estimated at 3,500,000 (INRS 1991).

Table 2-1. Population increase and density.

| | 1960-1970 growth rate (%) | 1970-1980 growth rate (%) | 1970-1980 rate of change in increase (%) | 1981 density (p/km ²) | 1990 est. density (p/km ²) |
|----------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|--|---|--|
| Central Region | -- | 5.6 ^z | 57.0 | 21.0 | 25.0 |
| Sotouboua prefecture | -- | 7.4 | -- | 18.0 | 22.0 |
| Fazao canton | -- | 10.3 | -- | 3.0 | -- |
| Mo plain | -- | 13.2 | -- | 10.7 ^y | -- |
| Kara Region | 2.2 | 1.4 | 17.8 | 37.0 ^x | 45.0 ^w |
| Binah prefecture | 1.5 | 1.0 | -- | 108.0 | 127.0 |
| Kozah prefecture | 0.9 | 1.9 ^y | -- | 72.0 | 139.0 |
| Doufelgou prefecture | 1.8 | 1.0 | -- | 53.0 | 57.0 |
| Keran prefecture | 2.7 | 0.5 | -- | 41.0 | 33.0 |
| national | 2.3 | 2.8 | 39.4 | 48.0 | 62.0 |

Sources: Barbier, 1984; GOT/MPI, 1986; GOT/MPI, 1987; INRS, 1991.

^z Rural region only

^y Estimated (normally Mo is less than Fazao)

^x Estimated at 400 p/km² in specific villages by Sauvaget (1981)

^w Estimated at 60 p/km² by Gu-Konu (1983)

^v Increase due to rapid urbanization of the town of Lama Kara (12% growth)

between 15 and 54 years (INRS 1991). The Kara region parallels the national age composition structure: 44 percent of the regional population is less than 15 years of age, and 42 percent between 15 and 54 years (Gu-Konu 1980; GOT/MPI 1987). In 1981, the national census (INRS 1991) reported on average 95 females for every 100 males. During the same period, in the Kara region, 92 males were counted for every 100 females, in contrast to, for example, the Central region, with 101 males to every 100 females, the Plateaux with 98 males, the Savanna with 97, and the Maritime with

Table 2-2. Migration patterns.

| | 1959-1960 | 1970 | 1981 |
|--|-----------|------|-------------------|
| Total percent of population emigrating from Kara region | 48 | 58 | 66.0 |
| Total percent of Kara emigrants immigrating to Central region | 9 | 13 | 40.0 |
| Percent immigrants of total population in Central region | -- | -- | 53.5 ^z |
| Percent immigrants of total population in Sotouboua prefecture | -- | -- | 42.0 ^y |
| Percent immigrants of total population in Kara region | -- | -- | 8.0 |

Sources: GOT/MPI (1986); GOT/MPI (1987); INRS (1991); Lucien-Brun (1987)

^z Estimated at 60 p/km² in 1985

^y 17.3% estimated to be Kabye

92 males for every 100 females.⁶ In Kara, of the active economic population (between ages 20 and 60), there are 5.5 percent fewer males than females. Yet in the cohort age of school attenders (5-14 years), there are 2 percent more males than females. In reverse, there is high male to female population rate reported in the Central region.

One obvious interpretation of the decline in the male population of economic active persons in Kara occurring simultaneously with an increase in the male

⁶ The Kara and Maritime regions have the smallest male populations, in Kara due to emigration, and the Maritime, likely due to the dominant role of women in market activity and commerce in Lomé.

population of the Central region is migration. High emigration of young male Kabye farmers during their active years of labor from their own land-scarce environment to other more land-abundant regions is a survival strategy which many adopt (motivated by diverse causes: Piot 1988).

Demographic importance of migrations. Data reveals that a loss of farmers from the north due to emigration grew rapidly in the early decades after Togolese Independence (Table 2-2). The first systematic census taken in 1960 reported that in 1959-60, 62.4 percent of all Togolese immigrants were from the Kara region. 67.6 percent of Kabye immigrants migrated to rural areas in Togo, of which 25 percent were registered in the Central region alone, most importantly in the Sotouboua circumscription (location of the Mo plain), while 12 percent (of the total) moved into the "zone de glissement" or stepping stone to the south in and around Bassar (Lucien-Brun 1987:32). The 1959-60 census also reports that 18 percent of the total Togolese population were migrants into Ghana, which Gu-Konu writes continued to grow in the following decades (Gu-Konu 1983).

Attention toward immigrating into the Central region occurred during the 1970s and 1980s, when the world market coffee and cocoa prices fell dramatically, forcing a freeze on hired plantation labor in the Plateaux region. With much unoccupied land, fertile soils, and extended social networks that enhanced prospects for resettlement through chain migration, northern migrants transferred their focus from the Plateaux to the Central region as a primary target for resettlement (see Table 2-2). Clearly, through time, a boom in population growth occurred in the Central

region, simultaneously with a steady population decline in rural areas of the Kara region (Figure 2-1). In 1981, government reports estimate approximately 66 percent of native Kara residents (about 350,000 persons, predominantly Kabye) were living outside the region (GOT/MPI 1987:18, and as shown in Table 2-2).

Other regions of Togo also experienced significant drops in population, notably in the Kara prefectures of Doufelgou (Loso) and Keran (Tchokossi) in 1981 (see Table 2-1). Population declines in these zones are caused by forced resettlements of farmers due to the construction in Doufelgou of the national airport of Niamtougou and to delimitations of the national park near Mango (in the Keran)(GOT/MPI 1987:43). Although some farmers independently emigrated to other parts of Togo (including Mo), the majority of those evicted were resettled by the government (most in the FED scheme). Forced resettlement is not a new concept in Togo, but rather an integral feature of national development programs since colonization.

Forced Resettlement under Colonialism

During colonialism (from the 1880s until Independence in 1960), according to modernizationist scholars, the engine of growth in Western industrial countries was based on penetration and exploitation of African colonies to amass natural and human resources, specifically land, labor, and minerals (see Black 1991 on these theories). During German colonization of Togo, an extremely efficient and productive structure of authority and administrative intervention was formed to build the infrastructural support needed to create and control a productive and profitable colony.




Figure 2-1. Comparison of population growth over time. (Sources: Barbier 1984, GOT/MPI 1987, INRS 1991, Pozarny 1992.)

Infrastructural development, including transportation, communication, and urbanization were extensively developed during the German and subsequent French periods of colonization.

During the German occupation in Togo (until 1914), German officials promoted an organized "transplantation" of Kabye to southern and central regions in order to assemble sufficient laborers for building public works, such as roads, railways, communication lines, and urban centers, and to cultivate export cash crops such as cotton and groundnut (Lucien-Brun 1987; Painter 1990; Pillet-Schwartz 1980, 1987).⁷ Kabye were the preferred choice of labor: first, it appeared they were more "available" to relocate due to their high density population which constrained agricultural development and, second, they carried a reputation of high propensity for hard and dedicated work. Organized relocation and settlement for labor, "corvée," was initiated during this period.

After colonial redistribution following World War I, France gained control over Togo. Between 1924 and 1956, the French designed a "masterpiece program" for the general development of Togo (Lucien-Brun 1987; Pillet-Schwartz 1986b). Resettlement, or "mises en valeur," played a key role in this plan by attracting northern populations to the Central and Plateaux regions to work and farm (Ahoomey-Zunu 1971; Cornevin 1969). Kabye relocation under corvée continued with even more alacrity than before. The potential for development by relocation was predicted high

⁷ Common to most West African countries with sea coasts, coastal regions of Togo developed much faster than inland zones.

and a sure success by the French administration of Governor Bonnacarrere in the mid-1920s (they justified this by pointing out that some temporary voluntary migration already occurred as Kabye migrated south as seasonal wage labor on plantations). During this period, the French administration developed a total of seventy-one villages with 6,000 relocated families (Lucien-Brun 1987; Pillet-Schwartz 1980).

Until 1920, the plains area of the Central and Plateaux regions of Togo were sparsely inhabited (density estimated at fewer than 0.5 percent by Sauvaget 1981). Vulnerability to attack from the strong states of the Kotokoli or Abomey ethnic groups left the Central plains largely uninhabited, except for the elevated plateau areas. Nascent development of these regions as settlements occurred under the French for multiple reasons. First, settlements served as compensation to Kabye farmers forced to relocate under "corvée." Also, the French hoped to curb high levels of Togolese emigration to neighboring colonies (namely Ghana) by offering highly lucrative opportunities on cocoa and coffee plantation settlements. At the same time, colonialists viewed settlements as a means to improving tax collection. These sites were also developed for agricultural research.

The French favored planned resettlement over spontaneous, unorganized migration. Controlled or forced settlement was an orderly means of population management and control. For example, all settlers were medically examined by French officials to prevent the spread of disease. Cornevin (1969) quotes a French doctor-in-charge during Kabye examination circa 1937:

L'emigration spontanée par contre ne comprend que les Kabré quittant leurs pays d'origine sans aucune autorisation et malgré la volonté de

leur chef. Elle est aussi la plus dangereuse au point de vue de la dissémination de la maladie car elle est incontrôlable et nous ne connaissons pas encore le moyen de l'empêcher. [Later he writes,] [Elle] s'expatrier enfin dans un sentiment de liberté individuelle qu'il nous paraît difficile de contrarier (Médecin commandant de Marqueissac in Cornevin 1969:295).

In addition to health concerns, colonial authorities used controlled settlement to monitor unlawful individuals. Pillet-Schwartz (1980:3) notes that three settlements were created in the Central region as national penitentiaries for recalcitrants.

The French campaign to "mettre en valeur" southern regions of Togo was implemented enthusiastically between 1930 and Independence. In 1956, the first integrated development project, the Est-Mono, was created by the French FIDES. The aims of this settlement were, first, to attain sustainable farm management, and, second, to initiate intensified cotton production. In both cases (as well as others in the Central region), efforts failed. Farmer resistance is the primary reason for discontinuation:

Ces exemples peuvent donner à penser que toute opération conçue par l'administration et imposée par elle à une population récemment immigrante ne peut-être que vouée à l'échec. Une opération de colonisation de terres neuves devrait être en somme dynamisée uniquement de l'intérieur (par les intéressés eux-mêmes) pour avoir une chance de réussir (Pillet-Schwartz 1980:9).

Contrary to French expectation, most Kabye farmers were reticent and unwilling to resettle in schemes. According to Lucien-Brun (1987), Kabye did not want to live according to the restrictions imposed by the colonial administration, but preferred the freedom of autonomous immigration, self-initiated from their own interests and motives. Autonomous migration allowed farmers the flexibility to

experiment with fewer obstacles. Despite large movements south, detachment from one's native land of ancestry was never an insignificant decision, and many Kabye preferred to move cautiously by choice rather than force. Exaggerated stories of hardship and mistreatment also increased reticence toward relocation imposed by the colonial administration.

"Forced" methods of recruitment into colonial schemes were resented and feared by local farmers (persisting as legacies in future organized settlement schemes). Lucien-Brun (1987) poignantly depicts the apprehension they felt at the prospect of being selected by canton chiefs, themselves under strict orders, forced to supply a certain number of young men to the colonial administration for relocation.⁸ Attached to family and land, ignorant of their future destination, many selected farmers did what they could to avoid "the draft" by either replacing themselves, leaving their village for temporary labor elsewhere, or escaping to Ghana, further undermining the settlement scheme. The brutality of the process is still remembered by many as a dark period in the colonial occupation of Togo.

Au pays Cabrais-Iosso, la déportation et l'émigration forcée ont été pratiquées depuis de nombreuses années et cette méthode tend actuellement à nous aliéner sérieusement la sympathie de nos populations et à nuire gravement à nos propres intérêts, car elle pousse nos gens à haïr l'Administration française et à s'évader en Gold Coast. Notre population est foncièrement hostile à toute déportation et condamne absolument la méthode actuellement employée pour désigner les partants (Préfet Apostolique de Sokodé, 10 avril, 1944, in Lucien-Brun 1987:111).

⁸ The decisive role of canton chiefs in settler selection during colonial resettlement was assimilated by FED. Surely, recalling years of the *corvée* legacy, Kabye were skeptical and fearful of this recruitment style in FED.

The fetters of forced settlement gradually loosened and developed into more benign, less forced, voluntary systems of relocation by the colonial administration. Relocation strategies transformed into "facilitating" farmer transition and adjustment. Settlers were offered advantages upon arrival, such as tools, seeds, and even money.

By 1950, more consent and even voluntary relocation was occurring. This stimulated and increased ongoing autonomous resettlement. Early resettlements of the "plus ou moins coercitive" period, although considered failures in their operational agricultural goals, have succeeded in retaining settlers in the areas over time (Pillet-Schwartz 1980:3). Projects have failed, but settler autonomy in deciding to stay has been an outcome of early settlement, and an indication of settler independence.

Causes of Spontaneous Migration

As early as 1915, small spontaneous migrations of northern farmers to the southern regions were occurring in Togo. The colonial administration did not in fact create the roots nor routes of relocation, but rather "piggy-backed" spontaneous migrations already in progress.⁹ Between 1950-60, spontaneous migration boomed and continues to exist today writes one scholar (Fofana 1978). Spontaneous migration is reported to have nearly doubled every decade between 1932 and 1960 (Lucien-Brun 1987). In 1932, spontaneous migration accounted for 12 percent of the total migrant population from the north, in 1946, 21 percent, and in 1960, 50 percent of total

⁹ Cornevin (1969) reports that the first spontaneous settler was a liberated Losso prisoner, a man of unusually strong character and leadership ability, who after his release in 1914 remained in the south to establish the first spontaneous settlement.

immigrants from the north in the Central and Plateaux regions were spontaneous settlers. By 1950, high rates of spontaneous migrations were occurring by self-led voyages of individualism, writes Gu-Konu (1987). Spontaneous migrations waxed, as forced settlement waned, and to this day, continues to penetrate "open" or free land in the Central and Plateaux regions in large numbers.

What has triggered this vast "undirected" movement of populations? First, many men descended south as temporary hired laborers, either to earn the cash needed to pay the tax fees initiated by the French administration, to altogether evade fees owed, or to escape overall colonial tutelage (Lucien-Brun 1987; Pillet-Schwartz 1986b).

Cultural inducements. A number of cultural practices encouraged Kabye spontaneous emigration as well (Piot 1988). Emigration served as an escape hatch for young male farmers to avoid burdensome familial obligations and responsibilities mandated by Kabye tradition (primarily labor or marital obligations).¹⁰ Lack of a formal, organized Kabye chiefdomship places significant leadership and control at the household level. Sons are shackled under their fathers' authority for many years. Their independence occurs only with the aging or even death of the "père de famille" (Piot 1988). Fofana (1978:46) and Piot (1988) explain that escape from this family control has induced emigration among young men. Kabye marriage rites and customs

¹⁰ The Kabye practice a strong, authoritative patriarchal lineal system where elders, or fathers of the family unit, hold power and control by applying austere and harsh measures (Sauvaget 1981). For example, during the period of slave trade, uncles often sold their nephews to other tribes for trade goods. In fear of this possibility, youth would venture south leaving no word of their destination or possible return. Eventually, the loss of men and their labor contribution served to soften this behavior by male elders and loosened the hegemony of their rule.

also induce emigration. Traditionally after marriage, the wife does not live with the husband until she becomes pregnant. To avoid this "waiting period," according to Fofana (1978), many young couples will emigrate, forcing parents to allow the girl to accompany her husband south, despite her childless condition. Steep payments of bridewealth and services may have influenced young men to delay marriage by emigrating as well. Other reasons cited for emigration include the onset of formal schooling, transportation development (both of which deter youth from the traditional lifestyle and encourage emigration (Fofana 1978), and onchocerciasis (river blindness),¹¹ causing large land-tract evacuation and consequent emigration of local farmers in search of other land (discussed below).

After many years of emigration, it is appropriate to identify emigration as an established, accepted, normative custom among young Kabye males. Many Kabye believe that travel is necessary before settling. Similar to a rite of passage, one hasn't lived or experienced life unless he has seen other places and people, Kabye informed me. It is indeed considered normal (and even encouraged among many) that young men should travel to distant places for a period of their life to see other things. In sum, among Kabye, emigration is an integral, commonly practiced venture resulting from multiple interwoven motivations.

Land shortages. Contrary to the long-standing belief, deficiency in land and food was not the single decisive factor motivating Kabye migration at its inception.

¹¹ This is a filarial disease transmitted by the small black fly *Simulium damnosum*. Through biting, the fly can infect humans by depositing the microscopic filarial worm *Onchocerca volvulus* under the skin, which in turn discharges embryonic microfilariae into the dermal tissue that later invade the eye, resulting in blindness (WHO 1985:7).

Colonial reports (examined by Lucien-Brun in 1987 and also discussed by Gu-Konu in 1980 and 1983) show that, despite the impending limitation of virgin land in the Kabye region, subsistence and ample surplus production were consistently attained. Ample beer (demanding large quantities of sorghum) was produced, and the Kabye were "bien nourri" (well fed) according to colonial reports written in the period around 1930 (Lucien-Brun 1986).

Administrative reports indicate, however, that cultivable land did become increasingly difficult to find. By the mid-1950s, all arable land was occupied or claimed by family units, leaving only less-preferred land open for expansion. Production dropped in several areas as soil conditions were worsened. Developments of lateritic or "hardpan" soils, granulated-textured soil, humus deficiency, and soil degradation appeared in greater quantities. *Striga rowlandi*, the widely spread parasitic plant caused by deficient soils, often destroyed cereal crops, particularly maize. As early as 1930, fallow periods were reported to be reduced to three to four years (Lucien-Brun 1987). Self-sufficiency was becoming a problem for the Kabye. In response, by the 1960s, streams of Kabye youth were flooding south to search for new options.

Search for space. Lucien-Brun (1987) and Pillet-Schwartz (1986b) maintain that Kabye migrated for more space. More specifically, they assert that space allowed Kabye to conduct extensive agricultural practices, thus freeing-up more time for other activities, "L'emigration est non seulement une conquête de l'espace, mais aussi et surtout une conquête de temps (Pillet-Schwartz 1986b:130). It is precisely this point,

they argue, that caused conflict between government and migrating farmers, and precipitated the failure of the majority of intensification development schemes (including FED).

Organized, structured rules of production are contrary to the goals of migration; "Tout forme de d'encadrement n'est-elle pas par définition la négation de cette dynamique purement paysanne? (Pillet-Schwartz 1986b:119)." This polarization of goals has not stemmed the flow of migration south, which is the aim of many projects such as FED. Despite the multiplication of government-sponsored programs and increased development in the north, Kabye emigration south continues in significant numbers.

In sum, historians of Kabye migration agree that spontaneous relocation, "le système migratoire auto-entretenu," is not a recent phenomenon, nor is it a colonial invention. It is first and foremost a traditional, cultural, and economic strategy, and only more recently a government-induced, development-oriented incentive for improving farmer welfare. The conflict between government and farmer goals in terms of migration and land use remains open: is development, implying intensified agricultural practices, the antithesis of spontaneous resettlement, when migration and extensification are the norms? Where the future of vacant lands is limited (as suggested by Painter 1990), how the dynamic spirit of spontaneous migration can be combined with intensified sustainable agricultural systems to promote development remains in question and underlies this research.

Consequences of Kabye Emigration

What were the social and economic consequences stemming from Kabye emigration? The large part of the emigrant population was young males between fifteen and nineteen years, a productive cohort of society. Loss of labor hands was perhaps the most critical and negative impact caused by emigration. "Le pays d'origine, surtout le principal massif du Kabyè, est malade de l'émigration," says Lucien-Brun (as told by Pillet-Schwartz 1980:7). As increasing numbers of young Kabye pioneered south to more promising prospects, at home, adjustments and accommodations were required concerning land use and systems of inheritance, engagements and arrangements of marriages, household responsibilities, and a host of other necessary changes.

Migrants were not, however, independent pioneers forging ahead without looking back. Most migrants remained attached to family and land, faithfully contributing to the livelihood and improvement of their households in the north. Although absent, migrants retained an economically active role in the household. They remained "providers" by sending remittances of both foodstuffs and cash back to the village. Their absence was not a loss, but ensured a supplementary income to the household, oftentimes more substantial than local contributions, particularly in hard cash.

A second important role early settlers played vis à vis home villages was facilitator for new settlers. By sending for settler-aspiring "frères" back home to join them in the south, they assisted others in settlement through a "chain migration." This

caretaking most often entailed food, lodging, and temporary allocation of field space for the first season or two of cultivation. At the same time, they reaped benefits of their guests' labor (Fofana 1978). An essential part of the assimilation process was introductions of the new settler (by the first settler) to the village chief. This was an official visit in request of land-use rights, but usually a pleasant and jovial affair, filled with much drink and offerings. Chiefs and local populations were highly receptive to new settlers. Existing extensive land was available and prestige gained from growing populations offered increased political importance to the area.

Isolation or Integration?: Patterns of Spontaneous Settlement

A symbiotic relationship between autochthones and settlers flourished during the decades of active migration, writes Lucien-Brun (1987). People co-existed under rules of mutual aid and respect. Autochthones were happy to hire migrants as temporary or permanent workers, and viewed the migrants as "associates" in clearing and managing the land, and fending off wild animals and other hazards (Fofana 1978). A benign environment offered security and comfort for newly arrived northerners and encouraged settlers' smooth and rapid transition to self-sufficiency and autonomy. In return, the settlers provided labor for land clearance and during bottleneck periods.

Land tenure and chieftainship were main ingredients determining sustainable integration between settlers and autochthones (Lucien-Brun 1987). In the northern Central region (from Sokodé to southern Sotouboua), land rights based on usufruct practice are loosely defined. The immigrants had a certain degree of power enabling

them to use and ultimately declare land rights over their own farms and fallow lands. In contrast, in the southern Central region (from south of Blitta, Atakpamé, and Badou), settlers were considered temporary, as users, "invitées," and not permanent land holders. These settlers were not to plant trees (a clear indication of land ownership and rights). Tenure over land was not an option for these settlers (nor did many find fault with this agreement). They were present to farm and eat, not to settle.

In both northern and southern settlement areas, respect for autochthones was considered essential for new-settler integration. This was commonly expressed through symbolic gestures of prestation (such as a quantity of yams, cereals, beer, or days of labor).¹² The absence of defined delineated rules of settlement did not abolish the need for some agreed upon system of order and justice (an essential element of social organization). Chieftainship was critical in preventing over-menacing conflicts and hostility between ethnic groups. In most cases, the settler and autochthone communities existed in harmonious separation. Settlers maintained their own chiefs (or elders) who regulated courts or judgements uniquely within the settler community. These customs and laws differed from those of the autochthones. Only in the case of a settler-autochthone conflict would representatives from both factions merge. For example, tax collection was initially conducted by autochthones and resented by settlers. In time, this task was allocated to both autochthones and settlers (both to quiet accusations of corruption and to reach maximum numbers of households).

¹² In time, settlers resented these "offerings" of sometimes large proportions and Lucien-Brun (1987) writes that by 1960 people refused to pay and began to claim permanency and autonomy for themselves.

Newly formed Kabye settlements in the central region generally remained separated and isolated from host communities. Immigrants settled in a mosaic of communities assembled in positions relative to their cantons of origin in the north. A "brassage d'origines" was strictly respected, which can be detected easily in the regional layout of settler communities in the Central region (Fofana 1978; Lucien-Brun 1987). For example, settlers from those villages whose original canton is Koumea are found in the proximate area to the immigrants from Koumea village itself.¹³

Most settler communities followed a semi-dispersed or scattered village pattern where a given number of hamlets are within 50-meter proximity of one another and loosely connected in a somewhat circular pattern.¹⁴ Scattered settlement patterns reflect traditional Kabye settlement practices in the mountains of their home villages, where vast, expansive territories were settled to give the appearance of large populations and control over large land areas.¹⁵

Separation between autochthone and settler societies is apparent in settlers' continuation of traditional religious customs. Marguerat (1986:107) writes that the Kabye diaspora is a spatial but not social mutation wherein essential social structures of the Kabye ethnic group remain unchanged. Kabye rely on former social and

¹³ Not surprisingly, Lucien-Brun (1987) found that settler villages experiencing conflicts and disputes reflected the continuation of conflicts originating in the north.

¹⁴ A second, less practiced, plan is a centralized, nuclear formation comprised of a small number of families.

¹⁵ Given the loosely knit political system and absence of centralized authority, the scattered pattern of settlement appropriately correlates with the Kabye forms of governance (Lucien-Brun 1987).

cultural practices rather than assimilate to those found in the new environment.

Pauvert writes, the Kabye-Losso immigrants,

restent fidèles à de nombreux modèles de leur organisation coutumière, et que tout en établissement avec les autochtones ana et kpressi certains modes de coexistence et même de symbiose, ils continuent à être liés à leur famille et à leur village, en particulier de fait de la persistance de liens économiques et religieux (Pauvert 1956:2).

A number of ceremonies were reenacted in the south simultaneously with those in the north (notably the important age-set fights, called Evala). For many, spoken language remained separate. Burials were oftentimes conducted in the south: "Rares sont les vieux migrants qui retournent au pays; la plupart acceptent de veiller et de mourir là où ils sont fixés (Margeurat 1986:99)." Settlers justified this otherwise sacrilegious act by claiming that spirits travelled with them to settle in the south. Settlers also carried with them (or recreated) from the north their own religious and ceremonial icons and fetishes. Marriages rites were conducted in the south, but exclusively among Kabye.¹⁶ Rather than integrate into their new world, many Kabye remained resistant to change;

Mais ces paysans semblent disposés à élargir le moins possible le milieu quotidien de leur vie de relations, aussi étroit fût-il à l'origine, et cet état d'esprit particulariste, pour se manifester dans le cadre d'isolats restreints, n'en est pas moins systématique. Le Centre-Togo ne se présente nullement comme un "melting pot" (Lucien-Brun 1987:127).

Traditional practices are reinforced through intermittent visits to home villages.

Settlers return north, usually at intervals of one to four years, for a variety of

¹⁶ Although early settlers found the idea of mixed marriages a humorously unfathomable notion, in time mixed marriages occurred (Lucien-Brun 1987).

reasons. In sixty-one cases, Lucien-Brun (1987) found thirty-two settlers returned to their village "occasionally" (for funeral ceremonies, illness, simple visits, age-class ceremonies, sacrifices, and other diverse reasons). These visits (usually spent during the low-labor season of January-March for a period of weeks) reinforce spiritual, economic, and social connections and attachments to one's kin. They demonstrate to one's community that settlers continue to hold a place in the family circle. It is rare to find settlers completely severed from their home village.

Strength of ethnicity and consequent distinction between groups fervently continues and is apparent in regions of settlement today. Conflicts over land rights and tenure have worsened during recent years in Togo (largely due to increased economic stringency and land scarcity). During my field research (May 1992), a hostile uprising over land rights between Kabye and Kotokoli groups occurred in the Central region. Kabye felt threatened and fearful of Kotokoli, who they accused of forcing them off what they consider now to be their own land. Kabye responded with hostility, first damaging Kotokoli houses then shooting. This violent incident resulted in several injuries and some deaths.

Similarly, in February 1994 a violent uprising leaving several injured and dead occurred between the Konkomba and Namumba ethnic groups residing on the Ghanaian side of the Mo plain (personal communication and the *Gainesville Sun*, February 18, 1994). According to Akpata-Ohoe (1994) in *Africa Events*, the Konkomba, settlers "who farm but don't own the land," have resisted Namumba pressures to return to their own land in Togo. Urgency of peoples in search for land,

whether it be the Konkomba or the Kabye, is intensifying as conditions in Africa deteriorate. Akpata-Ohoe remarks that, "Both sides blame the government for ignoring and refusing earlier calls to tackle the root cause of the conflict [land tenure]." These are the most violent in an lengthy series of hostile events that underline the importance of ethnic identity and land holdings in settlement. Clearly, historical events influence contemporary political conflicts which continue to afflict Togo today.

The Sotouboua Prefet confirms that these events are indicative of disagreements and confusion over land use and rights dating from the arrival of Kabye settlers in the 1920s. He believes they have sharpened and grown in intensity through time. Admittedly, an immediate need for resolution and clarification of land tenure is essential to prevent further violence, he says, but it is a very delicate and complex problem. Cornevin (1969) reports as early as 1926, that persons or groups defined land use and rights according to their own position and activity: a first settler declared that rights of first settler defined priority in land ownership, or hunters declared that rights of hunters was priority, and so on.

While for decades, tension over land rights and settlement have prevailed, leading to confusion and igniting episodes of conflict, in some cases these tensions and conflicts have precipitated autonomous problem-solving. I now turn to Part Two to analyze in-depth one of these cases, the spontaneous settlement of the Mo plain located in the Central region of Togo.

The Mo Plain: The Spontaneous Settlement

Early Settlement in the Mo Plain

As early as the seventeenth century, the first inhabitants of the Mo plain, the Kotokoli, are alleged to have travelled to the Mo plain initially for hunting, for trade, and for protection against other warring factions by residing in the mountain cliffs. Located on the Hausa caravan trade routes from the north, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the two ancient Kotokoli cheifdoms of Boulo and Djarapanga thrived from commercial activity (Barbier 1984, 1986).

The first immigrant settlers entered the plain mostly to hunt, eventually to farm (attracted to the area's land abundance and fertility), trade with autochthones, and also to escape eviction from Ghana and elsewhere. In 1960, Barbier (1984:2) reports a total population of only approximately 3,500 persons, with an annual population growth of 2.8 percent. Despite the onset of rapid population growth of the Mo plain, around 13 percent annually according to Barbier (1984), population density remains the second lowest of any prefecture in Togo (estimated at only 22 p/km² in 1990 compared to the national population density of 62 p/km²) (INRS 1991). What precipitates low population in the Mo plain? Scarce settlement is caused by both biophysical and political factors, which I review below.

Geographical features. The 1000 km² region of the Mo plain lies within the soudana-guinean zone of semi-tropical humidity at about 8.75°N, with an average temperature of around 25°C (GOT/MPI 1986). Regional enclavement best describes the geography of the Mo plain (see Figure 2-2). It is notably severed from the rest of




Figure 2-2. The spontaneous settlement site on the Mo Plain. (Source: Painter (1990) Land Settlement Review: Country Case Study Togo.)

the Togo by geographical boundaries severely inhibiting movement into the area. Despite its reputation of excellent fertile soils for cultivation, specifically of yams, and an average rainfall of 1500 mm annually that occurs over a seven-month rainy season, the plain is referred to as "l'endroit oublié," the forgotten region, due to its geographic and political isolation from other parts of the country.¹⁷ Until only the mid-1980s, it has shown greater affinity with neighboring Ghana (to which it previously belonged), both economically and socially, than with Togo.

Perhaps the greatest barrier deterring access to the Mo plain is the Fazao mountain range, a continuation of the Atakorian massif, spanning nearly the full length of the country. The Fazao cliffs (elevation of 400 m) are steep and jagged, impassable by any type of vehicle, let alone bicycle (except carried). In the past, the autochthone Kotokoli conducted all travel between the plain and the central canton village of Fazao (about 15 km away), or the prefectural center of Sotouboua (40 km from Fazao) over the mountain. Emergencies, commerce and trade, administrative responsibilities, and visiting of any type had to navigate this difficult passage.¹⁸

Today, less travel occurs on the beaten path due to the bridge constructed over the Mo river (financed in 1983 by the Société Togolaise du Coton: SOTOCO) allowing a new, less arduous access means of travel.

¹⁷ Soils in the plain mainly consist of tropical ferruginous and hydromorphic types of average to high agricultural potential (Painter 1990).

¹⁸ Nonetheless, the cliffs are still ventured by many, including those unable to afford vehicular transport or unwilling to wait for a bush taxi due to urgent business, those transporting illegal goods (such as firearms from Ghana or hunting prizes), those preferring the traditional lifestyle, or, like myself, those climbing for the sheer pleasure of it to see the glorious sight of the Mo plain from the cliffs of Fazao.

The Mo river. A key biophysical obstruction preventing entry into the plain has been the Mo river. The Mo, a mostly rainfed river, is a secondary watercourse from Lake Volta in Ghana (average output between 130-200 m³/sec). High waters correspond to the rainy season (high in September, low in March). In 1984, SOTOCO completed construction of a bridge (7 m high and 110 m long) across the river connecting the region with Bassar, opening the area for the first time for commercial as well as developmental activities. Intentions and interests of the SOTOCO project were strictly economic: to increase cotton production levels and profits. SOTOCO was compelled to provide Mo cotton growers with at least minimal services for survival (including potable water sources and navigable roads). Consequently, significant investments comprising a host of necessary infrastructural and social services in the Mo plain were committed by SOTOCO.

SOTOCO's foremost interest was the execution of the Mo bridge to enable passage over the river. This radically transformed the character of the Mo plain, enabling easy entry of people and goods. Today, vehicles (including large trucks packed with people, animals, crops, and market goods) pass through the region regularly, stimulating economic activity within and outside the plain. Similarly, the bridge has enabled the entry of a number of government services, such as health, social affairs, agricultural extension, and law enforcement. This dis-enclavement generated a long overdue development of the region.

Recent events in Mo have exposed the risks involved from over-dependence on the bridge. The bridge has collapsed (due to high waters and consequent pressure

caused by floating debris and large tree trunks) leaving entrance to the region precarious and intermittent. Although temporary repairs has allowed for intermittent travel, the repairs are inadequate and irregular.

The Fazao National Park. A third obstacle preventing access to the Mo plain is the delimitations of travel and habitation defined by the Malfacassa-Fazao National Park regulations. Declared a national reserve in 1954, and a national park in 1974, the picturesque Fazao mountains and surrounding area (notable for animal wildlife, including hogs, elephants, and rare monkeys) has been put off-limits for habitation. This forced a number of villages to relocate outside the park boundaries. Other than a government-based tourist hotel, settlement and cultivation within the park limits are prohibited (GOT/MET 1991:19). Strong local opposition to government legislation (seen in poaching and farming), however, has not lessened the isolation of the plain.

Onchocerciasis incidence. A fourth reason for enclavement and low density of the Mo plain is onchocerciasis (African river blindness). Researchers have found the incidence of onchocerciasis in villages sampled in the plain as high as 60 percent (Kedagni 1989a:9). High infectious rates have discouraged people from migrating or settling into the region, and are reported to be a major cause of low population (Painter 1990). Due to spraying of the plain by the Onchocerciasis Control Program (OCP) (since 1977), transmission of the disease has been limited, allowing for safe occupancy (Kedagni 1989a:8; Painter 1990:3).¹⁹

¹⁹ Invasion of the onchocerciasis vector, the *Similium damnosum* fly, from the south into the Mo plain region remained a problem until treatment of the southern regions were also included in the program. By 1988, the Mo plain was effectively controlled for onchocerciasis, relieving people of the risk of infection.

Frontier proximity. A fifth cause creating isolation of the Mo plain is due to its location on the Ghanaian/Togolese national border. This setting provides a dynamic interaction and assimilation between the populations of Mo and neighboring Ghanaian towns, but further separates Mo from the rest of Togo. In fact, a number of Mo plain settlers formerly lived in Ghana (some as long as twenty years of their lives) before relocating back to Togo.²⁰

Relocations and volatility of border placements between Ghana and Togo have caused confusion among local farmers regarding their own national identities (attributing to errors in national census). Borders even cut through family households and clan settlements, separating individual families into different nationalities. This fact, however, did not deter continuing relations and activities between people "across the border." Most farmers perceived national frontiers as political details of little concern, important only to the elite leaders. Today, Mo farmers still refer to nationality with little importance and concern. During my fieldwork interviews, many were uncertain and disinterested in their own nationality. After listening to life histories, replete with gyrations in borders, laws, and resettlements, I also confirmed difficulty in determining nationality.

Difficult access to Togolese administrative services in the canton and prefectural centers of Fazao and Sotouboua, respectively, have led Mo farmers to simply turn to Ghana for their needs regarding health, agricultural, marketing, and

²⁰ Most travelled to Ghana as migrant laborers during the lucrative economic years of plantation agriculture.

administrative concerns.²¹ Administrative, economic, and social detachment of Mo plain farmers has reinforced the existing physical enclavement from other parts of Togo. This isolation has compelled farmers to live independently, largely autonomous from the state.

In the present, enclavement and isolation in Mo wanes as an opening of the region gradually occurs. The SOTOCO bridge has been the key factor stimulating activity in the area, introducing a variety of public services, including health, education, social affairs, agricultural extension, and private organizations (such as religious organizations). The Mo plain has become an attraction for investment. With the onset of informal and formal activities, the Prefecture and the Ministry of Plan have followed suit, expressing keen interest in assisting the development of the Mo plain (Kedagni and Pounpouni, personal communication, 1992).²² The current Director of the Ministry of Plan in the Central region, Kedagni, has allotted the largest portion of 1992 funding to the development of the Mo plain (for road improvements, construction of proper market shelters, construction of bridges, and the completion of the dispensary of Tindjasse).

²¹ One clear example of this detachment is that through the early 1980s, the Ghanaian cedi rather than the Togolese CFA was the main currency in use. Only during the visit of the Togolese President Eyadema in 1984 was the cedi denounced and the national currency enforced. Nonetheless, in Djarapanga and Tindjasse today, market transactions actively continue to be in both the cedi and CFA.

²²

In years past, for example, a visit from the Prefet was an extremely rare event, occurring at best once annually. In 1992-93, during my fieldwork, the Prefet travelled to the plain to research development potential, assist specific field teams, or resolve particular conflicts on at least six occasions and once staying overnight.

Emigration to the Plain

The Mo plain population was estimated at approximately 3,500 persons in 1960, 9,100 in 1981, and 25,000 in 1988 (Kedagni 1989a:5; Barbier 1984:2, 1986). Spontaneous migration into the Central region has increased rapidly from 1960 to the present (see tables 2-1, 2-2).²³ By 1981, 40 percent of all immigrant farmers in Togo had migrated to the Central region (a total of 50,000 persons), creating an immigrant population in the Central region that was estimated at 60 percent of its total population in 1985 (GOT/MPI 1986:21) (see Table 2-2). Eighty-one percent of the total population growth in the Mo plain between 1970-80 is attributed to immigration (Barbier 1984:21). According to government estimates, Tindjasse, the prime settler village in the plain, has an annual rate of population increase of 10 percent, followed by Djarapanga and Saiboude both at 6.3 percent (GOT/MPI 1986:26).

The extent of immigration into the Mo plain has created a complex mosaic of ethnic groups. As shown in Table 2-2, Kabye make up the majority of immigrants (17 percent) entering the Central zone. They comprise a total of 44 percent of the regional population, while other ethnic groups, including the Bassar, Konkomba, Gan Gan, and Gourma (from regions of the Savanna and Benin), Tchokossi, Zamari (from Niger), Ewe (from regions of southern Togo and Ghana), Fulani herdsmen, Hausa (from Nigeria), and others from inside and outside the country, make up 30 percent, while the remaining population is comprised of the autochthone Kotokoli group

²³ During the decade of the 1960s a brief drop of -2.8 percent in population was recorded and attributed to emigration to Ghana during the peak periods of Ghanaian commercial activity. Other possible reasons suggested by scholars include incorrect figures due to faulty census-taking in the initial census periods (Gouellain 1965).

(GOT/MPI 1986:21). The immigrant population, reflective of the population of Togo, is relatively young and economically active: 50 percent are between the ages of 15 and 64.²⁴

In the Mo plain, population densities are reported to be exceedingly low and growing slowly (see Table 2-1) (Barbier 1984:6; Kedagni 1989a:5; SOTED 1985:6). Of the 1000 km² of land, it is estimated that only 250 km² is occupied. Thus 840 km² is far from being saturated (GOT/MPI 1986:12). According to government reports (GOT/MPI 1986), nearly 80 percent of the territory in Mo plain remains unexploited.

Causes of Immigration

Immigration into the Mo plain is explained primarily by the search for land (motivations discussed above). Other causes exist however, which supplement these Kabye migrations. Many of the earliest settlers to the Mo plain travelled from Ghana during the Ghanaian repatriation in the late 1960s (specifically during the expulsion of foreigners by the Busia regime in Ghana in 1969) (Barbier 1984:3, 1986). Another influx of settlers occurred during ethnic warfare between the Konkomba and Dagomba in nearby Ghana in the early 1980s.²⁵ Worsening economic conditions in Ghana triggered by the cedi devaluation and the fall of cacao production also stimulated

²⁴ It is important to note that there is also some emigration from the Central region to other regions, particularly the Plateaux, where plantation work remains available. Of the 14 percent who emigrate from the Central region, 6 percent relocate to the Plateaux and 5 percent to the coastal Maritime region (INRS 1991).

²⁵ Informants have notified me that a resurgence of these conflicts occurred recently in Ghana (1992), causing several hundred farmers to enter Mo as refugees.

Ghanaian emigration to Togo. With the erection of the SOTOCO bridge, Tindjasse became a boom town, growing from a small border village to an important market center attracting people throughout Togo and Ghana.

Patterns of Settlement in the Mo Plain

Settler occupation of land in the Central region and Mo plain in particular can be described as conservative and collective. It is not surprising, says Lucien-Brun (1987:166), that Kabye immigrants maintain a prudent and almost fearful respect for the free lands existing around them given their past history of defense and land scarcity. Cautious pioneering in exploring and settling unclaimed virgin land is a characteristic behavior of the former fixed, sedentary, and impenetrable pattern of settlement in their northern villages. Other important and interrelated reasons for establishing fairly tight patterns of habitation in the new settlements include proximity to transportation and marketplaces.

The apprehension which limits settler expansion results in new settlements being closely situated to autochthon centers of population. New settler villages placed at a distance from the central village are considered anti-social or even hostile. Collective conscience among settlers and autochthones inhibits individualism. Although settler fields extend outward from the village center (up to distances of 7-8 km or one-hour's walking time), few settlers reside outside of community limits. At a given point, however, pressure from population ruptures these tight configurations, forcing settlers to expand outward in search of land and space. Immigrants who do settle

outside of central villages are aligned closely with village communities (see Massaro 1994 on concepts of nodalization in settlement).²⁶

Les Kabyè-Losso, [au contraire] limitent leurs exigences individualistes à la vie privée et les réalisent dans le cadre de leurs "nébuleuses" villageoises. En revanche, face à la nature, un "mieu humain" leur est indispensable, même si cet environnement n'est pas constitué de population de même origine (Lucien-Brun 1987:170).

Today, Mo is comprised of both large village centers, as well as dispersed hamlets built at a distance from the central areas (Gouellain 1965:17). Settlement can be characterized by "tache d'huile," the slow spread effected by an oil drop (up to 80 percent of the plain is deemed occupied). Eighty percent of the Mo plain population resides in concentrated areas (villages of Boulo, Djarapanga Saiboude, and the settler village of Tindjasse) while the remaining 20 percent reside in dispersed hamlets.²⁷

An excellent case illustrating dispersed settlement patterns in Mo is the hamlet of Assaou. This farmer is a brave and independent Lamba migrant who settled along the Mo river in an extremely impenetrable area of dense vegetation and isolation (approximately 15 km from the central autochthon village of Boulo). He opted for this area due to easy access to maximum farm area and relative lack of theft or conflict with others. Following his own settlement, a number of family members and former contacts have also settled down-river from him, creating a sparsely populated thread

²⁶ In most cases, these individuals maintain strong ties with the settlers on whom they initially depended during resettlement.

²⁷ Saiboude, once an important autochthon village located on the main road in the plain, has decreased in status and commercial activity due to a loss of population caused by the road bypass and burgeoning population and marketplace at Tindjasse.

of hamlets and extensive fields of cultivation stretching west along the southern border of the Mo river.

A second case illustrating classic dispersed settlement is the case of Soli. Soli arrived in the Mo plain from Ghana during repatriation (around 1969). He approached the Kotokoli chief of Djarapanga in request of land, opting to settle in isolation from already established villages to gain maximum land area for extensive agriculture. Today, (after twenty years), Soli is notably one of the most successful and wealthiest farmers in Mo plain. Rather than living in isolation, remote from others as he intended, he is surrounded by Kabye relatives and friends, mostly from his native village of Pya, who together form a large and rapidly growing village (approximately 160 households). Soli has achieved success and gained enormous prestige by surrounding himself with "frères" of his homeland. He is happy to have his kin around him now, he says, it brings him wealth (clearly displayed during an important Kabye marriage ceremony conducted in the village).

Settlement by ethnicity has provided new settlers familiarity and relative security within a foreign and challenging environment (examined in Chapter 5). In most cases, settlers opt to settle according to ethnicity, resulting in ethnic-based villages and "quartiers." Not surprisingly, even neighborhoods are scattered according to ethnic alliances (where closely related ethnic groups are located in proximity to one another). For example, the Konkomba and Bassar, related ethnic groups, live in proximity in Tindjasse, as do the Lamba and Losso, and the Kabye and Lamba.

Practices of Land Tenure in the Mo Plain

Definitive, official transfers of land rights are absent between autochthones and new settlers in the Mo plain. Rather, a system of usufruct land rights is practiced according to local customs (Painter 1990:48).²⁸ Land in the Mo plain is distributed by a usufruct system of lending, determined and controlled collectively by the original land holders, the Kotokoli. Authority over land distribution lies ultimately with the chief of the oldest autochthone villages: Djarapanga, Boulo, and Souroukou. Formal requests, in principle, must pass to the chiefs of these villages who, in turn, control the jurisdiction surrounding their own village. In practice, higher chiefs often allocate their authority over land-use rights to lower, village chiefs falling within their jurisdiction. Lower chiefs, therefore, may distribute land in proximity to their villages without the consent or confirmation of high chiefs. They are "representatives" of the higher chiefs, functioning as intermediaries of land distribution.

New settlers' priorities lie in establishing their own farm plots as soon as possible. In most cases, a new settler and his sponsor will approach the village settler chief in request of vacant land. The chief either allocates unused land to the settler, if authorized, or directs the settler to the autochthone chief. The settler commonly provides ceremonial offerings to the chief in respect and deference to the elders and custodians of the land (as discussed above).

²⁸ As already discussed, land is not considered as property by any group, rather it is a stewardship responsibility which includes land allocation.

In practice, demarcation of fields usually occurs between local farmers and the new settler without formality of any kind. Agreements of land use varies according to each situation. At any given time, there are various categories of land use: some fields are indeed vacant and distributed by the chief, others are part of a farmer's unoccupied farm area (either under fallow, or in reserve for a later date), others may be under an informal community land title, destined toward community purposes (such as particular village field projects, construction, or for new arrivals), still others are used by local agricultural extension agents for trials, demonstrations or future projects. Under request, unfarmed land areas (although they may be "claimed") are transferred to individuals for temporary or permanent usufruct. Time restrictions are rarely defined in usufruct land agreements. Generally land is offered indefinitely, "for as long as the settler and his children choose to remain."

At present, the abundance of land eliminates tensions between autoctones and settlers so that new settlers are not viewed by autoctones as an intrusion or threat to further land access. To the contrary, land is offered by chiefs and local farmers to new settlers openly and enthusiastically. During my field work, farmers constantly told me that more people were welcome (an attitude elaborated on in Chapter 6). They said settlers would be an asset in helping to scare away wild animals, assisting in labor groups, clearing more territory, and increasing the local population, thereby all advantages that would bring status and increased importance to the village and region.

Summary

Farmers of the Mo plain, similar to pioneers of frontier towns of the American wild West, operate according to flexible normative patterns of behavior rooted in indigenous tradition. Unprecedented by an identical situation, spontaneous innovation is the norm. But a former balance ensuring autochthone control over the region is challenged and undermined now by settlers who are gaining in numbers and official power. Intentions for permanency shape sociopolitical interactions among settlers and between settlers and autochthones, which are treated delicately, with a long-term vision for conflict resolution.

Due to increased interest from donors, development potential exists in the plain. Careful planning and implementation of these programs is critical to the sustainability of the sociopolitical environment. Development of the zone also requires sensitivity to the physical environment. Relatively low populations, until the present, have enabled the use of traditional extensive agricultural practices. Changes brought on by population growth and new interventions will transform agricultural conditions, and could engender severe soil depletion and overuse of the natural resource base. These are critical issues reviewed in chapters below.

Changes in the Mo plain are evident. Government and non-government intervention is increasing, evidenced by a recent accelerated implementation of infrastructure and services (notably bridge and road improvements, schools and health services, market improvements, and prefectural attention and support). In following chapters, I describe and examine these changes, their impact, and outcomes.

The FED Project: Planned Settlement

Project Background and Intention

In this section, I describe the planned FED settlement scheme, the second of two foci in this comparative research.²⁹ First, I discuss historical events that have influenced FED's inception and underlie its philosophy and objectives. I then review basic environmental characteristics of FED (biophysical and sociocultural features). Finally, I review FED's financial sponsorship, technical design, and implementation strategies. This background provides an entry for further analysis in the chapters that follow.

Modernization. Several combined motives underlie the creation of the FED settlement scheme. One primary goal of FED was the acceleration of agricultural production through intensified, technological agricultural development. During the post-colonial period in Togo (as elsewhere in Africa), the government was seeking solutions for low national agricultural productivity and lack of food self-sufficiency (Akibode 1987; Eklun 1985; Gu-Konu 1983; Kpowbie 1982).³⁰

It is certain: the period of post-colonialism in Togo did not imply an absence of former colonial metropole support. On the contrary, during the era of Independence of the 1960s and 1970s, interest and investments in former colonies in

²⁹ For expediency, in this study I refer to the project as "FED." Other common titles of FED include "Operation de Mises en Valeur de Vallée de Kara (OMKV)," "FED-Agbassa," and "Projet FED."

³⁰ Contribution of agricultural production to national GDP hovered at around 30 percent throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Self-sufficiency in food had not been attained by the end of the 1980s (Nouvelle Strategie\MDR 1985).

Africa from outside donors heightened.³¹ In Togo during this time, active government and nongovernment assistance and cooperation transpired (notably from France, Germany, the United States, and international organization donors). The modernization package, based on Green Revolution technologies, was one approach taken in combatting "backward" agriculture in rural Africa.

The objective of the Green Revolution was to propel an economic and sociopolitical transformation from traditional, subsistence economies to modernized, export-oriented economies based on cash crops sales to an international market (Hyami and Ruttan 1985). Accordingly, traditional agricultural and sociocultural systems were dismantled and replaced by more modern, technological systems. In this period, many development projects such as FED were created as modern enclaves to generate more rational production systems.

As modernization transpired, so did urbanization, requiring food surpluses to feed the metropolitan population. Greater numbers of agricultural programs were implemented and export agriculture, foreign trade, and modern agro-industries expanded in an effort to satisfy urban demands and increase national revenues. At the same time, however, these large-scale ventures also increased the national debt and dependency on foreign countries. Financial support was key to gaining resources essential for continuing modernization. Foreign assistance served as the engine of growth, but not without conditions. The name "Project FED" in itself symbolizes the

³¹ Development assistance from Western to Third World countries provide industrial nations channels for investments, employment opportunities, and transfer of knowledge and technology. Economic and political benefits, including status and control over Third World nations, are enjoyed under the guise of "aid."

seat of control and power over finances. The dependency cycle was in motion through developing conditions for growth in Third World countries that required financial and administrative attachment to the metropole.

During the modernization period, a Twenty Year Plan emerged in Togo (1966-1985) including changes to more rational, equitable use of land; encouraging dispersal from densely populated regions (to stabilize the exodus in regions such as Kara); regionalizing the country; developing agricultural research and applied development institutes; and modernizing agricultural practices - increasing cereal crop production while also promoting export crops through specialization (Eklu 1985).

The Kara region became a priority for land development during this period. The zone secured numerous development programs involving large financial investments (BMB 1984).³² "Le Region de la Kara est à l'heure actuelle l'une de plus privilégiées des régions économiques du pays de point de vue de l'affectation des ressources dans la politique de développement conduite par l'Etat (Gu-Konu 1983:877)."³³ Inordinate attention to this region was due to overcoming the legacy of previous colonial neglect, geographical factors, and political interests (Gu-Konu 1983). Close observers (including participants of the FED project) have shared their concerns that the regional focus was motivated more by political than welfare

³² Examples include UNDP-funded "Projet Nord" (1974), the extension of the national highway from Kara to Kandé (1976), and construction of the Koza reservoir (1979) and the Niamtougou airport (1980) (Akibode 1987).

³³ Gu-Konu (1983:919) provides a general but in-depth examination of groups in the region, including the French SORAD, SOTOCO, and Volontaires de Progrès, the Chinese missions, various church organizations, the Peace Corps, and the FAO.

concerns. Many skeptics accuse the President of exploiting personal power to help and strengthen the situation of the Kabye, his own ethnic group (Kpowbie 1982), and question the genuine motives for creating projects such as FED at all.

Population Decompression. Another important official cause for the creation of FED was geographical constraints. Inequitable settlement in the Kara region (due to the mountains) lead to overly dense demographic conditions among the Kabye. Concomitantly, land in the Kara river valley remained under utilized. The government aimed to "deconcentrate," and assist Kabye farmers to resettle to other, less densely populated "free" lands: both to surmount the problem of overpopulation in the Kabye mountains (of up to 400 persons/km² in certain areas) and to exploit "unused" space.

The Kara river plain was a logical choice for relocation. Its low population density, around twenty persons/km² was attractive (Painter 1990:7). This sparseness of population in the river valley has been attributed to multiple factors. First, forced labor under German colonialism precipitated farmer emigration to southern parts of Togo. Second, for access to marketing and markets, many farmers preferred settling close to major roads, namely, the national highway (Route Nationale 1). Finally, and most importantly, the high incidence of blindness due to the presence of onchocerciasis deterred settlement (Akibode 1987; Eklun 1985; Kpowbie 1982; Painter 1990).

Due to endemic proportions of onchocerciasis in Togo and throughout many West African countries, fertile riverine areas (such as the Kara and Mo river areas) have been abandoned by former inhabitants, leaving large land areas nearly empty. In

1974, the World Health Organization (WHO) launched a fourteen-country program in West Africa to control the disease by vector interruption through operations of larvicide spraying and the distribution of Ivermectin (a drug proven to kill the adult filariae in the human body). After ten years of operation, the WHO reported the Onchocerciasis Control Program (OCP) to be successful, which meant;

OCP has conducted a highly successful operation which has lead to the interruption of the transmission of the disease in practically all of the original Programme areas and the opening up for resettlement and development of those riverine areas previously uninhabited and uncultivated (WHO 1985:7).

The Kara river basin and the Mo plain both have been target areas for the control program since the mid-1970s. Twenty years of spraying has resulted in a dramatic reduction in biting rates allowing for habitation of these and other target areas.³⁴ As an area of newly freed land, near to the Kabye mountain range, the Kara river valley was an ideal choice for the FED resettlement project.

Project Environment

Bio-physical features. The settlement location falls within the savanna soudano-guinean zone, at 9.25°N, with an average temperature of 26°C (see Figure 2-3). There is one annual rainy season with rainfall measuring approximately 1300 mm. The project region, covering a total of 30,000 ha, lies on a slight slope of 3 percent comprising tropical ferruginous soils of the sandy-loam type. Typically

³⁴ OCP has invested minimal funding in socioeconomic development in the zones due to its mandate as an exclusively disease-control program. Responsibility for development lies with each country, OCP administrators informed me (Zongo, personal communication, 1992).




Figure 2-3. The planned settlement site of the Fonds Européen de Développement (FED). (Source: Painter (1990) Land Settlement Review: Country Case Study Togo.)

bearing protective surface debris and adequate tree cover which maintain soil fertility, these soils are relatively favorable for cultivation, notably yams (Akibode 1987; Gu-Konu 1983; Kenkou 1990).

Located in the outlying regions east of the Atakorian mountains, the Kara river basin accumulates productive, fertile soil both from mountain run-off and river sediment. Impermeable soils combined with low rainfall create low water resources for the local population. The Kara river provides water to farmers close to its banks, but not to those households farther from the river. (Until OCP spraying, the river banks were largely avoided because of the presence of disease-bearing flies.) There is considerable agricultural potential in the area, despite purported soil infertility, water scarcity, and complaints of increasing soil degradation and infertility (Painter 1990:vi).

The project site is located in the administrative region of Kara in the prefecture of Doufelgou, spanning the three cantons of Leon, Alloum, and Kadjalla.³⁵ Despite an average farm area per household in the Kara region of only 1.4 ha—the smallest of the five regions—much uncultivated land still exists (BMB 1984; Painter 1990).³⁶ In the project area, an estimated 26 percent of land still remains unoccupied.

Sociocultural features. Autochthones of this region, the Lamba ethnic group, entered the area as early as the late eighteenth century as a means of refuge against

³⁵ It is located above the Central region with the Savanna region to the north, the Kara river to the west, and a laterite road skirting the Défalé range to the east.

³⁶ In the region, arable land in Kara amounts to 56 percent of the total. Of that potential farmland in Kara, only 13 percent is cultivated (Akibode 1989:3).

Konkomba enemies.³⁷ The current autochthone population in the project area is estimated at 20,000 (Kenkou 1990). Due to favorable agricultural conditions, they practiced extensive farming systems requiring low-inputs and labor. They selected low-maintenance traditional crops of low-nutrient requirements that were appropriate to the area, including sorghum, fonio, and small millet. Until the onset of Western-influenced development, farming in Togo was uniquely subsistence-oriented. The FED project was initiated simultaneous with other organizations such as SORAD, SOTOCO, UNDP, and others, to promote cash-crop agriculture and development. FED was one of the first of many efforts of this scale in the region to promote development.

Traditionally, land tenure principles were based on the age-old customs practiced throughout Togo of "bina, ma bina," ("I eat, you eat"). This custom has been in existence among West Africans for centuries (Lucien-Brun 1987). It required that sharing of land to those in need for the cultivation of food was one's obligation. In 1974, the government of Togo exploited this traditional custom by approaching the Lamba canton chiefs in the zone in request of land for the Kabye "to eat." The chiefs offered (or submitted) their land as requested. Ceremonial transactions ensued, and the settlement location secured—on paper—at least in the present. But the land, although unoccupied, was not unclaimed or "empty."

Malgré cette distribution de la population, la zone occupée par le projet n'est ni totalement vide, ni entièrement inutilisée. Elle représente le

³⁷ The Lamba, who settled in the Kara river basin, is one branch of the Losso, a group that occupied a vast territory during this period. Other important branches in the vicinity include the Naoudemba (Gu-Konu 1983:949).

terroir utile des Lamba, qui l'exploitent selon les faibles moyens dont ils disposent et selon leurs besoins (Gu-Konu 1983:948).

This distinction lies at the heart of future conflicts among autochthones, FED, and settlers that I examine in following chapters.

Project Costs

Enormous start-up costs and initial inputs were required to initiate a settlement scheme of FED's magnitude and scale. Outside assistance for both technical and financial spheres was clearly needed. According to FED precepts, modernization entailed two major components: infrastructural development (including roads and bridges, water sources, market centers, and a host of social services) and agricultural intensification (through a package of inputs, animal traction, and prescribed cropping systems delivered through an elaborate extension program). An implied outcome of this approach was socioeconomic development. To "root" people successfully in the region, planners believed, provisioning the population with basic infrastructural support was essential (Gu-Konu 1983:954).

The diversity of historical, political, and economic interrelated factors that underlie the objectives of FED in fact strengthened and gave impetus to the Togolese government's campaign of attracting the needed support from outside sources for financial and administrative and technical assistance required for FED.

Finance for the FED settlement was based on an arrangement between the government of Togo (GOT) and the European Economic Community's (EEC) Fonds Européen de Développement (FED). It was agreed that FED would provide two-thirds

of the total project costs, while the government would provide the remaining one-third, plus land, salaried employees, and other limited investments (Kpowbie 1982:55). Technical assistance to the project was primarily provided by FED (including administrative and agricultural expertise).

Estimations of total costs of the project vary from \$6 million (Kpowbie 1982:56-7) to \$10 million (Gu-Konu 1983:939, 993). Cost per household varies as well, from \$1,300 (Gu-Konu 1983; Painter 1990) to around \$3,000 (Kpowbie 1982).

According to settlement scholar Robert Chambers, "settlement schemes in Africa have involved large investments in the past, and the scale of future investment is potentially enormous (1969:7)." For example, he reports capital costs as high as 20 million shillings (UK:1967) for the Gezira scheme of Sudan, and one million shillings for the Kariba Resettlement in Rhodesia. Similarly, McMillan et al. (1990a) report that cost per resettled household of World Bank-funded resettlements between 1962 and 1975 averaged \$6,460, and by the mid-1980s costs ranged between \$5000 and \$20,000 per family.³⁸ In comparison to these costs, FED is a considerably more modest investment than average costs of rainfed settlement schemes elsewhere.

High initial settler costs are justified, in theory, by expected high-return and long-term benefits and actualizations by settlers and region farmers at large. In 1979, Gu-Konu (1983:993) reports annual cost per household (396,000 cfa), much higher than average annual settler net income of only 102,000 cfa. But this income figure,

³⁸ Irrigation schemes, where costs exceed \$10,000 per household, are considerably more expensive than rainfed schemes.

planners project, should rise steadily through time, and ensure farmers' debt payments and further prosperity.

Long-term considerations are rarely studied seriously when administrators are confronted with daily problems and concerns to solve. Results of settler household net incomes support the argument of increasing incomes, but fail to consider simultaneous increases in other costs (Akibode 1987; Eklun 1985; Painter 1990).³⁹ Painter shows, for example, that despite a certainty in increase in gross and net farmer income, household expenses (primarily for farming) have also risen from 21 percent in 1982 to 63 percent in 1988 of gross income (Painter 1990:15).⁴⁰ The absence of any indication suggesting a reversal of this trend implies that settlers spend increasingly more on debt payments than essential goods, and continue to witness a gradual decline in their household incomes. Debt repayments, therefore, become an increasing burden on settlers, as discussed below.

Securing and continuing external funding for FED was a priority for the government. Catering to an international audience by demonstrating "success" can be an effective means of harnessing future assistance (Pozarny 1990). In the case of FED, for example, a third phase of the project was financed well after original planning, earmarked on the basis of accomplishments realized during the first two phases of the project. Throughout the project, a string of high official dignitaries,

³⁹ For example, Painter (1990:71) shows a 31 percent rise in settlers' real income from 1977 to 1988 (from 113,000 cfa to 148,000 cfa). Likewise, Akibode (1987:77) reports a 53 percent rise in net income from 1979 to 1985 (66,154 cfa to 101,105 cfa).

⁴⁰ Painter (1990) shows net as percent of gross income declining from 96 percent to 36 percent from 1979 to 1988.

including French, American, and German Ambassadors, representatives of the EEC and UNDP, the World Bank, and others, visited the project site constantly. These visits provided opportunities for FED administration and the government to prove their commitment to the principles of modernization, and to increase dialogue and partnership for further finance from bilateral and multilateral funding sources.

Symbolic visits not only produced status for the project, they also promoted encouragement and pride from within, among staff and participants. It reinforced and legitimized project activities and administrative power and authority. Festivities honoring officials, speeches and "gifts" in cash and kind offered to the project and staff were not unusual, all contributing to settlement participants' esteem overall.

Consequently, FED has been an acclaimed success among the donor community and government. It is a celebrity throughout development organization circles. Journal articles and government reports have applauded the settlement as a key solution to Togo's developmental progress (Gbodui 1990 and FED project documents). Portrayed as a "model" project with a stellar administrative performance, the founding Director said little could be found to criticize. He could not recall a time when evaluators ever questioned or criticized the design or procedures used in attaining project goals (Dogbe, personal communication, 1991).

Project Planning and Operations

FED funding was retained separately from national accounts and decision-making structures, allowing for semi-autonomous operations and management of

financial and operative resources.⁴¹ The Director of the project (a Togolese) worked simultaneously under the Minister of Rural Development as the Director of the Regional Rural Development bureau (under which the project officially was positioned). This dual role assured the authority vis à vis the government needed for decision-making and rapid action. FED provided administrative and agricultural technical assistance to the project on a permanent basis.

Originally, the FED project was planned for two four-year phases, stretching from 1974 to 1981. Eventually a third phase was added, with funding officially concluding in 1986. The first phase, 1974-1977, was designated the trial stage and period of development and infrastructural placement. The first 250 families were settled during this period. This was followed by phase two (1978-1981), which included more intensive settlement and agricultural development in which approximately 675 families were brought in along with access to a highly developed extension service.⁴²

Nearing project closure, a third phase was implemented (1982-1986), developed as the consolidation and devolution phase, a period during which incomplete projects from the earlier two phases were realized (including the bridge over the Kara river toward Bassar, six primary schools, twenty-one houses for teachers, a new dispensary and pharmacy in Agounde, shelters for the central market,

⁴¹ During the funding period, the project was administratively insulated and enclaved, creating a great lack of coordination with ministries, with government administration, and with other projects (BMB 1984:57).

⁴² A key factor in promoting the subsequent third phase was the fact that settlement rates were 325 families short of the 1000 household target.

among others). During this phase, extension services were expanded to cover families outside the project boundaries. This doubled the number of project beneficiaries to about 1,800 households (Kenkou 1990; Painter 1990; GOT/MDR/FED 1988).

During this period, the administration concentrated on preparing settlers for self-direction and management through local organizations such as a Zonal Committee, cooperatives, and commercialization (Kenkou 1990:9). The solidarity fund was initiated at this time to ensure the maintenance of project infrastructure following project funding. Incorporation of the FED zone into national Ministries (Health; Education; Equipment and Public Works), and privatization of diverse operations, such as mills and ironworks ensued during this period as well. An important component of this phase of the project was the emphasis on "Après-FED," the post-funding period where control was to be transferred, or devolved, to settlers for self-management. "A ce titre, un accent particulier a été mis surtout sur la formation des groupements qui seront chargés de prendre en main leur propre destinée (MDR/FED 1988)." Results of these initiatives are analyzed below.

Project layout. The FED zone comprised five sectors partitioned into a number of blocks, each including several household farms linearly arranged in equidistance (see Figure 2-3). The layout of the settlement is an artificially imposed rigid blueprint plan rather than being reflective of locally existing landscapes of settlement patterns. The homogeneous, linear, and dispersed household plots are in distinct contrast to local settlements, where houses are grouped naturally around central points such as water or market places (Kupfer 1990; Massaro 1994). In FED,

individual houses align project roads for project efficiency, regardless of existing community landscapes more circular in nature (BMB 1984:112).⁴³

Broukou, the second sector formed (1976), is the administrative hub and urban center of the zone. This is where the central marketplace, pharmacy, secondary school, police headquarters, and central garage for project storage, repair, and mechanical work (notably for tractors and animal traction) are located as well as housing for administrative staff, the solar-energized water pump, and services shared by other sectors, including a primary school, water pumps, storage warehouses, and a village health clinic.

Throughout the zone basic development of infrastructure includes grading in excess of 135 km of laterite road, construction of two main bridges and fifteen culvert passes, housing for 279 families and forty-four extension agents, the installation of twenty-eight storage warehouses, fifty bore holes (unfortified wells), thirty wells, and the construction of ten primary schools, one secondary school, two cooperative stores, a chapel, a number of grinding mills, a large earth-filled retention dam and smaller secondary dams, plus an apiculture project, a six-hectare irrigation scheme for garden vegetables, and numerous small-scale irrigation perimeters (BMB 1984; Painter 1990; GOT/MDR/FED 1988).⁴⁴

⁴³ According to one evaluation, settlers objected to the loss of liberty and choice in settlement patterns, saying, "C'est l'homme qui doit créer son propre habitat en non le contraire comme a été le cas dans le project actual (BMB 1984:127)."

⁴⁴ Exact numbers of completed projects often differed slightly between references. I have attempted to ascertain the most accurate by identifying the most frequently cited data, most recent year cited, and source of information.

Despite projections to settle a total of 1,000 families, approximately 825 resided in the zone in 1980 (nearly half being of local autochthon origin). Original project design equipped each settler family with a three-room concrete house with a corrugated sheet-metal roof (limited project finances allowed for only 279 houses equipped with tin roofs) located on five hectares of land for cultivation and reforestation (0.5 ha designated woodlots, as required). The project cleared 2,000 ha, and initially settled 200 families on cleared plots (2.5 ha was cleared by FED, the remaining half was settlers' responsibility).

Administrative structure. An historical perspective is useful in understanding and analyzing the creation and impact of FED administration. Evolution from colonialism to modernization has shaped structures and processes of development projects. Authority and centralization were dominant features of colonial rule. A vertical, top-down approach was applied by colonialists to "manage" local populations most efficiently. It was believed that profits were assured through uniformity and efficiently conducted programs. Total command and authority over decisions, planning, and financial resources was controlled externally from the top. Little integration or coordination with existing local systems was incorporated into this relationship. Motivations were predominantly political and economic, rather than developmental or welfare-oriented.

In the wake of colonialism, the FED administration emerged, similarly built and organized hierarchically, from the top down. Starting with project planning, directions evolved from above, and execution and delivery were conducted at the

bottom, with little dialogue or exchange between the two. Although highly competent and dynamic, the Director of the project, a key figure influencing project decisions and dynamics, also served as the Director of the Kara Regional Rural Development Bureau, as well as the Mayor of the town of Kara (an extremely important political role). In juggling these quite time-consuming positions, even with the best of intentions, he was unable to give adequate attention to his role as project Director. Furthermore, in resemblance to former colonial relations, the Director candidly explained to me that FED, as the donor agency, maintained enormous control over him limiting his own autonomy and power.

The administrative center for the project was based in Kara, rather than a more logical location on site (or in the zone's prefectural capital and administrative center, Niamtougou). Accompanying the director in Kara were most of his assistants and the entire legion of foreign technical assistants. These people "commuted" to the project site daily (at project expense), over roads which wound over 60 km through river and bush conditions. Geographic distance created a large sociopolitical barrier and separation between the administration (at the hub of decisionmaking and control), and settlers living project reality. Absence of project management from the site enlarged already existing rifts among administration, subordinate staff, settlers, and autochthones.

A number of examples illustrate the extent of control that FED administration held over the settlement. One telling example, depicting "total" control since project inception, is selection of new recruits. Deciding on who would become settlers, the

administration (and more precisely, the Director himself) could directly manipulate the character and profile of settlers. FED established an official guideline of recruitment criteria for settler candidacy. Specifically, settlers were to be between the ages of 20 and 35, married with children, and of good character and morale. In other words, they were to be hardworking, interested in the project, possessing a positive attitude, be moral and of good character, without tendencies to theft, adultery, and, most importantly, sorcery (discussed in Chapters 6 and 7). The latter qualities, moral and of good character and attitude, were the least defined and most subjective and elastic qualities, allowing for flexible interpretation. This enabled the administration to exercise great discretionary power over who could participate in the project.

Approach to Implementation

Expediency best characterizes the planning and implementation of the FED project. The government embraced a sense of urgency to release Kabye from overpopulation and difficult conditions in the mountains.⁴⁵ Financing and administrative organization of the project, therefore, was conducted in haste (Dogbe, personal communication, 1993). Insulation ("enclavement") of the project was believed to maximize efficiency by streamlining decisions and operations.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ To justify this position, some Togolese officials went as far as to suggest that Kabye overpopulation was the primary constraint to overall national development.

⁴⁶ Critics, including BMB (1984), Gu-Konu (1983), and Kenkou (1990), believe this assumption of urgency was false, resulting in poor and insufficient project organization, especially during the final devolution phase.

Numerous sensitive and ambiguous issues and concerns were swiftly decided and enacted. One such subject concerned land tenure. Little dialogue transpired over the transfer of land; "Avant d'aborder ces aspects, il convient de noter que la délimitation de périmètre et l'appropriation des terres concernées n'ont pas fait l'objet de négociations préalables spécifiques avec les populations autochtones, présumées propriétaires (Kenkou 1990:91)." Similarly, financial planning and projections were formulated with the strict minimum of detail and precision (BMB 1984). Total available funding and projected costs were not rigorously defined. For example, confusion arose during the third phase initiative: "Par ailleurs, on n'a pas cherché à recueillir le montant global de financement de l'opération avant d'en amorcer le démarrage (Kenkou 1990:90)." Overzealous planning and implementation provided a sterling project appearance but hid profound impairing effects for the long term.

Due to priorities placed on immediacy and efficiency in starting the project, the approach to planning and implementation of the settlement was blueprint, a design and operation uniformly applied without originality or tailoring of interventions according to site specifications.

La réalisation de cet objectif de colonisation est fondée sur les grands thèmes du discours habituel sur le développement rural, avec leur style traditionnel: encadrement du paysan, vulgarisation de thèmes modernes, mise en oeuvre de moyens techniques modernes, crédit-remboursement...au point que l'OMKV n'est pas en réalité que la reproduction de "modèle," tel qu'on le connaît depuis que les grands milieux financiers internationaux étatiques ou privés ont décidé de prendre en main le sort du paysan "sous-développé" (Gu-Konu 1983:940).

As is often the case with a blueprint model to development, FED's approach disallowed for any adaptation or flexibility in project guidelines. Results can be particularly acute when confronting unanticipated difficulties and obstacles common to development projects (BMB 1984). FED management and planning style lacked foresight, and precluded participation from settlers or local autochtones.

According to the Director (Dogbe), lack of time prevented preparation or mediation with the population . Most autochtones were unaware of the project, "La première indication du projet que les paysans ont aperçu était, comme ils le disent, 'Le nez du bulldozer (BMB 1984:81).'" This fact created complex problems for the future.

L'avis des populations autochtones ou des migrants n'a pas été particulièrement recherché à travers un dialogue franc et mutuellement instructif. L'origine étatique de l'opération et l'urgence des activités à entreprendre sur le périmètre ont largement imprimé à l'équipe d'exécution une approche administrative exacerbée, orientée vers une réalisation technique efficace des actions unilatéralement définie (Kenkou 1990:91; emphasis mine).

Because people do not realize their concerns and needs, the Director explained, we are required, the government and FED, to design strategies toward development for them (Dogbe, personal communication, 1991). The absence of participation, however, liberated settlers from any responsibility, and generated a mentality of dependency among settlers;

Le caractère social du projet a été largement pris en compte sans une participation effective des populations bénéficiaires. Ceci bien que favorable à l'établissement des migrants sur la zone a contribué, à cause de manque de participation, à accroître la conviction des bénéficiaires dans la jouissance des privilèges offerts par le Projet sans contrepartie spécifique (Kenkou 1990:94).

I agree with Kenkou, suggesting even further that "enjoyment without compensation" has damaged and undermined potential long-term success of the project, placing its overall sustainability in jeopardy. Two major reasons explain this peril: one, lack of participation precipitated autochthon-settler hostility, critically threatening the permanence of migrant settlers; and, two, it subverted settlers' sense of ownership and investment in their environment, leaving a vacuum for future responsibility and maintenance of the region.

A focus of this research is examining whether FED's approach inevitably causes settler long-term dependency on external assistance and guidance, "où il est appelé à demeurer éternellement assisté au prix d'une aliénation définitive de sa personne" (Gu-Konu 1983:994), or whether the legacies of FED offer seeds for freedom and sustainability.

CHAPTER 3 METHODS OF RESEARCH

The anthropologist must go into the villages, and see the natives at work in gardens, on the beach, in the jungle; he must sail with them to distant sandbanks and to foreign tribes, and observe them in fishing, trading and ceremonial overseas expeditions. Information must come to him full-flavored from his own observations of native life, and not be squeezed out of reluctant informants as a trickle of talk (Bronislaw K. Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, 1922:147).

This chapter is divided into two separate, but interrelated sections. Part one is a brief discussion of the strengths and weaknesses that characterize the use of inductive and deductive models of research in social science. Selection of research strategies has been an ongoing epistemological debate among researchers for years. Many have resolved this dilemma by synthesizing the two approaches into a holistic, balanced approach, using both quantitative and qualitative methods, tailored to the needs and concerns of their particular study. In this section, I will discuss each perspective separately, offer advantages and weaknesses of each, and conclude by explaining that research opportunities gained by incorporating a combination of both allow for a rigorous but more flexible research agenda.

Part two of the chapter describes the methodological design and approach conducted in this specific study. The fieldwork methods and strategies employed are described in detail, as well as reasons for utilizing particular techniques. In addition to the overall one-year plan of fieldwork, I give a detailed description of daily activities and challenges experienced in the field.

Deductive and Inductive Research Approaches

In this section I discuss two different commonly used approaches or models of data collection and of evaluation and analysis used among social scientists conducting field research. The first is a positivist, hypothetico-deductive approach wherein preformulated hypothesis are tested on a given population to evaluate outcomes. The second is an inductive approach, where research hypotheses and outcomes are context-driven, grounded in real world experiences and recorded observations.

Deductive Research

In its most pristine form, the deductive approach is dependent on a fairly high degree of exogenous or outside control. It is most often found in the literature in the form of controlled experimental designs. Founded by researchers Stanley and Cook (1966), and Cook and Campbell (1979), this type of research design aims to understand causality and relations of events caused by inputs on a given population by use of partial coverage programs. In this model, at least two randomly selected comparative groups are monitored, one the control, one the experimental group, in which net

effects of a given intervention (input) can be predicted from theory, operationalized, and measured. Equivalency of groups, large enough sample size and control against extraneous factors are necessary components for achieving accurate results. The primary criterion, however, is a theory-derived set of hypotheses predicting outcomes.

One criticism of the positivist deductive approach, using the controlled experimental design, is "whether or not a program produces effects different from what would have occurred without the intervention or with an alternative intervention" (Rossi and Freeman 1989:231). Identifying net outcomes in contrast to gross outcomes is difficult to do under recurring natural endogenous factors such as long- or short-term drifts (changes in birthrate, adjustments in intervention). In certain experiments, it is often difficult, or impossible, to obtain essential pre-tests (such as disease rates) needed to measure intervention outcomes. Equally challenging to ensure are other required criteria of experimental models, including randomness in the population, reliable instruments - able to measure the same results repeatedly, and validity of the test - measuring what is "intended" to be measured.

In response to these criticisms, the quasi-experimental design provides an alternative to the rigid requirements of the controlled model. Among different types of this design, the constructed control is widely used by scientists because the researcher accounts for, or controls for, the differences between compared groups otherwise accounted for by randomization. In rare instances, and as was true in this specific study, quasi-experimental designs occur naturally, that is, they are in place already in the given context. In this case, researchers use actual conditions to conduct

evaluations without the need to build control/comparison experiments. Observations and evaluations reflect conditions created by natural events in given situations.

A dangerous potential for error in experimental design lies in overlooking critical differences between groups that may influence outcomes. Large sampling populations allowing for statistical inferential analysis is one solution often used by researchers to overcome this persistent problem. There is no substitute, however, for knowledge of relevant features of the populations and intervention involved in the experiment to understand processes of influence and change under certain conditions (a number of techniques are reviewed below).

Inductive Research

In contrast to predicted outcomes, categories, and techniques of deductive research, inductive inquiry provides an alternate approach to fieldwork research that is more adaptive and creative and less rigid and formal. Inductive research allows for a multi-paradigmatic, multi-discipline, multi-technique strategy, avoiding

routine ways of thinking and paradigmatic blinders [which] constrain methodological flexibility and creativity by locking researchers into unconscious patterns of perception and behavior that disguise the biased, predetermined nature of their methods' "decisions" (Patton 1990:38).

Synthesis of Approaches to Research

The synthesis of the inductive and deductive models in a pure sense is essentially impossible because deductive research requires preformed hypotheses and

carefully designed methods of inquiry. However, the qualities of inductive research: pragmatism, appropriateness, context-driven, flexibility, informal, dynamic, openness, discovery-oriented, and holistic, can piggy-back on the deductive model in attempt to capture all process and variations of a given phenomenon of study. Research hypotheses are created to explain outcomes, inform theory, and discover new relations among isolated factors defined as components in a field of study. When performed properly, they are a combination of both inductive and deductive models of research, using tools common to each camp.

To build a quantitative-based study, familiarity and knowledge of the local environment, including social, political, institutional, economic, and physical components, are essential to increasing the validity of its conclusions. Once results are generated, usually by high-powered statistical programs, interpretation demands qualitative understanding. As Cohen (1973:490) stated it,

To do so without reference to a qualitative understanding of the sociocultural milieu is to endanger the empirical applicability of the quantitative findings and to keep theory-development separate from the real world.

Quantitative findings offer relations and strengths among abstract variables, which reflect social reality, albeit on a general and theoretical level. Without a descriptive, in-depth counterpart, through case studies, cited examples, open-ended interviews, and direct observations, quantitative findings risk appearing meaningless and abstract.

Weaknesses exist in both methods. Quantitative, nomothetic research risks oversimplification of variables and their interactions, overgeneralizing and abstracting important detailed information that could inform the research quest. Qualitative,

ideographic methods are prone to over-subjective, researcher-created conclusions, which may be unimportant or marginal to actual events or comparable situations. Additionally, the perception, opinion-based data often collected through in-depth interviews and participant observation methods of qualitative research are prone to subjectivity and unreliability, even under questionnaire conditions. Over-empathetic researchers may wander, building unjustified conclusions.

Avoidance of errors of subjectivity on the one hand, or oversimplification on the other, while maximizing understanding of actual research conditions is likely to occur through a combination of utilizing both methods, thus diversifying the means of data collection and analysis. Techniques in both camps used simultaneously ensure reliability, systemization, and openness to new knowledge.

Selection of research tools or methods largely determines results and findings. In other words, the goals of the research are what counts in choice of methods. Selection between quantitative and qualitative techniques is not a mutually exclusive choice. Rather, marriage between the two may be the most sound research strategy for producing a holistic and accurate analysis.

Research Design

Plan of Research

In this section, I present the specific research design used in this study. First I describe the one-year plan, followed by a detailed account of the methods and techniques employed in each fieldwork period. Reasons for selecting these particular

tools of research as well as the advantages and problems of each that emerged during fieldwork are discussed. I summarize the effectiveness of these critical choices by discussing strengths and shortcomings in the overall outcomes of the study.

In accordance to the original research proposal, the research consisted of two main phases: first, preliminary rural appraisals (PRA) of each site for approximately three months; and, second, in-depth site and household studies of each site for approximately seven months. The first month in country, as well as intermittent periods during fieldwork, was spent in logistical arrangements, introductions, and, most important, reviewing documentation from the National Statistics Division, the Ministries of Planning and Rural Development, the National University, and European libraries (Organisation de Recherche Scientifique d’Outre-Mer:ORSTOM and Communauté Européenne Economique:CEE).

Preliminary Rapid Appraisal (PRA). The fieldwork began with six weeks of preliminary data collection at each site. A Farming Systems Research (FSR) approach coupled with a preliminary rural appraisal (PRA) methodology (Hildebrand 1983, 1988), was used to gain an initial familiarity with the diversity of the physical regions, the people and their ethnic groups, systems of production, marketing and trade, social and political activity, available resources (natural and government), inter- and intra-regional activities, and other problems and issues of the sites.

This assessment was both directed and open-ended. A systematic inquiry of themes or topics was prepared, but also, a wide margin for new, unexpected information was incorporated into these surveys. PRA was the primary strategy used

throughout this research period. According to Chambers (1992), a pioneer of this methodology, the key principles of PRA consist of flexible, progressive, and rapid learning where diversity, relevance, and trade-offs are maximized, and the researcher adopts an attitude of optimal ignorance wherein one learns and listens directly on site from rural peoples.

During my research, many of the ingredients of the PRA method have been exercised, including "do-it-yourself" or participatory learning tasks (farming, water carrying, eating), key informants, focus groups, chain interviews, open and semi-structured interviews, questionnaires, participatory mapping, time lines and trend analysis, seasonal analysis, livelihood and well-being analysis, probing, case studies, and relaxed rapport. By living on site among settlers, I built trust and confidence with people and gained a wealth of knowledge regarding physical, social, and technical conditions (Chambers 1992:14).

Site visits. In the Mo plain, the principal extension agents (sector chiefs) of each of the two sub-regions in the area accompanied me on my initial village visits (refer to Figure 2-1). Together, we visited each of the forty-three villages in the region, interviewing each chief and his attendants. Following the PRA approach, the interviews were semi-structured, informal, lasting as long as people were interested and attentive (usually between about one and four hours) (see Appendix A). The aims of these interviews were to familiarize myself with each specific village. Questions centered around how and when villagers migrated, what ethnic groups inhabited the village, approximate number of families, relations with other settlers and autochthones,

specific problems in the village, needs and complaints, and other points they raised by them as relevant issues. While conducting these visits, the villagers and I prepared a rough census and ethnic mapping of the region, and reviewed village history and current development trends.

Also during this preliminary assessment phase, key informants (knowledgeable individuals of importance, influence, or both) were identified and interviewed. These people included functionaries, ethnic chiefs (men and women), first settlers, and other high status men and women. In addition, there were always opportunities for casual social interaction. For example, weekly market days, festivals, funerals, and the like allowed me access to enormous amounts of information that led to an understanding of village life.

At the second site, the settlement sponsored by the Fonds Européen de Développement (FED), a much more planned and organized zone where sectors and blocs are measured, I also travelled throughout the region to visit all areas (refer to Figure 2-2). In this case, I visited each of the five sectors and most of the constituent blocs (about ten per sector). I interviewed the majority of chiefs of each bloc, plus numerous important officials, settlers, autochthones, and clergymen.

In both areas, I garnered sufficient information to formulate initial hypotheses regarding people's lives in the settlement sites. Inductively, my research was informed and refined constantly by statements and concerns expressed repeatedly in my exchanges with villages. Gradually, these preliminary hunches and notions formed ideas about settlement conditions, as well as similarities and differences within and

between sites. Through use of both deductive and inductive approaches during the initial phase of the fieldwork (combining directed, guided questions with open, free discussion regarding local concerns) the groundwork was laid for the more in-depth, focused study that followed.

The next research phase consisted of three main tasks: (1) creating an appropriate and representative sample of the populations; (2) constructing a questionnaire; and (3) fostering knowledge accumulation on many topics from a wide spectrum of people in informal, open-ended interviewing. These were the key concerns guiding me into phase two of the fieldwork.

Building the Sample

A total of sixty-five households at all sites were selected through purposeful random sampling techniques (therefore, $N=65$). I selected Kabye as the core comparative group in the study because, first, their reason to migrate, lack of land, was essentially universal, and, second, they comprised the majority of settlers in FED.¹ I built a representative model of twenty households of Kabye settlers from the two sites, supplemented by ten households of other ethnic origins in order to reach as complete a stratification of the ethnic diversity in the sites as possible. In addition, I included three to four autochthone households per site, essential to study for a comparative and holistic regional perspective.

¹ In this research study, I have included the Losso and Lamba ethnic groups as Kabye (see Chapter 3).

In order to cover the range of physical and ethnic diversity in the Mo, I stratified the area by villages and purposefully selected ten villages randomly (thus establishing about 25 percent coverage of villages). I selected households by village because inter-village differences between households are much greater than intra-village differences. For example, among the forty-three villages in Mo, thirty, or 70 percent, are ethnically homogeneous, while the remaining thirteen villages are ethnically mixed. I found household similarities, including common systems of sociocultural, economic, agricultural, and lifestyle conditions, to be greatest within ethnic groups, which influenced my using ethnicity as the major characteristic of village selection.

Mo sample selection. The Mo sample consists of ten Kabye-dominant households, ten households from mixed ethnic groups, and ten from other-dominant ethnic groups. This sample has naturally captured the diversity of criteria I hoped would occur through randomized selection to provide an inclusive, representative sample. In addition to ethnicity and regional placement (location and town/rural distinction on site), diversity in duration on site (from one to thirty years), settler age (twenty-one to sixty-five), sex of head of household (three female-headed), and wealth variations occur. According to the information regarding village size furnished by the preliminary research, combined with advice from local officials and my own mapping, five of the ten villages of larger populations included four households, and the remaining five villages had only two households each.

Households were randomly selected by a technique created by the researcher when no available census or list of inhabitants existed (an example of fieldwork ingenuity). I asked the chief and others where they considered to be the center spot of the village. From here, I asked a young person of school age to help me in pointing to a number on a random number table between 1 and 360. By holding a compass, this number was the direction in which to walk to select a household. Then I asked a second volunteer to choose a number from the table between 1 and 20. Walking in the designated direction, we were to fall on the *n*th house, which would become the selected household. In all cases this technique worked and provided much amusement for all.

FED sample selection. Similarly, in FED, sample selection occurred by a weighting technique, where the sample was selected by sector in proportion to the population of the entire zone. In the FED case, official settlers consisted of both immigrants, predominantly Kabye, and autochthone households who opted to enter the project. Farmers who resisted the project remained outside FED boundaries as "hors blocs" ("outside blocks"), or were removed and, therefore, were not considered participants. To reflect actual site conditions, my sample consisted of twenty immigrant settlers representing the five sectors in the zone (sectors were created according to a time line, so that households from each would cover the longitudinal diversity of households). In addition, one autochthone settled from each sector was included, as well as one hors blocs, which served the same role as the autochthones on the Mo sample.

I built a stratified sample based on sector population to select the twenty household sample so that the most populated sector was most represented. For example, Broukou, with 286 households of the total 806 in the zone, or 34 percent, would represent 34 percent of the twenty household sample, totalling seven. Unlike Mo, in each sector, fairly updated and accurate lists of all farmer households were kept by extension agents. Households were randomly selected by this list and then verified prior to the start of interviewing. To attain a representative sample, households selected were also from different blocs making up the sectors (about ten per sector). Blocs were settled as units from former villages; some were explicitly younger farmers who had participated in an agricultural training program; and many households in some blocs were actually replacements of initial settlers (discussed below). These variations ensured a representative sample using the same logic in Mo.

Minor aberrations in the FED sample exist for purposeful reasons. In one instance, two settler households were added to the original twenty; one was a randomly selected household of ethnic origins other than Kabye (because I wanted to include at least three "others" in the study). The other, the household in which I lived throughout the duration of my stay in FED, was also included. Through in-depth interviewing, farmers gradually unfolded intricate stories of their histories that revealed the fuzziness of their status as either settler, autochthone settled, or hors blocs. Thus, former hors blocs were detected as autocthonnes settled, and autocthonnes settled then became hors blocs. Ultimately, the sample consists of twenty-two settlers, six autocthonnes settled, and four hors blocs.

The Questionnaire and Interviews

The interview process was both directed and open-ended, with both styles being used according to the interview situation. After five months in the field I constructed a questionnaire reflecting my research agenda and the issues expressed by people during that time. Convincingly demonstrated in Chambers' work (1992:35), preformulated questions on what outsiders feel the priorities are often overlook and ignore the farmers' needs and concerns, and can generate results that are inaccurate, inappropriate, or irrelevant to actual conditions. By synthesizing the emic and etic approaches, allowing for guided but open and flexible exchanges, I aimed for interview techniques that created a safe and friendly environment, enabling people to share their own experiences while also responding to my often marginal concerns. For example, in one FED interview, as I sought out reasons for tree burning, one settler persisted in discussing his ill health and visits to healers. Later in the interview, I learned that his headaches related to his sorcery accusations of other settlers over land conflicts. This subject was precisely my own interest and the reason for my probing concerning tree-burning episodes. Ultimately, the questionnaire served as a facilitator for discussion and free exchange, rather than a rigid plan to follow and complete.

I began interviews in the household compound and directed them to the head of household. Of the total sixty-five families, three cases were headed by women. In nearly all cases, a group of family members, including wives, children, siblings, parents, cousins, and the like, would participate intermittently in the interview. The

duration of interviews varied from about five hours to nearly nine or ten, the latter usually including other accompanied activities, such as farming, cooking, and eating.

The questionnaire provided the groundwork for interviews. It is a comprehensive, holistic inquiry, including sections on history, family status, agriculture, economics, income activities, natural resources, use of services, and opinions and attitudes of the settlement, their own life conditions, and the future.

In addition to the questionnaires, a critical component of the interview was the essential visit to farmer's fields. Here, we walked the fields, verifying crops planted, boundaries, and farming techniques, and discussing specific problems in the farming systems. Usually food was prepared in the field, and gifts were offered to me. Farmers appreciated my efforts to visit their fields, often located far away and difficult to reach. Time and time again they said they would never imagine a "white person" ever visiting their fields. Field visits offered me the opportunity to further bridge communication lines and gain trust and camaraderie with farmers by demonstrating a genuine interest in the most important activity of their lives.

Throughout the interviews I took extensive notes and then returned at night to write up the day's field notes. Processing the information enabled me to refine my ideas and incorporate new issues introduced by the farmers. Based on these initial analyses, I conducted a second interview cycle with a much more brief and focused follow-up questionnaire. The aim in this cycle was to clarify those fuzzy notions previously discussed and to probe particular issues that we were unable to explore. I found the second round to be less tense for both farmer and myself. Quite often,

important, sometimes sensitive issues were shared during the second round rather than the first. This is most likely due to familiarity, casual meetings during the period (such as in the market), and gained trust.

The interviews were conducted with the aid of an assistant who served as both translator and informant. One assistant in each site was used for each questionnaire. All travelling was done by bicycle, which allowed for greater hands-on, intimate contact with the physical and social environment. People became quite accustomed to my extensive pedalling from village to village; I was told often that it pleased them to see that I was not so different from them and could live like themselves.

I considered these perceptions of cultural adaptation and immersion invaluable to my research. I consider local level existence as a trade mark to rural anthropological research, for in large part to live among the people is the first and biggest step to being accepted by them and understanding their ways (Bowen 1954). In this vein, I opted to live in a local compound among settler families. In both cases I became an integral member of the household structure (for better and for worse), and when possible, participated in and contributed to, the household maintenance. This participation enabled me one of the most fruitful, insightful vantage points from which to study the internal dynamics of the settler household.

Many of the civil servants were horrified and resisted my plan to live beneath a thatch roof, on the farm, with no electricity or running water, amidst animals, babies, smoke filled courtyards, and the household coming and goings. Insisting on this living style was essential to my work. In this way I was able to become very

close to the family and their relatives and friends in a way I would otherwise never experience. It also offered me a family away from home, consisting of all the fun, sharing, frustrations, and ultimate sadness in departing. The family live-ins were certainly the most meaningful, enriching, and satisfying parts of the fieldwork, and extremely useful in the overall research.

During the fieldwork I also journeyed beyond the study-site borders, visiting the Kabye and other ethnic groups' villages of origin. In one outstanding research case, I visited the village and former household of one of the settlers in the sample, staying several days with the parents and remaining family members, visiting their fields and markets, and discussing the settlement history and success among those who resisted or were unable to participate in the settlement. I also interviewed canton chiefs and traditional elders in this village who were approached by the government prior to the FED settlement, and discussed with them their reactions and attitudes toward the project.

In both research sites, I interviewed autoctones who were either accepting of or opposed to new arrivals. I spent several weekends with one of the most powerful autocthone chiefs in the Mo, learning from him the changes and developments that had occurred since the influx of settlers. Similarly, I spent extensive time with a number of different key informants: extension agents, young male and female farmers, local traders, and chiefs from both regions.

To round out the planned, more rigid strategy of the fieldwork, I also disengaged myself from the design into less structured and spontaneous investigations,

which continuously led me to unexpected sources of information. Throughout the research, I made several day or overnight trips to surrounding areas, including several border towns in Ghana, to the nearby game reserve, and in FED, to markets, towns, and in both cases to riverain areas. I also ventured to the Onchocerciasis headquarters for socioeconomic development in Burkina Faso where I spent several days interviewing analysts and specialists of the Onchocerciasis Control Programme (OCP) planned settlement schemes.

Finally, I periodically travelled to larger up-country towns to meet with the Prefet and other important dignitaries of each region, to discuss planning, intervention, and future development of the areas. I met with evaluation teams and researchers from a host of governmental and nongovernmental organizations who also were helpful in my research.

Data Analysis

Data consist of qualitative and quantitative material. In the field, all qualitative work was entered onto a notebook solar-energized word processor. These data are organized and compiled according to fieldwork phases, and as Bernard (1989) suggests, are "manageable enough to hold in one fist and be familiar with first hand." These data are presented in forms of case studies, anecdotal evidence, and quotes. The qualitative and quantitative data are interrelated; the quantitative questionnaire and analysis largely depends on the in-depth, ethnographic research accumulated through the qualitative research.

All quantitative data gathered from the two questionnaires are entered on the Epi-Info program available for public use through the University of Florida. Following data entry, all questionnaire results were computed and verified. I then selected specific correlations between questions and ran a descriptive comparative analysis by site in the SAS statistical program with the assistance of a Northeast Regional Data Center (NERDC) statistician on the campus of the University of Florida.

In the final step, I constructed nine compound variables built from selected questions from the questionnaire by converting the questions into a three-level ordinal scaling from high-medium-low, 1-2-3 range. These ranges were determined prior to observing results, according to my own knowledge and prediction of the settlements. The compound variables consisted of three to twelve questions of scaled ratings, each adding up to individual values. The questions were then tested to corroborate their correspondence in each variable. This was done by Spearman's Rank correlation. In each case, the questions mutually reinforced one another in the same direction, assuring correspondence. In sum, each site has a mean value for each compound variable.

These compound variables are the dependent variables in the research in which I tested my hypotheses. Site variables are the independent variables, while the compound variables, including wealth, quality of life, environmental perception, and, most important, autonomy, are tested to identify differences between the areas.

Use of a multiple comparison technique at a fixed confidence level was necessary in analyzing the differences of means of the compound variables. One important advantage of this method is that it is not transitive, meaning that lack of significance of differences between means of some variables at a given confidence level does not mean that there lacks significant differences between others. It may be that differences were just not quite large enough to be significant at the chosen alpha level (Agresti and Finlay 1986:410). An inferential test of significance of differences of the nine compound variables was analyzed through the t-test and Wilcoxon Rank Sum test using the SAS statistical program (results presented in Table 8-11). The Wilcoxon test was done because of some concern about the distribution of some variables. Fortunately, both sets of tests agree. To control for the Type I error, the Bonferroni method was applied to both procedures.

Tests were run at the 0.011 alpha level, thus individual variables are at a 98.9 percent confidence level and a 90 percent confidence level exists for the tests overall. Therefore, the probability of avoiding a Type I error in the overall test is at 90 percent.²

² In the statistical results, findings of ** indicated highly significant, and * indicated marginally significant at a 98 percent level of confidence.

CHAPTER 4

PRESENCE OF STATE SUPPORT

To the extent that human beings believe that reality is fixed and nothing can be changed, and that they themselves simply are the way that they are and unable to do things differently, they accept a world that is radically flawed and try to accommodate to it, rather than attempt to change it. Moreover, in every historical period there is a thickly embroidered set of ideas that are described as "common sense," which are in fact the summary of a set of expressions by which people reassure one another that what is, is all that could be, and that one is foolish to try anything else. In most historical periods, this common sense is also dressed up in more formal garb—in the forms of religious, metaphysical, or (in the latest incarnation) scientific beliefs that serve to reinforce this deep conviction that nothing much can be changed (David Lerner, *Jewish Renewal: A Path to Healing and Transformation*, 1994:111-12).

Problem-solving among settlement farmers is examined in this chapter through two domains: first, infrastructural conditions and maintenance, and second, government representation and intervention. Both domains are critical features to the livelihoods of farmers in each settlement, and rural African populations in general. The first, conditions and development of infrastructure, includes roads, markets, and social services. In this section, I describe each settlement's infrastructural condition. I elucidate how varying degrees and approaches of state intervention have resulted in varying degrees of maintenance and local responsibility of these services. The second domain examined, the type and character of government representation and

intervention in the settlements, provides an illuminating comparison between settlements, which convincingly shows how broad and lasting residues are formed by initial state-society relations.

Infrastructural Conditions and Maintenance

Roads and markets, according to scholars of African development, are critical factors to inducing rural development (Bates 1981; Timmer, Falcon and Pearson 1983). It is clear that rural agricultural African communities depend almost totally on roads and market places for the exchange of goods, for small but needed cash income, for social interaction and essential news of local, national and (sometimes) international activities. Roads are a key determinant of economic sustainability and growth in rural regions of Africa because they enable transport of agricultural goods and portend the likelihood of market development. Markets did not guarantee desired prices, but offered choices, options and the freedom for farmers to evaluate, rather than submit unconditionally to nonnegotiable prices offered by "commercants" (traders) at the farm gate, or government-run parastatal marketing boards.

The two settlement sites are starkly different in regard to roads and market activities. Comparison of infrastructural conditions and maintenance in the settlements provides an accurate and clear example of differences between settlements. Evidence that illustrates why farmers may accept responsibility for their future infrastructural development demonstrates that empowerment and sustainability are largely results of differing degrees and strategies of government intervention. Below I describe

infrastructural conditions in each site, and offer explanations for varying degrees of local maintenance.

Infrastructural Privileges in FED

All infrastructural development and engineering for roads, bridges and pumps were designed and completed by FED, with the assistance from the government of Togo (the Prefecture and Ministry of Public Works). At the onset, there was no participation from or reference to the local population or settlers regarding the layout of infrastructural plans, construction or maintenance. During the project lifetime, the infrastructure was extremely well managed and groomed by the project.

At the onset of project closure, responsibility for future infrastructural reparations were delineated clearly in SOTED's "Après-FED" document (1987:34). The document specifies that primary roads, including the bridge over the Kara river, were to be managed by the Public Works Ministry (excluding the road to Kadgalla which the Kara Regional Rural Development will manage) while secondary roads in the zone were to be supervised by settlers via the settler Zonal Committee (CZ), financed through their solidarity fund.

Evidence of FED's road maintenance scheme is glaringly apparent today. Six years following the official project closure, erosion, degradation, water permeation and saturation have severely damaged the formerly well-graded roads in the zone. In some places during the rainy season, roads are totally inundated and impassable. The

condition of FED-built bridges, however, is the apex of infrastructural default in the zone, creating hardships for farmers and dramatically stifling market activity.

In addition to the impassability of several key bridges during the rainy season, the bridge over the Kara collapsed due to high water in 1991. The main artery to Lama-Kara, it is the primary access road into the zone. Despite its importance, the bridge remains impassable today with no reparations forecasted (in probing the issue with government officials, they vaguely told me that maintenance delays were due to lack of funds and that priorities lie elsewhere). The critical problem of sustainability lies in uncertainty of "handing over" responsibilities (Scudder and Colson 1982). Although final plans were made to define the location of management over infrastructure, the reality is uncertainty or neglect of transfer of authority.

Although the transfer of responsibility for infrastructure has appeared in print, it has not yet occurred within administrative lines. According to government officials, FED remains a zone of indelible advantage that many consider beyond need of assistance (relative to other, less advantaged zones). Thus requests for road repair or bridge reconstruction seem far less pressing than needs of other, less "gifted" northern regions. Consequently, little action has been done to ameliorate the situation, despite extremely limited traffic during the rainy season.¹

¹ Minor reparations and constructions have been started in the FED zone in recent years, but many projects linger and remain unfinished. For example, as a result of faulty planning and eventual inundation of the original FED bridge, the government began a bridge crossing between Broukou and Misseouta sectors, but final grading of the roads leading up to the bridge remained unfinished for at least one year during my fieldwork. Farmers thus continued using the older bridge that was covered with water in the rainy season.

Farmer perception of the erosion of road conditions is acute. Seventy-eight percent of FED farmers sampled said roads were worse than before, while only 16 percent have witnessed improvements (compare to Mo: 36 percent perceiving worsened roads and 36 percent improvement). Although autocthonous considered the infrastructure in the region much improved due to the project, settlers varied in comparing the conditions on site with their home villages. During informal discussions, many settlers, including many women, remarked that roads were better in the home village, and that being in FED was too remote. Settlers felt that good roads were a "right" of being in the project; road erosion was clearly disturbing for them.

Settlers have approached the Zonal Committee regarding road problems to no avail. Canton chiefs also seem to hold no influence in this case, thus all complaints are directed toward the government administration in Broukou. No efforts or initiative have been made by the local population themselves to improve either the roads or bridges on any significant scale other than occasional clearing of grasses. They are clearly waiting and expecting the government to solve the problems, wondering how bad the conditions will become. Initiative is lacking due to years of efficient and dependable government response to problems and degradation.

FED Market Activities

To complement road development, the central FED market place was also constructed by the project (some autocthonous claim there was an incipient market already in place, this point is debatable). Project assistance in building and developing

the marketplace, by providing roads and encouraging outside marketers to attend the market day, and by establishing farm prices through marketing boards, all buttressed the growth and development of Broukou market.

Despite robust activity of the Broukou FED market, there have been unanticipated obstacles undermining FED's authoritarian style in market creation and development, not the least of which was the harsh response of autocthonous to their perceived loss of control over the Broukou smaller secondary markets. Not only had FED officials declared the market uniquely a settler market, it endowed settlers with control to administer the weekly event, collect taxes from marketers, and conduct all relevant ceremonial and sacred performances.

Autocthonous responded violently by setting fires in the market place (presumed but not proven to be set by autocthonous). FED consequently redefined market policies by including autocthone participation in the management and control of the Broukou market, notably, tax collection. The market is frequented now more equitably by both autocthonous and settlers, I was told, and is represented equally by both parties in the market committee and meetings.

In FED-created secondary markets, specifically Agbassa and Agounde, autocthonous boycotted the newly established markets on principles of exclusion from FED. Consequently, the Agbassa market failed to grow due to social conflicts between autocthonous and settlers. Autocthonous simply travelled outside the region to other markets, or to Broukou. According to Kedagni (1989b:4), autocthonous boycotted Agbassa in favor of the more distant Broukou market because it (Agbassa market) had

replaced a formerly existing small but important "market of drinks [presumably for alcoholic consumption]."

Les autochtones mécontents ne s'y rendaient pas en guise de sabotage et préféraient Broukou qui n'étaient pas très éloigné. Les migrants, ne pouvant à eux seuls faire asseoir un marché digne de ce nom les ont également suivi vers Broukou (Kedagni, 1989b:4).

Alcohol, a familiar and acceptable part of rural-farmer life, was an appropriate symbolic medium by which autochtones vented deep-seated hostilities.

In a similar case reviewed in detail in Chapter 6, FED completely overlooked the locally existing market of Tchore and created a new market place in Agounde, within only a few kilometers' distance. Although Tchore market continues, it has significantly declined in population and importance. Autochthone residents feel a loss and dispossessed. In addition to the local Agounde market, FED also constructed a primary school in Agounde, which forced closure of the Tchore school built only years' previously. Outraged by this fact, autochtones boycotted the school, or sent their children elsewhere. In sum, Tchore autochtones have suffered losses due to FED interventions.

Lean Infrastructural Conditions in Mo Plain

In contrast to FED, the Mo plain, largely enclaved from the rest of Togo, has had, until recently, extremely limited access to the rest of the country. Consequently, until completion of the SOTOCO bridge in 1984, most commercial activity was conducted through Ghana (the cedi was the primary currency as late as 1987). With interest in stimulating and expanding cotton production in the Mo plain, SOTOCO

made a considerable effort in dis-enclaving the region and initiating development, including grading 64 km of all-weather roads. Farmers who planted cotton, and even those who did not, enjoyed a number of other benefits brought to them by SOTOCO. Roads were of primary importance, while storage facilities, extension services, pumps for potable water, and even health dispensaries and schools were also provided by SOTOCO to ensure minimal infrastructure to support a cotton-growing population.

SOTOCO interests were geared exclusively toward cotton production. This fact is demonstrated by the total lack of farmer participation or input into decisions regarding infrastructural development. The roads SOTOCO developed did not always duplicate routes formerly trod by local farmers. The case of Gnezime and Souroukou was continuously mentioned by farmers as negatively effecting their livelihoods (also see Chapter 6). It illustrates how unforeseen results of road development can acutely circumscribe economic activity and social status of villages. Formerly a thriving key regional village strategically placed on the main Tindjasse-Souroukou route, Gnezime and Souroukou were later completely bypassed when SOTOCO created the Boulo-Djarapanga-Tindjasse road (refer to Figure 2-1).

Decreased economic and social activity caused less activity in these villages, including visits from traders, officials and donors, church representatives and other outside personalities. When ideas were raised in Gnezime to organize clearing a route to Djarapanga, Souroukou villagers protested. The shift of the allegiance of Gnezime to another autochthon village was a loss of economic and political advantages and influence for Souroukou. Conflict of allegiance ultimately caused Gnezime's inaction.

Today, a well-cleared passage exists between Djarapanga and Gnezime providing for pedestrian traffic and generating trade between the two villages. Gnezime sustains a strong relationship with Djarapanga (due to proximity), although a rather cryptic form of traditional, formal deference persists between Gnezime and its former autochthon benefactor, Souroukou. Like FED, SOTOCO development resulted in mixed and unpredictable outcomes, beneficial to some, and rupturing to others.

Despite indications of Mo's fertile, highly productive soils of excellent agricultural potential, interest among government and nongovernment agencies (SOTOCO excluded) in the zone have been minimal until recently. In 1981, the Société Togolaise d'Études de Développement (SOTED) reported that the Mo plain deserved attention for development. Starkly advanced in their assessment, researchers encouraged development by gradual disenclavement through spontaneous immigration realized by basic, limited infrastructural support. Researchers noted that lessons learned from past immigration programs (specifically citing FED-Kara) illustrated investing large sums under delicate situations of directed settlement was less preferred than "induced development," requiring smaller financial investment. Encouraged rather than directed development was key to this approach:

Le volet immigration vise à encourager le déplacement spontané des populations des zones très peuplées (Sanda notamment) vers des régions fertiles et peu denses. Il consiste pour l'essentiel à la réalisation d'infrastructure: pistes, points d'eau, dispensaires (SOTED, 1981:13).

In concert with SOTED recommendations, government and non-government agencies have initiated development assistance to the Mo region. The Sotouboua Prefecture has been surveying the region, and in conjunction with outside donors

(primarily FED-Bassar) is drawing plans to improve and construct roads and several essential bridges in the zone. One bridge crossing the Okou river (on the main artery to Tindjasse) was completely constructed during my field research.² This passage will ensure year-round travel to and from Tindjasse, permitting continuous market activity throughout the rainy season.³ Also during my fieldwork, SOTED surveyor teams were in Mo assessing and measuring central routes for intended pavement.

The primary distinction between SOTOCO infrastructural implementation and current government strategies in Mo lies in objectives. SOTOCO essentially maintained one central agenda, to increase cotton profits. Government goals are broad, the most important being to gain access to food crops, to improve the conditions and welfare of the local population, to monitor Ghanaian borders, and to incorporate the region into structures of central administration. Participation of local leaders in infrastructural projects, such as the Boulo chief in road mapping, community village work groups in bridge construction, and village-chief meetings for decision-making, is an integral component in Mo development policy (Pounpouni, Prefet of Sotouboua, personal communication, 1992). Participatory involvement ensures greater appropriateness and local community ownership of projects.

Despite specific cases of development initiative, Mo settlers appear unenthusiastic toward participation, and pessimistic concerning government assistance.

² FED required local contributions (particularly soil, gravel, sand, and water collections) from surrounding villages for construction of the bridge. They also hired several local farmers on wage.

³ The Prefecture is also considering grading both the north-south route from Souroukou to Tchatchakou (the southernmost tip of the plain), and the Kagnanbara-Djarapanga route via Kpangame, which would shorten the crossing to Djarapanga by 30 km.

Consequently, they appear passive and disinterested regarding infrastructural progress, despite their preoccupation with its inadequacies. Initiative to organize for meetings or preliminary work has been slow. "We are waiting" was a common response to my questioning settlers regarding enthusiasm to launch projects. Meetings convoked in Mo generally have low attendance. Based on experience, little government attention exists in Mo, and many see no reason to organize or personally invest in the region until evidence materializes. Lag between government action and settler trust must be overcome before active local participation is generated.

Market Activity in Mo

The Tindjasse market experienced outstanding growth during the 1980s due to active trade between Ghana and Togo. Studies show that up to 90 percent of all commerce in Mo was conducted through Ghana before the bridge (Barbier 1984; SOTED 1985:15).⁴ Despite the bridge construction, the Mo plain has remained a remote and difficult region to access causing suppressed prices biased against local farmers. Travel to the region is treacherous, and outside of Ghana, Togolese farmers have few alternatives to market their crops. They are compelled, therefore, to sell their crops at exceedingly low prices. In turn, the crops are resold at three to four times higher than the price of purchase outside the plain.⁵ Marketers consequently

⁴ Until 1984, with the completion of the bridge, the Ghanaian cedi had been the common currency in the plain.

⁵ Painter (1990) found that during the rainy season market prices in Mo for yams and sorghum were about 50 percent below Broukou prices. During my own fieldwork, price differences between the two sites was minimal. The Mo-Lome price difference, however, was about 400 percent.

grew rich at the expense of the local farmer (excluded from profit sharing) (Bates 1981; Cohen 1988).

Common to rural farmers in Africa, Mo farmers feel little power against market forces and macro-economic conditions, and believe they have few alternatives to counter exploitation. This unfavored condition correlates directly to low farmer motivation for technology adoption. Poor sales has been the primary complaint and concern among Mo farmers; "Money leaves the forest." Most settlers agreed there was no incentive to increase production; "why increase production when we gain so little from market sales?" Smuggling (of bicycles, arms and other illegal or taxable goods) appeared to be one of the few alternatives for income revenue among Mo farmers. A lack of financial basis to initiate their own commercial activities, plus poor roads, were constraints to local entrepreneurialism.

In the wake of the emerging Tindjasse market in the mid-1980s, smaller satellite markets, such as Naboukoura and Gbanzaba, developed.⁶ These local markets were conducted primarily by Kotokoli settler women customarily walking up to 30 km to satellite markets to conduct business and purchase crop harvests for resale at higher prices in Tindjasse.⁷ Back in Tindjasse, the women resold their produce, primarily yams and cereals, to outside traders. (Their earnings paled relative to the traders.)

⁶ SOTED (1985) researchers found that in 1984, 65 percent of all agricultural production in the Mo, as well as to 63 percent of all manufactured goods (i.e., cloth, lanterns, radios, etc.), and 70 percent of prepared foods, imported foods such as tomato paste, artisan production, and livestock, were sold at the Tindjasse market.

⁷ Transport for Mo farmers is by bicycle, foot, or, rarely, by motorized transport such as a rented truck or van.

Despite the common complaint of outside exploitation, when one wealthy settler purchased a truck to begin commerce in the region, settlers evicted him, accusing him of sorcery (Chapter 5). Fear of exploitation from someone on the "inside" triggered this harsh response. Success by exploitation from outsiders was undesirable, but from insiders, it was intolerable. One SOTED study (1985) on commerce in Mo reported that 43 percent of outside traders have settled in the Mo plain permanently since the bridge construction. This obscures the dichotomy between in and outside regional marketers. Obfuscation of origins of traders could benefit both parties by placing them in mutual cooperation.

In reaction to volatile and unfavorable market prices, many Mo farmers opt for more stable fixed prices from farm gate cash sales to military personnel passing through the region. In search of low prices for provisioning the national militia, army personnel regularly circulate in Mo to purchase food crops, specifically sorghum, millet, yams, and rice, offering stable prices for standard 100 kg sacks.

Farmers and extension agents confirmed that exploitation and market fluctuations have brought high-cost risks, leading farmers to prefer guaranteed prices. Although selling crops on the open market is generally preferred, fixed prices offer Mo farmers an alternative to the exploitation they currently face. One agent explained that regional dis-enclavement and growth will encourage a competitive, more open market arena superseding current constrictions forcing fixed prices. He views market expansion as an outcome and motivation for greater farmer autonomy.

Tindjasse has been the epicenter of economic activity in the Mo plain.

Nowhere within at least 150 kilometers does such a large, diverse, and international market exist. In parallel, the social setting: the exchange of news and friendship (internationally) is dynamic. From sunrise to the following morning, Thursdays in Tindjasse have a carnivalesque atmosphere. Ghanaian personages, including political officials, agricultural agents, marketers, prostitutes and the like, are known to flock to the market. By Thursday, the town increases its population dramatically, according to some informants doubling in size to about 25,000 people.

Proximity to the Ghanaian border has been a primary influence in Tindjasse market growth. Diversification of goods, lower prices and integration of the two nations have stimulated market activity. Recently, however, the centrally located autochthonic market of Djarapanga has gained importance in trade as well. The emergence of Djarapanga as the primary commercial center of the plain, although supported by no official data, was recognized by most informants (including the Prefet, Regional Director of Plan, extension agents and farmers), as an important change to the region, bringing renewed status to autochthones.⁸

Several factors explain the transfer of market importance; first, development efforts in Mo have largely focused on Djarapanga due to its centrality, increasing population, and also, perhaps, its autochthoneness. For example, during this past year (1993) the Ministry of Plan has invested \$300,000 in the Mo plain, largely centered

⁸ For example, marketers once travelling to the Mo plain for the Thursday Tindjasse market now arrive Wednesday for the market in Djarapanga, which, combined with increased social services, specifically the dispensary, brings increased economic activity and prestige.

on Djarapanga, and to a lesser extent, on Tindjasse.⁹ These infrastructural and social service improvements promoted through small-scale government assistance have attracted new settlers to the central plain area.

It is important to note also that agreements to invest in market shelters and storage rooms were based on decisions mutually realized between the local population (autochthones and settlers) and prefectural officials.

A second reason for the rise of the autochthone market is that Djarapanga is an autochthone village with a stable population of longer duration than Tindjasse. In fact, many farmers are moving eastward, toward Djarapanga, where more vacant, alleged virgin land is still available. Tindjasse population ebbs and flows with political and economic trends within and between Ghana and Togo. The Tindjasse market expanded in the 1980s during a period of rapid settlement in the area (Barbier 1984). But with increasing road improvement in the plain, and more stringent controls on the border, less dependency on the Ghanaian market, and thus less fluidity in residence is limiting further Tindjasse expansion in favor of Djarapanga. Consequently, Djarapanga, consistently increasing in a population of more certain permanence, has emerged as the more constant and secure market in Mo.

In sum, improvement and growth of Mo infrastructure, including roads and markets, has been locally generated with participatory involvement. Improvements in

⁹ Projects include shelters and storage facilities in both Djarapanga and Tindjasse markets, bridges connecting the main route from Djarapanga to Kpangame, Tindjasse to Saiboude, and perhaps Djarapanga to Gnezime, sixty beds for the dispensary of Djarapanga, assistance on completion of the Tindjasse clinic, and a proposed Social Affairs building for Djarapanga (Kedagni, personal communication 1992, 1993).

roads and markets have evolved incrementally (excluding SOTOCO intervention) from felt needs and actual conditions.

Infrastructural-Related Initiatives in Mo

Related to road and market improvements, two other examples of infrastructural development poignantly demonstrate strategies of participatory collaboration between donors and farmers in Mo. Below, I briefly describe the two cases: the first, a long-established grassroots village health clinic program, and second, the government's local water-agent program.

Village Health Clinics

Inspiration for the current health care in the Mo plain initiated with the "case de santé," (small health clinic), a system inspired by a German nurse ("Gabby"), working in the region for over fifteen years. In the mid-1980s, after years of working with the national leprosy program throughout the Mo plain, Gabby initiated the first health service, a clinic of modest stature, in Saiboude, the most populated autochthone village in the zone at that time.

The case de santé is based on a philosophy of voluntary, participatory, community-based and supported action. The program design and implementation are simple and direct. If villagers are interested in creating a clinic, they are required to create a committee of ten persons and submit a letter to Gabby of their intentions. A substantial contribution in materials and labor is required from each village in

constructing the case. One volunteer, and in some cases, two, are selected as village health agents, and enter a training and certification primary health care program in Sotouboua. The clinics also include a modest pharmacy selling supplies acquired at low rates from expatriate donations.

Although the program is rooted in small-scale, local-initiative and farmer-responsive concepts lying outside of formal governmental operations, its goal is eventual inclusion into state programs. At the period of my fieldwork, ten clinics existed in the Mo plain, all of which were attached to one of the two existing government-administered dispensaries in Mo. Already, the Djarapanga dispensary was incorporating many smaller village clinics by overseeing their activities, providing services and supplies, and representing their needs to government officials. Gabby said she has played only a small role in clinic management precisely because they should be autonomous, then gradually transferred to the state.

With Gabby's administrative assistance and moral support, the first dispensary built in Mo, in Boulo, was built in 1985 as a gift from the Red Cross. Soon after Boulo, the dispensaries of Djarapanga (autochthone) and Tindjasse (settler) were initiated with major contributions from SOTOCO. Boulo was the primary site, she said, because it was distant from the Ghanaian border, and believed to be a "safe" location. Although the Djarapanga dispensary was completed by 1987, the Tindjasse dispensary was still in process at the time of my fieldwork, six years following construction inception.

The delay in construction of the Tindjasse dispensary, Gabby points out, exposes the heart of development failures. People do not recognize adequately the need, and/or are unable to organize themselves. The population of Djarapanga, in contrast, realized the need and importance of having a dispensary and have a well-managed clinic.¹⁰ Much of this success appears to have been shaped by Gabby's work with Djarapanga villagers (through education, vaccination teams, frequent visits and meetings). This lead people to understand and appreciate the benefit of health care. Also, because the population is primarily autochthone, unlike the ethnic mosaic of Tindjasse, people collaborate easier. For example, Tindjasse was incapable of building even a small and easily built thatch protection for a visiting vaccination team in the village, Gabby remarked. This was due to ethnic tension, preventing people from organizing and working together.

The impact of the clinic program is evident. According to evaluations by Gabby and other health officials, compared to visits without clinics, villages with clinics: have higher responses to visiting vaccination teams, visit health clinics more often; have improved hygiene; maintain their village pumps adequately; and contract fewer illnesses, including parasites, worms, and other food-related sicknesses. Based on her own monitoring, she found that visits to the clinics continuously increased and current rates were approximately 55 percent of the surrounding population.¹¹

¹⁰ The village also supports two women working as mid-wife assistants.

¹¹ She noted that dispensary rates may have decreased or undergone less than normal annual increase rates (using Boulo as the example) during this same period because, as local clinic visits increase, the central dispensary visits decline.

Villages without clinics will observe their neighbors and gradually perceive the need for themselves, but they must see it for themselves; "Ils doivent sentir les besoins [they must feel the need]," Gabby vehemently believes. A key element in this approach is the "tam tam de brousse," (drums of the bush). As villagers see or actually use clinics of other villages, they will begin to understand its benefits by example. Examples abound showing the contagiousness of the program; Agbamassoumou took little time approaching Gabby after seeing the success of the nearby Tchatchakou clinic; similarly, Folo has now requested a clinic following Kagnanbara's example. Even the FED-Bassar program has now solicited her expertise to implement her program in the entire Bassar prefecture. The tam tam de brousse tolls loudly.

An increase in numbers of dispensaries should not prevent the need or desire for clinics. Larger government dispensaries have their role in the structure, yet people also prefer their own clinic, easily accessible to them in their own villages with familiar health agents. Moreover, many practices employed in the clinics are indigenous traditions; local midwives are used in birthing, and local medicines, healers and traditional ceremonies are employed. Gabby supports a health care system of combined local and Western medicine; she encourages an adaptive approach to healing, in contrast to government dispensary agents who discourage local healing practices. Ultimately, farmers select their own health-care system based on perceived advantages from each, or they may alternate or use the two simultaneously. In sum,

the clinics are not alternative to, but rather an integral part of, the government health-care system based on village-empowerment and autonomy.

Inception of a Water-Agent Program in Mo

Until about 1985, only settler-dug wells existed in the Mo plain. By 1988, Painter (1990:28) reports, thirty-eight boreholes existed in Mo financed in the region by SOTOCO, UNHCR, and FED. Of these, only 50 percent at most were functioning during the period of Painter's research in 1988. During my own field research in 1991-92, fifty-three water sources existed in Mo, including wells and pumps, but among these, several (estimated at around fifteen) were nonfunctioning.

The transparent cause of nonfunctioning pumps was resistance to financial contribution among villagers. Financial and organizational constraints, however, were facades concealing the more likely cause of breakdowns, ethnic conflict. In a number of Mo villages, underlying conflicts and deep-seated rivalries between ethnic groups were translated into otherwise seemingly simple organizational constraints to pump maintenance. Affairs of the pump, I learned, reflected complex political relations. In one example, following the eviction of one settler, El Hajji (discussed in detail in Chapter 5), two of the four pumps in Tindjasse remained broken. El Hajji, as President of the pump committee (and the only person able to independently finance pump repairs), usually paid for pump repairs himself, despite that the total population was requested to contribute. After El Hajji was evicted, people correlated the position of President as a dangerous position of power that may be perceived by others as

authoritarian. No one wanted overt leadership, including for pump maintenance, and certainly no one wanted responsibility over money.

In the case of Kpangame, fights at the pump between women of Konkomba and Lamba ethnic groups were so heated that with the intervention of the water agent, alternate days and half-days were assigned for each ethnicity to collect water.

Difficulties in organizing construction of the pump wall (required to protect the pump from animals) have prevented the wall from being built by the villagers. The water agent informed me that Kpangame was a particularly challenging village to motivate and organize because of intense ethnic struggles over power. At present, a committee of both men and women are responsible for pump maintenance and collection of annual user fees.

The majority of villages in the plain confront similar obstacles to water-source maintenance. These cases demonstrate how development efforts, such as water availability in rural areas, are more than technical solutions; they are sociopolitical issues requiring intimate knowledge and understanding of the sociopolitical environment. In the case of the Mo plain, the government has recognized that consideration and integration of the population is essential to long-term functioning of the pumps and wells.

As a result, a locally based water agent (native to the region) works in Mo to foster organization and self-dependency. His primary objective is assisting villagers in organizing their own committees and fulfilling the necessary tasks to ensure a continual clean water supply. Inevitably, the large portion of his work is spent in

resolving sociopolitical problems, he confirms. The obvious solution to former ineffectiveness in maintenance: encourage villagers to do it themselves. This is a formidable task, but the alternative - government dependency - has proven ineffective. In sum, by collaborating with government and non-government officials, farmers are involved with the decision-making and implementation of infrastructure in Mo. The government-farmer relationship in Mo contrasts with that in FED, and results in different outcomes and potential for sustainability.

Government Representation

Dirigiste Management Style of FED

Governmental presence in FED has been pervasive and omnipotent, one of "total" control. Project administration exercised full power and control over the settlement through a hierarchical, top-down management style. Those administrative agents living (often reluctantly) on site followed and directed settler activities closely. The FED Directors were extremely dictatorial, hierarchical and strictly authoritarian. They served as the exclusive decision-makers and arbitrators over social, political, economic and environmental affairs in the zone.

After twenty years living under management regime, settlers appear overly dependent on outside, governmental leadership. For example, on several occasions during my fieldwork, I witnessed settlers and autochthones approach the Director concerning different types of problems and issues (often totally unrelated to the

administration) as if they were unable to solve the problems themselves.¹² For many settlers, the Director still functioned as the primary source defining and distributing justice, power and leadership in the region.

Redistribution of power at project closure exposes flaws and shortcomings common to top-down nonparticipatory development programs. These weaknesses are well illustrated through the transformation of power of canton chiefs. Prior to the project, the three canton chiefs (whose constituencies define the zone) held enormous status and authority in the region. FED bypassed canton authority by establishing its own political system. During the lifetime of the project, FED maintained little dialogue with canton chiefs. The chiefs and autoctones were displeased. "FED took too much power and never consulted us. We could not react," claimed one chief. "We were forgotten, not respected," said another. Some attributed this to the dirigiste management style of the Director, Dogbe. He allowed settlers anything to the exclusion of and even detriment to autoctones, said one chief. Distinction and enclavement rather than integration created settler-autocthone rifts that are coming to fruition today (Van Raay and Hilhorst 1981, McMillan 1995). Hostility toward FED and settler farmers has been a hard price to pay for FED neglect of existing autocthone authority systems. These hostilities, largely expressed through land tenure conflict, have been a determinant cause of settler eviction and project failure and will be further discussed in Chapter 6.

¹² On several occasions I observed numerous parties approach the Director to resolve a diversity of conflicts and problems, including land conflicts, financial problems, interpersonal arguments, theft, sorcery, and internal household disputes.

Years after project closure, however, a transformation in settler attitudes is emerging. Settlers are increasingly turning toward autoctones, rather than the Director, for regional management (see Chapter 8). Return of power to autoctones, and cantons in specific, after twenty years of FED intervention has undergone a slow re-emergence. This is encouraged by the Prefet of Doufelgou. Following project termination, the Prefet held meetings among the entire population to clarify that authority returns to canton chiefs. He advised settlers to direct their problems to cantons. In addition, he encouraged extension agents to work with the entire population instead of exclusively with settlers. Autoctones were pleased with this outcome, and viewed the Prefet as representing their interest, the "voice of tradition."

Nonetheless, confusion over roles and responsibilities remain, specifically among the Prefet, canton chiefs and the FED-created settler political structure, the Zonal Committee (CZ) (discussed in Chapter 6). Formerly sparsely inhabited villages of Broukou, Bidgande, and Agounde have now increased to significant populations with their own chiefs. Canton chiefs have been keen to recognize the influence of these chiefs and astutely integrated settler village chiefs as liaison chiefs with their own existing political structure. They have incorporated village chiefs to effectively manage settler populations. For example, the Alloum canton chief cooperates with Dofile, the Kabye settler chief of Broukou, to work with settlers in the Brokou area. Adjustment to a new political landscape has been instrumental in canton chiefs' reclaiming their long-lost power.

The fate of the FED-conceived Zonal Committee (CZ) is less clear and more problematic. The objective of the CZ was to prepare for and manage FED operations and activities at project closure (by use of the solidarity fund). It was the key organization to promote settler self-dependence, "Il est la structure responsable de l'animation de toutes les actions communitaires (SOTED 1987:40)."

Today, the CZ enjoys little authority or influence over the zone. Settlers have mixed views regarding its fate. Some settlers and officials believe the CZ should continue; others prefer that the CZ relinquish control, specifically over the solidarity fund to the Prefet; still others suggest control over funds should be transferred to the canton. In fact, all of these perspectives are hollow because the CZ has ceased to operate in any capacity other than individuals whom persons may approach for personal advice. The CZ is essentially defunct, a flawed concept, or at best, problematic and inoperative. Settlers, autochthones, and especially cantons do not consider the CZ a viable political structure. It represents FED's past dictatorial control in the region and autochthone exclusion. As the Alloum chief said, "Maintenant? Le CZ? Zéro!!"

At least one project evaluator attributes CZ problems to fundamental flaws in the initial project design (Kenkou 1990:99). The cause of these problems, concludes Kenkou, is that CZ ideas were written onto the project near the end of the funding, an afterthought, allowing insufficient time to verify their potential impact and difficulties. Transfer of responsibility without previous local involvement cannot occur too quickly.

Despite the wane of the CZ, chefs blocs continue to hold great power within FED sectors. One reason for their sustained status can be explained by their selection process. These individuals were chosen by consensus by settlers in each bloc. Means of arbitration within their constituencies were often by consensus and negotiation, not by authority. The continued function and respect of chefs blocs exemplifies where sustainability holds greater potential under farmer freedom and self-empowerment. Also, it illustrates successful merger of pre-FED and post-FED political systems.

Settlers and project staff overwhelmingly agree that, "FED changes were too abrupt," far too heavy, and too fast. Farmers were ill-equipped psychologically or economically to bear immediate responsibilities (including agricultural and socio-political). Scholars underscore this problem as key to learning lessons. Kenkou (1990) asks, how can a population having received generous assistance up until a given point be convinced that the funding is truly over and that they are now responsible for a socioeconomic situation determined completely by the project? How can the people understand that they now are in charge of what the project created "for" (not with) them?

FED-Agbassa is an example of a more general problem that affects development programs in Africa. Most development projects have created transitory structures of access to productive resources, yet projects are often implemented as if they were permanent. Projects are frequently centralized, with little active input from local populations, and create dependency among beneficiaries. Given the artificial and temporary nature of these project structures, planners should ensure that local populations are actively engaged in development-related problem solving from the early stages of project design and implementation. This will increase the probability that planning options reflect local knowledge and perception, and will better prepare local populations for the end of project support (Painter, 1990:19-20).

Processes toward Integration in Mo

Integration of settler populations in Mo differs from FED. In Mo, two types of state-society relationships exist: between the state militia and settlers; and between the Prefet and local farmers. These liaisons demonstrate collaborative, mutually reinforcing associations maintained between the state and local farmers. Mo state-society relationships are founded largely on principles of reciprocity, support, open exchange, and respect for specific domains of authority and exercise of power. These cooperative and interdependent alliances are in stark contrast to the hierarchical and authoritative structure of state-society relations established in FED. Accordingly, the contrast in impacts and results of these divergent relations are apparent. Below, I describe these conditions, and analyze their causes and outcomes.

One key factor to understanding the development of state-society relationships in Mo is the existence of an already existing groundwork laid for adequate local self-maintenance and rule. Confronted with no alternatives, farmers in Mo are forced to be self-reliant. For example, problem-solving occurs on the ground level: in ethnic groups, village courts, autochthone villages, or through settler-autochthone meetings. Conflicts are seldom carried to higher levels of arbitration located outside the plain.

The militia in Mo. Neglected and isolated from mainstream Togolese administration, the Mo plain first received governmental representatives only when a modest military base was stationed in Saiboude (the largest autochthone village close to the Ghanaian border) to monitor events during the Dagomba-Konkomba war in the late 1960s. Although falling within the Prefecture of Sotouboua, the physical barriers

surrounding the plain prevented any prefectural visits until the construction of the SOTOCO bridge in 1984.¹³ SOTOCO development opened the Mo to gradual state intervention by generating contact between the population and the army and Prefet.

Key figures holding officially recognized authority in Mo include soldiers, affiliates of the Prefecture, and superior chiefs. Their interaction, rather than existing hierarchically, is one of cooperation and mutual reinforcement. They are interdependent, compared to conflict-ridden or hostile. The chief army officer of four years in the Mo plain described this relationship, "We collaborate as one service. The Prefet, the army and the chief are one acting body in justice." He explained that each leader has its own domain: the army treats cases of theft, while the chief handles cases over debt payments, women, land conflict, and internal affairs. Although the chief is often the first to know of problems in the village, he said, we each have our spheres of power, although these may change because of different reasons or situations over time. "What is important is that we stay in good contact continuously with each other," he said. We continually inform one another of new cases and outcomes of others.

However, the current political atmosphere surrounding chiefdomships in the plain is strained, the army chief explained, due to tension between the newly elected Tindjasse chief and the autochthone chief of Djarapanga. The mild style of rule of Lina (the new Tindjasse chief) appears indecisive. Because Lina is the first elected settler

¹³ Before the bridge, only the secretary of the Prefet visited the region, and that irregularly, to conduct broad informational surveys and censuses, and for political campaigning.

chief in the plain, he feels pressure and anxiety over evolving changes in ethnic power and control (democratization in Togo has heightened this anxiety). Consequently, Lina works cautiously. At a glance, one might characterize him as incapable or indecisive in public; he is far from impotent. Rather, he is a chief ruling during a precarious, unstable transformation period in Mo and in fact, is shrewdly responding and adapting to continuously changing subtle sociopolitical forces.

The Prefet in Mo. The second indication of state presence in Mo is the Prefet (equivalent to governor). Enclavement severely prevented former Prefets from visiting the plain. An annual visit from a Prefet to the Mo plain was considered exceptional. During the pre-bridge period, one long-term settler remarked, "We were lost in the bush. We presented our concerns and problems to the Prefet but we were not heard. We were forgotten, especially when it rained." During one six-month period of my fieldwork, by contrast, the Prefet visited the region on at least four occasions.¹⁴

Increased accessibility and interest in Mo has generated more frequent visits by the Prefet. For example, the first Prefet's visit I observed was a "reconnaissance" or rapid appraisal that the Prefet conducted with a World Bank surveyor (an obvious clue to potential development programs in the future). The Prefet held small private meetings with chiefs, then a fairly brief public gathering in Tindjasse (apologizing for being unable to visit all corners of the plain) to express his concerns and interest in developing the region. Another issue he underlined was solidarity and union among

¹⁴ This Prefet was newly appointed to the region and had assumed his post only a few months prior to my arrival. The fact that he travelled to Mo so early in his assignment was indicative of his unusual interest in the zone.

ethnicities; "you must have cement between you all. The Kotokoli (autochthone) and Kabye (settler) all must be unified to work together. We cannot advance without unity." He encouraged people to be patient in the transitional democratic period and to avoid disorder by living peacefully and paying their taxes (inconceivable in the past).

The Prefet also visited Mo plain following the forced eviction of El Hajji from Tindjasse (Chapter 5). With the diplomacy and delicate political manoeuvring of any ambassador, he calmed the population, examined the situation in-depth from all sides and perspectives, and resolved, at least temporarily, the violent and dangerous rage running through the town. The Prefet's approach on this and other occasions was atypical of the traditional governmental authoritarian dirigisme employed by Togolese officials. Rather than employing a strong-fisted dilettantism, his style was interactive, communicative and conciliatory. He counseled and listened to people. He advanced slowly and humbly in gaining knowledge and understanding of long-standing conflict and tensions between settlers and autochthones, as well as between the population and Prefecture.

Imposed freedom. "Dirigisme is over," the Prefet told me, "now the dictator is the majority." The motivation for this shift in approach, he explained, is democracy, a pluralistic notion based on divergences of ideas that must be canalized (Pounpouni, personal communication, 1992). We must allow for and benefit from forces of initiative and differences. No longer recipients of commands, people insist on dialogue. He must now justify and explain his position to people, defend himself,

he said, and communicate rather than demand. "It is much harder work now," he admitted, "it is like a marriage."

Existing traditional political systems, specifically chiefdoms, should not be overrun, he explained. We must revalidate traditional chiefdoms by modernizing them, for example through elections as in Tindjasse. We must also modernize our laws and systems of adjudication through democracy. "We must impose freedom to choose," he suggested, by leading people to the ideals of democracy. We must associate with people instead of directing them, and lead them to recognize the benefits of this new approach.

According to the Prefet, participation is key to success. "The farmer must be associated with development" he said, because we [the state] cannot do it all. They too must share responsibility in all areas. They must feel the needs, which will carry them in developing and making improvements. Modern is not always better, he asserted, and because funds are lacking, leading people gradually to develop is the best solution.¹⁵ Meanwhile, we can evaluate what works and adjust accordingly. He agreed, Mo has been "un coin oublié" (forgotten corner), and the state can disenclave and initiate infrastructure, promote commercialization and help attract funds, but the state cannot and should not do it all.

The case of protection of the Malfacassa national park exemplifies well the Prefet's participatory approach to development (also reviewed in Chapter 7). The national park service is attempting to "enforce" local participation in the protection of

¹⁵ This idea clearly exemplifies Hyden's (1983) argument in *No Shortcuts to Progress*.

the flora and fauna by associating the population; in effect, motivating people to participate in park protection themselves. On one occasion, I observed an animated, powerfully tense debate between an extension agent and settler villagers of Folo regarding the long-standing controversy over the state's enforced protection.

The tension was initially caused by farmer resistance and protest to the ordinance prohibiting cultivation within the boundaries of the park. Many farmers continued to farm in the reserve clandestinely, setting bush fires to clear the land and hunting. The parks administration suppressed this unlawful behavior with increasingly harsh penalties, including steep fines and imprisonment. Due to perceived excessive and unreasonable punishment, farmers demonstrated their disapproval with harsh retaliation. In early 1991, they forcefully evicted the forest agent from Boulo village, who fled for his life without even his personal belongings. Consequently, there is no forest agent in the area, leaving the extension agents the task of park control.

The new strategy for park protection is changing the dominant role of the state. People are to assume more responsibility for their environments now. The result, however, according to one agent, is that people are now doing what they want, planting in disorder in the park, killing the fauna, and even threatening each others' lives. People are destroying environments after years of protection, he believes, because they misinterpreted responsibility as doing whatever they pleased. During one meeting, the agent explained to the villagers, "Development is up to you, you are now responsible. Things have changed since your forefathers, there are new rules." This is the unfortunate effect and outcome resulting from initial farmer exclusion from

decision-making, in this instance, of park policy. Effects of former nonparticipatory strategies to development were producing onerous and irreparable results, even in Mo.

Mo settlers and autochthones alike welcome development, but dislike government enforcement in their lives. For example, many farmers believed the enforced election in Tindjasse imposed by the government was not good. The Boulo chief explained;

The government is breaking the people's traditions and a formerly established hierarchy by supporting an election rather than continuing the custom of the Djarapanga chief appointing the Tindjassé chief. We have always conducted the chiefdoms ourselves and now they are changing this. They don't follow our rules. The government wants to decode everything and we are obliged to accept this, although we don't really accept. But because we want things to come, like infrastructure, schools, clinics, we do not argue with the government (Boulo chief, personal communication, 1991).

When government compels development, farmers are prone to submissiveness, risking long-term dependency difficult to overcome. The Prefet's approach toward development is a viable and compromising solution. He advocates an "assisted," farmer-initiated strategy founded on dialogue, discourse and exchange with the population. Only under unusual duress, such as the El Hajji affair, has he actively or forcefully intervened. Development projects must be based on real needs voiced by the local population, he believes. Initiatives in Mo have been small-scale, incremental efforts which in many cases, such as the dispensary or pumps, require contribution from the local population. Handouts in Mo, unlike in FED, are rare.

Nonetheless, many Mo farmers are fatalistic (see Chapter 8). They believe that they have no power to affect change, that other villages must speak for their needs, and that only the government can make a difference. Many Mo farmers feel helpless (as individuals or as small villages) to improve their own lives without outside aid.

Civil servants working in the region can and do play important catalysts for change and development. The school Director, soldiers, extension agents, and social affairs agent in Mo have been influences toward motivating local organization. They have stressed to villagers the value of collaborating with civil servants to improve conditions and solve problems. During village meetings, they have helped farmers focus attention on pressing concerns, such as pricing of mills, transport, building village latrines, planning meetings and conducting a census. One limitation to this assistance is the short-term residency of civil servants in Mo. Most civil servants are replaced within a few years. Should ideas and organization rely on one or even several civil servants, sustainability is precarious and questionable. This fact underlines the importance that sustainable development begins and ends with involvement from local people.

Conclusion

As FED illustrates, developments introduced and implemented from external sources are often short-lived. Nonetheless, some forms of government assistance are beneficial and essential to providing sustainability (natural resource management) (Painter 1990:viii). Painter (1990) suggests that assistance from governments, NGOs

and other donors is necessary to ensure access to technologies for production and management of natural resources. Similarly, development of infrastructure and social services must be supported by the government. But local participation in these efforts is key to local responsibility and long-term success. Less addressed by Painter, the question of how to encourage participation is of essence in the struggle toward local empowerment and sustainability, and should be the core concern for future development policy-makers and researchers.

The Mo plain offers lessons about increasing local participation and empowerment in development projects. Incremental improvements with local decision-making underlie current development of infrastructure in Mo. Government representatives, in parallel, function in collaboration with the local population, rather than authoritatively. Government assistance replaces former centralized, top-down and government-provided development schemes. As a result, local farmers gradually perceive themselves as making a difference, and engage more actively in improving their own conditions than if state control were omnipotent.

How state intervention affects infrastructural conditions and government relations in settlement provides a launching point for further analysis of problem-solving. In the following chapter, I examine effects of varying degrees of state intervention on the social organization and interaction between settlers within both settlements to understand where and how problem-solving is most effective in leading to farmer empowerment and sustainability.

CHAPTER 5

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND SETTLER RELATIONS

The fact that we are constantly choosing between different values without a social code prescribing how we ought to choose does not surprise us and does not suggest to us that our moral code is incomplete. In our society there is neither occasion nor reason why people should develop common views about what should be done in such situations (F.A. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom*, 1944:57).

In this chapter, I examine problem-solving by comparing settlers' forms and perceptions of social interaction and organization. Findings presented in this chapter demonstrate how varying degrees of state intervention affect inter-settler relations in the two settlements. Data in this chapter show how settlers' ability to negotiate and resolve conflict, and capacity for community decision-making, have been formed largely by the type and strength of state control over their lives. Also, comparison between sites of the variation in types, scale, and breadth of associations offers important lessons regarding the importance of local support systems, group consciousness, and participation and responsibility for the sustainability of community projects and development.

Social Processes for Mo Plain Settlers

Settler Entry into Mo Plain

Familial ties among Mo settlers. In the Mo plain, family relations and personal ties form the liaison facilitating settler relocation (Table 5-1). The "tam tam de brousse" (bush drums) is the prime medium for recruitment in Mo. Upon arrival, all settlers sampled responded that once arriving in the region they were received by either family members, friends, ethnic "brothers," or referral contacts (Table 5-1). Farmer-to-farmer relations best characterize the new-settler entry into Mo.

In Mo, countless examples exist of migration by tam tam de brousse. One settler in Soli village financed his parents' and siblings' transport to the Mo plain and gave them his house while he completed a second house for his own family. My own research assistant also financed his fathers' arrival to Mo. In Sangouli, an entire line of lineage resettled together and established their own village. Soli, a settler of long duration, lured people from his home village of Pya into following him resulting in the creation of Solidé (village of Soli). The village of Agodji was created by seven families from Kande who settled together ten years ago. The chief of Sila was offered land by his brother-in-law already in Mo. The Bolkatanga chief sent word home to Kande for his brothers to join him. When among their own people, settlers feel less like "strangers" and are inclined to stay. Family presence encourages permanence, compared to settling alone.

Particularly during the early years on site, settlement in Mo is an arduous and challenging pursuit (Scudder and Colson 1982). Land clearance, house and granary

Table 5-1. Comparison of sources of settler information and sponsorship.

| | Mo | FED |
|-----------------------------------|-----|-----|
| Initial source of information (%) | | |
| family or friends | 83 | 19 |
| project or government | 0 | 74 |
| other (including self) | 17 | 7 |
| Sponsor upon arrival (%) | | |
| family or friends | 100 | 0 |
| project or government | 0 | 48 |
| other (including self) | 0 | 52 |

construction, introduction to a foreign physical and social environment, severed ties with home support, all contribute to a strenuous and stressful entry period. A familial social environment at entry fosters interdependency and mutual support among settlers from the start. An informal "social security" system is created among farmers, including autocthonous, which facilitates problem solving and ensures survival.

Abundant examples exist depicting the interdependency and mutual aid between early and later arriving settlers. Usually, new settlers (including husband, wives, and children) are housed by their "sponsor" family until their own home is built. As mentioned above, house construction and initial field clearance is completed typically through a communal work force comprised of familial and ethnic relations. These episodes are performed usually with much joviality and festiveness, exhibited by the final ritual celebration of a newly built house. In return for this support in early settlement, new arrivals were expected to provide labor in their sponsor's fields, household, or otherwise, and offer food and drink for the labor of helping

community. Resourcefulness, communalism and interdependency, rather than isolation and independence, are attributes most respected and employed during new settlement.

As described in Chapter 2, a key factor underlying settler arrival and settlement patterns is ethnicity. People of the same ethnic group generally settle together. They share a common language (or root language), similar traditional customs and ritualistic practices, such as ceremonies, celebrations and festivals, and practice comparable social and economic practices. They feel most comfortable, "at home," among their own (extended) family.

Land distribution. One of the critical determinants of permanence in resettlement is land. In Mo, land-distribution practices followed traditional custom *bina ma bina* (I eat you eat): land was shared to those in need while respect for original, recognized "owners" of the land ensued. Autocthones controlled land allocation by administering land rights to new settlers.

Land acquisition was nonetheless facilitated by ethnic relations. Soon after arrival, new settlers were led by their sponsor (invariably of the same ethnic group) to the paramount autochthon chief in the area (at Djarapnaga, Tindjasse, Boulo, or Souroukou). Following formal introductions (including ceremonial offerings and drink to the chief), the new arrival was given land. Ordinarily, the chief would simply point in a broad and vague stroke of the arm to the direction of the land. In this case, the sponsor himself was responsible for directing the new settler to unoccupied land close to his own farm. The settler was then "expected," but not formally asked to return to the chief after his first harvest to report on his land holding. Through token gifts of

appreciation (a small portion of his first harvest), the new settler was then recognized legitimately as a farmer in the zone. In many cases, out of respect for autocthonous, farmers have continued sending token gifts of harvest or drink to the chief annually.

This system of land acquisition operates relatively smoothly, with few misunderstandings or conflict. Land abundance allows for this loosely controlled land-use system. In addition, the shared ethos of social responsibility, a value expressed through the medium of *bina ma bina* and "respect" for others, ensures acceptance toward others and honor of the land-use system.

For example, when limits of land were uncertain or trespassed (intentionally or not), individuals approached one another directly: in serious cases with the witness of the sponsoring settler, and in the most grave cases, before the autocthone chief himself. Rules of land distribution and use were normative, legitimately recognized indigenous policies. New arrivals were initiated into the system by both their sponsor (informing them of the norms and proper activities) and by the autocthonous (reinforcing these practices).

A new settler's behavior determined his own reputation, and also it affected the reputation of his sponsor (to whom he owed allegiance and tribute) as well as his own ethnic group and settlers who may follow. In Mo, respect for early settlers, the "elders," was strictly observed. Common to traditional farmers in African societies, the Mo settler is not a "lone ranger" carving out an independent niche. Rather, he represents a family and ethnic group comprised of relations far exceeding his own household.

Importance of Ethnic Associations in Mo

Deriving from ethnic alliances are a wide spectrum of formal and informal organizations and associations of more and less importance. These groups contribute to the promotion and development of social welfare in Mo both positively and negatively. One valuable attribute of ethnic groups in Mo is their role in ensuring a morality and social responsibility among settlers and autochthones.

In Tindjasse (the largest settler village in the plain), each ethnic group delegates a chief serving as leader to the group whose responsibilities include: mediator of conflict, representative (for all-village meetings), decision-maker, collector of funds and other contributions for village affairs, and role model. While in Tindjasse, I participated in an array of ethnic-based functions including meetings to collect yams for a festival among Konkomba, judgements over unhappy wives wanting to leave their husbands among Lamba, funerals among Konkomba, marriages among Kabye, and the local court. Below, I describe several noteworthy cases that give meaning to the importance of negotiation and participation in settlement.

Local court in Tindjasse. An excellent example demonstrating participation through negotiation is the local court system in Mo. The primary mechanism for conflict arbitration in Tindjasse is a form of judicial court or public forum. This is held on "kupo," one day of the week for rest, leisure and community activity.¹ On kupo, judgments of offenses and misdemeanors occur at the chief's overhang.

¹ I describe Tindjasse because it is the largest and most important settler village in Mo, and one in which I spent substantial research time. Djarapanga, and Boulo also hold courts. Once a common form of arbitration in rural villages throughout Togo, local courts are being superseded by state forms of conflict resolution.

Characteristics of court are pertinent and informative to understanding how ethnicity influences the types and process of conflict resolution in Mo, and how it affects unity and sustainability in the region through public process.

The most important aspect of the court is its legitimacy for arbitration. Arbitrations of conflicts between settlers, or settlers and autoctones, that are brought before the court are considered conclusive in nearly all cases (I never once heard accusations of unfair judgment). There are usually four or five judges sitting on the court, each representing their ethnic group. Each judge enjoys the reputation of possessing wisdom and fairness in mediation.

The process of mediation is by consensus among judges, but indirect input from assembled observers inevitably transpires. After pleas are presented by both the accused and plaintiff, each judge will vocalize his opinion and justifications, permeating with historical, traditional, and moral lessons. To adjourn, the head chief synthesizes the information and announces a final verdict and sentence. In some cases, when particularly difficult cases occur, a reputable fetisher (from any ethnic background) may be summoned to conduct specific ceremonies to learn the truth from ancestral spirits.

Not all cases of conflict are brought before the court. In many instances, the two parties will refer their problem to a lower-level arbitrator first, beginning with perhaps an elder of the neighborhood, and then the ethnic chief (66 percent of Mo farmers sampled responded that the most common form of arbitration used was using the court, followed by negotiating among themselves or with a third party, both at 16

percent). Choice of arbitration often depended on the case and severity of the problem. Generally, land conflicts were resolved by autocthonous, while cases involving settlers were resolved in settler courts. In one instance, two settlers argued over land and resolved the problem with the autocthone chief of Souroukou, where the land existed.

Using the court is an expensive and publicly shameful event. Each party must initially pay 1000 CFA, and the accused must pay an additional 300 CFA for the delivery of the convocation. At the end, the innocent party retrieves 700 CFA, while the guilty party loses the total payment. There are frequently ten or more arbitration cases per kupo. Often a substantial crowd of witnesses, interested persons, and curious observers gathers about the scene. The cases are a public affair serving the important role of illustrating acceptable norms and regulations of behavior within the community; they also serve as entertainment, amusement and a social gathering for many.

The range of cases spans widely across locale and time. In one case, a young woman reclaimed a debt from an old man who owed her (now deceased) mother since twenty years in Ghana. Both parties were Lamba. The debt transpired just prior to the Busia repatriation period, when many Togolese farmers were forced to return to Togo. The judges ruled that the man should pay the 10,000 CFA. After two weeks, the woman returned to court, convoking the old man again, complaining she still had not been paid. The man was pitifully poor and unkempt, obviously lacking any financial or social support. The crowd felt pity; no verdict was made; and the woman

departed with some irritation but apparent understanding. The case demonstrates community memory: the longevity of unpaid debts (inter-generational) and the distance of the debt (since living in Ghana); and the function of consensus, monitoring economic interactions and encouraging relief when appropriate.

In another case, a dispute evolved over ownership of mango trees between an elderly Lamba settler of long duration and a young Konkomba recently arrived on his brother's land, both from the nearby settler village of Sebonia. The brother was given the land by the Lamba to plant trees. The brother, however, left for Ghana and was succeeded by his younger brother. But the younger brother did not present himself formally to the Lamba. The Lamba claimed that before the older brother's departure, he "returned the trees" to him and asked him to survey them in his absence. When the mango fruits ripened, the children of the young Lamba brother gathered a large bag of the fruits to consume and sell. The Konkomba believed this a theft, and consequently planted beneath one tree a visible and distinguishable fetish to attract lightning. In fear for his life and those of his children, the Lamba convoked the Konkomba to court for arbitration over ownership of the trees.

The judges (including Lamba and Konkomba chiefs, among others) resolved that the Konkomba was at fault for lack of respect in not presenting himself. This verdict illustrated and reinforced well the importance of observing norms and traditional customs of respect between people. The Lamba, being a first settler and prominent elder in the village, should be honored because of his duration on site and also his age. This court case clearly served as a symbolic lesson for other community

members that respect and veneration for first land (and tree) owners remained portentous.

A third case involved two Konkomba farmers disputing over the price of labor. The plaintiff said he hired the laborer for 400 yam mounds at 2000 CFA worth of yam seeds, while the defendant said it was 300 mounds for 1500 CFA of seed. Following a prior argument, an unknown number of yams was stolen from the plaintiff, who accused the laborer of theft. At court, the plaintiff agreed he would pay in cash 1500 CFA to the laborer and close the case, but the laborer, needing the yam seeds, not cash, refused. After each person's presentation, witnesses were convoked from other villages who said they knew nothing of the fixed price.

The head chief then decided the laborer should terminate the work and accept fewer seeds, but the laborer still refused and vehemently denied the accusation of theft. Both parties were then required to finance a fetisher (the plaintiff did not have immediate funds and was "spotted" clandestinely by one of the Lamba judges). The judges convoked a renowned charlatan from Djarapanga, but instead, after much confusion and discussion, a local charlatan, also Konkomba, was finally convoked (charlatans are believed to have unique powers to discover hidden truths). The price of the charlatan was publicly negotiated: one chicken, one bottle of local gin, and 100 CFA. An impregnated period of anticipation ensued while the charlatan performed a rather sophisticated procedure of inserting a cowrie shell into the eye of both parties to determine their guilt (if the shell advances into the head and brain, the person is guilty; if it drops out, he is innocent). Both parties were found innocent. People were

upset with the charlatan and demanded to find another. Chaos increased as the night fell and a hard rain increased. The court resumed the following day. By then, tension was lowered, and the plaintiff actually dropped the accusation.

This case attracted a large audience. Both parties rallied a large section of kinship and ethnic support, which inhibited reaching a clear and final decision.² Negative results damage the reputation not only of individuals, but of their families, kin, ethnic groups and home villages. Firm judgments are thus skirted in this case, and a lengthy period of disorder occurs to procrastinate and shade details of the event. No one dared to address the case directly, risking the provocation of family feuds and ethnic tensions. What appeared to be weak leadership, incapability to mediate or conclude, was an effective strategy to avert conflict and strife.

Conflict management through indirect, subtle avoidance behavior is legitimized behavior in Mo. People are held accountable for their actions by an assortment of loosely defined rules founded on principles of respect, tradition and custom. Checks and balances and constant reinterpretation of norms are integral to the operative system. Likewise, chiefs, elders and notables are restrained in power by public viewers. Various methods of consensus and traditional mediation (including witnesses, fetishers, charlatans), separately and in combination, are used for arbitration. In sum, conflict resolution in Mo can be characterized by the use of indigenous, traditional

² This resembles the O.J. Simpson case currently in process. Intense popular interest shows the power of public hearings in determining and "announcing" current morals and values in society.

processes moderated by local leaders with determinant input from the local community.

Ethnic syncretism in ritual. Reenactment of ethnic ceremonies and rites in the new settlement is another example of how ethnicity reinforces respect and normative behavior among its members. As settlers reenact former cultural practices and beliefs in Mo, rather than returning home, they are preserving and reinforcing ethnic solidarity and differentiating their group from others in their new environment.

During my research in Mo, many ethnic festivals and rituals occurred. On two separate occasions, I observed elaborate Kabye marriage ceremonies that included the proper trimmings required of traditional Kabye weddings. For example, in the village of Solide, a Kabye marriage was held. There were no attendants outside the Kabye ethnic group, but family members, including the father of the groom, travelled to the Mo from the home region. Family members and friends settled in other areas of the Mo travelled great distances to attend the celebration. Rather than travel back home for ceremonies, settlers are performing ceremonies in their new surroundings. Transfer of rites and rituals from home to the settlement is an indication that settlers are adjusting to their new settlements, developing a sense of security, and approaching permanency.

In the village of Tindjasse, in contrast, I attended an elaborate Kabye marriage ceremony where people from other ethnic groups attended and celebrated the affair (each according to his own interpretation). Similar to the Soli wedding, it consisted of appropriate rites and responsibilities traditionally required of Kabye bride and groom

families. The grand ceremony and festival was conducted exclusively by the Kabye elders according to prescribed laws of Kabye marriage. However, guests interpreted the ceremonies independently, through their own song, dance and celebration. This observation shows that tightly defined rituals (of marriage) on one ethnic group are being challenged to expand and open toward a more eclectic and syncretic interpretation shared by many.

The difference between festivities of the two Mo villages can be explained, I believe, in large part by the contrast in the degrees of ethnic integration. Solide is ethnically homogeneous with a charismatic and politically important village chief. Tindjasse, conversely, is the hub of ethnic diversity and integration in the Mo. Despite lingering attachments and respect of former tradition, Tindjasse villagers are being pulled from orthodox practices of former customs into more syncretic, adapted forms of customary practices shared by many ethnic groups.

Although ethnic diversity reinforces group solidarity, it also challenges isolation and segregation between groups and fosters greater interaction and social harmony in the settlement. For example, at one Konkomba funeral I attended, notables from all ethnic groups were formally invited to the festivities. Respectfully and dutifully, guests felt obliged to attend (although most welcomed the opportunity for dance, drink, and food); similar to in American culture, declining important invitations may be seen by others as disrespectful, arrogant or hostile.

Settlers are not suppressed in practicing their own rituals exclusively. In an environment of diversity, ceremonies thrive and flourish because of their adaptations

and transformations. For example, the Bassar fire-dance is an important religious ritual practiced to connect with and appease the spirits and gods. During my fieldwork, a period of unrest and social conflict among ethnic groups in Tindjasse was festering. There was tension between groups and accusations of dishonesty were rampant.

At this precise time, the Bassar chief of Tindjasse announced that a fire-dance was due, that trouble was coming between people and that libations and gifts to the gods were required. Skepticism or refusals by others were absent; everyone respected and agreed with the Bassar chief's insight. One non-Bassar informant told me that no one doubts Bassari premonition, "They have always been right with the fire-dance." Strength of belief buttressed the chief's request for gift offerings required for the dance: one cow, two chickens, one goat, one rare bird, one bottle of gin, one large jar of local beer and assorted vegetables. This is a considerable offering and people reacted harshly. The chief insisted that this was not simply a Bassar or Tindjasse problem but that all villages in the surrounding area were to contribute. Many peripheral villagers were not in agreement and much debate ensued. The conclusion were vague: village chiefs were to try to collect the debt from their own people.

This case demonstrates the power and legitimacy sustained by ethnicity, and the respect it can warrant from others. It also shows the value of inclusion underlying Mo sociopolitics. All settler villages were asked to contribute to the fire dance, giving credence to solidarity among villages and among ethnicities.

On one occasion, I witnessed a particularly vibrant and well-attended funeral of an elder and first settler from the Konkomba group. People travelled far and wide to pay their respects to the family and ethnic elders of this reputable man. The week-long affair was spotted with appearances of high ranking leaders from other villages and ethnicities. This demonstrated the reciprocal respect and understanding shared between ethnic groups, and suggests capacity for unity in Mo.

In sum, ethnicity promotes a moral order of civil society by consensus building. The case of the Prefet's visit to the Mo plain demonstrates the pressure that leaders apply to encourage conformity to an over-arching normative order. Following an important official visit to the region by the Prefet, the chief convoked a meeting among ethnic and village chiefs near Tindjasse regarding contributions of food required by each village to offer the Prefet.

Due to misunderstandings, nonpayments and late payments from villages, the chief was discontent and reacted quite violently. One informant explained that the display of anger by "flexing his muscle" was the chief's exhibition of authority and power. If he asks for yam contributions, he told me, then others must give yams. In the absence of alternative means ensuring political order, status and respect loom large. Demonstrations of anger, authority, dictatorship and rule are all methods of establishing some form of harmony and stability in a landscape of diversity and change. Settler adjustment in Mo has not been facile nor linear. Settlers have had to adapt to new and sometimes threatening situations. In the process, Mo farmers are

developing their own morality and justice system synthesized from different cultures and histories of the peoples involved.

The El Hadjii affair. Ethnic alliances and conflicts are not static, but ebb and flow according to circumstance. Similarly, solidarity among farmers also rises and falls according to situations. One remarkable episode involving the forced removal of a Tindjasse settler by other villagers shows how ethnic solidarity and collaboration can function defectively, destabilizing rather than supporting village unity. One constructive lesson garnered from this calamitous event lies in understanding how ethnic and economic boundaries were overcome toward a common goal.

Reasons for forcibly evicting this settler, I was told, lie in jealousies brought on by his own isolationism and blatant display of wealth. This settler was an El Hajji, a wealthy and successful entrepreneur from Nigeria who settled in Mo approximately eleven years ago. His income sources included six mills in town, a video-television machine (run by his own generator) by which he ran movies on weekend nights for public viewing (charging entrance fees), market ventures to purchase food crops in the region, and active trade and commerce with Ghana and Togo. Independently, he donated overhead lighting fixtures throughout the village market area that he ignited whenever he ran his generator. In addition, he financed the construction of the Islamic school, continuously financed the repair of a principal water pump, and owned and managed the sole general store (supplying basic provisions) in the entire Mo region.

Burning of his six mills, subsequent destruction of his house and possessions, and threats on the lives of his family and self were unusually violent, but acts in that

nearly all farmers of the Mo region approved. Settlers from crossing ethnic groups (including El Hajji's), regions, ages and occupations seemed to support the act.

Wealth alone did not generate this brutality, rather, nonconformity provoked hostility from others. In spite of his apparent generosity, he remained aloof and seclusive, seldom leaving his front porch (preferring to sit and "receive" those who visited him). Most villagers said he never reciprocated visits; he was enigmatic and reclusive, seldom attending meetings. This is not an admirable or acceptable quality among settlers, I was told by many settlers. People became suspect. Many questioned how he accumulated his wealth. Consequently, a number of incidents questioning the integrity and honesty of El Hajji ensued, including arguments over the pump, prices of milling, or petty debates over land use.³ Gradually these stories evolved into inflated accusations (moneymaking machines in his house, sorcery and wicked snakes and skulls in his room).

El Hajji assured me that jealousy provoked the violent attack. Because he is a trader and businessman and not a farmer, nor of Togolese origin, he believes people were suspect of him. He recognized that his demeanor was unacceptable to others. "They don't want people to get ahead. They want all to stay dirty. A small village is not good, this could not happen in town where we do not see everything of others," he said. People suffer in Tindjasse, he said, because there are no roots, no real

³ Individuals with unresolved debts with El Hajji are alleged to have staged one incident when counterfeit money was found in his store. El Hajji was incarcerated for three days. The money, I was later informed by the Prefet, was surely placed as a "set-up" to indict El Hajji.

owners or authority in the village as in the autochthone village of Djarapanga.

Djarapanga will grow and prosper.

One interesting point of this case is its massive, pan-ethnic participation among settlers. Settlers destroyed his belongings as if it were a cathartic, effervescent ceremonial event. All appeared to be involved or in approval (even civil servants and the local soldiers were all in agreement). Soldiers claimed to have been uninformed, which is widely known to be false. They are, in fact, alleged to be clandestine accomplices in the event. Similarly, all head chiefs and most villagers deny prior knowledge of the eviction. A number of candid informants told me, however, that all people were informed, and most, actively involved in its planning.

Ethnic groups joined forces in a fairly complex, well-planned and organized strategy to eliminate what they perceived as a threat to the stability and equilibrium of their social structure. This event demonstrates the strength and importance of an agreed upon social "etiquette" (which El Hajji violated) (Scott 1989). Given its clear violation of human rights and criminality, it nonetheless suggests underlying potential for cooperation in Mo.

Unity or Factionalism

Amidst smoke-filled compounds in preparation for the evening meal during the early evenings throughout Tindjasse village, the cry of the village messenger ringing out an announcement of an all-village assembly is the first indication of an existing sociopolitical order in the community. Village assemblies in Tindjasse are multi-

functional affairs, providing a forum for open exchange of ideas, opinions, disagreements between community members. These meetings sometimes spontaneous, other times planned weeks ahead, are important events for representatives of the local population (including settlers, autoctones, young, old, men, women, all religious and ethnic emissaries, and civil servants) to express their concerns and play active roles in the development and growth of the village.

Given the enormous diversity of community members living and working in a common space who cooperate to create a satisfactory environment, Tindjasse meetings are impressive. The content and agenda of village meetings range widely. I observed meetings concerning the El Hadjii eviction, conflicts over animal grazing rights, visits from the Prefet and from FED Bassar agents, strategies for unification, and farmer-civil servant tensions. Because villagers have a stake in outcomes, their interest to attend meetings and organize, negotiate and compromise is heightened. Organizational capacity in Tindjasse, particularly among ethnicities, is a result of people's real concerns for problems that inflict them.

Tindjasse farmers cooperate to negotiate issues precisely because the concerns are their own. Unlike in FED, participation in the Mo plain is not a "luxury," but a necessity for survival. Akin to a "frontier" mentality, settlers and autoctones living in the plain realize that if they do not do the job, it will not get done, whether it concerns bridge building, receiving a dignitary, or working with civil servants (refer to Table 5-2).

Table 5-2. Comparison of participation in labor and credit associations.

| | Mo | FED |
|--|------------|------------|
| Formal associations (%) | 27 | 47 |
| Informal associations (%) | 52 | 0 |
| Labor-sharing (%) | | |
| as most common form of inter-ethnic activity | 62 | 69 |
| prefer own ethnic group exclusively | 39 | 19 |
| Credit transactions since on site | | |
| total number per farmer | 9 | 3 |
| of which, only own ethnic group (%) | 28 | 22 |
| Total lent to others (average per settler since on site) | 22,806 CFA | 10,344 CFA |
| Total borrowed from others (average per settler since on site) | 8,818 CFA | 11,750 CFA |

Negotiation between groups during the assemblies is not easy and often meetings terminate unexpectedly as one party simply walks out. Decisions and arbitrations are often very slow due to fragile political alliances and lack of formal guidelines and policies governing local politics (as discussed in Chapter 4). But where formal, public mediation procedures fail, local, informal, more private networks kick in and operate actively.

Why the political environment in Tindjasse functions more or less effectively, I suggest, is due to villagers' alternating use of two levels of operation, the public and private. The public forum, such as the court and ethnic chiefs, provides institutional structure to codify and reinforce a minimum of rules and guidelines by which to live,

while the more active, private network allows for mediation and the continuous recreation of community laws. In effect, the private level is process-oriented, while the public level is policy administration.

The increasing involvement of the Prefet, the quintessence of public rule, appears to enhance cooperative solidarity among villagers, rather than divide people. Aware of the importance of supporting continuation of the delicate but growing solidarity between ethnic groups, the Prefet has been outspoken regarding regional unity; "we cannot advance without unity." He emphasized during his visits to Tindjasse that unification is not only critical to their own development, but a sure defense against threats from nearby Ghanaians. During troubled times, and in periods of political national instability, Togolese must remain cohesive, especially at the borders (Pounpouni, personal communication, 1992).

Local solidarity, according to the Prefet, transpires through retaining authority and control in local traditional power structures. In one message from the Prefet, he said, "we must prevent the loss of power of traditional chiefs, it must be public knowledge that chiefs are first in charge." The Prefet is supporting the existing structure of authority and promoting local autonomy. This buttress encourages the integration of the public and private spheres of political activity and encourages local capacity for organization and empowerment.

Group dissension. On the other hand, uncertainty of leadership and fragility of political stability challenge potential for farmer solidarity in Mo. In one Tindjasse assembly during the early planting season, a group of animal raisers was adamantly

opposed to protecting their animals from grazing freely. They did not forward a request for grazing their animals, but rather imposed their declaration upon the village community. No resolution was attained. In another case, arguments and heated debate transpired between civil servants and the population during one meeting based on confusion over allocated funds awarded to the village after a visit to the President. Accusations of inequity, mistrust, and lack of appreciation were launched between civil servants and villagers.

These vignettes illustrate a precariousness underlying political order in Mo. This may be a result of settler impermanence, but also may be caused by recent government prompting to implement formal political systems with which people are unfamiliar and mistrustful (also see Chapter 6). There have been mixed responses from villagers regarding the recent formal election in Tindjasse, the first political event in Mo performed under national institutional regulation (see Boulo reaction in Chapter 6). Where jealousy, paranoia and other divisive forces, until recently, have been apparatuses of local politics, the introduction of codified law and authority in the Mo plain has left farmers uneasy.

The Mo plain is changing and evolving. No longer remote and eclaved from the rest of Togo, the region is gradually becoming attached to the central structures and processes of the state. Varied responses from the local population to this unification presents unprecedented problems and realms of controversy to which people are unaccustomed. A tension exists among farmers between attachment to the past and attraction to the advantages of the future. This strain creates confusion,

disagreement and hostility among people. Straddling the dilemma produces inconsistencies, personalized judgements, ignorance of proper procedures, and inappropriate behaviors that exacerbate conflicts. As neophyte participants in the larger structure of the state, farmers of the Mo plain are experiencing growing pains.

Ethnic factionalism is prevalent in Mo and a powerful force propagating dissension in Mo. In a number of villages, such as Tindjasse, Gnezime, Sebonia or Gbanzaba, ethnic divisions between people counter the potential for unified participation and contribution towards developing community infrastructure. In Kagnanbara, where Bassar and Lamba coexist in equal numbers, conflicts have emerged over several issues. For example, Lamba complain that Bassar farm on the official kupo day of rest in the village; settlers from both groups complain that land is distributed without official request, and is sometimes located in sacred zones; and Bassar have accused some Lamba of collecting water at night from the sacred falls in the forest. These accusations (valid or not) demonstrate tensions existing between ethnic factions.

Development efforts are stifled by the lack of cohesiveness among ethnic groups. A priest working in the region depicts his own frustrations encountered by discord among ethnic groups. "Because many people are not permanent here, there is no incentive to integrate or create social cohesion. The 'melting pot' theory is not yet applicable when people do not see the urgency or need to unify," he said. Many projects and initiatives started in the region have not come to fruition because people do not organize and work together (example of Tindjasse dispensary reviewed in

Chapter 4). Ethnicity prohibits unity in organization. For example, community work efforts, financial donations, and decisions by consensus are difficult in the villages that consist of two or more ethnic populations. The Prefet, well informed of this problem, promotes unity and cohesion as the solution to the development and success of the area during his visits to Mo; "You must have cement between you all. The Kotokoli, the Kabye, and others, all must be unified to work together. We cannot advance without unity."

There are a plethora of examples of unfinished projects due to ethnic discord, most notably the dispensary of Tindjasse. Although this dispensary was initiated prior to that of Boulo and Djarapanga, construction remains incomplete. The priest attributes this to lack of social cohesion in the community. Ethnic groups will organize and come out to work as individual groups, he observes, but not cooperatively. Ultimately this is insufficient to complete the tasks. A German nurse working in the region for over fifteen years agrees that ethnic conflict underlies the problems of local contribution. In one case, she explained, when a vaccination team travelled to the region, the population of Tindjasse was unable to organize to build a thatch shelter for the team when working under the hot sun, despite countless requests.

Other examples of where ethnic divisions inhibit development include school construction and attendance in Kpangame and pump construction and maintenance in Gnezime or Kpangame. In Gnezime, for example, a pump has been installed, but conflict over payment between the Lamba and Kabye settlers has prevented payments

needed to implement the final components. Fighting around the pump between women of Lamba and Konkomba has become so bad in Kpangame that alternate days are assigned for use by each ethnic group. Accusations of sorcery and witchcraft are common between ethnic groups in villages, all reflecting an insecurity and fear of living among people of unknown background and unfamiliar custom.

People settle by ethnicity; this only reinforces their segregation, says the priest. Ethnicity perpetuates and guarantees security and protection for the "we" against outside, potential effects from "them." He points out that family ties foster dependency and insularity. He echoes many critics of African societies who observe that big families may encourage intra-familial support where "leaches," those who are supported by others, strive to exist off the help of others. Group reaffirmation then occurs through ceremonies and festivals. Nonetheless, in optimism the priest postulates, politics and tradition are changing. Democracy may encourage more solidarity among families, and the family unit as seen today will change. In time, people will marry outside their groups and even natal villages. Disintegration of the cohesive family unit may promote greater community holism. Infrastructural projects requiring participation from the whole community is one positive solution to overcoming ethnic segregation.

In a village of ethnic homogeneity, by contrast, such as Sangouli, collections for building and maintaining a pump have been rapid and effective (there are also a number of mills in this village). Where ethnicity does not cause divisive social and political relations, it appears that more progress occurs towards improving the region.

One strategy to promote success employed by the regional social affairs agent, therefore, is to work with those villages or individual ethnic groups willing to work together towards a common goal. Their progress and success will encourage and entice others to imitate.

To summarize, in Mo, self-reliance and independence is enabled largely by ethnic-based associations. These groups provide both potential for growth and handicaps toward further development. Observation of current sociopolitical developments in the region shows that reform, even incremental, will not come without the pains of change. An incorporation, rather than a shift to alternative, modern state-oriented political systems, is the direction in which Mo has moved. A sociopolitical system of syncretization between traditional and modern processes of governance appears to be a viable solution toward sustainable local-level governance.

Ethnic-based informal associations. In combination with social and moral security, ethnic alliances also serve important supportive economic roles. There exists in Mo numerous ethnic-based associations rooted in indigenous custom and tradition, such as labor associations, rotating credit groups or "tontines," and support groups. These groups are most often initiated locally and are based on immediate needs and concerns of its members. These types of self-help groups (which I label informal associations) primarily lie outside of official structures and direction of the government, although they may tap into governmental activity to some degree.

There exist also in Mo formal, state-influenced types of associations. These are usually formed by outside intervening actors (usually government), sometimes based

on local needs (but not necessarily) and usually imposed on the local population. I label these types of groups formal associations.

As shown in Table 5-2, Mo settlers appear to participate in associations more than FED settlers, specifically in informal associations. Some of these associations are identified by villagers as ethnic groups, with a designate group chief. Women's ethnic organizations in particular are dynamic and serve as important support sources for members (as individuals, however, women rarely carry formal power or influence over village public affairs). Similar to men, women leaders are responsible to judge the affairs of their members, resolve disputes, support women, organize festivities, serve as role models, and keep the male chief informed of women's activities.

For example, during focus-group interviews with associations of settler women of the Kotkoli and Bassari ethnic groups of Tindjasse, I was told of numerous creative, spontaneous and supportive self-help ventures in which members engage. Since ten years ago, Kotokoli women informed me that, although their group is informal (built from former relations in their home villages), they have defined nonetheless an elaborate organizational structure consisting of a President, Secretary, Under-Secretary, (responsible for law and order), Regional Chief (responsible to receive visitors), and Assistant Chief (responsible for organizing marriage ceremonies). Members contribute 25 CFA/weekly to a common treasury, which is used for members' emergencies, such as illness or ceremonies. Repeatedly they told me they are "de la même bouche," of the same mouth, emphasizing their unity and support.

Although other ethnicities also have women's groups, the Kotkoli group is an unusually active and organized association. A major purpose for their formation and strength of their membership is risk-aversion through financial support. Members recognize a need and security in belonging to the group. Other ethnic women's groups, such as the Kabye and the Lamba, also maintain treasuries, and some have collective fields in which they all work and use the profit for festivities.

The need for cash, on credit or through rotating funds, is a great concern among rural farmers, men and women. Money is always in short supply and often greatly needed (whether for emergency reasons, such as illness, travel expenses, food purchases, family obligations, or for other concerns). Informal exchanges in Mo provide an indigenous and self-initiated solution to financial constraints among settlers. In Mo, settlers have little access or means to formal credit sources provided by the state. Consequently, through their own resourcefulness, they turn to other options--one another.

To overcome this constraint, many farmers practice informal credit exchanges (see Table 5-2). Since this type of financial lending system is based on trust, in most cases the lender and borrower are well known to one another, and usually in close relation (although a borrower will also approach a lender of "reputation" without prior acquaintance). Similarly, membership in tontines or other credit associations in Mo are commonly based on friendship or relations (by birth or marriage). Informal credit exchanges prevent risk and function as insurance plans; indirectly, they also are forces of solidifying, unifying social integration which facilitate and foster support.

Where alternatives to secure these essential ingredients for social and economic survival are absent, Mo farmers are compelled to rely on their own social networks rather than outside resources. This demonstration of self-reliance strengthens their skills and broadens their networks for greater autonomy and sustainability.

Women in Mo actively conduct petty trade and commerce, and predictably actively practice rotating credit associations or "tontines." Rules vary among groups, but generally, they are based on the rotation of a fixed sum of money to which all members contribute weekly. The total is then used by a different member each week. The tontine may provide additional resources to members under emergency situations as well. The group usually has a leader as well as a money collector, both of whom have earned the trust and confidence of other members. For women who lack start-up funds to initiate commercial activities, the cash is vital.

A large number of small, informal tontines function in Mo (it is difficult to identify a fixed number due to the ebb and flow of groups). Some women participate in several simultaneously, some not at all, still others only during certain periods. Tontines are voluntary, where membership tends to grow gradually by word of mouth between friends and family. Although more members in a group increases funds available, a smaller group is easier to manage, according to most women.

Women I interviewed in one case said their investments are directed generally toward generating more income through entrepreneurial activities such as bread-making, small commerce of manufactured goods such as tomato paste, shoes, linens, jewelry, maintaining a bar, brewing local beer, or selling prepared foods. Each week,

the ten members give 1000 CFA to the leader (and founder) of the group, who then delivers the money to the recipient of the week. This is in fact a substantial sum of money that each member re-invests to develop her commercial activities. In another case, four Konkomba women (from the same home village) organized a tontine based on wood-collection sales. Each member collects one basin full of wood - sold at 50 CFA. They combine their basins to sell together at 200 CFA in the weekly market. Weekly, they rotate the proceeds, which are used to purchase household goods, clothes and other personal items for themselves and family. In another case, tailors in Tindjasse formed an association where each year money is contributed by the twenty members for emergencies and festivals. They also meet periodically to discuss business improvements, price fixing and to select a delegate to attend an annual meeting of tailors in Sokode to learn of apprenticeships, exams, and new regulations.

The groups do not always operate smoothly, however. Numerous problems arise including lack of payments, loss of members, and problematic individuals (often the president is responsible to pay someone's share). Problem-solving and decision-making within the groups occur usually by consensus or, as among the Kotokoli women, by vote. These informal associations illustrate initiative, self-organization and problem-solving among Mo farmers. On modest (tontines) and larger community levels, farmers are approaching empowerment.

Formal associations. Formal associations in Mo are less common than informal associations, largely due to minimal government presence in the area. Formal associations in Mo are generally comprised of loosely organized groups, most

importantly, church groups, the cotton grower bank, water associations, and the farmer association. In each case, participation in these organizations was generated by farmers' recognition of personal advantages and benefits gained by membership. Ethnic and familial affinity also play an underlying role in membership. For example, during recruitment, members and organization officials often approach settlers' former sponsors and sponsees, neighbors, and "brothers," all usually from the same or related ethnic group. Certain churches, for example, maintain high membership of one predominant ethnicity. In the case of Gnezime, the near total membership of the Assembly of God church consists of Lamba, whereas the Kabye villagers refuse to join.

Religious organizations were among the first to penetrate the Mo plain. It is difficult to ascertain membership size; members estimated about seventy in the Catholic church, and perhaps slightly more in the Assembly of God (the two sects in Mo). It is certain that, in both cases, membership is increasing. Many smaller villages have requested missions in their villages, and already four villages have created Catholic missions. Similarly, the Assembly of God has village missions in Gnezime and is campaigning in other villages as well.

The Catholic church and Assembly of God both have taken steps to organize not only routine religious services on Sundays, but also extraneous activities for religious, economic, and educational purposes. For example, the Assembly of God has organized adult literacy (focusing on the Bible, of course) attracting a number of settlers (including women). In Gnezime, women hold weekly meetings to learn of

"good conduct, skills and values such as household care and living in the family." In this village, the members also have a communal field. Similarly, the priest of the Catholic church has initiated a number of projects throughout the plain, including construction of a school, wells, and credit associations (the Catholic church has an ongoing "bank" in which people contribute 100 CFA monthly). Both religious groups organized communal fields in which profits are used as an emergency fund for members for emergency purposes.

Religion plays an important role in providing solidarity, support and faith among members. The Assembly of God is particularly effervescent during services, where loud singing, drums and dancing take place for several hours. These social events work in generating cohesiveness and mutual understanding between members. Although initiated from formal institutions, there are clear indications that self-initiative is fomenting among these groups.

Another formal association in Mo is the cotton-growers' bank (of the Lao quarter in Tindjasse). In 1978, SOTOCO agents told cotton growers they must construct a storage warehouse of substantial size, in order to stock their cotton prior to FED purchase. Many growers failed to participate in the work. Consequently, the growers decided that evaders would be "fined" 500 CFA daily for their absence. The money was put into a "bank" and used to initiate a lending institution among growers, eventually extended to all regional farmers. A committee was elected, intricate rules have been established concerning lending, borrowing, interest and such, and money is actively transacted. The 67-member association (of diverse ethnicities) now has about

80,000 CFA, and a sister association has started in a second village. This case illustrates that many problems, such as lack of individual contribution in the storage construction, have been overcome positively.

Similarly, distrust among different farmers and of the government have led to conflicts over cotton sales. But mistrust led FED to transfer the accounts of cotton sales to local farmers. Farmers won control over their own sales by expressing their negative opinions of SOTOCO (Saiboude farmers, however, said they still prefer government control because they distrust other ethnic groups).

The establishment of water associations in Mo is a good illustration of how challenges in Mo can be solved through a marriage of formal and informal associations. Recently in Mo a villager has been trained to help organize and monitor pump associations. The main objective of these groups is to initiate local responsibility for pump maintenance and repair (they are to contact the agent when repairs are needed, but otherwise independently collect dues from the community to finance repairs and organize pump maintenance and equitable use). Ethnic contention prevents effective pump maintenance (pumps remain broken in larger villages of ethnic diversity). Although ethnicity can be a debilitating, inhibiting factor to organization and development, in Kpangame, where Lamba and Bassar fights have been rampant at the pumps, villagers have decided to alternate days for each group to use the pump to avoid further conflicts; in Tindjasse, established committees collect money (100 CFA monthly) from pump users. In these cases, solutions are built from exploiting the problem (ethnicity).

A final example of a formal association in Mo is the Farmers' Association. This group was formed in 1984, in response to the Prefet's idea for a forum of exchange among Mo farmers to discuss transportation, prices, markets and other concerns (the group meets four times annually). In one instance, Mo farmers were angered with market women who inflated standard-bowl measurements by "cupping" their hands. Scouts from the group now monitor the market to ensure proper measurements. The standard sale of yams (by two throughout Togo but in Tindjasse by three) is another case under study by the group.

According to the President, the group is constrained by lack of organization. The area is too large for farmers to meet, he explained. The problem was not ethnic segregation, he clarified, but rather dispersion caused by distance. Most villages share similar concerns: poor roads and prices, but farmers generally are inactive in the group because they consider the association ineffective in meeting their personal problems. Persistence of the group is based on real needs. This case illustrates where potential for formal state initiative is sustainable if generated by real needs facing local farmers.

Social Processes for FED Settlers

Settler Entry to FED

Project recruitment. Although farmers "volunteered" to enter the FED project, FED's rigid and expedient inscription preempted FED management style and control. Canton chiefs were compelled by the government to recruit a certain number and type

of new settlers from their constituency. This requirement produced a coercive quality to an otherwise voluntary inscription process. First settlers and many later settlers had no former contacts in the zone prior to arrival (Table 5-1) and gained information of the settlement through the government. Land acquisition was overwhelmingly via government distribution (see Chapter 7).

According to Gu-Konu (1983:954), submission, malleability and passivity were at the heart of recruitment. Education was not required among settlers and even considered undesirable because it could foster ambition, outspokenness and courage. The administration preferred the most responsive, amenable volunteers as possible. Similarly, Akibode (1987) views FED's recruitment criteria as manipulative and a means for the government to scrupulously screen the selection of new recruits for conformity: "loin d'être le résultat d'une installation sauvage, la présence définitive des colons sur la Zone FED, émane d'une oeuvre suffisamment étudiée par le pouvoir politique et administration technique de project (1987:37)."

The Director had near complete control over the recruitment process, and personally assisted in much of the settler selection (discussed in Chapter 2). Our only concern, he explained, was settler performance according to FED standards. Donor expectations harnessed us and limited other agenda, "La lettre du projet" overrode "l'esprit de projet." This rigor resulted in inflexibility, obligatory rules, evictions and pressure to attain goals.

Observées sur l'exploitation, ces rapports de production révèlent encore mieux l'absence totale de liberté de colon, dont le seul statut possible dans le processus de production est celui de l'exécutant; aucune possibilité d'initiative ne lui est laissée, compte tenu, non pas du

caractère des hommes, mais de la nature des structures mises en place et de leurs logiques propres; tout est pensé à sa place; tout lui est donné sans qu'il émette un avis (Gu-Konu, 1983:990).

To describe the settler as an "executor," with denied opportunity for initiative or liberty, is the painstaking result of an overzealous administration striving to succeed. During interviews with Director Dogbe, I was struck with his candidness and naive sincerity in describing the project's management style and aim towards success. He embraced an ambition that he believed achievable only through rigid policy and authority.

Over time, a transition occurred from more to less uniformity. For example, at the start, settlers were restrained from liberally travelling outside the zone and needed authorization to travel back home, even under emergencies (Gu-Konu 1983:990). This paternalistic regulation policy progressively loosened over time as the administration began to feel more secure and trusting of project operations and of settler behavior. FED relaxed their control over details as illustrated below.

Relations with home villages. By involving home village chiefs (and family clansmen) in the recruitment process, FED administrators aimed to capture entire social networks to police settler behavior. Monitoring (and support) of family was believed to encourage greater settler compliance and ensure permanency. As a result, an interdependent relationship developed between home village and settler, each representing and, to some degree, being responsible for the others' actions and reputation. The "liberation" that farmers gained by settling in FED, away from their

home villages, actually increased interdependency with their home villages.

Disenfranchisement thus energized affiliation.

Separation of settlers from their home villages was thus discouraged. Home-village canton chiefs designated a "chief in absentia" to replace him as the head chief in the settlement. This new chief was responsible for deliberating, decision-making and reporting back to the canton regularly on the state of affairs within the settlement. I was told by one FED chief that a great deal of deliberations were settled back home, even today. In another example, home ties were reinforced by project-organized visits home. Especially during the early years of the project, settlers were transported by FED to their home villages for special ceremonies, such as age-rites, deaths, ethnic events (also see Chapter 8). In the short term, these strategies were useful for settler transition; in the long term, however, they prevented total settler assimilation and integration, nurturing settler defection.

To ease administrative burdens of entry processes and minimize the stress of settler estrangement, FED settled new recruits according to home villages and cantons (in blocs of about twenty households and fields) (see Figure 2-2). By settling recruits in groups, planners hoped that settlers would feel less isolation, and greater support, particularly during the transition period of uncertainty and unknown (Scudder and Colson 1982). Social, psychological and economic support provided by family closeness was believed to discourage farmer abandonment.

Accordingly, settlers from the same village of origin retained strong alliances, which served as a basis for associations (other persons certainly infiltrated these

groups, including autoctones, but there was a clear selective bias towards one's "frères" or brothers). Social preferences expressed through labor groups, credit lending and marriages indicate the persistence of boundaries between groups. Unlike in Mo, where group formation is defined by ethnicity, in FED (initially all Kabye), groups are defined predominantly by home villages.

Divisiveness among FED Settlers

Divisiveness and conflict between settlers expressed through subtle, culturally-rooted weapons is due to jealousy. According to one settler, "We are discouraged, there is insecurity. People are fearful. In this rural area, there is misunderstanding, jealousy. It is easier in big towns - less visibility. Jealousy is a problem in small towns." Jealousy has been rampant in FED from the start of the project. Accusations of sorcery were common against those settlers showing success in the settlement. Accusations became so fierce and frequent, the Director informed me, that the strongest and best farmers were all being evicted. A policy was instated that the accusers, rather than the accused, were to be evicted from the site to prevent loss of the best settlers. The number of accusations declined immediately.

Another result of jealousy is theft, which has been a recurrent problem since FED's inception (37.5 percent said theft was the primary cause of conflict between settlers compared to only 3 percent in Mo). Settlers attribute the high frequency of theft in FED to a number of causes, including: more people in the market attracting more youth and more theft; more oxen to steal; less judicial order. Availability and

access to resources and inputs, such as animal traction, fertilizer, tools, and an abundance of crops, provide ample opportunity for theft. Theft undermines the success of others, I was told; it stems from jealousy.

Competition was fostered by FED since the start of the settlement. Settlers differ in opinion of whether competition motivates or hinders regional growth and development. Many believe that development nurtures social conflict, expressed primarily through jealousy, sorcery and theft. Similar to in Mo, a "levelling mechanism" operates through sabotage, sorcery, or theft to deter others' achievement and prevent them from prospering. One settler said to me, "As people evolve more and "get ahead," they also become more jealous of each other. There are more evil spirits now." Although more people in the region are good, he says it brings sorcery. This same settler was being treated by a local shaman for an illness he identified as loss of force, fatigue, and headaches. He believes this is caused by sorcery from new settlers.

In contrast, some FED farmers view competition as a positive influence giving impetus to their work. As one settler said to me; "There is a competition between farmers and everyone tries harder; this is encouraging. The market is more commercial and less local than in Namon." The FED market has gained a significant place among the markets located throughout the Kara region (I counted twenty-three large trucks and 200 locally-brewed beer stalls at Broukou market compared to thirteen trucks and 150 beer stalls in Djarapanga). Since prices are on average twenty

percent lower in FED's Broukou market than in the central marketplace of Kara, the market is dynamic with traders from outside the zone.

Despite nearly two decades of resettlement, familial ties and alliances persist strongly in FED. Although ethnic chiefs may play only a symbolic role today, they are still highly respected. Ethnic rituals and festivals are still practiced by FED settlers, but in contrast to Mo settlers, often by returning home (specifically during the renowned Kabye age-set rituals of Evala, FED "empties out"). Unlike in Mo, detachment from home villages among FED settlers is minimal.

The Young Farmers: A Special Case of Settlers

The more recent and quite significant entry of the "Jeunes Rurales" (JR) settlers has created an important impact on the settlement and region as a whole. Approximately thirty young farmers were placed in FED after receiving advanced agricultural training and equipment from the national government during a three-year program. All of these farmers have a secondary education and are chosen because they are hardworking, serious and ambitious individuals. Indeed, they are outstanding regarding agricultural and sociopolitical astuteness.

The JRs have played a key role in FED serving as role models to other settlers (in production and farm management). In many instances, they have informed and shown other farmers and local extension agents new techniques. For most settlers, JRs are viewed as an asset to the region and helpful because they are one of them. "We are effective in influencing farmers. We work like them; extension does not play

this role." Because the JRs are settlers and not salaried agents, they are more effective in influencing and inspiring farmers than extension agents, of whom farmers are sometimes wary and mistrusting.

JRs have adeptly integrated into the settlement, experiencing similar social difficulties as all settlers. As one JR told me, "For some JRs, fear of jealousy and spite from others is a concern. Many hide their wealth by sending it home or investing elsewhere." In addition to agricultural improvements, JRs have also played important roles in settlement politics, serving as leaders in cooperative organizations and on the Zonal Committee. Like many settlers, JRs are frustrated and disillusioned with unmet promises from FED and the government. They resent the solidarity fund and perceive increasing tension and anxiety over land. Their leadership role in protesting FED injustices and expressing their surmounting insecurities is the subject to which I now turn.

Nothing to Gain, Nothing to Lose: The Case of the Kara Convention

FED management dissuaded settlers from solving their own problems and strongly advised them instead to approach the staff directly, specifically the Director. At the start, however, settlers referred problems to their home chiefs rather than to FED (or chiefs blocs or Zonal Committee). Gradually, under FED coercion, settlers increasingly diminished their dependence on home villages in favor of on-site problem-solving through the administration.

The core of FED's political operations ensuring settler management lies in chefs blocs (each bloc has a chief with public but limited actual power) and the Zonal Committee (CZ) (a representative committee to oversee settler affairs and serve as leaders in preparing for project closure). In principle, the CZ was to share decision-making power with FED over project fund investments (also see Chapter 4). In practice, however, the CZ's primary role was to bare the burdensome task of collecting the solidarity fund, the annual "contribution" of 5000 CFA devised to absorb project costs (Painter 1990:18).

At its inception, the fund was administered solely by FED. In reality, the fund was not voluntary, but a tax payment required and much resented by all FED settlers. In fact, the CZ had no control over finances or decisions; as the vice-president of the CZ frankly remarked, "We only had a name, not a function." He pointed out that on one occasion when the schools and dispensary in Agbassa sector needed repair, the Director ordered the work and handed us the receipts as a mere afterthought. This is far from a checks and balance relationship. The bank account was in the name of FED exclusively, leaving the CZ no access or control over its use.

Problems caused by the use and management of the solidarity fund led to a CZ response of unprecedented self-determination and organization. Why and how initiative developed toward sufficient settler collaboration and leadership to vocalize settler objections lends vital lessons concerning farmer participation, autonomy and self-governance from within a formerly top-down and controlling authoritarian settlement.

After over a decade of payment (but objection) to the solidarity fund with few concrete results, settler unrest and uneasiness spread. Unrepaired pumps, eroded roads, and the incomplete bridge construction are a few examples settlers cited orally and in writing, which, according to the solidarity fund mandate, were legitimately FED's responsibility. Expenditures decreased and settlers perceived a noticeable decline in real conditions. Gradually, independently and in association, settlers began to realize that FED was inconsistent and inattentive to settler concerns. The Director rarely visited the zone exhibiting his gradual loss of interest in administration.

With nothing to gain, nothing to lose became increasingly attractive to settlers. As benefits of paying the fund diminished, the risk and fear of harsh consequences to protesting continuing payments waned. Although settlers continued paying annually, they saw no results. They were granted no part in the decision-making over allocation of funds, and complained that many civil servants did not contribute to the fund as required. With their own situation worsening, fertilizer prices rising, normal erratic yields in crop production causing insecure economic conditions, increasing land conflicts with autoctones, and, most important, the onset of democratization sweeping throughout Togo, settlers shifted from submission into action.

Factors leading up to settlers' confrontation with FED were not unknowns, but rather a combination of brewing discontentments among settlers, gradually heating and reaching boiling temperatures. As a result, rather than bubbling over in disarray, settler tension, dissatisfaction and frustration were condensed and distilled into concise and persuasive objections and recommendations that the CZ presented to the

administration. Worsening conditions were discussed and bantered with increasing intensity, in markets, meetings, and social occasions. This led settlers from all sectors to complain to their sectoral delegates, who formally transmitted these grievances to the CZ committee. In response, the CZ formulated a thirteen-point grievance list and conducted a formal meeting with the FED.

The climax of settler disapproval of FED administration occurred during a May 1991 meeting convened between the CZ and the Direction in Kara. During this conference, settlers charged the administration of unaccountability, and denounced their methods of financial and administrative management. These grievances were claims to greater participation and equity in decision-making and control over FED finances and activities, marking a transformation of institutional policy and sociopolitical dynamics between settlers and the project administration.

The Director responded positively and promptly to most requests. Presentation of precise and finite complaints armed settlers with powerful ammunition to which the administration was forced to surrender. For example, settlers accused the direction of deciding on and dispersing fund expenditures with virtually no input from settlers. This needed change. Settlers insisted on a reformation of the financial structure of the fund: they should have equal access to the bank account, requiring signatures from both administration and settler representatives. They wanted an accord from both parties to be necessary to plan and implement projects using the money. Not only were settlers demanding greater administrative accountability, they were demanding equal participation.

Negotiation between the two parties was not smooth. In the first point, where settlers asked why reparations were not being conducted, the Director responded by inquiring why settlers have ceased to pay the fund. Indeed, the payment rates reported by SOTED as early as 1985 were only 43 percent, and by 1992. In my own study, only 35.7 percent of farmers sampled recently paid the fund (compared to 64.3 percent who refused), and 86 percent of farmers sampled said that the reason for the fund's termination was settler resistance (as opposed to project closure or other factors).

Si aucune décision n'est prise, quant à ce qui concerne la réorganisation de la collecte, le degré d'implication des communautés villageoises à cette collecte, et surtout, le mode d'affectation de ces fonds au financement des charges récurrentes, il est certain qu'on assistera à brève échéance à une démobilisation de ceux qui cotisent encore (SOTED, 1987:11).

Ironically, the FED-created system for settler governance enabled settlers to funnel their local concerns and criticisms toward changes in FED policy. A key element allowing for settler success was the fact that an apparatus for political action was already in place. The organization, collaboration, representation, leadership, and actual protest by settlers were largely a consequence of FED. Unintentionally, FED provided an enabling environment for self-management.

Although I applaud settler efforts, I fault them in not going far enough. For example, by directing their concerns to FED (for new regulations concerning their own committee structure, rules, and elections) rather than legislating rules themselves, settlers were undermining their own power and autonomy and reinforcing the status quo.

The participation of autoctones, in my view, would have strengthened settlers' position as well. An even more impressive demonstration of solidarity and clout among the local population as a whole would have occurred if autocthone settlers and hors blocs were represented during the conference. This would encourage and strengthen the future of the CZ as well. One problem, of course, is that many autoctones did not share similar grievances as settlers. Nonetheless, crossover of grievances occur, and autocthone complaints could have been integrated and expressed as separate but related issues. Were the administration confronting a "population" rather than "their" settlers, FED control would be curtailed.

In sum, power balanced in favor of the FED Director prevents settler self-responsibility and growth, and remains a primary obstacle to greater settler initiative and independence. Efforts to change structures of authority (such as the CZ convention) are encouraging but still insufficient for transforming power from the top to local levels. Continued efforts in asserting self-rule, combined with the national movement toward democracy, create a favorable environment toward this goal. Local organizations and associations are fundamental steps toward achieving local autonomy.

Associations in FED

Associations in which settlers participated were uniquely government-created (Table 5-2). Agricultural-oriented groups particularly have been the critical basis for association. The formation and management of these groups, and assessment of their

degrees of success and sustainability, are important in understanding the long-term impact (problems and potential) of FED's approach to collective action.

The GAV. One key organization formed by FED are the Groupements Agricoles Villageois (GAV). These are farmer cooperatives, theoretically comprised of all settlers, with the objective of benefitting from cost sharing and collective sales and bargaining. The formation of GAVs was a response to the national effort of promoting farmer cooperatives. According to this policy, farmer groups would increase cash crop production, specifically cotton, by taking advantage of available credit sources, inputs, technical and organizational training and experience. For example, common collective activities were to include purchases of fertilizer, crop storage, credit appropriation, establishment of "banks" for emergencies, and labor groups. In FED, over 150 members participated in GAVs in some sectors.

In addition to GAVs, smaller groups, "groupements," formed within blocs. These served a similar function as the GAV, but on a smaller scale. There are approximately five groupements in each sector, each with an average of twenty members. Many farmers belong to both associations. Originally group membership was reserved exclusively for settlers, but from the mid-1980s, autochthones were also incorporated into the groups.

Many farmers chose not to join the groups because of mistrust. One autochthone, formerly settled but now hors bloc, remarked, "they are a bad idea, there is dishonesty and theft. People sell their fertilizer and never repay the group." He explained that he was forced to sell his own cattle to repay his debts to the group, and

yet others did not repay their debts. He no longer belongs to any group and will never rejoin, he assured me. Many farmers told me that people in the groups cheat.

To assist management and operations of the GAVs a government liaison specializing in cooperatives has been assigned to the FED zone (extension agents, as well as other civil servants were expected to assist as well). Data gathered from observation of GAV meetings provide rich insight concerning the attitudes and interactions between government officials and settlers. In one meeting, I observed the liaison and extension agents maintain an uncompromising, paternalistic, condescending attitude toward the farmers. At the opening, the liaison launched into an obdurate harangue scolding farmers for bypassing the agents in notification of the meeting. The meeting proceeded on that note, with apparent hostility and resentment between the two factions.

The liaison monopolized the meeting by presenting a diatribe concerning his discouragement with the GAV: "Despite the attempts to 'make you' independent, it doesn't work. You must ask for help." He enumerated concerns and issues propagating his discontent: poor planning and organization in the GAV; lack of solidarity - no group responsibility; needed elections for GAV; thefts of fertilizer; low production of cotton; and insufficient use of the extension agent technology. He encouraged the group, in theory, to openly discuss their concerns and speak their minds. In practice, most farmers knew that candidness of FED criticism would be fodder used against them at random.

This scene presents a host of mixed messages: encouragement to seek assistance and accusations of over-dependence on agents. Compounding the situation, behavior among civil servants is authoritative, dictatorial and dirigiste, despite their appeal for farmer equity, independence and self-initiative. There is misalignment between management style and objectives. A contradiction underlies FED goals: settler welfare cannot cultivate in an environment of suppression.

In private, the liaison explained that GAVs' malfunctioning is caused by settler impermanence. High investments are risky he said. By contrast, GAVs comprised exclusively of autochthones function well (risk-oriented), as do those with JRs (who have education). Without assistance from extension agents, he believes no GAV can succeed.

Groupements. FED also made efforts to form smaller groupements, primarily centered on garden activities. In the sector of Agounde, FED constructed a six-hectare irrigated garden project operated electrically by a generated pump (at a cost of 16 million CFA). The produce (including potatoes, onion, and also okra, chili peppers, and maize) were intended for sales in the nearby urban area of Kara. But from the start of the garden, in 1980, FED was required to hire laborers from within and outside the settlement because of lack of interest from settlers. Even after two years, settlers were not participating.

The coordinator of the garden project (also the sector head of Misseouta) attributes disinterest of settlers to initial disorganization and poor technical expertise. For example, no planning occurred for storage or conservation of the produce. The

produce began rotting, so FED decided to truck much of it to President Eyadema's farm where his pigs consume the rotting potatoes. In fact, most of the production actually ended in the hands of the President. This led many to question the original intentions of the garden project.

Poor management, where no one held responsibility to organize the work, led to failure, he admitted; "It was a failure. Nothing continued because there was no monitoring." He added, "The idea did not come from them [settlers]. Groups that FED formed had problems. When they [settlers] form their own groups it works better." Today, the six-hectare irrigation field is divided into separate parcels and distributed among settlers. The generator was taken to FED headquarters in Broukou where civil servants share costs to run the pump for illuminating their own homes. Only rusting pipes and remnants of the generator shelter remain on this once-predicted "exemplary garden project."

Groups organized by FED still persist, some actively and structured, others loosely organized and operating intermittently. For example, women in some groups contribute money to a common pool annually for materials and for personal emergencies. The groups also have systems of organization and rules of membership. One group has decided among themselves to start a 0.5 ha cotton field. Two cooperative garden groups (primarily comprised of women) in Broukou and Agounde sectors work with the Social Affairs agent in the region. The agent advises and assists them to attain outside support for tools, seeds, fencing, and even credit. Some groups are extremely motivated, says the agent. He observed that autocthonous seem less open

and interested in resolving problems and searching out agents for new techniques, advice, or consultation. He suspects that in resettling, settlers have a predisposition for openness and willing to listen compared to autoctones who are in their same environment and retain traditional practices.

Associations formed around maintenance and care of water pumps have had mediocre results at best. I was told by FED civil servants that delegates to manage pumps (all women) do not work with the agents or the population to organize the work, to collect funds, or to liaise with the agents. One leader of a pump association said her attempts to organize women were in vain, there were too many fights at the pumps, and people were divided. People do not want to participate. She alluded to divisions between autoctone and settler women in particular, where autoctone women were hostile about contributing financially or physically to pump maintenance. The autoctones assumed the water was there for everyone freely. Pump associations located outside the site, in hor blocs, have had less organizational and motivational problems, according to agents. They are more unified than farmers in the settlement, and understand their responsibility.

Problems in pump maintenance illustrate flaws in FED's initial approach toward infrastructural development. Rather than include the population in the installation and maintenance of the pumps from the start, FED did all the work themselves barring local contribution. When pump complications arose, the bloc chief was to inform FED, which would then repair the problem. From the start no committees were formed. Consequently, at project closure, when the Social Affairs and water

agents initiated associations to care for the pumps, the results were a fiasco.⁴ Without proper training ("sensibilization") from the start, according to the water agent, FED settlers will be reluctant to participate in sustaining their own services. At the time of my research, he was conducting intensive training throughout the FED zone.

Today, incipient groups are forming informally in the FED zone among settlers and between settlers and autochthones. Bloc groups, ethnic associations, trade groups (such as weavers and tailors), and small tontines (especially among women) are increasing in number. In one bloc of Broukou, settlers organized themselves to protect their animals from grazing, particularly during planting season, to prevent crop damage. As a result, not only do farmers guard their animals every planting season, many settlers in the bloc have built parks for their animals. The Catholic church also generates small-scale group activities in FED. In one case, four farmers have formed a chicken-raising project with aid from nuns of the Catholic church. The nuns have contributed materials for the shelter, while farmers contribute animals and other local materials. This is an assisted effort, seeds for opportunity, which the nuns say they hope to replicate with others.

Conclusion

Differences in strength and scope of group association and problem-solving between Mo and FED have been caused by and nurtured due to varying degrees of

⁴ In one atypical case, women organized themselves to request the transformation of one well to a water pump. Due to the women's vigilance in pursuing the problem, the task was completed.

government intervention. The varying processes of settler arrival and entry into the zones underlie and have considerable influence on differing outcomes of settler relations. Similarly, settler penchant for association and interdependency results from the nature of settler arrival. From first learning of the settlement, to actual relocation and settlement and adjustment, differences in settler conditions have effected variations in settler inter-relations, problem-solving and sustainability.

Reliance on ethnic associations and the importance of active village sociopolitical activities in Mo reflects settlers's lack of alternative means for problem-solving. Far from perfect, the social landscape in Mo nonetheless embodies seeds for long-term empowerment and a sustainable social environment that embraces a wide range of ethnicities. In FED, residues of FED control still linger, as seen in GAV meetings or lack of settler coordination for infrastructural maintenance. Expectations of government support, the legacy of dependency, limits organization and collective action in FED. It is only when limitations of state assistance are recognized that settlers are motivated into action (unfortunately based on negative causes). In sum, while FED provides a model where settlers perceive nothing to gain and nothing to lose, Mo plain offers lessons concerning participatory development and collective action that lead to permanence and sustainability.

CHAPTER 6

SETTLER-AUTOCTHONE RELATIONS: A QUESTION OF LAND

Treat a visitor as guest for two days, on the third day, hand him a hoe
(Swahili proverb quoted by Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania).

A traditional African notion concerning land rights contends that land, used or vacant, is the possession of territorial ancestors, subsequently managed by the alleged descendants of these original settlers. Despite an apparent abandonment of land, according to tradition, all land nonetheless is "claimed" and occupied by its autoctones (in principle, if not in practice). Settlements do not enter areas of a clean slate (McMillan et al. 1990a). Through negotiated transfers, land may be lent and borrowed between peoples, but never actually disowned by the autoctones.

The traditional concept of land rights and land use held by rural farmers throughout Africa is the galvanizing principle underlying settler-autocthone relations in both settlements of this study. How and to what degree these sacred principles of land ownership were integrated into settlement processes largely defines current social relations between settler and autocthone populations. Farmer attitudes and behavior, expressed through transparent as well as less obvious, more covert actions described below, demonstrate legacies of settlement strategies toward integration.

Existing sociopolitical dynamics in both sites have been transformed in unanticipated ways. Below I compare settler-autochthon relations between sites by describing their contrasting forms of interaction and conflict mediation. In each, I highlight deficiencies, inadequacies, and effectiveness in problem-solving generated by influences, or lack of state control. I also examine social consequences and transformations exclusively between autochthones.

Relations in the Mo Plain

The Consequence of Respect

"Respect" is a pregnant term among autochthones in the Mo plain. The most important factor determining autochthon-settler relations, according to autochthon chiefs of Mo (Boulo, Djarapanga, Souroukou, and Saiboude), is that settlers recognize they are on our land. "As long as settlers recognize the owners, there will be no problem," explained the Boulo chief. "A settler can never be chief of the region, like a German can never be President of France," claimed the Djarapanga chief. The Boulo chief explained;

People must understand who are the ancestors here. No matter how long you live in an area, you are always what your father is. Kabye cannot be owners [of land] or canton chief. How can a Kabye arrive and be MY chief? No way. There must always be respect for land.

Conflicts in Mo are seldom over use of land, for there is no shortage of space, at least in the present. Conflicts concern respect for land, more specifically, respect for the land's traditional owners and stewards of the environment.

Settlers and autoctones agree that in most cases, settlers respect autoctone status, even if it is expressed simply by deference shown through symbolic gestures of small annual offerings or drink. Although many settlers consider autoctones the traditional stewards of the land, and offer gifts of respect, some also see the land as their own now (refer to Table 7-1). For example, the Bassar chief of Tindjasse told me that the Prefet informed the settlers the land is now their own, and no longer autoctone. As Tindjasse grows and develops, increasing numbers of farmers consider the prime settler village of Tindjasse becoming equal in status to autoctone villages.

Levelling mechanism. Resulting from this deference and respect to autoctones, a "levelling" mechanism operates that limits settler initiative and resourcefulness. In several cases, settler villages were compelled to depend on autoctone "mother" villages to express their needs to improve village conditions. For example, people in Mada expressed frustration that the autoctone village of Saiboude still maintains control over them. They explained that their needs for roads, a bridge, a school, and services must be requested to the government via Saiboude. Villagers told me they feel both incapable and restricted in expressing their own needs; " we have no right because we are illiterate, small."

Saiboude villagers consider their own needs as a priority, however. Mada villagers recognize that they should go directly to the agencies themselves, but feel powerless internally and externally. Lack of initiative and confidence results in the absence of responsibility. Other villages have similar experiences. For example, Sebonia depends on Djarapanga to transmit to authorities their need for pump repairs;

Maladema relies on Djarapanga for pump repairs and roads, but laments that Djarapanga can do little to help them, "the chief is incapable."

The levels of village control in Mo produce tension between villages. Where transience is common, and the population expands and contracts in dramatic proportions, the sociopolitical hierarchy in Mo is complex and constantly redefined. The ebb and flow of power loci causes confusion and difficulty among farmers regarding expected allegiances and loyalties.

Autochthone chiefs commonly extend their authority over allocation of land use rights to settler chiefs. Consequently, a chief or settler of long duration may give later-arriving settlers land to farm. In time, the settler of longer duration considers land surrounding his own plot as his territory, *de facto*. This nuance explains and justifies why settlers of long duration in Mo often respond that surrounding land is their own and theirs to distribute. Further probing, however, reveals the complexity of this situation.

One example of this ambiguous network is the case of the village of Gbindila. As explained by the settler chief, sorcery has been common in the village because of problems with jealousy between villages. Jealousy occurs when one village progresses ahead of another, or when a smaller village defers to one village rather than another. For example, he explained, autochthones of Souroukou gave Gbindila settlers land. But in practice, Gbindila villagers recognize Leguede as their superior chief and village.¹

¹ In Kabye, the suffix "de" translates "as home of." Kabye village names are often proper names plus *de*, such as Legeude.

Leguede performed the actual demarcation and land offering for Gbindila by request from Souroukou. Gbindila allegiance and "respect," therefore, is directed toward Leguede. Furthermore, the chief added, he favors allying closely with Leguede because he sees growth and progress in that village (formed church groups, new pump, small school). Due to his openness in alliances with Leguede, he suspects Souroukou of sorcery.

As one Sangouli farmer poignantly told me, in Mo, initiative is considered a "political act." Ideas exist, but seldom materialize - it is a mentality. He explained that in the central region of Mo, Djarapanga is the sole village to initiate efforts and unite surrounding villages. They are the leaders and we are "expected" to follow. He dislikes these conditions and believes it is time other villages organize themselves. But we only wait, he doomfully said. "We are only peasants," he resolves, in a tone of hopeless defeatism.

Juggling and vying for power and authority between settlers and autochthones is characteristically allusive, rather than overt dissension. Tension between villages is disclosed through many avenues of expression, including frustration, anger, jealousy, passivity, resistance and even respect. For example, during one of the Prefet's visits to the region, he alluded to settler-autochthone tensions by saying: "We must have a cement between you all. All must unify to work together. We cannot advance without unity." In private, he later informed me that the sociopolitical balance in Mo is delicate due to potential future autochthone-settler tensions over land. Being too forceful in promoting unity is dangerous, particularly during a period of national

political transition. He believes, however, that the role of the government is to monitor the situation and assist villagers when problems arise.²

Tindjasse assertion of authority. One example illustrating the tensions over power between autoctones and settlers was the Tindjasse elections for chief. For the first time in Mo, a settler won chieftaincy over an autocthone. Also, for the first time, elections were conducted by means of formal governmental election procedures, rather than local, idiosyncratic methods. Governmental procedures ensured secrecy in voting, and accountable and fair ballot counting. The elections were an important event in the Mo plain, which most villagers viewed as a positive step toward progress and development. Many villagers of Djarapanga (autocthone village), however, were not as approving of the election process, more precisely, with the results. Never before had a settler usurped authority over a village of importance in Mo. Clearly, winds of change prevailed.

Not long after the inauguration of the Tindjasse chief (Lina) the Prefet visited Mo. Villagers welcomed the Prefet in typically lavish pomp and circumstance. But on this visit, conflict occurred between Tindjasse and Djarapanga over responsibility to ensure the formal reception. Tindjasse claimed it was their duty, but autoctones considered this proclamation a horrifying assertion of self-righteousness. Djarapanga disapproved vehemently. Abreast of the situation, during his visit the Prefet responded

² The Prefet was simultaneously managing a similar conflict, albeit much more acute, between autoctones and settlers over land ownership and use in the region of Sotouboua. Kabye claimed control over land due to their long duration in the south due to *corvée*. The Prefet affirmed that, in many cases, the Kabye were in fact first settlers in the area and deserved land rights. Autocthone Kotokoli, in militant protest, killed several innocent Kabye returning from their fields. The problem, explained the Prefet, is particularly acute in the Central region.

by admonishing the autochthon chief that "In theory, the land may be yours, but the people are not." He advised autocthonies to recognize changing times, that the settler population is too large now (illustrated by their new chief) for the autocthonies to claim Mo as uniquely their own.

It is important to note that preempting this episode was a bold neglect for traditional customs by Lina. He failed to formally "visit" Djarapanga following his election as chief (a traditional custom at appointments of superior chiefs). This slight was a dangerous message conveyed by Lina. Despite warnings by subordinate ethnic chiefs of Tindjasse, he was unyielding in avoiding the venture to Djarapanaga. Ensnared in his newly won position, he aimed to firmly notify others of his power and authority. In rebuttal, Djarapanga declared their refusal to accept Lina formally as chief, and even tore down his ceremonial flag. This was grounds for potential warfare.

In reaction, Tindjasse boycotted autochthon and local markets in the Djarapanga vicinity for three weeks. Intense hostility loomed in Mo. Farmers told me that crops risked failure, and the market was worsening because of tensions in Mo. Finally, under coercion by ethnic chiefs and Tindjasse elders, Lina sent emissaries to Djarapanga who were refused, twice. Eventually, tensions simmered and dissipated, and Lina's chieftainship has proceeded without further trouble.

Djarapanga's denial in accepting Lina, combined with Lina's attempt to garner control, are a result of changing sociopolitical dynamics in Mo brought on by increasing numbers of settlers. Several important lessons underlie these events: first,

problem-solving occurs among actors who have a long-term investment in the outcomes; second, through these and future negotiations, Mo farmers are establishing groundwork, a forum for power brokering and conflict resolution in the future. Eventually, familiarity and trust should develop between factions that allow for effective and consensual management of sociopolitical tensions. With a small nudge from government forces, Mo farmers appear to be managing their sociopolitical environment more or less independently.

Autochthone Response to Settler Penetration

Development resources are trickling steadily into the Mo plain. One key informant told me, "Tindjasse is becoming an important village in comparison to Djarapanga." Increased services, including roads, pumps, an improved marketplace, health services, and increased civil servants have enabled Tindjasse settlers to garner benefits, even surpassing autochthone villages. Autocthonous generally welcome more settlers in the region. Increased population promotes development and growth. The Boulo chief remarked, "More people will bring more pavement," and said more young people will bring new ideas. Settlers are very successful, he told me, they build houses, even back in their home village! He also recognizes that as people arrive, the government will follow.

Nonetheless, a tension exists among autocthonous between benefits of regional development and conservation of traditions and custom. Along with development, new social, political, economic, and environmental changes also occur. Autocthonous are

feeling pressure from transition. It is unlikely that autoctones can maintain sovereignty within the flurry of change, rather they will need to adapt. For example, greater availability and access to government and nongovernment resources in Mo has sharpened competition between autoctone chiefs. Observations of the autoctone chief of Boulo demonstrate the current storm in Mo where local leaders contend for personal power and influence over the region. During one of his many circuit visits within his district, I met the Boulo chief at the remote, isolated village of Kui (a small village of approximately 300 autoctones). The chief was accompanied by a fleet of scientists consisting of a six-man team from SOTED and the Ministry of Plan from Lome. Their mission was to survey the village to promote development, specifically, road pavement.

The team's organized trek to reach Kui (over difficult roads and obstacles) was worth the chief's efforts. He rallied strong personal support from the village through demonstrating interest and concern in their village. In consequence, his status and power increase. A wide power base was particularly important to the Boulo chief during this transition period in Mo because of the prospect for naming an official canton chief in the near future (resulting from the increasing population). The Boulo chief was campaigning by stimulating development in his sector and therefore winning the allegiance of villagers. The Boulo chief understands the changes onset by settlement, and is wisely preparing for his future. Mo is "une femme enceinte" (a pregnant woman), he told me, preparing for a new birth.

The chief of Boulo's yearn for control is illustrated best during his annual two-day village festival. For the past three years, the chief has organized a celebration widely attended by people from in and outside of Mo. For example, this year he arranged three trucks from Ghana to transport former Boulo farmers to return for the festivities. For the occasion, he hired several music groups, including a Ghanaian rock band fully equipped with their own generator and quite impressive sound system. The size of this affair is impressive and displays to others his wealth, power and wide base of support. It is a rare event for a rural chief (and farmer) to host an event of this scale. Adequate wealth, time, social status and management skills are required. The chief's large investment in this festival reflects the importance he places on garnering and displaying support and status.

Throughout the festival, continuous meetings, conferences and political interactions ensued. The chief collected funds to support the festival by requiring each village to contribute food, drink and 1000 cfa each. Lack of contribution, he said, showed lack of support for his leadership, and could damage relations with that village. In a language understood and respected by all, "la fête" (the festival), the chief builds patron-client relations toward firmly securing a political base. The chief of the nearby autochthone village of Souroukou, once boycotting the festival, now attends the festival. Despite a persisting dispute over ancestral supremacy between Boulo and Souroukou, as the Souroukou chief carefully steps off a van into the festival, it is clear where the power lies.

In addition to political transformations, autocthonous have needed to adjust economically to the settler influx in Mo as well. For example, when the east-west road was graded between Boulo and Tindjasse in 1984, villages well-placed on the former road were bypassed, and consequently lost economic advantages of passing marketers. Formerly, the settler village of Gnezime, for example, was connected directly to Souroukou, (12 km distance), rather than Djarapanga (5 km). Consequently, Gnezime's foci for trade, political mediation, services and support were directed toward Souroukou. With the new road (and consequent advantages, such as increasing market activity) passing Djarapanga, Gnezime transferred their foci of activities from Souroukou toward Djarapanga. People of Souroukou complain of the loss of economic, as well as sociopolitical benefits. Similarly, market activity has decreased in Gnezime. In sum, Souroukou has been nudged out of a loop of progress by losing economic advantages and status to Djarapanga and Boulo.

Shifts in power and allegiances from one autocthone village to another have fostered new alliances between villages while exacerbating competition among others. For example, the autocthone chief of Saiboude, once an epicenter of population and thriving market activity in Mo, gravely laments the loss of population in his village and market to Tindjasse. "So many people have left, many more than have stayed," he told me. Indeed countless houses have been abandoned in Saiboude, and the market has been bypassed by the flourishing Tindjasse market and economy. Formerly a key autocthone village in Mo, today Saiboude pales relative to its neighbor village Tindjasse. Settlement is attracting development in Mo (notably new

roads) bringing unpredictable economic and political changes to which farmers are accommodating. Prediction and accommodation are vital features in which to compare Mo with the FED settlement, to which I now turn.

Relations in the FED Project

Autochthone Exclusion

Prior to the start of the FED project, the administration approached canton leaders to formally request land, and negotiate logistical aspects of the project. Many autocthonnes disapproved of the scheme, astutely perceiving the project as yet another development scheme masking government officials' attempts to gain political and financial resources. The canton chiefs could not refuse the government requests regarding sharing of their land, however. But they did not necessarily agree, nor did they consult the population.

With little room to manoeuvre, the chiefs obsequiously offered FED the land (Kenkou 1990:96). The customary law of *bina ma bina* (I eat you eat) requires that land is shared for subsistence farming with those in need of food. Accordingly, autocthonnes could not refuse offering land to Kabye, who had little of their own. Autochthone tolerance waned, however, as they watched FED transport food surplus and cash crops from the zone. They realized that abuse of traditional law was occurring.

The government assured canton chiefs that they would prosper from the project. In retrospect, the chiefs feel misled. Although the government assured them

access to benefits, many autoctones deny that this actualized. The canton chief of Alloum told me that FED said increased population would increase our prestige, instead, we lost power. We were manipulated because they told us one thing and did another, he said. His son agreed, "FED did not sense our needs." Although most autoctones believed more people would bring development, this did not occur.

The canton chief of Leon agrees that FED took too much power from local people. We had no right to respond or consult with FED, he explained. FED's director Dogbe wanted distinction rather than integration from autoctones. He attempted to erase and override traditional authority, despite the fact that we helped him a great deal with the preparation of the project. "We were forgotten." It was this kind of isolation and enclavement from the region, the chiefs explained, that underlies damaging effects of FED on social relations between settlers and autoctones today.

Abundant evidence exists supporting autocthone claims of exclusion and disrespect from the project. Initially, FED did not plan on the inclusion of autocthone farmers in the project. FED removed several autocthone households from the area by relocating during preparation for new settlers. When problems arose with removals, including autocthone complaints over their loss of land, it seemed easier to allow "settlement" of autoctones preferring not to move. One key informant (an autocthone actively involved in protesting autocthone exclusion from the project) confirmed that after three years, many autoctones were refusing to move off the land, despite threats from FED. He remembers that when the President of Togo was informed of our rising hostility, autoctones were then permitted to join the settlement.

Autoctones reconsidered. In the wake of high autoctone hostility, FED's inclusion of autoctones was inevitable. Consequently, the constitution of the settlement population transformed from original project plans. As early as 1979, autoctone recruits represented about 33 percent of all settlers (Gu-Konu 1983:973). In the 1979-80 campaign, Gu-Konu (1983) estimates no more than 16 percent of new recruits were Kabye. By 1980, 80 percent of all new recruits were from the local Lamba population, representing 35 percent of all settlers (Gu-Konu 1983:953, 991). Painter reports that in 1981, 430 of 897 families were Lamba; nearly half the population was autoctone (1990:11) (also see Chapter 8)! By May 1984, one study (BMB 1984) reports that only 44 percent of all settlers in FED were Kabye. Similarly, according to my own FED zone census (1992), 48 percent of all adult inhabitants in FED were autoctones.^{3,4} Rapid evolution and diversification of the population, rather than Kabye homogeneity, best describes settler population in FED. Despite FED's alleged exclusivity, from early in the project, it appears a mixed population emerged.

Autoctone entry did not eliminate all problems, however. For example, FED would sometimes shift autoctones to nearby plots. One informant explained that because his FED plot of land was distant from his own land and home, he moved onto another nearby plot. After three years, he decided to leave the project all

³ My results parallel those of Gu-Konu (1983:975), where Aghassa and Agounde sectors combined had the highest adult autoctone population, 57.3 percent, while Broukou had the lowest, 32.5 percent. Misseouta and Bidgande sectors each had 51 percent autoctones.

⁴ I was told by government officials that no current census exists on settler-autoctone populations or on ethnic populations represented in the zone.

together. Even when autocthonous were granted official status in the settlement, therefore, problems did not dissolve.

Autocthone Perspective

Perspectives of the FED project were not homogeneous among autocthonous. Some considered the scheme a benefit to exploit, while others saw few advantages to joining. Hors blocs (autocthonous remaining outside the project) informed me that advantages to entry were few and constraints many (specifically, the solidarity fund and the strict production rules). Extension agents were seen as a "bother." "I want to make my own decisions, not sell produce and have money taken from me," exclaimed one hors blocs. Many echoed this view, perceiving no advantage to settling.

Among autocthonous, hostility and resentment toward FED are tempered by noticeable improvements in the zone, such as roads, dispensaries, schools, and water sources. Autocthonous did detect changes, not all of which were negative. Increased population brings more infrastructure and resources from the state, as one hors blocs said; cheerfully he remarked, "we don't have to go very far to borrow fire, others are close by."

Increasingly through time, autocthonous have exploited FED services. Civil servants agree, however, that autocthonous use available government services less than settlers. For example, two primary school directors told me that fewer autocthonous attend school than settlers. In the secondary school, only 5 percent are autocthone. Parent committees for all levels were reported much lower for autocthonous than for

settlers. The Broukou primary school director attributes this difference to settlers' history of following FED rules. "Enforced adoption" was required of early settlers, including, for example, sending children to school. He believes that autoctones will, nonetheless, slowly conform.

In health care, similarly, autoctones visit and use the dispensary and pharmacy less than settlers, according to the head nurse. For autoctones, these modern concepts are still new. Autoctones still use traditional healing methods (local plants), he explained, and are ignorant of our benefits. He said many reasons explain autoctone resistance to government health services: some autoctones remain unaware we even exist, others consider us too far for travel; while still others cannot afford the cost. Settlers have been informed of the clinics and are becoming increasingly aware of the health services provided in FED. While many settlers have had these and other services in their home villages prior to relocating, autoctones have had little prior exposure and remain skeptical of their benefits.

Land conflicts. Indisputably, the most important cause of settler-autoctone conflict today revolves around land. Land has been an extremely volatile issue between settlers and autoctones from project inception (Kenkou 1990:9); "[the project] a provoqué un sentiment de frustration chez les autoctones, qui y ont une menace pour leurs droits fonciers et, au-delà, pour leur sécurité alimentaire (Gu-Konu 1983:991)." Initially, frustrations and conflicts were resolved by FED. Staff predictably sided with settlers, ensuring them rights to land controlled by the project.

FED endowed settlers with legal access to their plots. This operated more or less effectively for the short term.

Lack of clarification over land tenure and use rights in the long term, however, after project closure, is causing severe problems today. The current Director confirmed that land conflict is the main cause of current settler desertion. Autochthone land reclamation has severely undermined and threatened settler permanency in FED. Settler vulnerability is particularly acute today, during violent democratization uprisings throughout Togo.

From the start of FED, jealousy and reticence from autocthonnes affected settlers. As one key informant explained, settlers harbored a "one day or other" attitude, estimating, rightfully so, that their land may be taken away from them at whim. Further, worsening conditions over land access has increased noticeably. "Before they were scared of us, now they are removing us. The problem lies in no one contacting actual land owners at the start," explained one settler.

A diversity of examples demonstrate importance of this issue. In Agounde sector (the most heated area of settler-autochthone conflict in the settlement), autocthonnes convoked a meeting with settlers to "discuss" land issues. They expressed openness to accept and live beside settlers, but requested settlers to respect their role as land owners and decision-makers over land use. Settlers considered this discussion a threat rather than dialogue and exchange of ideas. This has led many to depart, while others remain living in fear and trepidation. The autocthonnes, on the other

hand, consider this initiative an essential and long-overdue clarification in order to protect their own land for the long term.

Actual reclamation incidents, however, in fact did occur. In one case, a settler extended his 5-hectare plot to a 15 ha area (previously warranted by FED). After FED closure, autochthones began farming over 10 ha of his fields, without forewarning, leaving him only his initial 5-hectare plot. He explained to me that he had no authority to whom he could report the violation, and could only respond to their somewhat violent actions. It is their land after all, he said. In another case, when FED allocated a plot to a settler, an autochthone settler claimed it as his own and refused to relinquish it. The settler was then moved to another plot, where again there were problems with an autochthone. Finally, the autochthone deferred to the project and gave the settler his land, under the fist of FED. The settler said to me, "Autochthones were forced to leave for settlers; this has been and continues to be a problem." Further, he adds, "More autochthones are now returning to take their land back and in principle they are right; the project was wrong." Another settler told me, "It would be better if WE negotiated for land instead of the government. If I did it, it is with sincerity and *'la bonne coeur'* rather than authority, force, without will."

Manifestations of conflict over land also appear in less overt, more subtle acts of resistance, such as animal grazing, sorcery, theft, and tree burning. In grazing conflicts, for example, autochthones disrespect certain rules of animal protection (fence building) advised by the extension agents. Instead, they allow their animals to carelessly roam over settler fields. As Scott (1985) has elegantly shown in his

observations of peasant farmers, forms of resistance to government enforcement and settler livelihood are often expressed through farmer defiance. Another constant threat to settlers has been sorcery by autochthones. In the case of Agounde settlers, sorcery concerns have risen to epidemic proportions. For example, settlers told me stories of autochthones bewitching and actually stealing settler children, poisoning the river source with excrements, and conducting other malign ceremonial rites to remove settlers from their land.⁵

Other than farm land, disrespect for autochthone sacred areas exposes FED's undermining of traditional autochthone culture. FED offered little attention to local cultural preservation during settler installation. One autochthone told me, "The Direction did not accept our laws of sacred natural areas and cut our trees they should not have." Others agreed, commenting that less rain is a result of FED's violating sacred areas. FED's near complete erasure of autochthone beliefs and systems of land use evidently held significant outcomes.

Smoke leads to fire. Settlers recognize that the adverse situation they have inherited is not of their own making and resent FED's legacy of top-down control. In attempts to repair old wounds, many settlers now approach autochthones concerning sacred land areas, ceremonies, and other local issues. An outstanding example of this fact occurred over land conflict at the Broukou market. This case illustrates how bypassing autochthone power, formerly attempted by FED, is untenable, despite

⁵ The Agounde sector has subsequently lost most of the settlers placed there by the project. As discussed in detail in Chapter 8, estimates of desertion in Agounde are as high as 90 percent.

contrary efforts. This incident is retold among settlers and autochthones continuously, as proof and reminder to all of the precarious balance of land control and ownership in the region.

The story begins in the early 1980s, when Dogbe asked settlers to perform ceremonies for the marketplace (during a presidential visit). The autochthones were furious, believing the market as rightfully theirs, on their land, under their custodianship: "Un étranger n'as pas le droit de faire les cérémonies sur notre terre." After several similar incidences (due to frequent diplomatic visits), autochthones insisted that they perform ceremonies. Soon after this demand (1983), a devastating fire broke out in the marketplace. FED accused the Alloum canton chief of committing the arson. Consequently, he was imprisoned for three months, and soon after release, accused again, of provoking resistance among autochthones by meetings and protests. He was asked to leave his parcel (he was settled), then removed from the project by force.

Despite these hostile episodes, during the project lifetime, FED approached the Alloum chief in 1978, and again in 1986, to perform proper local ceremonies against severe drought. On both occasions, it promptly rained. Many settlers believe that these episodes confirm autochthone rights and power over land, despite FED's attempt for control.

The first Director Dogbe, however, minimizes the importance of this and other episodes of autochthone hostility. He assured me that the "brassage" between autochthones and settlers was strong and that the results of first settlers still on site are

a continuing proof of harmony (Dogbe, personal communication, 1991). The fact remains, however, that first settler permanence may be attributable more to his initial cajoling than actual settler permanency. Smoke leads to fire: underlying settler dissatisfaction and resentment over land rights have led to high settler rates of turnover and desertion (examined in Chapter 8).

Other common and less dramatic, but nonetheless galvanizing, episodes of settler-autochthone conflicts include fights at water pumps (consistently between autochthone and settler women), theft, and more recently, the burning of tree farms planted initially by FED. During my field research, a number of FED's tree plantations (about one ha each) were burned in sectors throughout the FED zone (see Chapter 7 for details). This has been a disgrace for the current director of the project (FED's former forest agent during the project), who slides the problem off as errant locals who are hunting. In reality, this is hardly the case.

I was told by farmers in the zone that burning tree farms is not insignificant, but due to lack of land. A number of autocthonos (surprisingly fearless in their honesty) admitted they were working in the reforested zone because land is scarce. Land shortages have caused many to disobey rules previously respected and to farm in the off-limit areas of reforestation. They viewed this as their right. FED's initial programs are in process of ruin for personal survival and profit among local farmers. A second explanation for tree burning, in addition to land shortage, is resistance (among autocthonos and settlers alike) (Scott 1989). Farmers informed me that increasingly open and hostile resentment of FED has provoked several autocthonos

and settlers to burn the trees uniquely for spite. In sum, although FED's reforestation program in the zone may have been well intended, the results have now come to fruition - burning of the trees for farmland and spite (also see Chapter 8).

Like coals under a fire, muffled autochthonic opposition has persisted, even during the "high" period of FED. Contrary to what one may assume, the end of project funding did not correspond to the end of the FED legacy. Burning of the trees and the marketplace, for example, are weapons of continuing autochthonic revolt (Scott 1989). Despite initial formal autochthonic agreement with FED (in accordance with the value of *bina ma bina*), many autochthones did not foresee the effects of FED's dirigisme and settler intrusion. Current outspoken resentment is reactionary fire from twenty years of repressed smoke.

Disruption of Autochthonic Social Landscapes

Precisely where and how FED affected existing indigenous autochthonic inter-relations is illustrated well through the case of the village of Tchore. This example shows FED's undermining of existing status and power relations between autochthones (intentionally or not) and disturbance of an otherwise effectively functioning sociopolitical landscape.

Tchore is an older, more populated, and politically more important village in the canton than the FED-supported village of Agounde. The construction of Tchore's government primary school serving the region (built in 1970) gives evidence to this fact. When FED arrived, Tchore was delegated as a constituent of nearby Agounde

village, rather than as an independent village. When FED arrived, Aiga, the chief of Tchore, explained, the canton chief in Kadgalla wrongly defined this area as Agounde, without mentioning Tchore (apparently political alliances between villages favored Agounde over Tchore). FED planners and representatives did not bother to enter, explore or verify the landscape or information concerning existing villages. Consequently, Aiga was not consulted and the integrity of Tchore was subverted. He explained, "FED essentially removed Tchore from the map."

Understandably, Aiga and his villagers have been extremely resentful of this situation. "We will not accept going to Agounde to receive their authority, we protest," Aiga told me. In 1982, FED built a primary school in Agounde, forcing the closure of the adequately functioning school of Tchore. Initially, in protest, the Tchore inhabitants refused to send their children to this school. After recognizing the personal losses in this, they reinitiated attendance. However, some youths can no longer attend school: some live too far from the new school, while others have to cross a river, too high in the rainy season to traverse.

Similar to the school, the marketplace in Tchore has succumbed to the increasing importance of the FED-established Agounde market. Most market activity in Tchore has been relocated to the Agounde market. Had FED originally conducted inquiries and field examinations, Tchore residents explained, they would have observed a regional school and market already in existence. This could have prevented the formation of new institutional entities, saving resources, and deterred the acute animosity existing between autocthonous today.

Neither settlers nor Agounde autocthonous would mediate problems directly with Tchore residents during FED. FED's patronage and support gave them a confidence and power to act independently. FED's termination has created a lacuna of support and mediation, however, allowing for the reemergence of traditional systems and structures of power bargaining. "Now they are forced to reason with us," the chief told me.

Agounde prominence and power are waning with time. For example, in one case, a settler was planting a rice field along the river. To evict Tchore women collecting household water in the area, he was defecating in the river, a taboo practice. The irate women took the problem to the canton chief of Kadgalla, but even before consultation, the settler defected from the region (on his own will). According to Aiga, this shows the strength and respect for Tchore women's power, even more effective than the canton chief's. In another case, when lightning struck a tree threatening the life of an Agounde settler, he approached the Agounde chief for divination and meaning. The chief, however, directed him to Aiga for consultation. Aiga accounts this story as proof of widespread recognition of Tchore's importance in the region.

Search for Solutions

Autocthonous are becoming more confident in reclaiming their former power and respect in the region: "Now settlers ask us directly for land; they recognize it is

ours." Confidence, however, must translate into institutionalized rules and policies, including methods of arbitration mutually agreed upon.

With project closure, a hollow opening and vulnerability, prone to more hostile and destructive means of resolution remain. The cost of confusion over authority and control of the region is proving to be high, as settlers flee for their lives, or remain on site in fear of autochthone aggression, and as environmental resources, specifically trees and soils, are overused and destroyed.

Current confusion regarding authority in the zone is a legacy of FED. Abandoned by FED as caretakers, settlers and autoctones are confronted now with resulting problems, discord over land, with little preparation or experience for problem-solving. Enclavement and isolation from existing sociopolitical systems has created a void for ensuring stable autochthone-settler relations.

Canton chiefs wielded power over the region, in collaboration and in balance with the prefecture prior to FED intervention. FED's acquisition of absolute authority, first over settlers, then encompassing autoctones as well, left canton chiefs with much less control and power than previously exercised. With project closure, there is confusion and disagreement regarding transfer of power and appropriate center(s) of authority.

The prefecture has assumed much of the administrative authority of the settlement region. Cantons have reclaimed significant power, specifically over land, sociopolitical disputes, ethnic conflicts, and the like. Also, since FED departure, autoctones are slowly regaining respect and recognition as landowners in the region.

Questions remain, however, such as the role and function of institutions of settler-based structures of governance, specifically the CZ and chefs blocs. However effective their roles during the project, these positions fail to function integrally in the surrounding sociopolitical environment today. This shortcoming exposes the lack of duration of FED's political structures.

The end of FED control has created a vacancy in authority and representation of settlers. To fill this void, the role of village chief has grown in stature. The first official village chief, of Broukou, is a Kabye settler of long duration and high reputation. With supervision from the Prefecture, the canton chief, and the acting Director in the zone, he was elected into office in 1991.⁶

The canton chief of Alloum is among the majority who consider the role of village chief essential to vocalize settler rights. In order to best oversee the settlement zone, it is critical to have someone from the zone, a settler, to serve as chief, he explained. "Chiefs on locale," a form of decentralized power, is a new structure defined in the post-FED era, he told me. "There is a new system in a former structure," he explained, new roles and positions of authority exist within the framework of traditional models. The new village chiefs play a collaborative, but secondary role to the canton superior chief. The village chief supplies the settler ingredient to overall regional affairs.

⁶ In the sector of Bidgande, a second village chief was voted into office at the time of my departure from the field site. Chiefs of Agounde and Agbassa are named as well.

The distinction between traditional pre-FED, FED and post-FED political systems of authority is nonetheless far from clear. Although the Broukou chief, Dofile, has been elected into a newly formed, post-FED position, confusion over transitions of political power and authority are not yet resolved.

Conclusion of Autochthone-Settler Relations

The cost of settler reliance and interdependency with autocthonous in Mo has been respect and levelling. This has caused a deferment and limitation of growth and development. Autochthone-settler tensions exist in Mo, recently attested by public display of vying for power between the two major villages of Tindjasse and Djarapanga. Regional development of the zone, ironically, is reinforcing these tensions as settler villages enjoy unprecedented outside aid due to their growing populations. As settlers increase in numbers, autocthonous will be forced to contend with a sharing of power in the zone, and recognize new limitations of their authority.

Changes occurring in the FED zone since project closure have unleashed a host of formerly muffled and concealed hostilities and tensions endured by autocthonous throughout the project lifetime (the smoke of the fire). Autochthone anger over denial in sharing many project advantages ignited a loosening and expansion of the settlement's isolation and concentration of benefits. This was a prelude to further autochthone protests over control of economic, sociopolitical and environmental institutions and resources that they considered under their rightful auspices and control, specifically the market and land areas.

Confusion over land use and land rights has provoked aggressive events and threats of eviction in FED, causing settler fear and desertion. Insecurity and uncertainty over land may be the most enduring ill-fated legacy left from FED. New and appropriate systems of power are developing in the zone (overriding failed efforts of FED's CZ) to initiate a basis for problem-solving, conflict mediation, and community action. Problems over land tenure and rights, as well as natural resource management, however, raise hard questions regarding sociopolitical processes of resettlement and development projects in general. In Mo, where experience in sociopolitical mediation generates trust and effective problem-solving, there appears greater potential for sustainability than in FED, where suppressed resentment and consequent insults to social and environmental stability are just coming to fruition.

CHAPTER 7

AGRICULTURAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE SYSTEMS: LESSONS FROM SIMILARITIES BETWEEN SETTLEMENTS

There is nothing more dangerous than to build a society with a large segment of people in that society who feel they have no stake in it, who feel that they have nothing to lose (Martin Luther King quoted by Bob Herbert: editorial in the *Gainesville Sun*, January 11, 1995:10A).

This is the foundation of development, for wealth is simply the product of combining interchangeable resources and productive labor. Wealth is achieved essentially by one's own efforts. It is earned little by little, in an active market where goods, services, and ideas are exchanged and people are constantly learning and adjusting needs. Wealth comes from knowing how to use resources, not from owning them (Hernando de Soto, *The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World*, 1989:243).

Natural resources and environmental conditions are clearly effected by agricultural techniques farmers employ. In many regions of rural Africa, harsh climatic conditions produce fragile soils which are particularly susceptible to degradation and erosion. Farming practices which insult the natural balance of soil depletion and rejuvenation under heavy agricultural use risk causing irreparable environmental destruction. The most critical, often "missing" element in resource management and conservation, therefore, is culture, the human impact.

In this chapter, I compare settler farming practices and their long-term effects on the surrounding natural resource base in each site. I first describe the farming systems of each settlement, focusing on their unique evolutions, strengths and weaknesses. I examine rationales and outcomes of technology intervention, and subsequently raise questions regarding technology sustainability. I then analyze broadly the environmental effects generated by settler farming practices in each site, and consider prospects for long-term sustainability of surrounding natural resource bases.

In this chapter, problem prevention plays as much a role as problem resolution. Unlike in other chapters, evidence shows that similarities, rather than differences between the settlements' agricultural systems may best depict their relationship. In consequence, I conclude this chapter by posing hard questions concerning the justifications and consequences of FED's high-investment agricultural scheme.

Agricultural Practices in the Mo Plain

Extensification

Increased land availability, combined with exposure to new agricultural methods, have modified traditional farming practices for Mo settlers. Former labor-intensive, environmentally protective land management systems employed by Kabye have transformed into a more extensive, less elaborate, less labor-demanding, and less environmentally protective farming system (this is true for Kabye throughout southern

migrations, Lucien-Brun 1987:150). Kabye agricultural practices, notable for exceptional conservation (such as formation and application of compost as green manure, contour planting, and so on), are little practiced when quality of soil and access to new land are increased. In turn, longer fallow periods are feasible, allowing for the practice of extensive slash and burn agriculture.

In general, surface area of fields cultivated and total number of fields farmed increases dramatically among Kabye settlers in the south. Lucien-Brun (1987) reports that an average household of 9.5 persons in the north uses at most five hectares (one ha per field), compared to an average household of seven persons in the Central region using an average of over fifteen hectares (3 ha per field of five fields). This amounts to over three times the surface area. In contrast, autochthone Kotokoli households having an average of eight persons use about 7.5 hectares (five fields of 1.5 ha each), nearly one-half of the Kabye surface area (Lucien-Brun 1987:84,173, Annex I and II).¹

Land abundance is the essential factor for extensive slash and burn agriculture. Land surplus allows for extended fallow periods and rotation of fields. The concept of land shortage is not yet a major concern in Mo. Settlers perceive land as abundant and near limitless for cultivation.² Perception coincides with farmer practices of long and extensive fallows (Table 7-1). Soil quality and land abundance were key incentives for resettlement for most settlers (in both sites) (Table 7-1). Despite that

¹ Kotokoli are not a farmer-based society generally; rather it is commerce-oriented.

² Autocthonous likewise told me that land is plentiful and that they welcomed settlers.

Table 7-1. Comparison of sources and availability of land.

| Site | Mo | FED |
|--|---|---|
| Land as primary reason for migration (%) | 63.3 | 75.0 |
| Farming approach | extensification; syncretization of techniques | intensification; FED's agricultural package rigidly enforced |
| Perceives land as own (%) | 42 | 58.0 |
| Primary initial source of land (%) | | |
| family or friends | 58 | 16.0 |
| government | 0 | 62.5 |
| other ^z | 42 | 21.5 |
| Average land area (ha) per household | | |
| initial | 1.99 | 4.86 |
| total (1992) | 10.33 | 5.76 |
| Permission required for land increase | | |
| no one | 83.4 | 21.4 |
| autochthones | 8.3 | 43.0 |
| settlers | 8.3 | 35.6 |
| Average area in cultivation (ha) per household | 3.33 | 5.76 |
| Average area in fallow (ha) per household | 7.0 | 0 |
| average years in fallow | 5.2 | 0 |
| Average distance (km) to field(s) per household | 3.9 | 0.3 |
| Women | | |
| with own fields (%) | 46.7 | 23.0 |
| average size of fields (ha) | 0.47 | 0.20 |
| primary crop | groundnut | sorghum |

^z When arrived, obtained from previously unknown settler chief or autochthone chief, or from a settler or autochthone, or asked no one.

more people are entering the zone, no farmers in the sample mentioned land as a form of constraint to greater success, and 60 percent of settlers sampled perceived no change in soil quality since on site (Table 7-2).

Inattention to environmental conservation in Mo, according to one former SOTOCO Director, directly correlates with the absence of land pressure (Ewovor, personal communication 1992). People do not feel or perceive a need to protect the environment because there is so much remaining forest, he said. Also, people are itinerant and do not see the value of planting trees when they will not benefit from them. Nonetheless, informants confirmed that villages are growing, and that people are moving further "out" to farm. The current chief and first settler of Gbanzaba, for example, initially settled to farm in Saiboudé, but then moved in search of virgin land and founded the village of Gbanzaba. Since then he resettled even further from his village to a small hamlet where he currently farms. This sprawl illustrates settlers continual search for virgin, fertile soil.

Sprawl also illustrates effects of an increasing population in Mo. At the present, however, conflict over land in Mo, unlike in FED, appears to be minimal. Land is perceived by most settlers as owned by autoctones (Table 7-1). However, farmers still consider themselves permanent in Mo: "This is home," said the chief of Banda village, who has no other land than in Mo. Tuali, chief of Bolkatanga, sees his role as that of land "manager" for Boulo autoctones. He considers the land more than a loan, but not quite his own either. He revealed his perspective of

Table 7-2. Comparison of perceptions and management of natural resources.

| | Mo | FED |
|---|----|-----|
| Settler perceptions (%) | | |
| adequate land available for future | 94 | 47 |
| land availability primary constraint to agricultural production | 0 | 19 |
| inavailability of land primary cause for potential defection | 13 | 25 |
| reduction in numbers of trees | 70 | 53 |
| decrease in access to wood | 63 | 78 |
| should plant trees for future | 42 | 50 |
| own soil quality is good | 64 | 16 |
| no change in own soil quality since farming on site | 60 | 9 |
| decline in own yields due to soil degradation | 33 | 75 |
| population increase primary cause of soil degradation | 30 | 72 |
| Settler practices | | |
| protects trees on own farm (%) | 3 | 56 |
| average number of trees planted per household since in settlement | 18 | 301 |

permanency by assuring me that his children will remain on this land.³ In sum, Mo farmers practice a system of diverse land use agreements in which they negotiate among themselves.

Labor Patterns

Extensive itinerant farming systems, rather than intensive field management, best describes the farming systems practiced in Mo. A primary motive for the transformation from intensive to extensive farming among Kabye, according to Lucien-Brun (1987), is labor reduction and increased time for leisure and for other activities. For example, studies of labor patterns and time allocation between northern Kabye farmers and Central region Kabye settlers by Lucien-Brun (1987:180, Annex xx-xxii) show that initially, Kabye farmers seem to allocate about the same time to work in the fields. In both sites, he found an average of about 30 hours/week in the low season and 40 in the high season are spent in farm work (with a small increase in settler hours due to the slightly longer rainy season in the Central region). Closer scrutiny of work patterns reveals, however, that hours per hectare farmed annually by individuals and collectives (measured by T/ha) show that traditional Kabye farmers work three times more than settlers (Lucien-Brun 1987:181). This discrepancy, according to Lucien-Brun, is explained by settlers' less precise, less fastidious, and more rapid approach to work than in the north.

³ In contrast, another settler also said that his children can stay, but he plans to leave.

Lucien-Brun (1987) found that traditions of hada and egbare work associations are continued and practiced even more by settlers than those in northern Kabye. This is not due to more intensive labor, he asserts, but likely explained by the increase in land cultivated, requiring more initial labor to clear overgrown or virgin fields, and to perform other necessary agricultural tasks. Clearing land is essential to the success of new settlements where landholdings cleared and prepared for cultivation, then cultivated, indicate potential for settler land ownership (Lucien-Brun 1987:173). In the long term, land less aggressively cleared and farmed is less potentially owned by the settlers.⁴

In my own research, all farmers sampled in Mo responded that labor, rather than land, shortage was the primary constraint to increasing agricultural production (Table 7-3). As a result, a resourceful and very dynamic system of labor patterns has evolved, which combines a diversity of work groups (Table 7-3). Observations of southern migrants by scholars (Kedagni 1989; Painter 1990; Sauvaget 1981) underline that importance of increased labor demands for land extension does not denote more work for migrants, but increased hired labor.

This transition from high to low population-density area entails marked reductions in labor time by household members and a concomitant increase in the use of extra household hired labor to meet production needs. Pillet-Schwartz, for example, has estimated that households from high-density areas who settle in new lands in Togo may reduce their own contribution of labor time in agriculture by almost two-thirds (1986:130-1) (Painter, 1990).

⁴ Staked land will not necessarily be put into cultivation, per se. Rather, it will be partially cleared or arranged to identify occupancy. In fact, a large part of a settler's landholding will not be under cultivation, but in fallow or reserve. Lucien-Brun (1987:155) shows that average fallow periods in the Sotoboua area were ten years, and no less than six or seven.

Table 7-3. Comparison of labor systems.

| | Mo | FED |
|--|------------|------------|
| Own animal for traction (%) | 0 | 43.7 |
| Conduct Hada (%) | 94.0 | 81.3 |
| Conduct Egbare (%) | 70.0 | 69.0 |
| Labor | | |
| hire labor (%) | 64.0 | 37.5 |
| annual investment per household | | |
| overall sample | 50,312 CFA | 13,031 CFA |
| those who hire | 79,000 CFA | 34,750 CFA |
| Labor shortage considered primary restraint to increased productivity (%) | 100.0 | 81.0 |

In addition to considerable use of work associations, family labor is a key component of Mo farming systems.⁵ Women work long and hard hours on family farms, specifically in tree burning, planting, weeding, thinning, harvesting and transport. According to Mo women sampled, women work in agricultural activities on average 5.4 days per week in the rainy season and 3-4 days in the dry season. Women also participate in hada and conduct egbare (often separate from men). As shown in Table 7-1, most women in both sites have little time to spare for farming their own fields (which would contribute both to overall household earnings and personal income).

⁵ Estimated average family size in Mo is approximately seven persons (of whom five are able to contribute actively to farm labor).

Increases in labor ironically coincide with low investment in land management. Labor patterns, oriented towards clearance rather than intensification, reflect settlers' quest for expanding freedoms. Land abundance and good soil quality allow for greater farmer freedom, but place the sustainability factor into question.

Farming Practices

Farming practices among Mo farmers is shaped by the pursuit of space and leisure as well. Lack of settler interest and investment in improved technologies for high-yielding production, according to Pillet-Schwartz (1986a), can be explained by the concept of leisure.

Sa conquête de l'espace fut avant tout et demeure une conquête pour le temps et non pour l'argent, avec tout ce que cela implique de facilités: travail moins fastidieux, disponibilité plus grande, vie sociale plus intense, etc. Il en profite, certes, pour mettre en valeur plus d'hectares qu'il ne le ferait dans son pays d'origine, mais aussi et surtout pour se dépenser moins. (Pillet-Schwartz, 1986a:328-29)

Change in settlers' farming systems can be characterized as simplification rather than invention, where abandonment rather than innovation is most practiced. "Au total, parmi les changements mineurs intervenus, on observe plus d'abandons que d'innovations, ce qui ne suppose aucune difficulté d'adaptation notable" (Lucien-Brun 1987:207).

Adaptive, new farming practices among Mo settlers are determined and transformed by increased land availability, and also by a syncretization of farming practices among different groups in the region adapted to the bio-physical conditions. Cultivation practices of Kotokoli, Bassar, and Kabye-Lamba-Losso groups differ in

subtleties according to climatic conditions and tradition. In working alongside one another, independently and in cooperation, diverse farming practices and technologies are observed, exchanged, adopted and innovated between farmers (Napo, chef secteur extension agent, personal communication, 1991). This explains the transformations and adaptations in Kabye farming systems in the Mo plain compared to their home villages.

Settlers have adjusted former cropping systems to accommodate new environmental conditions found in the Central region. Yams, for example, play a greater importance in Mo farming systems than in traditional Kabye systems (Table 7-4).⁶ Today, the Mo plain is known as the yam capital of Togo (and even West Africa). Maize also plays an increasingly important cereal among settlers, overriding sorghum and millet which are less planted in the south. Rice also increases in production, while manioc, beans and groundnut are less planted in the Central regions than in the north (Kpowbie 1982).⁷ Fonio, as well as tobacco, important crops of the northern Lamba, decrease in importance in the Central region. Similarly, household kitchen gardens, primarily grown by women, grow more lean in the south, with fewer varieties, but simultaneously bear new species, such as taro plant, sweet potato and the local nyato leaf. According to Lucien-Brun (1987), most of the same types of crops are produced in the south as in the north, but settlers have juggled their

⁶ This is the crop planted immediately upon arrival. Arable soils in the south permit easier cultivation, plus more available land allows for greater yam production and more diverse cultivars.

⁷ Cotton, formerly abandoned by Kabye as an income-producing crop mostly because of land scarcity, plays an increasing role for many settlers in the south but not in Mo.

Table 7-4. Comparison of cropping systems and production levels.

| | Mo | FED |
|--|---|--|
| Primary crops planted (% settlers planting) | sorghum (100) yam (94.0) manioc (87.9) rice (57.6) | sorghum (96.9) maize (96.9) yam (87.5) groundnut (87.5) |
| Highest-yielding crops (average per household, in kg) | yam (1940.0) manioc (415.8) rice (360.3) sorghum (351.6) | yam (1303.0) maize (1162.8) sorghum (645.5) groundnut (519.4) |
| Total harvest (average kg per household, excluding cotton) | 3,499.5 | 4,636.7 |
| Of crops sold, average per household: excluding cotton: | | |
| percent sold annually | 19.84 | 16.66 |
| annual gross income (CFA) | 84,788.94 | 93,381.84 |
| including cotton: | | |
| annual gross income (CFA) | 89,993.94 | 121,964.42 |

importance and added varieties formerly unknown to them, according to new climatic conditions.

Production levels. Actual production levels are difficult to ascertain due to the imprecision of measuring crop associations, planting densities, inputs, labor activity, and so on. As shown in Table 7-4, my research findings show average yield per hectare among sampled Mo households was 3,499.53 kg (excluding cotton), somewhat lower than yields attained among FED settlers.⁸ Total income from agricultural

⁸ Lucien-Brun (1987:173) found the following average total production of settler farmers: 1810 (dry)/ha valued at 39,500 CFA, slightly higher than home villages with 1460 kg/ha worth 39,400 CFA. Kpowbie (1982) found traditional Kabye households with plots of 1 ha produced about 1286 kg.

production of settlers is somewhat lower than FED farmers (Table 7-4), but significantly higher than their northern brothers, according to Lucien-Brun (1987:174 and Annex XIV). Lucien-Brun (1987) found that settler net revenue amounted to around 80,000 CFA compared to the farmer of origin revenue of only 1,200 CFA. He attributes this dramatic income differentiation between northern and southern Kabye not to price differentiation, nor yield, but to difference in surface area cultivated, "Il est clair que l'essor économique est lié seulement à l'augmentation des surfaces cultivées puisque les rendements restent à peu près inchangés" (Lucien-Brun 1987:14).

Mo and FED farmers both reported selling less than 20 percent of all crop production outside the household. Yams earn the greatest income among Mo households (38,098 CFA). Decisions on type and quantity of crops to sell depend on a variety of factors, including sale price, local demand, hada dates, household consumption, festivities planned, and so on.

Resistance to Technology Adoption

Settlers maintain considerable disinterest and resistance to improved technology adoption introduced by extension agents in the Mo plain. Until 1984, there was a total absence of the national extension service. At this time, SOTOCO Bassar initiated an extension of their cotton production program into Mo, and consequently erected the Mo bridge.⁹ Despite a decade long of intervention, extension in Mo appears to have little impact in the region, other than some cotton production.

⁹ Since 1988, FED-Bassar has assumed responsibility for agricultural extension in Mo following the termination of SOTOCO Bassar.

A small number of settlers sampled actually work with extension agents in Mo (see Table 7-5).¹⁰ As shown in Table 7-5, most believe the fault lies with themselves: they were unwilling to conform to the inflexible, rigid rules of planting and crop maintenance required by agents, particularly in cotton. Therefore, Mo farmers opt not to engage in formal relations with extension agents, despite potential benefits. Data results of Table 7-5 reflect Mo settlers' limited use of extension benefits. Only four farmers among those sampled plant cotton (requiring extension services). In his study, Painter (1990) found similar results of farmer resistance to inputs, specifically fertilizer;

These settlers show strong resistance to using chemical fertilizers for crops other than cotton. All the individuals we met in the plain area argue that because the quality of land is good, there is no point in paying for fertilizer. When land becomes "tired," they can move to another plot (Painter, 1990:44).

Even cotton production in the region has decreased to about one-third its production level within the last decade, according to the former SOTOCO director (Ewovor, personal communication, 1992). He attests that cotton production dropped from 517.67 kg to 164.87 kg between 1986-1987 and 1991-2. Also, he confirmed that total area planted in cotton during these same years dropped from 610 ha to 173 ha. As the prime incentive to "open the region" of Mo, cotton production has failed. Constricted international terms of trade and macro-economic stringency have increased fertilizer and inputs costs, while the market price for cotton declined.

¹⁰ Ninety-one percent of farmers sampled expressed a preference to work with agents (compared to 9 percent expressing no interest).

Table 7-5. Comparison of extension policy, services offered, and outcomes.

| | Mo | FED |
|---|---|--|
| Extension policy | relatively responsive to farmer needs approach incremental, cautionary, piece-meal | dirigiste style, enforcement of "packaged" technologies "faire passer" approach |
| Outcomes | farmer disinterest mining of natural resource base | "interpretation" of guidelines farmer resentment exploitation of natural resource base |
| Extension agents | | |
| work environment | isolated region farmer resistance | accessible region farmer compliance |
| performance | agent despondency | agents enthusiastic |
| agent visits settler (average days per annum) | 2.4 | 7.8 |
| settlers visited regularly (%) | 18 | 81 |
| settlers never visited (%) | 61 | 0 |
| Settler perceptions | | |
| infrequent visits settlers' fault (%) | 84 | 60 |
| receive respect from agents (%) | 53 | 81 |
| Settler practices | | |
| monocrop (%) | 3 | 16 |
| use fertilizers, (%) (no.) | 19 (4) | 94 (31) |
| Settler investment in fertilizer (CFA) (average per household) | | |
| for overall sample | 18,736 | 28,316 |
| for users only | 33,180 | 29,040 |
| (standard deviation) | (60.27) | (21.4) |
| adjusted average, Mo ^z | 8,350 | -- |
| (standard deviation) | (3.51) | -- |

^z Among users in Mo, average fertilizer use is skewed by one settler in Kagnanbara who averages an annual investment of 156,000 CFA in fertilizer. Given the two standard deviations, the figure that excludes him appears to more accurately reflect the actual investment in fertilizer on the Mo plain.

Farmers have increasingly lost interest in cotton, while extension agents increasingly despair.

Declining world market prices do not explain fully Mo's decline in cotton production, according to Ewovor. Isolation of Mo farmers and the difficult condition of resettlement create a social environment which prevents successful introduction of new techniques. People fear inputs and rigid rules he explained (see Scudder and Colson 1982 on innovation and change). They consider extension a burden rather than luxury, and prefer extensive traditional practices to modern techniques, he told me. Based on informant accounts, settler interviews, and my own field observations, it appears that the current overall ineffectiveness of the extension service in Mo is determined foremost by farmers' resistance to change.

Despondency among Extension Agents in Mo

During one village visit by an extension agent in Mo, I observed a lively discussion held between villagers and the extension agent. The debate concerned bush fire and land use rights for cultivation within the perimeter of the national reserve (where cultivation is prohibited). Farmers have been opposed adamantly to government prohibitions of the land use. Many settlers disregarded the regulation and farmed in the reserve. After the local forester cajoled farmers, then issued several warnings of farmers' arrests for trespassing, the population rose up and evicted him by threatening his life. At present, no agent dares to replace him.

After concerted efforts towards flora and fauna protection, animals are being hunted down and killed by bush fire, and the environment is being destroyed. People cannot understand on their own, one agent explained. "Development is up to you," I observed him tell farmers with sincerity during one village meeting, but in private, he said in frustration, nothing is internalized, nobody responds, and people do what they want.

This vignette illustrates the despondency shared among extension agents, combined with farmer disinterest and even affront. There have been numerous problems among agents in Mo. Most agents consider the regional post a "punishment" assignment because of its remoteness, difficult conditions due to lack of infrastructure, and resistant, "backward" farmers. Many agents either incessantly request relocation or, due to malaise, simply fail to conduct their work at all, which the regional head agent informed me was a recurrent and formidable problem.¹¹ Incentives in salaries, living expenses, benefits, and training have been inadequate, according to the agents.

In effort to reform agricultural services in Mo, FED has initiated new approaches to extension by employing more participatory methods. Interest groups, collective activities, farmer-based needs and self-responsibility are some of the new strategies implemented by extension agents in Mo. Ineffectiveness of former top-down information-delivery styles, combined with decreasing funds available for promotion

¹¹ One agent assigned to Gnezime has simply ceased working. He moved from Gnezime to Tindjasse, rarely visits the village, conducts no field trials, or household visits; he simply quit.

of improved technologies, have transformed the extension approach from one of classic agent authority to more facilitation and participation of village committee focus groups. Needs identification, formulation of solutions, and implementation of projects are now to be jointly decided and managed by agents and farmers. Priorities are to be built according to farmer interests as collectives, rather than government decisions based on the individual as "client."

There is underlying tension in the new extension strategy. The challenge is: to apply a participatory, bottom-up approach to sensitize, educate and convince the population of applying sound environmental and sustainable agricultural practices. This crux of challenge, I suggest, is rooted in settler impermanence. Impermanence creates a complex web of influences that undermines sustainable farming initiatives in Mo. Ewovor agrees, if improvements are made in villages, and standards of living rise, people will be more attracted to stay and become greater custodians of their environment (personal communication, 1992).

If, as Pillet-Schwartz suggests, settlers consider their settlement to be ephemeral, and invest as little as possible in their surroundings, recommendations from extension agents would not be heeded. Whether or not Mo farmers are truly transient, according to one extension agent in Mo, they still behave as such, and prefer not to enter into any formal relationship with the state. This uncertainty prevents farmer participation.

Mining of the Soils and Natural Resource Base

Settlers do not place a priority on improving their milieu precisely because they do not consider it "home." When Kabye farmers change former farming practices to more extensive techniques, conservation is lost. Native land, as opposed to foreign land, holds a less important, less sacred meaning to the immigrant:

"D'ailleurs, le concept de champ diffère aussi: le paysan va-t-il traiter avec les mêmes égards le pan de brousse anonyme qu'il vient de défricher et sa part de terre patrimoniale travaillée, aménagée par ses ancêtres vénérées?" (Lucien-Brun 1987:182).

Lucien-Brun argues that environmental effects of shifting cultivation and extensive agricultural techniques in the Central region are not alarming (1987:154,207), while other scholars think differently (Kenkou 1990; Painter 1990; Sauvaget 1981). Despite time and energy efficiency, these practices are apt to create an array of short and long-term environmental problems for the surrounding area. "En effet, les Kabyè qui abandonnent du jour au lendemain leurs techniques traditionnelles de culture intensive ont cédé à la tentation de l'espace libre, saccageant la végétation naturelle" (Sauvaget 1981:70). Painter (1990) agrees that long-term settler extensive agricultural practices risk environmental pillage;

The impact on the natural resource base of husbandry practices used by settlers in the Mo plain must be clarified through agronomic and soil studies. The combination of slash and burn and shifting fallow cultivation may be an effective way of exploiting the plain's soils, but its sustainability will depend on the effectiveness of the fallow system in regenerating soils, and the pace of settlement and consequent pressure on fallow land. Deterioration of the plain's soils can be expected if fallowing does not allow sufficient soil regeneration to occur and as fallowing declines because of demographic pressure (Painter, 1990:46).

One indication of environmental conservation among Mo settlers is farmer attitudes towards reforestation. Table 7-2 shows that Mo farmers express little concern or sensitivity to environmental degradation. Low rates of reforestation, I suggest, is caused by the three significant and interrelated factors already discussed above: perceptions of land abundance, the absence of land ownership, and perception of transience. Lack of ancestral ties or clear ownership rights to the land inhibits settlers from initiating projects of long-term or permanent status such as tree planting. Although traditional practices of the "common land" may prevent landlessness, it discourages improvements and investments in conservation (Harrison 1987; Little et al. 1987).

Land tenure, currently a volatile issue in the Sotouboua region of warranted concern, is evidently interrelated with settler permanency, and, consequently, conservation and environmental sustainability. I agree with Painter:

If the settlers consider the Mo plain as a place to pursue their livelihoods over generations, their approach to using productive resources will be more conservation-oriented than if they see it merely as an auspicious place to be exploited for the production of surpluses and income for investment in the home areas. Relative ease of access to land and the security of tenure that prevails in the plain may contribute to permanence of the settlement in the area (Painter, 1990:45).

In the present, Mo farmers do not seem to recognize environmental consequences of the rapid rise in population and extensive farming practices. Eventual land pressure will compel Mo farmers to confront problems of land tenure, intensification and conservation. Problems will exacerbate as population increases in the plain. Already, examples of mounting tensions over land exist in Mo, including the formation of

interest groups, arbitration over land, autochthone-settler disputes, and forester-farmer conflicts. In preparation for the future, it behooves Mo farmers, with guidance from extension agents, to establish systems and organizational procedures to ensure farmer sustainability in the area.

Agricultural Practices in FED

Modernization

One principal goal of the FED settlement was the development of commercial agriculture through increased agricultural production among settler families. It was believed that higher production levels among farmers in FED would ensure increased national levels of agricultural production (for domestic and export revenues) and also improve farmer net incomes and standards of living. To attain these objectives, FED's strategy was to "modernize." This entailed designing and enforcing an "agricultural package" following a strict regimen for intensification by use of improved farming technologies delivered through a dense extension service. "La modernization de la société rurale avec l'introduction des pratiques monétaires, grâce à une stratégie appropriée pour faire passer les fermiers de l'agriculture de subsistance à l'agriculture commerciale" (Gu-Konu 1983:966).

External assistance and intervention were the engines of growth for the scheme: "L'ensemble de la Région fut ainsi définitivement tourné vers l'extérieure utile" (Gu-Konu 1983:917). Higher farmer income, one of the primary objectives of FED, was essential to repay project debts and credit loans (particularly on animal

traction) to outside donors: costs of modernization. Household food security was the second objective.

Consequently, FED introduced a modern agricultural system based on cash crop production, which included an array of intervention techniques. This package was founded on four underlying techniques: improved seeds, crop rotations of specific crops, the use of animal traction, and use of fertilizers and pesticides. The extension service was to "popularize" these improved techniques and ensure correct and timely applications (Kpowbie 1982:47).

At the start, FED cleared by tractor one-half of each 5 hectare parcel (the remainder to be cleared by the settler).¹² In preparation for settler arrival, a total of 2,000 ha was initially cleared by the project, mostly for settler plots, but also for woodlots and other purposes (Painter 1990:11). FED prescribed to settlers a comprehensive regimen of farming techniques such as a farming calendar, regularized treatments, improved high-yielding seeds, row planting at given densities, and a total field and crop maintenance program complete with rotations, associations, cover cropping and the like (Gu-Konu 1983:980).

To attain the highest crop production yields as possible, close adherence to package prescriptions was aggressively pursued by FED. Improved agricultural methods were requirements rather than introduced as recommended alternatives to traditional practices. By use of phrases such as "strictly controlled," "rigorously

¹² This was on the order of ten times the land holding that individual settlers had access to in their home villages (Painter 1990:35).

prescribed and respected," "obligatory," and "imposed," Gu-Konu (1983) does not hesitate to accurately describe FED's approach to development.

La conduite des travaux agricoles s'est faite dans un climat de guerre, avec un déploiement extraordinaire de forces et d'activité, afin de gagner la bataille pour l'adoption des nouvelles techniques par les paysans, et pour l'accroissement de la production, surtout celle des cultures nouvelles introduites, les culture commerciales (Gu-Konu, 1983:977; emphasis mine).

Few opportunities existed for flexibility, individual interpretation, or degrees of freedom within FED's "agricultural package." "L'OMVK apparaît surtout comme 'une opération ponctuelle,' concentrée sur un nombre limité d'acteurs paysans déplacés, puis transplantés, et plus exclusivement orientés vers des objectifs productivistes" (Gu-Konu 1983:938). It was impermissible to challenge or compromise the goals and objectives for the resettlement. Settler submission, malleability and passivity were desired attributes of FED farmers. It is not surprising, consequently, that at the heart of recruitment, lack of education was not required, or considered important or desirable, because education could foster ambition, outspokenness and courage. The administration preferred the most responsive, amenable volunteers as possible (also see Chapter 2).

Observées sur l'exploitation, ces rapports de production révèlent encore mieux l'absence totale de liberté de colon, dont le seul statut possible dans le processus de production est celui de l'exécutant; aucune possibilité d'initiative ne lui est laissée, compte tenu, non pas du caractère des hommes, mais de la nature des structures mises en place et de leurs logiques propres; tout est pensé à sa place; tout lui est donné sans qu'il émette un avis (Gu-Konu, 1983:990; emphasis mine).

FED enforced settlers to abandon many of their formerly practiced techniques that included methods to conserve and enrich tired, depleted soils in the mountains.

These practices were eliminated and replaced with modern technologies. This transformation is described dramatically by Akibode, "Ces modèles d'exploitation d'un genre tout à fait nouveau constituent une rupture remarquable par rapport aux pratiques traditionnelles largement utilisées dans les villages d'origines (1987:53)" [emphasis mine]. These innovations are not mutations, but total ruptures in their lifestyles, he suggests. This, combined with loss of former agricultural and cultural practices and a loss of land security, are key results of the modernization transformation.

FED (exemplar of other development programs aimed at agricultural modernization) became an "assault" on rural people who had no choice but to accept the conditions, says Gu-Konu (1983). There was no participation among farmers in project planning. Farmers have been viewed merely as factors of production, "invitees" to execute tasks. Farmers were to be assimilated and inculcated into the modern mentality by influence and force, if needed, from project personnel (by means of the rigid agricultural package, credit, and bloc formation for farming). The resulting ill-adaption or passivity of technology adoption among settlers commonly reported by project administrators and agents is not surprising given this treatment.

Animal traction policy. Intensive agriculture implies increased energy input on a given land area. Animal traction was a critical component of the intensification program. According to project planners, the use of plow agriculture would alleviate constraints of labor and land deficiency and accelerate those tasks requiring timely completion (clearing and plowing for seeding). From the inception of the animal

traction program, each household was obliged, that is, compelled, to adopt the plow technology in order to remain in the zone. Refusal of the technology usually meant eviction from the settlement and replacement of the plot.

Considerable resistance to animal traction was due to many factors ranging from financial to psychological. A large number of settlers were hesitant and fearful to try the new, "foreign" technique.

The animal-drawn plowing program, started in 1979, encountered many difficulties. The first and most important difficulty was the lack of acceptance of the use of animals in farming by resettled farmers who had no background in dealing with animals. They have always considered animal breeding a "dirty job" accepted only by the "low class" people (Kpowbie, 1982:47).

Many were unfamiliar with farming with oxen; they feared the animals, and were not proficient and effective in the technique due to poor training and inadequate skills in proper use (Kenkou 1990:56; Gu-Konu 1983). Many settlers were apprehensive about the costs and credit loans, and rightfully so. Dramatic decreases in initial assistance and credit breaks, combined with the severity and stringency of terms, caused a sharp decline in animal traction use. Despite FED's detailed scheme of credit lending for animal traction, the high initial investment costs to obtain the animals and equipment were excessive for the farmers.

Initially, start-up costs were low to encourage and promote animal traction. The project was obliged to "buy farmers" to facilitate adoption of animal traction, writes Gu-Konu (1983:981). The total cost in 1979 was 80,000 CFA, with a down payment of 5000 CFA and annual payments of 15,000 CFA (essentially, the farmer only paid for the oxen; the equipment was provided freely by FED). By 1982, free

equipment was terminated; the initial payment was alleged to have increased to about 220,000 CFA (one-sixth total cost); and total cost increased to 410,000 CFA in 1989 (in addition, five regular payments and an additional annual interest of 12 percent was required) (Akibode 1987:49). Total costs for animal traction increased five times from 1980 to 1989 (Painter 1990:17), significantly reducing farmer-adoption rates (SOTED 1987 estimates even higher total cost increases of 12 times). Painter (1990:15) reports that input expenses increased from 21 percent of gross income in 1982 to 63 percent by 1988 (decline in overall net income also occurred during this period). Akibode (1987) believes that FED actually discouraged farmer adoption because of continual decreases in benefits simultaneous with increased interest rates and rising costs.

Slow acceptance of the animal traction program resulted in FED's even stronger enforcement of the technique upon settlers. The current FED Director (having worked in the zone during FED's initial phases) explained that rigidity was needed to ensure the success of the program. Those who did not comply had to be evicted from the project. "It was their choice," he said (Nebona, personal communication, 1992).

Results of animal traction. Settler adoption rates of animal traction were far short of FED's projected target rates (Akibode 1987; Kenkou 1990; Painter 1990). Reports (Gu-Konu 1983:981; Kenkou 1990:54) show that in 1980, only 139 pairs of animals were sold and used, despite project policy of required adoption. In 1989, Painter (1990:13) reports that less than one-third of all households (about 285) owned

animal traction. My own research findings show that only 43.7 percent of settlers sampled use animal traction (see Table 7-3).

Low acceptance, however, did not prevent extensive use of land. Total land plowed in the FED zone rose from 509.50 ha in 1982 to 1,238.75 ha in 1987, and Painter (1990:13) reports that the average amount of land under cultivation per household in the zone increased from 2.4 ha in 1977 to 3.9 in 1987. Land-use increase in FED is largely due to the use of animal traction. Land absorption rather than land intensification has been encouraged by plow agriculture, undermining and misdirecting the goals of intensification;

Animal traction has done more to extensify than intensify production, and has resulted both in large cultivated areas within settlers' parcels, and in the cultivation of the same areas year after year at the expense of fallows. The link between this change and declining soil fertility deserves examination. The expansion of the area cultivated owing to the use of animal traction appears not to have been anticipated by project planners, who considered five hectares to be sufficient for each household's needs (Painter, 1990:60).

Continuation of agricultural extensification is limited and already meeting barriers. Settlers complain of land insufficiency and soil exhaustion, recognizing that diminished or total elimination of fallows, combined with the continual use of fertilization, are primary causes of infertility.¹³ My own data (Table 7-2) confirm that farmers' perceptions of the increasingly acute land shortage and loss of soil fertility in the FED zone could lead to their defection. Compared to Mo farmers, FED farmers perceive environmental conditions as a decisive challenge to their permanence.

¹³ Land pressure is markedly expressed through autochthone-settler conflicts, which are increasing rapidly in frequency and severity.

In their haste to launch the project, soil and environmental depletion have been neglected by project planners. Long-term problems of conservation caused by continuous land use and chemical applications cannot compensate for the gradual decline in soil fertility. Consequently, the long-term viability of the agricultural package appears limited, and natural resources in the area are exposed to risk of destruction. Environmental sustainability has not been monitored or managed in FED (common to agricultural schemes elsewhere in Africa), and could result in irreparable long-term damage.

Cropping systems. As new cash crops and improved traditional crops were introduced in FED, the importance of subsistence crops and traditional farming systems (including labor patterns, work loads, seasonal activities, and crops produced) dramatically transformed. Former calculated farming techniques practiced by Kabye to combat soil erosion (discussed in Chapter 2) were deconstructed and replaced with new systems (Akibode 1987:10). Between 1984-1989, project reports confirm progress in the agricultural transformation; "Au niveau des cultures par stades, nous pouvons dire que les paysans abandonnent petit à petit leurs vieilles habitudes vers l'adoption de nouvelles techniques" (GOT/MDR/FED 1989-1990:33).

Traditional subsistence crops, the basis of the Kabye diet, including yams, small and large millet, sorghum, fonio, and manioc waned in favor of cash crops, including cotton, groundnut, rice and maize for commercialization and debt reimbursement to FED (Table 7-4) (GOT/MDR/FED 1987). For example, Kpowbie (1982:65) reports 1980 average crop production per household in traditional cropping

systems: rice-5 kg/household, groundnuts-90 kg/household, and no cotton production recorded. Local crops were integrated into FED's recommended cycle of rotations, but played much less significance in the overall cropping system. The contrast between maize and sorghum illustrate well this shift.

The importance of maize, originally a minor crop in traditional farming systems in northern Togo, increased significantly in FED (Table 7-6).¹⁴ Eklun writes, "Le maïs, peu cultivé sur la zone avant l'implantation de projet, devient une des cultures de base" (1985:37).¹⁵ As shown in Table 7-6, production in maize increased as sorghum decreased. Comparison of my own research data (1991-92) with data from Kpowbie (1982) shows a 381.5 percent increase in maize compared to a 34 percent decrease in sorghum. Painter (1990) reports that hectareage planted in maize increased 136 times from 1977 to 1988. This is clearly in response to FED's promotion and incentives for maize production, combined with an increase in preference for maize consumption throughout Togo.¹⁶ As least one critic of FED has denounced FED's promotion of maize as Western imperialism (Father Klur, personal communication, 1992). He claims that maize is not an indigenous crop to the region and therefore lacks climatic, disease, and parasitic resistance. He adds that it is not naturally prepared or consumed by the Kabye, requires longer preparation time,

¹⁴ Between 1984 and 1989, for example, maize production nearly trebled compared to only a 15.7 percent increase in sorghum (GOT/MDR/FED 1990:35).

¹⁵ Kpowbie reports that between 1974 and 1980, household maize production increased four times (241.5 kg compared to the previous 52 kg). There was a 31 percent decrease in sorghum (from 1430 kg to 983.24) during the same period (Kpowbie 1982:64).

¹⁶ Substantial home village increases in maize production reflect the change in national tastes.

Table 7-6. Comparison of annual production and consumption of maize and sorghum (average kg/household).

| Crop | 1974 ^z | 1978 ^z | 1980 ^y | 1982 ^x | 1989 ^x | 1990 ^w | 1992 ^v | overall change '74-'92 (%) |
|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Production | | | | | | | | |
| FED | | | | | | | | |
| sorghum | 1,430 | -- | 983.2 | 800 | 898 | 853.3 | 645.5 | -34.0 |
| maize | 52 | -- | 241.5 | 1,520 | 1,688 | 1,264 | 1,162.8 | 381.5 |
| home village | | | | | | | | |
| sorghum | -- | 242 | 225.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -7.0 |
| maize | -- | 22 | 84.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | 280.0 |
| Consumption | | | | | | | | |
| FED | | | | | | | | |
| sorghum | 714 | -- | 680.8 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -4.6 |
| maize | 52 | -- | 121.5 | -- | -- | -- | -- | 135.0 |
| home village | | | | | | | | |
| sorghum | -- | 211 | 175 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -17.0 |
| maize | -- | 92 | 84 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -8.7 |

Sources:

^z Kpowbie, 1982^y GOT/MDR/FED, 1982^x Painter, 1990^w Kenkou, 1990^v Pozarny, 1992-93

In addition to adjustments in crops cultivated, planting methods in FED also changed from traditional systems (see Table 7-3). Rather than multi-cropping systems based on associations of sorghum, millet, and yam, monocropping rotations such as

cotton, followed by rice and groundnut, then sorghum and maize were recommended, with limited if any integrated fallow (Gu-Konu 1983:966).¹⁷

Intercropping is a widely used practice in the village because of lack of land. This practice is a farming technique that can curtail yields. Abandonment of such practices is one of the conditions that the project participants farmer has to commit himself to before his admission to the project (Kpowbie, 1982:66).

In 1979, Gu-Konu (1983:978) reports that 75 percent of surface area planted in the zone was planted in monocrop. Despite that monocropping was initially encouraged by FED (to increase production levels), farmers gradually planted crops in association (Kpowbie 1982: 66).

Inputs. The introduction of inputs, particularly chemical fertilizer and improved high-yielding seed varieties, essential to cotton, important to maize and rice production, and valuable in increasing sorghum and bean yields, have been key factors in encouraging the new production system (Akibode 1987). This is dramatic contrast to traditional farming practices, and to those in Mo, where fertilizer use is rare (see Table 7-5).

Initially, FED distributed both fertilizer and seeds on credit. Reimbursement was ensured through FED's obligatory system of commercialization that required settlers to sell to the FED marketing board for debt recovery. Consequently, fertilization was mandatory. According to Akibode, "Le fait que l'administration soit intransigeante sur l'application effective de ces nouvelles méthodes dans la zone de

¹⁷ It is important to recognize that nearly all crops produced in the zone, including traditional crops such as fonio or manioc, increased in production compared to traditional farming systems, largely due to improved agricultural practices. Their relative importance, however, became secondary.

l'opération peut être interprété comme la rançon qu'elle doit payer pour la réussite des objectifs de projet" (Akibode 1987:53).

Due to an increasingly stringent and volatile international economic environment in the mid-1980s, by 1983, government subsidies severely decreased and in some cases (cotton) terminated. Less credit advantages were available for farmers.¹⁸ This decrease resulted in a 51 percent reduction of chemical fertilizer use in the zone between 1983-87 (Kenkou 1990:60).¹⁹ Notwithstanding macro-economic conditions, my own research indicates farmers continue to use fertilizer (see Table 7-5).²⁰

Labor patterns. The FED agricultural package, replete with animal traction and input application, required intensive labor, compelling FED farmers to work longer hours and more days than in their former villages.²¹ As shown in Table 7-3, lack of labor was mentioned as a primary constraint to overall success. During informal interviews, farmers confirmed that living in FED demanded more labor investment.

As in Mo, FED farmers conduct a variety of work associations to overcome bottleneck periods of labor shortage. I found in my own research that FED farmers

¹⁸ Fertilizer costs rose from 15 CFA/kg in 1979 to 65 CFA/kg in 1988 (Painter 1990).

¹⁹ My own research data show a negative correlation between duration and investment in fertilizer (discussed in Chapter 8), implying that settlers of longer duration have undergone cutbacks in subsidies resulting in greater risk and less investment.

²⁰ Painter shows that 93 percent of households sampled in FED continued to apply some chemical fertilizer (Painter 1990:35)

²¹ Kpowbie (1982:84) found the average annual days of labor performed by traditional Kabye farmers to be 141.5 compared to 186.3 days for FED farmers, or 44.8 fewer.

also practice traditional labor associations, despite the fact that at FED's start, these work groups were discouraged.²² My research shows that FED farmers invest in hired labor, although less than Mo farmers (Table 7-3).²³

Similar to in Mo, family labor plays the key role in farming production in FED. Average family size, approximately six persons, allows for four to five persons working on family farms. Among women sampled, average number of days working the field was five per week during the rainy season and two during dry season, which is about two days less than Mo women annually.

Levels of production. Overall production increased dramatically in FED, estimated about twelve times. It is certain that production overall has increased annually in FED, and certainly compared to home village production levels. Kpowbie's (1982:64) economic analysis of FED production (among seventy-one settlers over a seven-year period between 1974-80), shows that all crops except rice and manioc underwent an enormous increase in overall production.²⁴

Average production levels for various crops in FED surpass those in Mo, according to my research findings (see Table 7-4). When examining these figures for

²² Farmers were directed to work more independently using animal traction, rather than depend on traditional work associations.

²³ Less investment in hired labor among those who do not use animal traction compared to those who do (2,810 CFA compared to 22,930 CFA, respectively), suggests that financial constraints may cause lack of adoption of animal traction. Because animal traction generally allows for cultivation of larger land areas, labor costs also tend to increase (to complete required tasks such as seeding, which animals cannot conduct (Hansen, personal communication 1995).

²⁴ For example, groundnuts increased from 95 kg to 489 kg per household from 1974 to 1980; and between 1978 and 1979 cotton doubled from 144 kg to 241 kg after only one year of production (see Kpowbie 1982:65 for comparative examples of crop production between FED and home villages).

FED overall, we find that average production, excluding cotton, is over 1000 kg higher than Mo production. Despite impressive increases of production in FED, however, Painter (1990) demonstrates that yields have been inconsistent and actual changes in yields may not be as high as data suggest at first glance. Increased land area under cultivation largely due to animal traction, he argues, has enabled the increase in production levels rather than actual increased yields per hectare. For example, he reports that in 1977, average FED land cultivated per household was 2.4 ha, increasing to 3.9 by 1987.²⁵

My own research parallels Painter's postulate. My data show that among sampled FED farmers who practice animal traction, average land area cultivated measured 4.95 ha, compared to those not practicing animal traction, cultivating 3.78 ha. Correlatively, harvest for farmers practicing animal traction measured 5,950 kg per household, compared to those who do not, measuring 3,800 kg per household.

Reported yields vary among different sources of research (Akibode 1987, 1989; GOT/MDR/FED 1989-1990; Kpowbie 1982; Painter 1990). Annual FED reports (GOT/MDR/FED 1982 compared to GOT/MDR/FED 1989-90), show that production levels increased during the last decade for most crops (Table 7-7). Total production decreases after around 1986, (largely due to the drop in yam production, from 3,655 kg to 1489 kg per household). Reasons for the drop in production are mentioned in footnotes, explaining that the introduction of autocthonous in the zone

²⁵For example, cotton hectareage increased fivefold from 1979 to 1988 (Painter 1990).

caused less land area available for planting certain crops (maize, rice and groundnut) (example in GOT/MDR/FED 1982:11).

In sum, it is important to understand accurately the reasons for increases in agricultural production in FED. Increase in land use, as opposed to yield, accounts for most increased production. In the first three years of the project, land use increased 10 times, from 60 ha to 601 ha. By 1979, 1315 ha were already planted in monocrop, a total of 75 percent of all land planted in the zone (Gu-Konu 1983:978). Based on cost-benefit analyses, Gu-Konu (1983:982) asserts that the increase in land under cultivation due to animal traction has not compensated for the quantity of work and cost of production to maintain the system.

Extension service. The key link to promoting FED's agricultural package, thus ensuring the project's success of agricultural production, has been the extension service (Gu-Konu 1983; Kenkou 1990). As in Mo and throughout Togo during the 1960s and 1970s, FED's approach to extension was top-down, based on recommended technologies delivered, and if necessary, imposed upon settlers. FED management embraced the concept of "tache d'huile" ("oil drop"), whereby new ideas would be released, flourish and slowly spread through the farmers.

Obligated by donors to get new technologies "off the ground," we strictly enforced instructions regarding technology adoption, explained the first Director, Dogbe. At the start of the animal traction program, for example, settlers were "required" to adopt FED policy or they risked eviction. In accordance with Dogbe's premise that "we must break eggs to make omelettes," therefore, settlers adopted

Table 7-7. Crop production yields in FED over time (average kg/ha).

| Crop | 1982 ^z | 1986 ^y | 1989 ^y | 1992 ^x | overall change '82-92 (%) |
|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|------------------------------------|
| maize | 1,520 | 1,849 | 1,688 | 1,087 | -28.5 |
| sorghum | 800 | 1,035 | 898 | 709 | -11.0 |
| yam | 8,500 | 15,724 | 12,800 | 3,919 ^w | -54.0 |
| groundnut | 970 | 1,073 | 1,066 | 1,561 | 61.0 |
| cotton | 785 | -- | 809 | 920 | 17.0 |

Sources:

^z GOT/MDR/FED, 1982^y GOT/MDR/FED, 1989-90^x Pozarny, 1992-93^w Estimated weight of yam, 2 kilos

these technologies or risked eviction. Fear rather than interest or "felt needs" motivated technology adoption. The reason for FED's "success," according to many project adherents, has been due to an unconditional commitment to the realization of its objectives.

Most technologies were prepared and available for implementation at the start of the project. This expedited the "faire passer" (delivery of the information) approach. Extension agents operated with urgency and determination. As vehicles of FED policy, agents engendered an environment of rigidity, inflexibility, authority, and suppression. Critical to their evaluations, for example, were to satisfy quotas (in crop yields, fertilizer distribution, number of farmer cooperatives organized, etc.).

Successful agents were uncompromising in their aim to transform settlers from traditional peasants to modern farmers.

The dirigiste style performed by the FED extension service is a legacy perceptible today. On one occasion, for example, while attending a meeting for the GAV (Groupe Agricole Villageois: the settlement cooperative), I observed the demeanor and general attitudes of extension agents and the cooperative agent in attendance. The civil servants were clearly distinguishable from the farmers by an assumed superiority and privileged status. The cooperative agent in particular assumed a commanding, controlling demeanor, despite the fact that the group was, in theory, a self-directed, local-level managed organization. During the meeting, he criticized and admonished the group for various mistakes (such as poor planning, lack of security over fertilizer, and low cotton production), and then proceeded to harangue about their need for independence and self-direction. He discouraged their self-initiative and empowerment by talking "down" and reprimanding them. The aim of his speech, I underline, was to encourage independence and self-reliance among the group. The scenario was a classic case of unlearned lessons in fostering local empowerment through an enabling sociopolitical environment.

Similarly, during numerous visits to farmer households I accompanied extension agents and observed repeatedly agents' hierarchical, authoritarian control over farmers. Despite that some farmers, specifically the "Young Farmers," were extremely knowledgeable of agricultural conditions and techniques, the farmers continued to defer to the agents, behaving with a modesty and respect offered to

superiors. While policy-level changes are being promoted to work less authoritatively with farmers, and as in Mo, to listen and respond to farmer needs, this new approach is far from realized among FED agents.

Agents working in FED were carefully selected among a wide pool of candidates and considered the most fortunate and privileged extension agents in Togo. Many received specialized training (in specific fields such as apiculture, forestry, and veterinary work) and benefits (bi-monthly training, informational meetings, and feedback sessions) denied to other agents in Togo.²⁶ Each was equipped with bicycles, formidable housing and other perks from the project, separating them in status from extension agents working outside the zone.

Today, conditions have declined for the agents since the beginning of the project. Both funding termination and the national effort to "deconcentrate" resources from favored zones has diminished benefits. Many veteran agents resent this lowered status and complain of insufficient resources. Years of special treatment have accustomed them to "favored" conditions that no longer prevail.

At the project start-up, farmer-agent ratios hovered around 40:1, with approximately one agent per bloc. This dense network of extension agents enhanced farmer adoption and respect of recommended technologies. Continuous visits to individual households enabled familiarity between the agent and settler (see Table 7-5). For example, at the beginning of the project, I was told agents visited each settler

²⁶ For example, the bee-keeping specialist undertook a six-month training course in France in the late 1970s, and another technical assistant attended a one-month Farming Systems Research course at the University of Florida in the 1980s.

every 15 days and closely monitored their activities. Familiarity through more intense interactions with farmers and their family situations cultivated a sharing of farmers' histories, needs, problems and desires, and permitted agents to respond better to each situation than on a more casual basis, most agents confirmed.

Today, the ratio has significantly decreased in the FED zone to approximately 150:1, with a total of only 15 agents and four supervisors in the zone.²⁷ Decreased numbers of agents have definitely resulted in less individual attention and a drop in production yields, claims one agent. For example, average cotton production dropped from over 1 ton to 700 kg/ha in many households, he told me. "Because of poor monitoring, farmers complain they no longer see the agent. Now they are encouraged to approach the agent themselves, and to pass the messages more quickly; extension now works with groups," explained one agent. Despite the decrease in numbers of extension agents, 81 percent of sampled farmers in FED responded that they work with the agents regularly, while no one said they never work with the extension agents (Table 7-5). Unlike those in Mo (discussed in Chapter 8), in FED, farmers recognize that less agent attention is an outcome of state policy rather than in their own control (Table 7-5).

Cooperatives and commercialization. Two essential interrelated components of FED's agricultural package have been the establishment of cooperatives for commercialization. The project administration initiated cooperatives late in the

²⁷ These ratios nonetheless are substantially superior to those in other parts of Togo, reaching up to 300 farmers per agent, according to Gu-Konu (1983:962).

project, in 1984, to assist in commercialization of crops and to prepare settlers for the completion of external financial assistance.

L'action de vulgarisation des differents sections du projet doit être polarisée sur ces groupements qui doivent constituer dans l'après-FED le fer de lance du développement économique de la zone et qui seront appelés à prendre en charge certaines activités des sections (SOTED, 1987:39).

Responsibilities transferred to cooperatives included maintenance of infrastructure, environmental and social resources, and agricultural activities, specifically, provisioning for necessary credit sources, inputs, such as fertilizer, managing storage facilities, and organizing marketing outlets, particularly for cash crops.

At the outset of FED's promotion of cooperatives, the initiative appeared successful. A total of thirty-three groups, numbering around 500 members, was reported in 1990 (Kenkou 1990:69) (Eklu 1985:48 reports a lower figure of only thirteen groups with a total of 203 members). Groups generally formed around existing hada work groups according to blocs (Eklu 1985:48). The number and pace of group formation, however, do not reflect accurately the nature or quality of the organizations.

Information garnered from reports on FED and from my own in-depth observations and interviews concerning cooperative organizations lead me to conclude that, at best, the groups were problematic. Frustration, suspicion, fear and mistrust of extension agents and the government in general pervade the organizations. For example, cooperative members have accused officials of embezzling their weekly

contribution emergency monies, and often complain of their lack of control and decision-making in their own meetings and activities.

This mistrust and skepticism is largely due to the process in which the coops originated and developed. FED initiated these groups and took major responsibility for their evolution and ensured success. At its inception, a cooperative specialist was posted in the zone to develop the program. The groups functioned more as audiences to civil servants than active participants on their own. Herein lies the contradiction; the authoritarianism of FED's approach is directly contrary to and inhibiting the realization of the underlying principles that they promoted: dialogue, exchange, openness, equality, liberalism, self-development, and autonomy.

Il est important d'inculquer une autre philosophie auprès des encadreurs, et responsables de vulgarisation qui ne doivent plus ni se considérer comme des assistants techniques détenant la technique sacro-sainte, ni jouer le rôle policier, mais plutôt de conseillers flexibles à l'écoute des paysans qui ne remplissent leurs tâches qu'après avoir créé une base de confiance mutuelle (SOTED, 1987:39).

Farmers were confused by the discrepancy between official, formal rules of operation and conduct and actual activities and behavior of project staff.

Cette méthode d'approche, caractérisée par une création superimposée des groupements de producteurs, semble être à l'origine de la confusion instaurée dans l'esprit des paysans, habitués à respecter les directives du Projet avec l'espoir d'être récompensés par des avantages déterminés (Kenkou, 1990:69).

Cooperative membership, however, did not dramatically decline over time. Farmer groups offered individual growers many advantages, for example, benefits garnered through shared storage capacity, transport, fertilizer and other input costs, and negotiation leverage. Certain advantages, like storage in well-protected houses on

a rental basis, provided even nonmembers advantages to which they were formerly excluded. The important change in cooperative systems was that farmers elected to join and participate in the organization based on felt needs, rather than government obligation. In sum, as FED regulations relaxed, settlers increasingly benefited from autonomous transactions both in and outside of the project.

Commercialization. Commercialization is one of the key objectives underlying FED's creation of cooperatives, and an essential component for the financial survival of the project. By the mid-1980s, FED's direct purchasing of crops already organized with assistance by farmer groups. The primary objectives of FED's strategy of commercialization were to insure reimbursements from credit loans (predominantly for animal traction and fertilizer) and to profit from stochastic market tendencies by withholding harvests for timely sales during a bullish market.²⁸

Commercialization was a direct, simple and efficient market system conducted by FED. In 1980, the largest of FED markets, Broukou, was established (Kedagni 1989b). Other marketplaces in FED also existed, but in less robustness than Broukou.²⁹ The administration decided annually which crops to purchase and at what price. They subtracted credit owed by farmers from due payments. Farmers were forced to sell under these circumstances, often undergoing a loss of revenue that they

²⁸ FED sold the crops to private organizations, including SOTOCO, TOGOGRAIN, and private agencies, as well as on the open market.

²⁹ Broukou market has attained an important reputation regionally as well as nationally (Kedagni 1989b).

could have gained otherwise.³⁰ This left them completely vulnerable to project commercialization. Gu-Konu (1983:934) reports that in the 1979-80 campaign, FED purchased, rice for example, at 45 CFA/kg, but the open market prices were as high as 120 CFA/kg. The difference of value in purchases resulting in FED profits for rice, maize, cotton and groundnut combined, averaged 21.4 percent. As external input costs rose, FED continuously "squeezed" settler earnings by decreasing prices and increasing credit terms. According to Gu-Konu (1983:984), obliging farmers to sell to the project rather than choose their own market strategies was the basis of exploitation under the guise of reimbursement.

Credit reimbursement rate in the zone during the early project years varied widely, 59 percent in 1978, 87.5 percent in 1979, with some sectors in the zone as high as 96 percent (rates varied considerably annually often due to exogenous factors such as environmental conditions or national price fluctuations)(Gu-Konu 1983:985).³¹ Reimbursement rates are reported to have dropped with time (for various reasons, including devised means of avoidance or sheer lack of resources).³² "Le taux de remboursement tend à baisser, conduisant les responsables à mettre en oeuvre des mesures coercitives directes ou indirectes pour récupérer les fonds" (Gu-Konu

³⁰ To ensure debt repayments (primarily from animal traction loans), to gain further profits to finance the project, and, according to some informants, for illegal embezzlement by some administrators for personal profit, the project controlled market transactions tightly. Settlers were discouraged from selling outside the project market mechanisms.

³¹ Gu-Konu found that sectors formed later reported higher reimbursement rates than those established earlier. For example, Agbassa, the first sector, had only a 75.6 percent rate of reimbursement compared to the most recent sector in FED, Bidjande, with a 96 percent rate.

³² Many informants revealed to me that clandestine market activity occurred continuously throughout FED's lifetime although concrete data appraising the importance of this activity are lacking.

1983:985). FED's response to the less than satisfactory reimbursement rates from recalcitrant farmers was to apply greater coercion and pressure on them to repay loans and to discourage private sales of cash crops and cereals. Despite their efforts, greater settler autonomy over crop sales occurred and local market activity flourished as settlers independently conducted transactions.³³ Crop commercialization increasingly became a choice for settlers, a source for farmer entrepreneurialism. Today, the importance of independent, privatized commercialization and income earned from crop sales is apparent (shown in Table 7-4).^{34,35}

Commercialization of agricultural production is one example of where overly centralized project control loosened through time. At project closing, settler cooperatives conducted their own crop sales and purchases of inputs. One underlying problem with this transfer of market control from FED to settler was its abruptness. Settlers lacked experience with the management of credit, formal market negotiations, and input purchases, having been denied access to information or experience.

Income diversification. In addition to crop commercialization, alternative sources of income for FED settlers have persisted throughout the project lifetime despite lack of attention by FED. Animal husbandry and alternative income sources,

³³ In actuality, beginning early in the project many farmers refused to sell their crops to Togograin, the national marketing board in which FED organized its commercialization program, either because they were able to attain higher profits on local markets through "clandestine" transactions or they were circumventing the project commercialization structure to avoid mandatory debt repayment.

³⁴ Other than cotton, groundnut is most commercialized by farmers (44 percent of total harvest is marketed), followed by rice (34.7 percent), maize (30.3 percent), and sorghum (26.5 percent).

³⁵ Earnings from maize were highest, averaging 34,803.2 CFA per household, followed by sorghum, averaging 16,229 CFA per household.

such as fabrication of hand tools, baskets, petty trade and commerce provide important sources of income for households throughout the year, particularly during the "hungry season" (Kedagni 1989b).

In my own research, for example, income generating earnings for men and women (see Table 7-8) are modest in FED compared to in Mo. These differences are likely due to FED's discouragement of alternative, diversified sources of income in favor of agricultural production (a subject further explored below). Animal raising, in contrast, was encouraged by FED, and appears more practiced and lucrative than in Mo (Table 7-9).

Conformity and Continuation of the Agricultural Package

Data confirm that control and inflexibility of FED administration gradually eroded through time. FED administration was forced to apply increasingly less stringent measures, especially regarding the agricultural package, to ensure compliance and curb potential abandonment of settlers and project personnel. Consequently, adjustments to the rigid project plan ensued. Many of these transformations, such as commercialization discussed above, expanded or accommodated privileges to settlers, and more important, to autochthones, all facilitating the undermining of FED's rigidity and original approach.

Cornerstone to the success of the settlement was farmer adoption of the agricultural package. However, discrepancy between project design and actualization is exemplified in numerous cases. Commercialization, described above, is one

Table 7-8. Comparison of income-generating activities.

| | Mo | FED |
|--|-----------|----------|
| Men | | |
| participate in activities, %(no.) | 66.7 (22) | 28.1 (9) |
| average days invested annually | 40 | 5 |
| average annual earnings (CFA) | 26,125 | 10,213 |
| percent of total income | 22.5 | 7.73 |
| target of earnings (%) | | |
| home village construction | 27 | 41 |
| settlement construction | 3 | 9 |
| settlement farming system (%) ^x | 27 | 25 |
| "in pocket" | 24 | 3 |
| other ^z | 19 | 22 |
| Women | | |
| average days invested annually | 62 | 69 |
| average annual earnings (CFA) ^y | 32,110 | 18,000 |

^z ceremonies, "on the hoof," as crops in storage, and so on.

^y comprises roughly 90% or more of total earnings.

^x including animal traction investments

Table 7-9. Comparison of animal ownership and annual income generated by sale of animals.

| | Mo | FED |
|---------------------------------------|-------|--------|
| Men | | |
| average number of animals per settler | 16.6 | 33.6 |
| average income from sales (CFA) | 6,152 | 13,866 |
| Women | | |
| average number of animals per settler | 2.1 | 2.7 |
| average income from sales (CFA) | 100 | 1,100 |

example demonstrating the expansion and loosening of FED control over project activities. Other examples exist of inconsistencies between extension recommendations and farmer responses and practices. Consequently, projected targets rates of production or technology adoption fell short of project expectations.

Animal traction, a pillar of FED's package and alleged as a major project accomplishment (GOT/MRD/FED 1989-90), in reality shows dubious success under close examination. Gu-Konu appraises the animal traction program as problematic at best; "Le Projet, suivant son propre aveu, fut obligé, à partir de 1977, d'acheter certains paysans pour faciliter l'adoption de l'innovation" (1983:981). As mentioned above, far from total adoption of the technology occurred. Painter concludes, "Under conditions where the profitability of animal traction remains doubtful, we should not be surprised to see a drop in the rate at which animal traction is adopted" (Painter 1990:17). My own research findings of animal traction seem to support this claim. Those FED settlers sampled who own animal traction are of shorter duration on site (average eleven years) compared to those who do not use animal traction (fifteen years). This finding implies that through time (perhaps following an experimental period with the technology), settlers opt out of employing animal traction, recommended by FED, due to their own priorities.³⁶

³⁶ In contrast, research conducted by Painter (1990:34) suggests that ownership of animal traction may associate positively with longevity of the sector. He found 70 percent adoption rates in Agbassa and Broukou, the earliest sectors, compared to 30 percent in Agounde, the final sector established.

In the case of fertilizer, similarly, doses were seldom applied according to recommendations.³⁷ Most often, farmers would apply smaller quantities than advised, hoping to extend their quantities to other crops. Inadequate doses, however, can severely decrease production and lower total harvests overall. These results raise questions regarding the cost effectiveness of fertilizer application. Eklou writes, "En effet, il ne semble que quelques migrants mettent peu d'engrais car ils ne veulent pas s'endetter auprès du projet et se voir ainsi amputer une partie de leurs recettes en fin de campagne" (Eklou 1985:53). In parallel with animal traction, data from my own research show a negative correlation between settler duration and investment in fertilizer (-0.13 Pearson Correlation Coefficient) (also see Chapter 8). This finding suggests that fertilizer application, a fundamental component to agricultural intensification, may be a temporary practice based on prevailing advantages.³⁸ It exposes the precarious sustainability of technologies recommended by FED.

Examples abound illustrating where project guidelines were not met, not respected or completely ignored by farmers. For example, herbicide treatment was much less applied than previously calculated by FED.³⁹ Adjustments in crop prices

³⁷ Early FED reports (GOT/MDR/FED 1982) already indicate that target levels of fertilizer were low, reported at only 39 percent of total surface area projected in 1982. FED attributed this shortcoming to high prices for fertilizer. The document also reported that despite free distribution of natural phosphate fertilizer, farmers refused to apply it to their fields. FED attributed this resistance to the fact that the fertilizer arrived late in the growing season, and that it risked causing weed growth.

³⁸ According to my research data, correlation between extension agent visits and fertilizer use in both sites is weak: only 0.37 and 0.40 in Mo in FED and Mo, respectively (Pearson Correlation Coefficient). This suggests that causes other than extension intervention may influence farmer behavior.

³⁹ Kenkou (1990) reports that in 1987 maize and rice (crops that require herbicide) only liquidated 43 percent and 57 percent, respectively, of FED's estimations and inventory. He attributes farmer rejection to two main causes: "L'une des causes de cette insuffisance [d'usage] semble résider

failed to correspond with rising costs of inputs and interest rates on farmer loans. This incongruence increased farmer vulnerability to greater indebtedness and intensified their mistrust, discouraging and preventing their further use of project services and benefits.⁴⁰ Other incongruencies included: improper associations and rotations (in favor of "interpreted" practices according to personal needs, priorities and situations), alternative planting schedules (based on labor demands), mixed rather than monocropping, planting of discouraged traditional crops (such as fonio, sorghum, and even yam), and low results in cotton production.⁴¹ In my own research, 27 percent of farmers sampled in FED stopped planting cotton for similar reasons. Most settlers said they opted not to grow cotton because it was FED's prime source used for debt and solidarity recovery. If they abstained from cotton, they believed they were skirting FED's unfair "thievery." Other exit options included unsatisfactory credit repayments, as well as low solidarity fund payment rates (only 43 percent in 1985) (SOTED 1987).

Clearly, settlers adjusted to FED's agricultural program. In addition, FED itself was forced to adjust policy. Most notable of examples includes: the regional enlargement of the extension service to autochthone populations; individual purchase

dans l'existence de prix de vente élevés de ces produits et [l'autre] la méfiance des paysans" (1990:58).

⁴⁰ My data show a significant correlation between fertilizer use and total income for both FED and Mo farmers sampled (0.66 and 0.78 Pearson Correlation Coefficient, respectively).

⁴¹ From the start, one-fifth of FED settlers did not use the one-quarter hectare designated for cotton production. "Nous n'avons jamais encore pratiqué cette culture," settlers pleaded in self-defense, but further probing reveals that in fact, settlers resent FED's compelling regulations for cotton: "Le caractère particulièrement astringent de cette culture." (Othilly et al. 1974:46).

rights (privatization) of grinding mills (initially owned exclusively by the project); and the key event of settler resurrection against payment of the annual solidarity fund. These conditions combined fostered and gave impetus to an unleashing of project restrictions and control.

In sum, a complexity of combined causes and forces, including both settler and FED-induced, contributed to project changes. Despite appearances of project control, local forces have played a key role in guiding and directing project activities and outcomes by interpreting and expanding the original objectives. Results and outcomes of these accommodations, in terms of farmer benefits and social and environmental sustainability, appear mixed.

Effects of Accommodation in FED

Environmental outcomes. Despite favorable crop production results in FED, agricultural intensification has not been realized (Painter 1990; Kenkou 1990; Gu-Konu 1983). Rather, land extensification through a "mining of the soil" explains much of FED's success story. As shown in Table 7-2, settlers perceive declines in the environment, including production yields (also refer to Chapter 8). Painter (1990) found that already settlers are cultivating their entire parcels, fallows are infrequent, fertilizer was applied inappropriately, and infertility was a complaint of many. Conclusively, he suggests, "production systems in the project area may be in disequilibrium" (1990:39).

My own research findings indicate that area cultivated positively correlates (albeit weakly) with duration on site: Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.15. Not surprisingly, area cultivated also showed a positive Pearson correlation coefficient with total harvest, 0.65, and total income, 0.53.⁴² Conclusively, farmers aim to cultivate more land to earn greater incomes. Increased area cultivated, rather than increased production yields, appears to cause high production levels in FED. According to Painter (1990:45), this is cause for serious scrutiny concerning potential for sustainability in the zone. "The result of continued extensification without fallows and less-than-optimum use of inputs will be soil degradation" (1990:46).

Case of reforestation. The case of FED's reforestation effort embodies a number of lessons and weaknesses in FED's approach to technology transfer and to natural resource management in specific. It exposes flaws in FED strategies toward environmental management, and provides a window into close examination of the social consequences of a top-down approach to environmental management.

According to FED policy, each settler was required to plant 0.50 hectare of trees on his own farm. Settlers, however, did not consider tree planting as a priority, and "neglected" to complete this task. FED was forced to hire laborers to plant trees for settlers (settlers were required, at minimum, to dig holes for the trees, many of whom failed to complete even this task). This approach, however, was similarly unsuccessful, forcing FED to resort to planting the trees themselves without settler

⁴² Area also showed positive Pearson correlation coefficients: total fertilizer purchased (0.66) and hired labor (0.62).

participation in community woodlots. Direct intervention by "doing it ourselves" was the only viable solution, according to the Director at that time. "We could not wait for degradation," he asserted, and told me that sensitizing settlers to the benefit of trees would take too long (Nebona, personal communication, 1992).

Despite the Director's affirmation that settlers helped substantially in tree maintenance, settlers offer a different view. They considered the trees as FED's, and resented that precious land that could be under cultivation was occupied. Low motivation for reforestation, according to one SOTED (1987) report, is due to three primary causes: "problèmes liés au droit foncier" (lack of security over land tenure); "la non assurance de disposer du bois de leurs plantations" (insecurity and distrust that the trees will not be at their disposal); and most important, impermanence;

Certains ne pensent pas passer leurs vieux jours dans la zone du projet, et espèrent retourner dans leurs villages d'origine avec lesquels ils gardent toujours des liens très affectifs et, pour preuve, leurs revenus sont essentiellement investis dans ces villages et toutes les grandes cérémonies, notamment les funérailles et les initiations se font toujours dans ces derniers (SOTED, 1987:A4/4.1).

After years of FED promotion of tree planting, many of the bloc woodlots were recently destroyed (during my fieldwork), by both autochthones and settlers in the area. Informants agreed that both a need for land, and vexation against the administration, led to this arson.

My own research findings illustrate the complexity in understanding the interrelation between environmental consciousness (internalization) and action. Data indicate that FED's promotion of environmental awareness and action has been effective (see Table 7-2 and Chapter 8). Similarly, qualitative data show considerable

awareness and apparent effort by FED farmers to protect trees and safeguard their environment. One settled autochthone vividly explained;

There were many more trees before, it was difficult to farm at first. There was so much water that the dew of the trees would drench you as you walked to school in the mornings. You had to undress to go to school! There is now no wood for burning. My wife has trouble, nothing! Now we were cutting everything, this is not good. There are less rains, they come later in June rather than April. This is because the Direction may not have accepted our laws of sacred natural areas and cut trees they should not have. There is also fewer [wild] animals, but this is good because they eat the crops.

As prime wood gatherers of the household, increasing wood shortages were mentioned by women sampled in both settlements (Table 7-2). Women explained that, formerly, they collected wood close to the house, now they travel greater distances, to the fields, to collect wood. One settler metaphorically described tree production and growth as being "Like that in a household, where there is more youth than age." The old growth is eliminated for needed wood, but the young seedlings are not yet at full maturation. More young trees are more noticeable showing that more mature trees are being cut rapidly to provide wood for an increasing population. Similarly, women conduct the majority of weeding on farms. One woman told me, "Soil is finished, no more fallow, we need to plant on farmer land now." She explained that due to less virgin soil, less fallow, and more land use, more weeds sprout requiring labor-intensive weeding, sometimes continuously throughout the growing season. We know the soil has changed, said another settler, "Car il y a les chiens-dents [dog-teeth weeds] causé par la houe."

Data from statistical analyses (Chapter 8) suggest that perception and praxis towards protection and care for the environment is higher among FED farmers. I argue that this assumption is suspect due to the complexity of the issue, and requires more in-depth, context-oriented comprehension. I suggest that farmers' attitudes and actions are legacies of FED's precarious sustainability effort (temporary at best) generated and maintained almost exclusively by FED intervention. Years of extension services consistently enforcing recommendations upon farmers to integrate conservation measures (such as rotations, soil rejuvenation, or tree planting) have gained some good results. However, these reflect more project intervention and regulation than it does actual farmer adoption (and initiation) of these practices. Reversion to former cropping patterns and rotations, improper use of fertilizer, and tree cutting and burning, demonstrate the ephemeral duration of protective measures promoted by the project. The project top-down approach to conservation, as discussed above and well-depicted in the current Director's attitude that "it would take too long," for people to understand the need themselves, has clearly shown to be short-lived in practice and belief.

The key lesson learned from the farmer responses and the reforestation program is that FED's initial efforts, although perhaps well intended, were imposed and enforced too rapidly from the top disconnected to the bottom. Tasks were accomplished solely by the project rather than with the participation of settlers. This process ultimately prevented settler involvement in or understanding of the importance of reforestation. FED bypassed potential for advocating and fostering environmental

awareness and sustainable farming practices among settlers in favor of ensuring preset goals of a specified number of trees planted to meet the project quota. FED intentions backfired into inverse outcomes, resulting in even greater losses of trees and environmental destruction. Ultimately, goals of reforestation, a cornerstone of FED's environmental program, remain unmet and deeply resented.

Social impact. Sociopolitical conditions in FED, rather than project recommendations, seem to be the determinant long-term factor influencing farmer behavior and beliefs towards environmental conservation. Problems of FED management style, uncertain land tenure, lack of autochthon-settler integration, the risk of settler impermanence, are all factors leading to settlers' deferred internalization of environmental management. Lack of reference to former agricultural experiences, practices, and aspirations from the start of the project is a key cause for project failures in conservation (Kenkou 1990).

Le prix qu'impose l'innovation de paysan revient ainsi à cette perte de liberté, et à l'asservissement à un système économique le mettent définitivement en divorce avec lui-même en tant que homme, et avec son environnement physique et social (Gu-Konu, 1983:III:51).

Technologies and innovations introduced in FED, such as reforestation, were peculiar and often inappropriate to settlers, viewed as a disruption and not always understood. Combined with a distant and authoritarian extension service, FED's official policy to encourage participation in conservation diverged from action. Lack of dialogue between FED personnel and farmers was a cautionary signal indicating a more deep-seated inequality and authoritarianism prototypical of the traditional top-down approach to development.

Failures such as this result from planning inappropriateness. According to Gu-Konu (1983), this incongruence is rooted in FED's less apparent, but actual intentions: not at all to encourage settler autonomy and improve welfare, but to fulfill "opaque" objectives of entering the cash-crop market economy through farmer exploitation. In this perspective, lack of farmer participation and restraint of farmer liberties to the extent of total submission are characteristic and expected outcomes. Gu-Konu's bald accusation: "Tout est pensé à sa place; tout lui est donné sans qu'il l'émette un avis" (1983:990), certainly pertains to FED's hollow reforestation effort.

Many scholars of Kabye migration have suggested that social status gained from emigration, rather than increased agricultural production, was a primary reason for farmer resettlement (Gu-Konu 1983:989; Pillet-Schwartz 1986a). This motivation would explain settlers' cool reaction and apparent disinterest to technology adoption and environmental concerns introduced by the project. Convincingly argued by Pillet-Schwartz (1986b), FED settlers are typical of most northern Kabye migrants in migrating neither for greater production, nor increased land, space, or detachment from their homeland. Rather, she asserts, Kabye resettle for the sole benefit of garnering greater "leisure time." Although land, labor, soil fertility and production contribute to this end, she found in her research that the locus of migrant priorities lies in time.

In sum, divergent priorities between FED and settlers have resulted in unattained target goals, short-lived farming practices and unsustainable agricultural

management systems. Poor investment in the environment caused by a mining of the soil and natural resource base has been caused by disinterest and obstacles, less and more intentional, within the project plan. Although the concept of participation was hailed as essential to project sustainability and increasingly integrated into FED, this cry, too late, fell upon deaf ears.

Comparative Conclusions to Settlement Agricultural Systems

In comparing agricultural systems between the FED and Mo plain settlements, striking similarities emerge. Despite enormous investments of money, time, labor and political capital in FED compared to Mo, in-depth analysis discloses comparable problems concerning environmental management. These similarities offer lessons concerning where and how rural farmers are best able to prevent or solve their own problems, and also inform future agricultural policy recommendations of appropriate, adaptive and adoptable, sustainable environmental management systems. For purposes of analysis, I have aggregated and summarized these lessons into three key domains: extensification, resistance to technology, and reluctance towards environmental investment.

Extensification. In both sites, settlers have adopted extensive farming practices, rather than intensive farming, despite FED's promotion of agricultural intensification through advanced technology. This fact should not be surprising given

settlers' primary motivation for migration: the search for farmland.⁴³ Obstacles to settlers' further extensification differ: in Mo, labor shortages have been the primary obstacle, while in FED, land conflicts (mostly with autocthonous), have emerged due to unanticipated land shortages brought on by animal traction. This unexpected expansion in FED has generated unforeseen (or overlooked) land occupation and accelerated soil degradation.

Land shortages, combined with soil overuse and overall environmental deterioration, introduce limitations to extensive agriculture. Settler solutions to managing land compression differ between sites: in Mo, groundwork is being laid at the local level to provide for adjustments to former land abundance. Dialogue and negotiations between autocthonous and settlers based on traditional, indigenous systems of land tenure and use rights (including practices of formal traditional requests, negotiations concerning borrowing, sharing, and rules of duration) are being exercised, refined and regularized. Inevitable conflicts that arise are managed by a tribunal comprised of the diversity of the population (ethnicity, duration, age, and livelihood). Capacity for problem-solving appears promising toward landscape custodianship.

In FED, solutions to land conflict have been conducted in totality through the administration (also see Chapter 6). A shared recognition for a legitimate, effective, and trusting form of local governance since FED's departure is absent. Autocthonous'

⁴³ When land is free, people never intensify. Land preparation is a cost that usually is accompanied by and encourages the evolution of intensive agriculture (Andrew, personal communication, 1995).

suppressed frustration and volatile anger towards FED over forced land acquisition and initial removal has surfaced and resulted in dramatic injury to social and environmental conditions, including reforestation destruction, fallow elimination, and violence. FED prevented ongoing problem-solving at the local level, and failed to prepare the population to confront and manage their environment.

Transformations from extensive to more intensive land use appears best managed at the local level by people most affected, such as in Mo. Directions that emanate from external players at the top often create more harm than good in terms of long-term land management. Sustainability of social and environmental conditions requires participation of involved actors.

Resistance to technology. Resemblance between sites in resistance to technology adoption reveals fundamental lessons concerning farmer incentives, and underscores common shortcomings found in development projects in rural Africa. In Mo, overall, farmers maintain disinterest and resistance to extension agent recommendations (most consider lack of contact their own fault). Unwillingness among Mo farmers to conform to stringent agricultural practices derives from their search for "leisure" (Pillet-Schwartz 1986b), and freedom. At present, Mo settlers' satisfaction found in their newly improved livelihoods (notably, increased land and production levels) abates aspirations for technology improvement.

In an appropriate response, extension agents have concentrated on locally perceived needs and existing social institutions to stimulate farmer interests, create programs, and promote pieces (rather than a package) of improved technologies.

Large-scale, "total" interventions have been ineffective, ephemeral, and expensive. Results of top-down authoritarian regulation in Mo have been negligible and even harmful and life-threatening. Under challenging conditions of isolation, Mo agents are replacing assumption and arrogance with humility and dialogue. By listening actively and attentively to farmers' problems and concerns, agent ignorance is overridden and possibilities are strengthened toward deriving genuinely appropriate, farmer-driven solutions.

In FED, in stark contrast, a complete technology intervention was administered by an intensive network of extension agents. Innovative, adaptive, extraordinarily environmentally sound agricultural systems practiced by settlers (particularly Kabye) were replaced with a total package of technologies, designed externally and imposed rigidly. Much of this package was inappropriately designed (favoring external inputs, controlling prices and thereby creating risk) and, in the short term, suppressed entrepreneurialism and free-market activity.

Short-lived stellar project results steadily declined with the onset of FED's withdrawal from the project (and unfavorable international terms of trade and world market prices). Farmers witnessed sharp declines in project conditions, benefits, and services (extension, infrastructure, inputs). Enforced conformity to package guidelines ruptured into significant settler abandonment of prior recommendations (loss of external aid, risk), destruction of project endeavors (hostility), and defection (limitations, disinterest). Inadequate concern for: settler priorities; former farming systems; post-project maintenance; and settler participation, have promoted settler

dissatisfaction. Due to lack of settler involvement from the start, FED's investments have been short-lived and unsustainable.

Animal traction is a key example of technology intervention that exhibits the array of problems and ephemeral duration of the FED package. The technology itself, I suggest, may be useful in certain contexts given appropriate strategies of intervention and support (a dense subject requiring attention and study beyond the margins of this work). Possibilities for this type of labor-saving farming technology in Mo may be worth considering. However, in light of the obstacles explained above, notably eventual limitations of land, the delicate balance of the natural resource base, reasons for settler migration, and questions of technology sustainability, I argue that animal traction in Mo should be held at bay, at least until Mo farmers themselves initiate the demand, or until further infrastructural and sociopolitical development occur throughout the region.

Environmental investment. Settlers in both sites devote minimal attention or interest to sustainability or natural resource management. In Mo, where ample and fertile land exists (compared to their home areas), farmers "mine" the resource base impulsively by means of slash and burn agriculture. In efforts to maximize production levels (not necessarily yield), land is cleared and trees are destroyed as far as a farmer can labor. For the majority of settlers, loosely-defined consent of land-use, rather than permanent delineated tenure laws, is the operating system of land rights.

Settler zealotry towards optimizing space and time for cultivation is caused primarily by their impermanence and transience. Where the future in Mo remains

uncertain and insecure (despite intentions to move permanently), settlers proceed with indiscretion, rather than caution and care, in confronting their environment. In addition, because settlements are not settlers' ancestral "homeland," less stewardship is practiced towards the natural environment than in their home areas. Farmers perceive few restraints to their extensive practices and no urgency, in the present, to restore natural resources. In consequence, despite government officials' warnings of environmental degradation and a need to incorporate conservation measures into existing farming systems, in their conquest for land, settlers appear heedless.

FED settlers, by comparison, recognize a decline in production caused by soil degradation and land over-use. Overall worsening conditions due to population pressure and lack of government support for infrastructure and services have increased farmers' anxieties, hostilities and anger towards FED and one another. As FED farmers astutely witness environmental conditions exacerbate, stress rises, panic is aroused and land management suffers (in some instances serving as an intentional target for tension and conflict expression).

The FED settlement process, unlike Mo, is neither a spontaneous movement nor a clean slate in terms of regional penetration and resource use. FED administration's guidelines, intended foremost for production increase, are resulting in acute environmental obstruction, which is inducing degradation (land shortage, soil infertility, deforestation). FED's departure leaves farmers confronted by these obstacles for which they blame the government, and do not perceive as their problem.

For similar reasons as Mo settlers, FED settlers seem inclined to accelerate natural resource exploitation, rather than restore the balance under worsening conditions.

Environmental management in both settlements appears to require foremost a change in settler attitudes and practices. In FED, anger, blame, resentment, mistrust, and hostility toward FED and between autoctones and settlers characterize farmer perspectives. In Mo, the quest for land, leisure and improved quality of life largely determines farmer motivations. To build is less difficult than to overcome.

In sum, I suggest that the natural resource base in FED, appearing more advanced in terms of farmer awareness and action than in Mo, in actuality is experiencing severe threats to sustainability. Although Mo regional farmers do not fare much better in terms of stewardship of their environment, the recognition of soil degradation and tree loss exists, and perception and need are first steps to action.

As suggested by Painter (1990), directed, careful intervention of natural resource management in the Mo plain is possible when issues of land tenure and permanency are resolved.

The issue of commitment by settlers to new land is equally important here. If settlers consider the Mo plain as a place to pursue their livelihoods over generations, their approach to using resources will be more conservation-oriented than if they see it merely as an auspicious place to be exploited for the production of surpluses and income for investment in their home areas. Relative ease of access to land and the security of tenure that prevails in the plain may contribute to permanence of the settlements in the area (Painter, 1990:45).

Here we reach the juncture between environmental and community sustainability.

Without clarity and resolution of settler-autocthone conflicts over land, resources and power, the sustainability (permanence and environmental) of both settlements remains

untenable. I argue that Mo farmers currently operate within a more effective sociopolitical system enabling problem resolution in a long-term perspective. Greater overall sustainability, therefore, is encouraged by greater autonomy. Where farmers are self-reliant, hold responsibility over their own lives, share and are interdependent in approaching and resolving their problems (despite challenging environments), they are more likely to remain permanently and invest in their surroundings for the long term, than settlers without empowerment or autonomy.

CHAPTER 8

SATISFACTION: DETERMINANTS TOWARD SUCCESS

A successful man is he who gives rides to others in his car
(Temberma settler in FED Project).

There is more than real powerlessness standing in the way of human improvement. There is also what I call surplus powerlessness, the degree to which individuals have internalized their powerlessness and become convinced that the way things are now is the only way they can be (David Lerner, *Jewish Renewal: A Path to Healing and Transformation*, 1994:111).

In this chapter, I address two interrelated questions concerning settler satisfaction and sustainability. First, I ask, what factors create and influence settler satisfaction in the present, and second, how do these factors affect future settler decisions to either invest in the settlements and remain permanently on site, or defect. To examine these questions, I present and analyze research findings concerning: first, settlers' overall satisfaction in each settlement; second, their forecast of future conditions, including their attitudes and opinions concerning causes for these projections; third, actual indications of settler defection or permanency; and, fourth, a comparison of degrees of settler autonomy between sites measured by a constructed tool of measurement.

Projection of future settler circumstances and conditions of the settlements overall are predictive qualities that emerge in this chapter. These predictions are key contributions that this study offers to the current body of settlement literature. Understanding present conditions and future trends of settlement is only a first step toward a critical focus and understanding of long-term outcomes of settlement processes. A synchronic analysis of settlement may render rich data concerning present conditions and successes, but it generally fails to offer predictions toward the future and sustainability of settlements. A diachronic analysis of settlement, in contrast, consisting of a longitudinal perspective based on continual site visits and studies, provides insight regarding the sustainability of settlers and the settlement in the longterm (also mentioned by Scudder, see Chapter 2).

One objective of this chapter, therefore, is to predict the future sustainability of each settlement by understanding their processes in depth and over time. This aim is an important contribution that this research in specific, and anthropological studies in general, can offer to settlement studies and development at large.¹

Rather than employ one research tool to conduct this study, I have applied a multi-dimensional, triangulation approach (Patton 1990).² I use three diverse

¹ I thank my committee members for pointing out during defense this critical component regarding the contribution my study offers to current settlement research.

² Validity and reliability are research concerns when examining cross-cultural attitudes and perceptions of satisfaction. What the researcher perceives as "discontent" may in fact be others' complacency, if not pleasure. Once satisfaction is identified, it is difficult for the researcher to "prove," measure or appraise degree of satisfaction according to rigid standards.

methodological approaches, each offering different data results:³ first, I directly question farmers about their attitudes by use of a semi-structured survey. Quantitative outcomes result from this methodological approach. Second, I informally interview farmers through in-depth, often spontaneously encountered, conversations. The outcome is quotations and narratives replete with descriptions concerning farmers' attitudes, beliefs and behaviors regarding the settlements.

Finally, I conduct participant observation of actual farmer behavior. Farmers' decisions to remain permanently or defect from the settlement is a question continuously confronting all settlers and evidenced best in actual behavior, through their feet. Accordingly, I attempt to ascertain desertion rates and regional demographic changes (growth or decline of the settlements) through formal and informal sources, despite the paucity of formal records ("Il est difficile d'évaluer à partir de ce moment le taux de rotation des familles Kabyés implantées et remplacées pas d'autres, originaires d'autres centres de migrations" (BMB 1984:83). Clues to farmer intention and commitment to permanence also are embedded in the degree of farmers' investments in the household, farming systems, environment, and social organizations. Analysis of these domains and activities offers insight to farmer intentions for the future as well. In sum, use of these three methods combined serves to crystallize a depiction of farmer satisfaction, future aims and intentions, and overall settlement sustainability.

³ The advantage of using multiple methods and approaches in research is in studying and analyzing a given problem or idea from multiple angles; "because each method reveals different aspects of empirical reality, multiple methods of observation must be employed" (Denzin 1978, in Patton 1990:187).

Settler Satisfaction

"Are You Better Off Than Before?"

One logical method to discerning which settler group is more satisfied in the present in the settlement is to ask them directly. As shown in Table 8-1, FED settlers appear more satisfied, in the present, and recognize their more favored status than those in Mo. As shown in Table 8-2, farmers in both settlements considered public goods to be the most important difference between the settlements and home. Furthermore, as shown in Table 8-3, data from both sites indicate that duration on site correlates with satisfaction (except for decreased production in FED, which will be discussed below).

Measures of Socioeconomic Status

A second indication or measure of success and satisfaction conventional to social science research is wealth. To measure degrees of wealth, social scientists apply standard forms of socioeconomic status scales (SES) ordinarily built from inductive diagnostic analysis. A common assumption held by social scientists contends that wealthier households accumulate and invest in a greater number and diversity of goods and services (such as radios, bicycles, among other goods) than poverty-stricken households. Wealth invested in household possessions and acquired goods, according to this method, is one indicator of success and satisfaction.

Findings in this research indicate that although this method may be valid for certain research settings, in this study, simple measurements of farmer belongings,

Table 8-1. Comparison of settler satisfaction (reported better off, as percent of sample).

| | Mo | FED |
|----------------------------|------|-------|
| <u>Men</u> | | |
| compared to previous home | 61.3 | 96.9 |
| compared to other Togolese | 27.3 | 40.6 |
| health of family | 43.8 | 78.1 |
| in agricultural production | 87.9 | 78.1 |
| in cash income | 48.5 | 75.0 |
| <u>Women</u> | | |
| compared to previous home | 71.4 | 86.7 |
| compared to other Togolese | 28.6 | 10.0 |
| health of family | 35.8 | 83.3 |
| in agricultural production | 96.4 | 100.0 |
| in cash income | 50.0 | 56.7 |

particularly within the planned settlement project, may be inaccurate and misleading. Accuracy is skewed, and the real meaning of these measurements misunderstood because of two main reasons. First, FED donated specific items (such as tin roofs and tools) to settlers free of cost; second, different items may hold different values in different settlement environments (such as greater need for a bicycle to travel longer distances to fields in one site rather than another).

Table 8-2. Comparison between home village and settlement.

| Site | Mo | FED |
|--|--|--------------------------------------|
| <u>Men</u> | | |
| primary change(s) compared to home | worse infrastructure, more food, worse market (each 19%) | improved infrastructure (34%) |
| secondary change | better soil (16%) | less distance to fields (19%) |
| primary change since living on site | better infrastructure (41%) | worse infrastructure (34%) |
| secondary change | better cash flow (17%) | worse environmental conditions (19%) |
| <u>Women</u> | | |
| primary change(s) compared to home | worse infrastructure, more food (each 32%) | more land, more food (each 27%) |
| primary change since living on site | better infrastructure (25%) | worse infrastructure (33%) |

In the case of Mo and FED settlements, correlation of SES with total income (estimated by farmers' gross cash income), shows that income does not increase with SES as one would assume (see Table 8-4). These findings do not reflect wealth and standard of livelihood exclusively, but also, and perhaps more importantly, demonstrate variations of settler needs determined by settlement environments and conditions. For example, one reason for the high-income farmers in FED answering number three (having bicycles and radios only) could be explained by the fact that FED provided tin roofs to many settlers, whereas a bicycle is of critical importance to farmers for travel to market, to meetings, to other sectors, and even to travel to the

Table 8-3. Effects of duration in settlement on settler attitudes and behavior.

| parameter | years on site (no.) | | Pearson Correlation Coefficient ^z |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|--|
| | men | women | |
| Perception of conditions compared to home | | | |
| Mo | | | |
| improved | 12 (19) | 11 (20) | |
| worsened | 9 (11) | 8.5 (8) | |
| same | 10 (1) | 0 | |
| FED | | | |
| improved | 13 (31) | 13 (26) | |
| worsened | 8 (1) | 19 (4) ^y | |
| same | 0 | 0 | |
| Perception of crop production | | | |
| Mo | | | |
| increased | 12 (29) | | |
| decreased | 11 (3) | | |
| FED | | | |
| increased | 13 (25) | | |
| decreased | 18.5 (6) | | |
| Total income v. years on site | | | |
| Mo | | | 0.06 |
| FED | | | -0.14 |
| Visits to dispensary v. years on site | | | |
| Mo | | | 0.02 |
| FED | | | -0.14 |
| Number of children v. years on site | | | |
| Mo | | | 0.28 |
| FED | | | -0.59 |
| Visits home ^x v. years on site | | | |
| Mo | | | 0.07 |
| Fed | | | -0.23 |
| Number of animals owned by women v. years on site | | | |
| Mo | | | -0.16 |
| FED | | | 0.02 |
| Income-generating activities by women v. years on site | | | |
| Mo | | | -0.33 |
| FED | | | -0.18 |

^z Pearson Correlation Coefficients, often used for prediction, describe the strengths of the association between two variables, but does not measure the strengths of the association

^y two of the four were autochthones

^x based on annual number and duration of visits home

Table 8-4. Income and socioeconomic status of settlers as reflected in purchases of material goods.

| Goods owned by respondents: | nothing | radio | bicycle | radio & bicycle | tin roof and/or mill/machine | roof/etc. and radio | roof/etc. and bicycle | roof/etc. and radio and bicycle | other |
|--------------------------------|---------|--------|---------|--------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------|
| Mo | | | | | | | | | |
| percent who own | 28.1 | 6.25 | 12.5 | 18.8 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 6.3 | 21.9 | 0 |
| (no. of respondents) | -- | (2) | (4) | (6) | (1) | (1) | (2) | -- | (9) |
| average income of | | | | | | | | | |
| respondents (CFA) | 17,730 | 92,500 | 236,000 | 55,150 | 4,000 ^z | 21,000 | 70,500 | 160,800 | -- |
| (average gross income | | | | | | | | | |
| of total sample: | | | | | | | | | |
| 90,971 CFA) | | | | | | | | | |
| FED | | | | | | | | | |
| percent who own | 6.3 | 12.5 | 3.1 | 15.6 | 6.3 | 18.8 | 0 | 37.5 | 0 |
| (no. of respondents) | (2) | (4) | (1) | (5) | (2) | (6) | -- | (12) | -- |
| average income of | | | | | | | | | |
| respondents (CFA) | 41,500 | 73,480 | 47,000 | 165,600 | 109,000 | 117,330 | -- | 144,110 | -- |
| (average gross income | | | | | | | | | |
| of total sample: | | | | | | | | | |
| 115,726 CFA) | | | | | | | | | |

^z autothone whose primary source of income is moneylending and has experienced dramatic fluctuations in income.

home village. In addition, radios are highly desirable among FED farmers to receive notification of settlement announcements (often emitted through radio), and news of home village and national events.⁴ In comparison, in Mo, the highest income farmers were at number two, bicycles, which farmers consider vital for travelling long distances to their remote fields.⁵

Another noteworthy point disclosed through SES data analysis is that across sites, settlers have both higher incomes and SES than autocthonous (tables 8-5, 8-6). FED settled autocthonous have higher SES scores than hors blocs (but less than settlers). Correlation thus exists between total income and SES according to farmer-settlement status within each settlement, further supporting the assertion that a degree of shared needs, values and advantages regarding possessions exists within each site, but differs between sites. To summarize, data suggest that, first, settlers fare better than autocthonous in terms of income and SES across sites; and, second, despite FED farmers' apparently higher SES measure than those in Mo, less obvious, but critical indications reveal ambiguity in FED farmers "overt," favored status compared to those in Mo.

It is important to note as well that comparison of average annual net incomes per household estimated by farmers (shown in Table 8-7) suggests that FED farmers

⁴ In Togo, most news, including family, village, regional, national and international news, is announced by radio (including birth, marriage, death, and age-rite ceremonies). In Togo, the radio is the primary medium for information exchange, especially in rural areas where television and telephone are still rare.

⁵ Also, many Mo farmers take advantage of low-cost bicycles readily available through Ghanaian markets.

Table 8-5. Socioeconomic status by farmer status as reflected in purchases of material goods.

| Goods owned by respondents: | | nothing | radio | bicycle | radio & bicycle | tin roof and/or mill/machine | roof/etc. and radio | roof/etc. and bicycle | roof/etc. and radio and bicycle | other |
|--------------------------------|--|---------|-------|---------|--------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------|
| Mo settlers | | | | | | | | | | |
| percent | | 27.6 | 6.9 | 13.8 | 20.7 | 0 | 3.5 | 6.9 | 20.7 | 0 |
| (no.) | | (8) | (2) | (4) | (6) | - | (1) | (2) | (6) | - |
| autothones | | | | | | | | | | |
| percent | | 33 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 33 | 0 | 0 | 33 | 0 |
| (no.) | | (1) | - | - | - | (1) | - | - | (1) | - |
| FED settlers | | | | | | | | | | |
| percent | | 4.3 | 8.7 | 0 | 13.3 | 8.7 | 26.1 | 0 | 39 | 0 |
| (no.) | | (1) | (2) | - | (3) | (2) | (6) | - | (9) | - |
| autothones (settled) | | | | | | | | | | |
| percent | | 0 | 20 | 0 | 40 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | 0 |
| (no.) | | - | (1) | - | (2) | - | - | - | (2) | - |
| autothones (hors blocs) | | | | | | | | | | |
| percent | | 25 | 25 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 25 | 0 |
| (no.) | | (1) | (1) | (1) | - | - | - | - | (1) | - |

Table 8-6. Settler status and income (CFA).

| Site | settler (no.) | autocthone/ hors blocs (no.) | autocthone settled (no.) |
|------|---------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Mo | 97,070 (30) | 22,670 (3) | -- |
| FED | 126,640 (23) | 104,100 (4) | 114,800 (5) |

Table 8-7. Comparison of estimated average annual gross and net household incomes (CFA).

| | Mo | FED |
|------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| <u>Men</u> | | |
| crop | 89,994 | 121,946 |
| animal sales | 6,125 | 13,866 |
| other ^z | <u>26,125</u> | <u>10,213</u> |
| subtotal: | 122,271 | 146,025 |
| <u>Women</u> | | |
| animal sales | 100 | 1,100 |
| other ^y | <u>32,110</u> | <u>18,000</u> |
| subtotal: | 32,210 | 19,100 |
| subtotal (men and women): | <u>154,481</u> | <u>165,125</u> |
| <u>Expenses</u> | | |
| fertilizer | 8,350 ^x | 28,316 |
| animal traction | 0 | 5,000 ^w |
| hired labor | <u>50,312</u> | <u>34,750</u> |
| subtotal: | <u>-58,662</u> | <u>-68,066</u> |
| NET INCOME | 95,819 | 97,059 |

^z other includes cottage industry output of miscellaneous handmade products and crafts^y other includes beermaking, prepared foods, petty commerce, sale of firewood^x adjusted value^w estimated annual debt payment

do not in fact earn incomes significantly higher than Mo farmers. Furthermore, comparison of average annual net incomes per household over time in FED indicates that earnings have been inconsistent and do not indicate a steady gradual increase as projected in FED's initial design (Painter 1990).

These findings undermine one of FED's key objectives, raising farmer incomes; it also challenges a common assumption of development intentions, that increased donor investment increases farmers' cash incomes and overall wealth. Conclusively, obscurity in correlating and understanding (quantitative) measurements of wealth, satisfaction, and permanence should alert researchers to exploring alternative approaches of inquiry and analysis. Comparing and integrating results from different sources and methods may provide the most accurate depiction of the real world. Satisfaction and permanence, for example, may be better understood through in-depth qualitative study, to which I now turn.

"What's Not to Like?": Common Responses from Settlers

Informal conversations between settlers and myself provided abundant information concerning what promotes or prevents farmer satisfaction. Below, I review key issues to which settlers frequently referred as integral to their happiness and permanence.

Space and family. The value of "space," in social and physical terms, was particularly valued among settlers in both sites. Independent control and surveillance of one's land was mentioned by many settlers as a welcome change from a lifetime of

fieldwork with family.⁶ FED farmers, in particular, remarked that change in space was beneficial. One woman in FED vividly explained, "here there is shade." More space allows for fresh air, space, good health and fatness. Space allows for shade and protection from negative social influences as well, she explained. Familial duties and obligations, specifically of labor, she said, are reduced when separated from home;

In Siou there is more work on others' farms, here I am alone and not with my family. It is best to be here, farm well and bring gifts, than not to have time. There is more money here because there are less mouths to feed. It is good to have people to talk to, however.

By relocating, settlers have liberated themselves from the shackles of familial scrutiny and obligation. "La famille va te gêner de venir les aider," explained one FED settler. Another FED settler said; "Separation is an advantage, because I can do as I please. I am close to my fields, and my health is better. There are sorcerers at home and less here because we live less tightly and settle less closely. There are more people there [home] and less land." Remoteness from family lessens obligations and demands on labor, time, and resources, plus diminishes jealousy. 'Progressive' farmers are afraid to change their way of life because they do not want to stir up the envy and hostility of friends and relations (Harris 1991:224). To be "à l'écart," I was told by many, was pleasing.

"Familiarity [connaissance] brings debt, this is bad," remarked one settler. Another settler's wife remarked; "It is best to be separated from family at home. People would be jealous over possessions and wealth, and they are wealthy!" This

⁶ Dispersed settlement patterns of traditional Kabye villages do not detract from the vital role that extended family plays in satisfying labor, economic, social, and ceremonial responsibilities (Lucien-Brun 1987; Sauvaget 1981).

same woman told me that at home seven of her small piglets were killed and her commerce was sabotaged by sorcery caused by jealousy from others. Settlers confirmed that one can "get ahead" easier through independence and anonymity. Another settler I interviewed explained that distance from one's family allows him more independence to plan and organize himself: FED permits settlers greater efficiency and long-term forecasting.

As one settler explained, "we do not know stories about each other's lives and families." Ethnic diversity insures a moral order, a code of conduct, because "outsiders" can arbitrate problems more easily than relatives from within. More people breeds less familiarity, less visibility and fewer problems. Where less familiarity exists, fear of other does not breed. My host-family settler explained that a mix of people was preferable because obedience was assured. Greater respect between people thus occurs with less intimacy. Because we are strangers, said one settler, there is more obedience: you have fear of those you don't know. Another settler explained straightforwardly: there is more respect among strangers than family.

Family ties are never severed completely, however. Labor, food, cash, counsel and advice are all continuously exchanged between home village and settlement.⁷ FED administrators were keenly aware of the important role that family ties played in reinforcing settler satisfaction and permanence. Consequently, they invested much time and energy in ferrying settlers back home for various events (including funerals,

⁷ Research findings show that remittances home appear more frequent among FED than Mo settlers (100 percent and 73 percent, respectively), and that food and cash are the most common form of remittance in both sites (61 percent and 33 percent, respectively).

births, illness, ceremonies and personal needs). Visits home continue with more or less regularity in both sites (mean number of visits home annually for FED and Mo settlers was 5 and 1.5, respectively). Despite greater interaction with the home village among FED settlers than Mo, their alienation and disengagement from family members may be higher than in Mo.⁸ Data derived from the Pearson correlation coefficient in Table 8-3 show that over time, home visits decline among FED settlers but increase among Mo settlers.

One interpretation of this finding is that Mo settlers maintain relations with family members back home in aspiration of sending for them to join them as settlers; in contrast, FED settlers, who perceive resettlement as temporary and plan to return home, would not require as continuous and intense an interaction in the long term with their home village as Mo settlers. FED settlers may continue as satellite family members through time (reinforced by numerous visits home), confident of their alliances and likely return. Mo settlers, in contrast, may maintain or intensify their lineal alliances through time in effort to attract followers and establish a new home. It is conceivable that ethnic identity, home village contact and family contacts endure in Mo precisely because settlers perceive themselves as less incorporated into the home village in the long term than those in FED.

Evidence presented in this study suggests that continued interaction with family at home appears to reinforce settler permanency. Critics (BMB 1984; Kenkou 1990)

⁸ Less distance between Kabye villages and FED than Mo may account for their higher frequency of visits home among FED settlers.

of the FED settlement have observed that one main cause of settler defection is due to settlers' isolation and loss of family support from the onset of recruitment. For example, settlers were initially brought to the zone alone, without their wives or family members, and lodged in the granaries under one roof in difficult conditions until their individual houses were built and fields plowed. Families were settled on site as independent, isolated, autonomous units, a landscape alien in traditional lifestyle.

One acute problem (particularly for FED settlers) resulting from loss of family is labor shortages. One settler complained that his lack of sons has made his work in FED particularly difficult. Without the labor assistance provided by his extended family members back home in Defale, and without close affiliates with whom he feels comfortable to borrow money for hired labor, he has done his best to accomplish his farm work, with some help through *egbare* and *hada*. Regarding labor, he laments, "no one knows of each other here" and prefers to be amongst familiar surroundings and people. Labor shortage was ranked the second greatest constraint to overall success by FED farmers (28 percent), compared to the third ranked among Mo settlers (15.6 percent) (also see Chapter 7 for agricultural constraints). Although hired labor, as well as *egbare* and *hada* work groups, are employed during bottleneck periods, farmers still view labor as insufficient. Animal traction eases the burden for accomplishing certain tasks (such as plowing and preparing fields), but also places heavier labor demands on specific tasks such as seeding and weeding, traditionally women's work. Women in Mo and FED alike, for example, overwhelmingly

considered their work loads as increasing compared to their home villages (89.2 percent and 83.3 percent, respectively).

In response to these obstacles, Mo settlers have sustained relations with their families and concomitantly nurtured a chain of followers (Lucien-Brun 1987; Pillet-Schwartz 1987). As family members arrive, ethnic neighborhoods form, like those in Mo, allowing for the reemergence of former traditions and customs. Reinstatement of these traditional economic and sociocultural practices reinforce settler satisfaction.

One means to strengthen village and family alliances is through marriage arrangements. In one case, for example, a settled woman in Mo arranged the marriage of her son to a girl also living in Mo from their native village of Namon. The son was living in Namon at the time, continuing work on family fields. In ignorance of his arranged marriage, he was sent for by his mother. Soon after arrival, the two married. In another case, one young Mo settler told me with no uncertainty, "My father was an animist and I must respect his ceremonies. I will never take a Gnezime wife because they are all Christian and I will never change. Instead, I will marry a woman from Kabou." Typical of marriage arrangements conducted in Mo, these cases illustrate how family bonds and ethnic alliances persist between the settlement and home, and reinforce permanency.

In complement, home villagers appear to approve of settlement and encourage the young, in particular, to resettle to pursue more successful livelihoods. Many farmers from both sites mentioned that when they visit home, they are viewed by families and friends as a success, rather than traitors to the clan. One woman in Mo

captured the essence of her satisfaction in the settlement with poignant accuracy: when she returned to Kouka during a visit after many years' absence, she was received by local women in the marketplace with great applause. She is different now, she explained, she has new habits and has gained weight, she is stronger and better. Others admire and envy her; she now understands she is successful.

Time-saving advantages: animal production. Opportunities for income-generating activities outside of cultivation have been seized by many settlers from both sites. Less travelling time to fields has been an enormous advantage in saving time, mentioned particularly by FED settlers (see Table 7-1). Access to time is a benefit that many FED settlers attribute to convenience of household location (Table 8-2).⁹ One woman remarked that less distance to fields allowed for work earlier in the morning, leaving more time for food preparation. Another settler explained that due to fewer hours spent in the fields, he gained time for other activities such as animal raising and other off-farm activities.

Settlers from both sites increased their numbers of animals in the settlement than at home (56 percent and 31 percent of total increase in number of animals for FED and Mo, respectively). FED settlers reported raising double the number of animals and earnings than Mo settlers (see Table 7-9). But resettlement of animals was a decision that many settlers opted against (30 percent and 23 percent of Mo and FED settlers, respectively). Like many rural Africans, settlers' investments are often

⁹ Although traditional Kabye habitations are located directly on-farm, expansive secondary fields (specifically for yams) can be as far as 16 km from the household.

carried "on the hoof" in the form of livestock. Some settlers preferred to retain their worth in "chez," (their homeland) where they felt the animals were more secure. One FED settler admitted he had seventeen cows and forty-six small ruminants at home; another said he preferred retaining his cattle outside the settlement in what he considered safer areas. One Mo settler admitted having twenty-five cows at home under the surveillance of Fulani. All these settlers explained that "problems" could arise if the animals were on site. Candidly, one FED settler revealed that jealousy would arise when others saw his wealth. Lack of "entente" among settlers, he said, was dangerous. By retaining investments (including possessions, animals, wives, or other household members or items) at home rather than bringing them on site, settlers demonstrate their incomplete transition from home to the settlement and their uncertain permanence.

Income-generating activities. To increase household income, settlers have seized an array of income-generating opportunities. Particularly needed during the "hungry" months (just prior to September harvests), even small amounts of cash are critical contributions to needs of the household to purchase food, condiments, medicine and other necessities (Table 7-8).¹⁰ Time that settlers allocated to these activities dramatically differs between sites, resulting in wide income differentiation.

¹⁰ Most frequently performed activities mentioned in both sites are cottage industries (non-specialized skills such as fabrication of hoe handles, straw baskets, and other raw-material household objects); second, specialized skills (such as school teaching in formal or clandestine schools, religious and spiritual figures, tax collectors and mill owners and operators), and third, apprenticed skills (such as work in construction, masonry, iron, wood, tailoring, and bicycle repair).

Mo farmers pursue income-generating activities for a greater period of time than FED settlers, earning overall greater incomes.¹¹

This variation highlights the difference in importance of income-earning diversity between sites. In Mo, income diversity is recognized as a critical component to household survival in the short and long term. In Mo, diversity ensures stability. In FED, where the government consistently provided relief for immediate necessities and unexpected misfortune, there is less need or urgency for settlers to buffer themselves against severity or prepare for the future. One legacy of FED is that it was always there. Constant patronage and support of settlers without significant reciprocal obligation has left residues of dependency causing lack of settler initiative.

In correspondence with FED's myopic and exclusive pursuit of successful agricultural production, they failed to encourage income diversification among settlers. Diversity, they believed, would detract from production results. A result of FED's monoculture, mono-objective approach has been an undermining of settlers' formerly practiced income-generating activities ensuring survival and sustainability (Hyden 1988; McMillan 1995). The omission of promoting opportunities for income diversity, according to Scudder, has been a pivotal cause of settlement failures worldwide (Scudder, personal communication, 1990).

Investments. Income earned from off-farm activities combined with profits from agricultural production are invested widely (Table 7-8). Investments are

¹¹ One interesting finding in my research shows that among FED farmers sampled, settlers earned more cash from off-farm enterprises (12,860 cfa) than autochthones settled or hors blocs (0 and 7,750 cfa respectively). This finding suggests that immigrant settlers, more than autochthones, attempt to diversify incomes in pursuit of financial gains.

indicative of farmer perceptions of the settlement and their aspirations. An examination of how farmers use their income thus offers insight to understanding processes and potential for sustainability. From observation and informal discussion with farmers, it is obvious that, in both sites, settlers are representative of rural subsistence farmers throughout Africa confronted with risks, fluctuations, unknowns and uncertainties of the economic, political, and social landscapes in which they live. Response to uncertainty lies in diversity. Diversity, for example, in types of investment, location of investment, and persons involved, all offer settlers some control and management over savings.

The degree of investments made on site, compared to at home, are strong indicators of permanence and settler sustainability (Table 7-8). Not only do FED settlers appear to invest more at home than Mo settlers, one other noteworthy distinction is that 24 percent of Mo settlers said they would save money "in the pocket" (hidden for emergencies) compared to only 3 percent in FED. This difference may suggest that Mo settlers are investing more in the present to improve their current lifestyles (by diversifying and saving), while FED settlers appear to be less invested in the settlement, in favor of investments at home.

Women in the settlements did not imitate their spouses in income-generating activities and investment activities (Table 7-6). Most women in each site said they engaged in off-farm activities.¹² Although women reported spending about the same

¹² Beer-making is the primary income-generating activity in both sites (40 percent), followed by preparation of small finger-foods (such as local doughnuts, peanut sticks: "kuli kuli") and food processing for resale (such as shelling groundnuts and rice hulling) (13 percent and 23 percent in Mo and FED, respectively).

time in these activities, the amount of income earned differed significantly.^{13,14} Given income differentials between sites, research shows that women's financial responsibilities in the household also vary accordingly (Table 8-8).

Results garnered through these findings offer a number of lessons concerning women in rural African households and settler sustainability at large. Women in Mo, earning higher incomes (independent from men) than those in FED, also hold greater responsibility (independently or shared) in household costs. Women in Mo participate more than those in FED in contributing to household expenses precisely because they acquire higher earnings. Conclusively, responsibility appears to correlate with levels of income. Integral to this assumption, data suggest that greater diversity of income earners in the household increases shared responsibility over household expenses. Because a diversity of sources of income are fundamental risk-aversion strategies critical to rural household survival, these findings demonstrate: first, greater risk-prevention is practiced among Mo settlers than FED due to women's greater participation in and contribution to household income and maintenance; and, second, greater vulnerability to various types of unanticipated shocks (particularly common in monocultural, export-oriented agricultural systems) exists in FED than Mo.

¹³ Correlation of women's time invested in off-farm activity with income earned (by the Pearson correlation coefficient) was nearly twice as high in FED than Mo women (0.63 and 0.35, respectively). This finding suggests that Mo women could work less time earning higher incomes than those in FED.

¹⁴ The highest income earned among Mo women was commerce, for example, where three women gained average earnings of 81,000 cfa annually (including one woman who reported earning 192,000 cfa annually). By contrast, in FED, small food production was the highest earning income-generating activity. For example, in Fed, seven women reported average earnings of 33,970 cfa annually.

Table 8-8. Comparison of household financial responsibility (% of respondents).

| | Mo | FED |
|-----------------------------|----|-----|
| Provide food | | |
| wife | 4 | 0 |
| shared | 71 | 50 |
| husband | 25 | 50 |
| Provide clothing | | |
| wife | 18 | 21 |
| shared | 32 | 17 |
| husband | 50 | 62 |
| Provide cost of health care | | |
| wife | 7 | 3 |
| shared | 11 | 7 |
| husband | 82 | 90 |
| Provide school fees | | |
| wife | 0 | 0 |
| shared | 4 | 0 |
| husband | 96 | 100 |

Forecast for the Future

Resiliency of Success?

Despite FED farmers' greater apparent satisfaction in the settlement compared to Mo farmers, the question remains, how resilient are these attitudes and conditions? Since living in the settlement, settlers in both sites have recognized changes. But those changes have been in opposite directions (Table 8-2). Although initial conditions appeared more satisfactory for FED settlers than for Mo farmers, changes have occurred that FED settlers perceive as deterioration, compared to Mo settlers, who

consider their surroundings as improving. These findings offer clues to forming accurate predictions concerning the long-term sustainability of the settlements.

Effects of Settler Duration

Duration in the settlement seems to influence settlers' attitudes toward the future, according to my research findings. In Table 8-3, I offer findings that suggest that, over time, lifestyle improvements ensue for Mo settlers, but decline for FED settlers. Unlike men, women in FED appear slightly better off over time than those in Mo (as shown). Although women in Mo and FED perceive themselves better off than before, over time, conditions harden for those in Mo, allowing for less time available than for those in FED for their own activities such as farming, animal raising, and income-generation.

The arrival phase of settlers seems to affect settler initial and long-term adjustment and success in FED. In subsequent phases, FED administration varied policies and practices concerning settler benefits and settlement development. First settlers benefitted from advantages that later-arriving settlers did not totally receive. Compared to the favored status of first settlers, later-arriving settlers were treated marginally, and were simply placed ad hoc into available plots (mostly of those previously evicted). Considerable problems ensued with this style, such as premature arrival and overlap causing new settlers' wariness and mistrust of other settlers and FED.

To avoid settler defection and ensure success at the start, FED created as attractive an environment as possible (in terms of benefits, advantages, rewards and settler interests). Unlike later settlers, initial recruits received a complete smorgasbord of advantages (see Chapter 2). One settler mentioned that, "The propaganda worked; by spoiling first settlers, they were very happy and returned home to villages and encouraged others to come. People were convinced."

A long-time extension agent in the project remarked that an initial continual flow of settlers into FED was due to the premium treatment and advantages received by first settlers. This allowed them to excel by saving money, improving their farming systems techniques, and exploiting the services available. Likewise, their children are better trained by living on site and thus get a head start on others as second generation settlers. A second informant agreed; first settlers were nurtured and cajoled into action. Adoption of improved farming practices was slow at the onset; people were resistant. But technology adoption accelerated largely due to FED incentives, such as free fertilizer and attractive animal traction contracts.

Sterling benefits offered at the outset were artificial and short-lived, resulting in detrimental long-term outcomes. One long-time extension agent noted that spoiling settlers set a precedent causing settlers to expect all things from the administration. Early settlers have become lazy, he said, and cited the case of low credit repayments as an example of settler negligence, lack of concern and irresponsibility. This has been a common opinion among many involved in the FED project. One long-time

settler considers early settlers less successful than late arrivals because later arrivals are more educated, observant, and hard working.

To summarize, data suggest that duration on site has an effect on settler attitudes. First, Mo settlers of longer residence on site perceive their conditions improving, in comparison to those in FED, who perceive their conditions degenerating; and second, early settlers in FED have experienced exceptionally favorable treatment, which not only exacerbated their perspective on declining conditions, but inhibited their initiative to improve their surroundings. These outcomes support a fundamental premise of this research: despite initial stellar conditions and settler livelihoods in FED in comparison to Mo, long-term maintenance and sustainability in FED is suspect.

Seeds of Success

Informal conversation and exchange with Mo settlers reinforce the assertion of their shared faith and confidence in an improving future. Their anticipation of changes, primarily in infrastructural development, is clear. Numerous settlers shrewdly remarked that increased population ensures future roads, markets, and more families to contribute to further progress (such as pump maintenance). One settler said, "development follows people's needs." He described Mo's development as an oscillation between settlement and incremental development: increased settlement attracts government assistance, which then attracts more people, which requires more development. As discussed in Chapter 6, the autochthone chief of Boulo (during his

regional tour for inspecting SOTED and Ministry of Plan employees) dynamically presented his visitors with an array of opportunities ripe for further development in the area (specifically roads).

A slow, but nonetheless, inevitable path to growth and development in Mo has been initiated by local and outside donors. The government and other organizations (notably Father Theodore of the Catholic church in Bassar and FED) have already started to invest cautiously but steadily in improving conditions. For example, roads and bridges are under improvement by joint efforts from the government, FED, and local participation; pumps are proliferating throughout the region based on farmer input and assistance by the government and the church; the Souroukou school is under construction by the local population and church aid; health clinics are under construction and improvement by local, governmental, German, and other donor assistance.

People with whom I talked from throughout the region shared optimism and hope for the future; nevertheless, they are not blind to inevitable obstacles. For example, in years ahead, the Boulo chief estimates an intensification of land conflict in Mo, as well as farmer-grazer confrontations.¹⁵ In consequence, soil will erode. Despite these and other problems mentioned (including social conflict, lack of credit, and environmental fragility) there is no doubt of Mo's direction toward growth. The former SOTOCO Director is optimistic. He explained that self-responsibility overrides

¹⁵ Informants in Mo often referred to the phrase, "Chacun pense à soi," translated as, "Each thinks only of himself," in projecting obstacles in the future.

paternalism in Mo due to limited funds and the realization that rapid growth is not real development. "Actions are not development, development is to take all problems that inhibit development and resolve them" (Ewovor, personal communication, 1992). Unlike the predetermined blueprint process in FED, in Mo, where people are at the center of development, the pace and process to Mo development is unpredictable, sure to be bumpy, erratic and inconsistent. The potential for long-term sustainability, however, should endure and survive through the perils of time precisely because people are at the core.

In stark contrast, FED settlers perceive degradation of infrastructure, specifically in roads and pumps. As one autochthone settler explained, the two major changes have been, one, infrastructure degradation and, two, increased theft. New and better infrastructure at the start, remarked one FED settler, has not favored earlier settlers. They have been less successful than later settlers, he explains, because the later settlers see and understand the faults of their predecessors. Settlers are cognizant that infrastructure (and other technological fixes) alone does not secure success.

In addition to infrastructural decline, settlers also perceive environmental conditions as eroding (discussed in Chapter 7). Widespread recognition of environmental degradation heightens settler skepticism toward the future. One settler astutely said that even fertilizer application will eventually degrade the soil. Likewise, the accelerated return of autochthones from the south due to national political unrest intensifies land use and degradation and social conflict. Informants confirmed that

social problems, jealousy, and misfortune will increase as more people come. Combined, these effects seriously threaten settler permanence.

Whose Responsibility?

Who is responsible for the lead role in settlement improvements? By asking settlers this question, valuable insight is gained to understanding settlers' sense of responsibility and development initiative. Outcomes from my own research show that Mo settlers overwhelmingly perceive responsibility for improvement of the zone as their own, compared to those in FED (see Table 8-9). Expectations of government assistance built from initial substantial FED support have fostered continual settler dependency and deterred self-reliance.

Analysis of these outcomes through time further strengthens and sharpens the significance and long-term impact of FED's legacy of dependency (Table 8-9). Conclusively, self-reliance is strengthened through time for Mo settlers, but for FED settlers, reliance is transferred to local populations at best, or maintained at the government level at worst. This outcome shows that first settlers (longest on site) may be more reliant on others than later settlers. It also may suggest that greater government dependency prevails most during the first few years of the settlement process. One interesting conclusion garnered from these data is that recognition of autochthone control in the region (as opposed to government assistance) portends the start of community development.

Table 8-9. Comparison of duration of settlers in settlement and perception of responsibility for development.

| | Mo | FED |
|--|--|--|
| | average years of residency (no.) | average years of residency (no.) |
| Both sites: | | |
| Who is responsible for development? | | |
| settler | 11.0 (23) | 12.0 (13) |
| autochthone | 9.5 (8) | 19.0 (10) |
| government | 45.0 (2) ^z | 14.0 (5) |
| project | -- | 8.2 (4) |
| FED only: | | |
| After FED closure, who takes over project zone? | | |
| government | | 15.0 (11) |
| chefs blocs | | 11.8 (8) |
| settlers | | 9.6 (5) |
| canton chiefs | | 11.6 (3) |

^zBoth autocthonous.

In addition, when I asked FED settlers "who" should maintain the "project" after funding, settlers of longest duration perceived the government as responsible for the project site (Table 8-9). This finding suggests that duration under government tutelage and control reinforces and sustains settlers' belief in government responsibility for development rather than self-empowerment. It lucidly reveals the enduring dependency engendered by FED and the undermining of settler autonomy, initiative and independence.

The solidarity fund is an example of how FED prevented settler independence and autonomy. The fund was a key component in the final phase of FED, designed to prepare settlers for future responsibility. It concluded, however, not only in failure, but in reversed intentions. Illicit use of funds (for personal use) and poor financial management resulted in worsening infrastructural conditions. Settlers felt a deep violation and breach of trust with FED, which ironically led to increased settler dependency and heightened expectations of the government. Settlers turned toward government support for recovery of FED blunders. The solidarity fund fostered settler disappointment, loss of hope, dependency, and, for some, defection.

Settler perception of "breadth" of government aid may also affect degrees of dependency. Aid perceived of as a public good, rather than personal benefit, may diminish farmer expectations of outside support and foster self-reliance. In my research, Mo settlers view the aid they receive exclusively as public goods (94 percent), having little or no direct benefit on their personal lives. This is in stark contrast to FED settlers, who view outside assistance more beneficial personally than publicly (53 percent and 47 percent, respectively). Where farmers have habitually experienced the support of government assistance in personal ways, in their quotidian private lives in the household, on their farms, in their villages, and in communities, they are more apt to rely upon state support, and perceive it as an indispensable personal need, as opposed to an advantageous, surplus public good.

These data indicate that farmers in FED may not share a similar vitality in self-reliance as those in Mo. Rather, they perceive themselves in the settlement as

clients, adherents, followers, and even "invitées" (invited guests, a term used by settlers). Data further indicate that time plays a role affecting autonomy. FED settlers' transfer of control from the government to autochthones ("We are in the hands of the autochthone chief of Leon"), for example, does not remedy FED's curse of dependency. These conclusions demonstrate that FED settlers are not carrying their own torch toward freedom.

In sum, farmers receiving services and direct outside assistance develop increased expectations of others, and gain self-confidence regarding their "deserved" right to outside support. FED settlers hold raised expectations of what they "should" receive, and also perceive themselves personally as near devoid of liability for their own improvements. They are, in short, more dependent and more expectant of outside sources to solve their problems and improve their lives. Internalization of these expectations guides much of settler behavior. It is this issue to which I now turn.

Internalization

My research findings suggest that more involvement with government agents correlates with assuming less responsibility for one's life. In comparison, less involvement with the state correlates with a greater sense of self-blame and incrimination. Mo settlers, unable to enjoy the savory fruits of state coffers as had their FED counterparts, appear to acquiesce somewhat vulnerably to a plight that they perceive as stricken neglect and indifference by the state. FED farmers, having tasted the sweetness of success (albeit artificially sweetened) through project benefits,

presume state intervention as a right. What evidence supports these assumptions concerning settler internalization of state intervention?

Settlers from both sites agree overwhelmingly (93 percent) that, in principle, they merit respect from civil servants. In practice, however, Mo farmers actually receive much less contact with agents compared to those in FED, consider this their own fault, and perceive less agent-farmer respect (Table 7-4).¹⁶

Even autochthonic hors bords in FED appear to have a higher sense of expectation of government assistance than Mo settlers. One autochthonic told me that he has not received the seeds promised by the extension agent despite his recurrent requests. In frustration, he said decisively, it was his "right" to government services (despite that he was not a settler). Use of FED services was confirmed by all hors bords with whom I talked.

In parallel with settlers, many hors bords held animosity toward inattentive agents and officials. In one case, when I asked an autochthonic who should repair the broken water pump, he responded, "the project." When I replied "the project is over," he retorted, "then it will remain broken until we die." Another hors bords confirmed that settlers are no better off than himself: he uses fertilizer and other services, but unlike them, he is also free. In sum, proximity to the FED zone seems to increase awareness and expectation of state support among farmers in and, as important, outside the project. In parallel, heightened levels of confidence among

¹⁶ The few FED farmers who responded that it was their own fault also admitted to a lack of concern; they did not look for or know who to ask, but would do so should an urgency arise.

farmers in and outside the FED project enable high degrees of assertiveness. An apparent difference in confidence between Mo and FED settlers, I suggest, is a legacy of FED.

FED-Settler Confidence: Dependency as Habit-Forming

Conversations with farmers disclose their frustration and anxiety over FED closure. They were given promises which, in many cases, have not been met. Many settlers believe that government assistance is essential, to "get us back on our feet." One settler explained, "Nous sommes dans leur main;" another told me, "the government must pay for us because we do not have the means." One woman in FED said all was given out during the project, but, without it, life is much worse, including less water, less fertilizer. Defined by one settler, "The state is the father and the project is the son. Now that the project is over, the state should be responsible." The project should transfer us back to the state, he said. Another settler said frankly, "dependency is good; solitude is not good."

Another settled autochthone remarked that the project was initiated by FED, therefore FED had rights over them. One recently settled farmer observed astutely that many settlers simply assumed FED would always be intense aid. He noticed that although people refused technology at first, now they want it but it is no longer available. He concluded that despite FED's warnings of imminent closure, people did not internalize the ensuing reality and were unconcerned. The lack of acceptance and

preparation for future responsibility has sustained settlers' view that the government's role is provider.

Settlers were spoiled; the project was too much, too fast, and too controlling with no reciprocity required, according to one extension agent. He attributes lack of settler initiative to over-expectation caused by habitual receiving: "we always approach them" he remarked. In agreement, one settler explained that at FED's closure, many defected to relieve themselves of the responsibility of work, "Ils sont gourmandes." "Ils sont exigeants."

The formation of the Zonal Committee and the solidarity fund was to create settler responsibility in managing their own problems, but the mandate was hollow. As one member said, "we were only a name and not a function." The fund actually exacerbated dependency rather than eliminated it, according to the former treasurer. He explained, initially Dogbe held the sole power over the fund; we had no control over the money or anything else: "They wouldn't give us liberty to express ourselves," he said, open criticism risked eviction. In his opinion, the fund exemplified total lack of settler autonomy despite its objective to create it.

The strength of dependency persists vigorously and is apparent today. For example, during my fieldwork, one former FED Director continued to receive numerous settler cases requiring arbitration and problem-solving (despite the fact that he no longer held an authority position). Queues of forlorn settlers and autochthones seeking solutions and direction to their problems daily formed in front of his house. This vignette raises one fundamental question concerning transfer of authority: at what

point does the project cease functioning "to control," and allow for settler management (despite the risk of mistakes and undesirable outcomes)?

Dogbe, FED's founding Director, believes that "maturation" is essential for transfer from dependency to local management (Dogbe, personal communication, 1991). The "cadeau" mentality is ephemeral not long term, he explained. Grafting of development onto initial assistance is essential for sustainable growth. But the motivation underlying settlers' continued external search of recipes for problem-solving, I argue, lies precisely in "habits" formed from this approach. Rather than solving conflicts on their own, settlers are enslaved in a system from which they have not or cannot liberate themselves easily;

Si le colon est privé de toute initiative et de toute liberté de choix et d'organisation dans cette phase de l'opération [project planning], il est douteux qu'il soit en position d'assumer, demain, une attitude participative consciente à l'égard de la mise en valeur sur la zone (Gu-Konu, 1983:991-92).

Responses to settlers' "habit" can be harsh. Agents, either ignorant of or insensitive to the history, power and outcomes of FED's legacy of dependency on settler internalization, are critical and disapproving of settler over-reliance and respond contemptuously, with aloofness and apparent disregard. The realization and actualization of converting old habits to new is a challenging transformation that requires support rather than antagonism.

Confusion and inaction over roles and responsibilities are residues of the FED settlement legacy contributing to prolonged dependency. It is clear to all actors involved that a transformation is imperative, and that settlers should have a greater

stake in the management and decision-making of their affairs. Although conflict resolution and problem-solving are now officially to be directed to canton chiefs, settlers find it hard to direct their concerns to autochthones from whom they are ethnically, spatially, agriculturally and, until recently, administratively completely segregated. Lack of regional integration through project insulation has prevented liaisons with autochthones, delaying the transfer of power to locally existing systems.

Mo-Settler Personalization

Compared with FED farmers, Mo farmers have personalized their situation through self-incrimination and self-accusation. Mo settlers offered a host of reasons, including personal shortcomings, weaknesses, and flaws, which prevented them from seeking outside aid. Assorted deficiencies, such as inadequate skills, knowledge, credibility, finances and remoteness have prevented their further achievement and assertiveness. For example, settlers found themselves guilty of having inadequate or inappropriate relations ("connections"), ignorance of how to inquire, fear of being turned away, lack of French-speaking language to communicate with civil servants, and lack of any formal schooling.

A common sentiment shared by Mo farmers was one of personal unimportance: "Je suis petit." Mo farmers project an attitude of inevitable almost unavoidable acceptance, fatalism, disillusionment, and enduring patience regarding their fate. It is what David Lerner (1994) refers to as "surplus powerlessness." Many Mo farmers told me they are "small," undeserving of aid, and simply "waiting" for a

turn of government attention toward their own concerns. One single-headed household settler felt that because she was a woman, she had no right to ask for improvements; another settler said the "whites will find us aid." Many settlers expressed frustration with lack of roads and a developed market place, but held few solutions for amelioration. Self-incrimination is a form of acceptance, but can be transformed into action under appropriately supportive conditions.

Contribution of the Levelling Mechanism

In addition to personalization, sociopolitical reasons, specifically, the levelling mechanism referred to in Chapter 6, further prevent individuals from adopting a more aggressive initiative in solving their own problems. For example, many Mo settlers, notably of surrounding satellite villages, referred to autochthone chiefs from Djarapanga, Boulo, Saiboude, or the newly elected settler chief of Tindjasse, as exclusively responsible for regional development.

As explained above, Gbanzabade village settlers told me that their needs are expressed through Saiboude because Saiboude maintains authority over them. Their needs, however, are not assured transmission to government representatives, particularly given Saiboude's own problems requiring solution. Settlers of Gbanzabade claim they are incapable of approaching officials themselves because they have no right; we are small and illiterate, they say. With full understanding that their concerns are not likely to be voiced by Saiboude, they feel helpless and wait. Similarly, villagers of Sangouli believe that autochthones' control over others discourages

independent problem-solving. We all are forced to concede to them, they said. We never raise our problems in Djarapanga because "we are only peasants." Settlers repeatedly told me, "we are like children," and, according to many, "there is nothing we can do."

"When a village speaks, there is jealousy," claimed the settler chief of Gbindila. If settlers take initiative, it is considered a "political act, a threat." When ideas are raised among settlers to the central villages, they are never carried out. "We bring our problems to Djarapanga, but can they really do anything? Maybe the chief of Djarapanga is incapable," the settler chief of Maladema said. We have intentions to raise our problems over a pump, the road, and other matters, with authorities, but autocthonous consider this as rivalry. Although settlers claim they do not know "how" to ask for help, further examination reveals otherwise.

Rather than inability, sociopolitical practices required by custom and tradition, specifically deference, inhibit settler initiative, progress and opportunism. Apparent inaction reflects neither actual attitudes nor settler abilities. In Mo, settlers have been labelled by some as "mou," or soft, generating a commonly-held belief among civil servants that rural farmers are lazy and apathetic. Extension agents, for example, in the Mo plain informed me that farmers do not attempt to solve their own problems, "they wait for all solutions," and appear disinterested. For many of the agents, the importance and meaning of persistent traditional sociopolitical relations remains obscure, resulting in a false perception of settler capabilities.

Lack of understanding from government officials of the complexity and opaque interacting forces determining settler belief and action reinforces the self-condemnation in which settlers subject themselves. Some agents still tend to view settlers as incompetent and ignorant, and treat them accordingly. Short-term, immediate outcomes and successes underlie and define the operations of government agents and functionaries and also dictate their activities and strategies. Their approaches toward settlers, therefore, are markedly hierarchical, authoritarian, top-down with negligible consideration of settler priorities, feedback, or contribution.

But Mo agents, compared to those working in other regions of Togo, hold lower expectations to reach quotas and deliver improved technologies because they recognize Mo as a delayed zone of development. They operate with less dirigisme and greater flexibility than their colleagues precisely because they are aware of their unusually challenging surroundings. Agents in Mo, whom I found astutely informed of Mo activities and lifestyles, enumerated several reasons for farmers' disinterest in working with them, including: ethnic rivalry, oversized labor groups, minimal trust between settlers and autochthones, fear of risk and debts, low incentive for resource management, and impermanence. They keenly understood the mosaic of reasons causing apparent farmer resistance. Understanding is the first step toward partnership. One agent said that his work is much like my own: we must study the farmers first, be familiar with their motivations, attitudes and practices, spend time with them and gain trust, then we can begin our work.

Viewed in this light, traditional practices (such as social deference) do not appear as limiting a long-term, sustainable perspective. Rather, tradition (such as deference) functions to maintain essential social, political and economic equilibrium in society. It ensures conflict mediation, for example, which is a critical pillar for social survival. It is a societal mainstay, which has allowed for the unusual self-reliance and independence that Mo settlers have been forced to adopt.

With little state assistance, at least in the present, Mo settlers have been compelled to exist autonomously and have used traditional systems to survive. Problems exist, particularly in political and economic arenas, but observations of the development in process show potential for sustained improvements offering opportunity and growth ahead. Tradition, therefore, underlies and is a critical ingredient for sustainable progress in Mo. By including, rather than excluding, people's indigenous practices and beliefs (as shown in preceding chapters), technical seeds of development have greater support and potential to succeed and endure.

Speaking with Their Feet

Population Oscillations and Defection

Deceleration of population growth in both sites should alert scholars to recognize the fluctuations affecting settlement conditions through time. In FED, where the administration "imposed" population growth, it appears development improvements and opportunities have only modestly "attracted" immigrants

autonomously to the zone. In actuality, Painter (1990) reports that autoctones, rather than resettled Kabye, comprise the population.

Kabye families settled on the project, but then left in significant numbers, in part because of their negative reaction to the project's policy of promoting animal traction. The relative importance of Kabye in the FED-Agbassa population has also declined because of the decision by project management to allow local (Lamba) families to settle on the perimeter. Project records show that, overall, turnover of the settler population has been high, and Kabye households presently account for a smaller percentage of the settler population than originally envisaged. The project's success in relieving pressure on the Kabye home area and slowing migration from it has therefore also been less than expected (Painter 1990:59).

One evaluation study of FED (BMB 1984), reported that in the Broukou sector (one of the two original sectors created and holding the highest concentration of Kabye settlers), 16 percent of original Kabye settlers have rotated out of the settlement (thirty-two of the original 213 Kabye families) and, further, due to a high number of replacements of replacements, the number is likely even higher than estimated. Gu-Konu (1983:971-2) also convincingly shows that the likelihood of Kabye defection was a hidden reality in FED documentation and much higher than formerly recognized.

Actual data confirm high defection and difficulty in attracting and retaining new Kabye recruits. In 1978, 100 of the original 197 families recruited subsequently deserted (for various reasons, including eviction and "personal problems"), and over twenty plots were left abandoned at different times. Empty plots continue to exist today. In 1978, 315 defections occurred while only forty-four new families were settled. From annual reports of project recruitment, Gu-Konu (1983:972) found that

between the years 1974-1981, of 1,206 families recruited, 793 were settled, leaving 413 families, about one-third, as probable defectors. This period of high defection, he points out, coincided with the most severe and inflexible period of the project (outset of animal traction and stringent production guidelines).

In comparison, in Mo, although a dramatic population increase of 13 percent occurred immediately following the bridge construction, informants confirm that immigration into the region since then is decelerating (Figure 2-4). Today, settlers and civil servants describe Mo's population growth rate as a continuous "trickle" rather than the former influx of new settlers.¹⁷

From 1981 to 1990, the prefecture of Sotouboua (encompassing the Mo plain) actually decreased in population as a percent of the total national population from 4.8 to 4.7 percent (INRS 1991).¹⁸ In Doufelgou (location of FED), by contrast, the prefectural population increases as a percent of total national population from 1.2 to 2.1 percent.¹⁹ According to my own census, total population in FED is 6,162 (less than Kenkou's 1990 statistic of 10,500), and in Mo, 21,574 persons (low range of Kedagni's 1989 estimation of 20,000 to 25,000).

¹⁷ Difficulty in acquiring an accurate census is due to a continuous fluctuation of population in Mo. This is largely caused by people alternating between Togo and Ghana for various periods of time due to diverse reasons (such as national politics, economics, ethnic tensions such as between Konkomba/Dagomba, hunting restrictions, and problems with civil servants). Customs officials informed me that, in many cases, people themselves may be ignorant of their true citizenship.

¹⁸ Density however increases from 18 to 22 p/km².

¹⁹ Density increases from 53 to 57 p/km².

Dogbe himself contends that the real test of FED's success and sustainability is at the end of funding. "Real development is judged when they [donors] leave and the project is on its own" (personal communication, 1992). According to Dogbe, settlers vote with their feet; the settlement has endured the transfer of responsibility and survives today with about 25,000 people, he exclaims. The real trial of success, according to Dogbe, lies in first settler and second generation permanency. He assured me that few first settlers have left, and settler children are staying. In my own research sample, however, six of twenty-one resettled farmers sampled moved onto previously occupied parcels. Statistical estimations suggest clearly a deceleration of population growth in both sites raising important questions concerning: what factors provoke this process, how does it occur, and why?

Defectors: Myth or Reality?

It is certain that defection exists in both areas. In FED, desertion consists of both initial settler defection, as well as secondary, replacement defection. FED staff confirm that defection rates vary among sectors, currently hovering around 25 percent.²⁰ The current FED Director is convinced that rates of defection today are even higher than those estimated, due to fears of violence brought on by the transition

²⁰ In Broukou, the central hub of the project, rates of desertion are low, about 10 percent. In Agbassa, the first sector created, about 30 percent desertion was caused by failure to adopt animal traction. In Misseouta, where sorcery accusation have always been high, about 25 percent have defected. Lastly, in Agoundé and in Bidgandé, the two most distant sectors, autoctones, instead of settlers, have been heavily incorporated into the zone from the start; Agoundé has undergone extensive settler defection because of settler-autoctone land tenure conflicts.

to democracy (Nebona, personal communication, 1992).²¹ If settlers' perceptions of defection do not reflect precise, accurate statistics, they nonetheless reflect accurate trends of population movement, and give settlers' own prediction and forecasts. Data in Table 8-10 illustrate that FED settlers perceive a higher intention for permanency among themselves and other settlers than do Mo farmers, but simultaneously acknowledge an actual higher defection rate. Intention (reflecting attitude and belief), therefore, does not coincide consistently with action (reflecting behavior). What underlies this incongruence? A first step to understanding this distorted perception is examining causes of defection.

Push or Pull Motives

What are the overriding factors causing settler defection? The most important factors that cause defection identified by FED settlers were "push" factors (Table 8-10). Push factors are negative attributes that deter settler complacency and encourage desertion. In probing this issue further during subsequent interviews, I asked settlers a slightly different question: "what would lead you to return home?" In response, social/jealousy-type conflicts and/or problems with autocthonous specifically (over land tenure) were mentioned most by FED settlers (62.5 percent) compared to settlers in Mo who answered nostalgia for family (66 percent).²² Flaws and deleterious

²¹ At the start of FED, the most successful, bravest settlers were evicted due to sorcery accusations by others. Because the best settlers were leaving, policy was inverted, and accusers, rather than the accused, were evicted. As a result, accusations and defection decreased.

²² One extremely informative study reviewing FED defection explicitly specifies its causes: rapid pace of scheme, settler obligation to adopt animal traction, enforcement of new and difficult

Table 8-10. Comparison of settler opinions on defection (% of respondents).

| Site | Mo | FED |
|---|------------------------------|------------------|
| Intention for permanence | 78 | 91 |
| Perceive other's intention for permanence | 64.5 | 84 |
| Perceive defection in settlement | 33 | 84 |
| Causes of defection | | |
| push | 19 | 66 |
| pull | 81 | 25 |
| (will not leave) | 0 | 9 |
| Primary response to question, "What would make you leave?" | "No one leaves" ^z | "Solidarity tax" |
| percent of total responses | 67 | 34 |

^zSecond-most cited response was poor soils (10%).

outcomes resulting from FED planning, notably, settler-autochthone tensions, problem-solving inability, and dependency are rawly exposed.

In Mo, by contrast, the most important criteria for possible defection and return home cited by settlers were "pull" factors. Pull factors are positive attributes that attract settlers toward home, but do not imply resistance to permanence.

Attraction to return to home included nostalgia for one's family, one's own land, the value of being in "chez," old age, or being needed by family members.

One significant and valuable interpretation of this finding suggests that an increase of "attractive" qualities and attributes in Mo should provide greater incentive

technologies, arbitrary evictions and the rise of autochthone settlement (BMB 1984:114).

for settler permanency. The most important criterion for attracting settlers to the sites in both FED and Mo was the "pull" of land (65.6 and 62.5 percent, respectively), specifically good soils and land abundance (Table 7-1). This result parallels other studies concerning Togo's significant and long-lived history of migration that show that settlers in Togo are seekers rather than evaders. Combined with data collected through descriptive and informal interviews, this seems to be the case. Rather than fleeing from problematic home lives per se, the incentive for farmer resettlement is search of improvement of livelihoods; emphasis lies on optimism and renewal.

An increase in adversity, therefore, obstructs settler objectives. Problems, such as social conflict, heavy taxes, increased rules and regulations, lack of infrastructure, limited market opportunities, and overall loss of independence, counter original motives for settlement. As shown in Table 8-10, the primary response for reasons for actual defection witnessed by Mo settlers is indicative of settler attitudes: no one leaves at all.²³ For FED settlers, the primary cause of defection was opposition to payment of the solidarity tax.²⁴

Escalation of restrictions, limitations, and confusion in sociopolitical systems and land tenure undermines settler goals and the long-term sustainability of the settlement. A number of FED farmers described the settlement as rigid and confining, an environment of which many complained and *hors blocs* preferred not to join. One settler explained, "people leave because they don't follow rules;" another farmer who

²³ Compared to only 15.6 percent of FED farmers who selected this option.

²⁴ Insufficient labor was second in importance (18.7 percent).

defected (now hors blocs) said, people do not want to be told what to do; "people want to be free; the extension agent is bothersome." Cotton was grown "by force" so that FED could take the profits, said one embittered settler; this is why so many of us stopped growing cotton, and why eventually some left.

Lessons from FED demonstrate that stellar attractions offered by the government in and of themselves fail to secure settlers' lasting commitment to permanence. Inappropriate designs and programs commonly are rejected by settlers and pale through time. Comparative results from Mo and FED indicate that government assistance aimed at responding to specific farmer needs through a participatory approach provides attractive qualities for permanence, and a more appropriate and sustainable approach for regional development than top-down, lustrous interventions prone to fading glossiness.

FED Settlers' Decisions to Defect

Discussions and informal interviews clarify further why settlers decide to defect. One of the prime causes of early settler evacuation in FED was forced adoption of animal traction (refer to Chapter 7). At the inception of the animal traction program, in 1981, all settlers were required to adopt the new technique or leave the settlement. Dogbe admits that settlers were insufficiently trained, and participation was nonexistent. Consequent adoption constraints were considerable, including psychological (many settlers were totally foreign to maintenance of cattle,

which generated fear, inability and resistance to "conform"), technical, and economic (Kenkou 1990).

The project was rigid and inflexible toward technology adoption, admits Dogbe. Meeting donor conditions by producing positive statistics assured subsequent funding. One astute settler accurately told me that obligations to donors came at the expense of success of settlers. It forced people to leave because changes were too abrupt.

Evaluation of the success of technology adoption is measured best over time. Defectors I interviewed back in their home villages said they discontinued the use of most practices promoted by FED (notably animal traction and chemical fertilizer), due to lack of funds or credit sources. One defector said that because he could no longer afford chemical fertilizer, he returned to using organic manure as before. Although in the settlement settlers replaced traditional farming practices with FED-provided inputs, traditional technologies reemerged at home. Improved crop associations, new farming techniques and adjusted labor patterns were unsustainable outside of the project as well. Lack of access to resources (particularly credit and extension), compounded with different land-use patterns, layout, and quality and quantity of soil available, prevented continuation of most agricultural lessons learned in FED.

A second critical factor precipitating defection, mentioned widely by settlers in FED, is the solidarity fund. Like animal traction, it was required of settlers and identified by nearly all farmers sampled as a key cause of defection. Although a few settlers said people simply could not pay and were obliged to leave, most said they

were simply unwilling to pay an unfair tax.²⁵ One autochthone settled explained candidly;

We saw that the fund was a lie from the start. People ate the money. We work and they take. We don't pay taxes in Togo, why do we have to pay? We never saw this money. They ate it. We were forced to accept because if we refused, the government would deport you. We tried. Democracy led us not to pay.

Another cause of settler defection is autochthone-settler tensions, in specific, over land tenure (also discussed in Chapter 6). "La souplesse du régime foncier local joue un rôle déterminant dans les migrations rurales et la permanence des migrants dans les zones d'immigration" (Kenkou 1990:105). As one defector explained, too much sorcery occurs in FED due to conflicts between autochthones and settlers over land. Even today, he admits, he still fears whether the sorcery of FED could possibly extend to Ketao. Many settlers confirmed that it is safer to be among one's own family.²⁶

En dehors de l'expulsion, l'une des sanctions graves établies par le Projet, il constitue l'une des principales causes de l'abandon ou du départ des migrations amenés à quitter la zone. Il souligne toute l'importance de la question foncière sur le périmètre, l'insécurité sociale suscitée par des litiges fonciers et l'impact de cette situation précaire sur les objectifs d'une installation définitive des migrants (Kenkou, 1990:92).

Associated with land conflict, acts of sabotage against tree plantations (by fire and tree slashing) have occurred and are increasing. Hostility of autochthones and settlers

²⁵ Reports (SOTED 1987) show that in 1985, only 65.6 percent of settlers paid the solidarity fund, and those who paid were largely from the Broukou sector.

²⁶ One village chief informed me that recent political unrest in Togo has prompted people to return to their native villages (despite the fact that many had never visited there before). Studies are being conducted now to trace lineages and family land.

against one another and the project concerning land tenure has generated these destructive acts, and provoked settler defection through both forced and voluntary eviction.

Another reason for defection confirmed by settlers is a shortage of labor due to loss of family support (see Chapter 7 and also McMillan 1995). One defector's wife admitted she did not want to stay in the project and wanted to return home because "it was too much work alone." Without family and friends to help in labor, she explained, they could not accomplish necessary tasks and abandoned the project.²⁷ For many settlers, the overall cost-benefit calculation about remaining on site was negative.

Oftentimes, defection was averted by a "sharing of resources for survival." Family members at home often travelled to the settlement to assist in farm work. A dynamic interchange of household members between the settlement and home exists among many settler families. For example, school-age children live at home where better schools are thought to exist but, during bottleneck periods of labor, travel to help in FED; food is sent to either area depending on need, and much visiting, celebrating and sharing alternates between areas.

One FED settler family with whom I conducted extensive interviews in the settlement and home village was able to develop and manage a highly resourceful labor system crossing between the two sites. Depending on age, occupation, gender,

²⁷ Remittances home were often expected from settlers and increased their economic burden. One defector mentioned that familial obligations of providing food at home persisted and even increased throughout his stay in the settlement. High transport costs worsened the situation.

aspiration, season and, to some degree, fate, family members would be rotated and situated in one or the other site. For example, one young daughter (approximately twenty years) was participating in a beautician apprenticeship. Consequently, she was relieved of farm work in both sites and obliged to remain at home where apprenticeships were offered. A son (25 years) rotated continuously between sites and said he enjoyed the freedom of revolvment.

Another motive for defection commonly referred to by women was expressed eloquently by one settler's wife: she identified her loss by describing how she missed the "clay bowls" of Pya. Identification with the bowls symbolizes more than the quality of Pya clay or bowls, but signifies a longing for a total cultural and social repertoire lacking on site. "Nostalgie" was mentioned on numerous occasions, particularly by women, as a shortcoming of settlement life. Familiarity and security are missing in the settlement. Women (more often than men) often mentioned loneliness and lack of family as undesirable qualities in FED.²⁸ Similarly, language barriers and differences in agricultural practices were mentioned by settlers as other shortcomings caused by a mixed population.

Nostalgia was also translated into lack of benefits of infrastructure and services. Settlers from both sites considered the settlements as "la ferme," "en brousse" relative to their home villages. Women often mentioned that services offered in less remote areas of Togo enabled women elsewhere to live better than themselves.

²⁸ The heightened sense of loss among women settlers is likely due to the loss of shared labor (for child care, farm work, and food preparation) traditionally practiced among female kin and older children within the extended family. In rural West African households, extremely dynamic forms of mutual labor systems function to distribute excessive work loads.

"They are in town," one woman answered when I asked why she is worse off. Many women agreed that the settlement offers food to eat, but is nonetheless less preferable than living in town, where roads, dispensaries and other services are available, and where sale prices are fair. One nostalgic woman said, "In Pya, there is always light; even in the night when you arrive you think it is the day!"

Only the rare few in FED considered the settlement their home. One settler, for example, unyielding in his permanency in FED, told me, "even if I'm taken elsewhere and die, I want to be buried here." The land is his own, he told me. In appreciation of FED land (compared to his small and infertile land in Lama), one settler said that although the land is not his own, he will never leave because at least he has found food to eat. For most settlers, however, FED remains "la ferme," "la brousse" in which they exploit to reap profits in order to return home. Indications of permanency are rare in FED. One indication may be intentions for or actual house construction.²⁹ As shown in Table 7-8, 41 percent of FED farmers sampled said while living in FED, they have completed, are in process of, or hope to build a house in their home village, compared to 27 percent of the respondents in Mo.³⁰ Farmers sampled from both sites said they hope "to die" in their home village, and that "chez" was clearly at home.

²⁹ Once attaining income and savings, house construction and improvements are common investments for rural African farmers.

³⁰ Nonetheless, this information must be carefully scrutinized. More than one settler conveyed that they have a house in their home village, but will leave that to children in the family because they do not plan ever to leave FED. A house at home, constructed or in progress, therefore, does not necessarily indicate intention of permanency, unless specified as such.

Manoeuvred Hurdles in Mo

Are Mo farmers confronted with similar challenges as those in FED, or are theirs of a different kind and intensity? Do obstacles enumerated by Mo farmers (such as infrastructural inadequacies, land conflicts, labor constraints, and social levelling) appear to cause insurmountable limitations and severity leading to defection as in FED? As described throughout this study, there is no doubt that many troubling conditions confront Mo farmers.

According to informants, lack of infrastructure has played a primary hurdle to greater success. It presents shortages of market opportunities, which limit cash income and strain household livelihood. This has provoked defection of settlers who are intolerant or incapable of survival on the meager prices available in the region. One settler explained that although production was higher than at home, prices were so low that people find conditions worse than at home. But where survival in Mo, at least in the present, depends predominantly on subsistence production: "I'm here for the stomach," most settlers do not perceive market constraints yet as a reason to defect.

There is no doubt that transformation from subsistence to surplus agriculture is occurring in Mo, eventually requiring more extensive and developed road and transport systems.³¹ As commercialization of agriculture increases, infrastructural

³¹ Some illicit trade across the Ghanaian border exists to earn money, but this trade network, consisting of contraband goods, bicycles, and other commodities, is highly irregular and risk-oriented.

development (financed through government and donor assistance) will follow suit.³²

The degree of settler frustration currently expressed over development "lag" in the region appears insufficient to induce defection. Compared to FED settlers, who are witnessing a decline of infrastructure, Mo settlers are jubilant in participating in the construction of a bridge on the main artery from Boulo to Tindjasse.

Likewise, land conflict in Mo does not threaten and undermine settler permanence as it does in FED. Two reasons likely explain this difference: one, current population pressure on land is less severe in Mo than in FED; and, two, and more important to this study, agreement and mediation over land use in Mo is more conducive to settler-autochthone negotiation and partnership (Chapter 6). In several cases, farmers "consider themselves" permanent despite that they perceive land as owned by autochthones. Unknown effects of democratization has generated fear among settlers: "We never know what will happen with democracy; we may be evicted like those in Kpalimé," but, as the settler chief of Banda village said, "this is home;" he has no other land.

Perception of land ownership seems to coincide with permanency, according to my research findings. Those settlers who do not consider land as their own also claim to be transient. Of the seven settlers sampled who responded they do not intend to live permanently in the settlement, only one considered the land his own.³³ This

³² For example, during my fieldwork, SOTED was surveying the area for road extension and development and FED was assisting in bridge construction.

³³ This compares to three farmers in FED who do not intend to remain permanently on site, only one of whom responded the land is his own.

finding suggests that perception of land entitlement may be a result, rather than determinant of settlers' decisions to remain permanent. Those who intend to remain in Mo initiate and facilitate agreements and/or informal contracts with autoctones concerning land ownership. In contrast, those settlers who are ambiguous about permanence have less interest in formalizing an accord with autoctones over land rights and perceive their land as borrowed or temporarily in use.

There is a wide spectrum of degrees of certainty and consequent land agreements, which lie between the polar extremes of permanence and defection. Many settlers in Mo resemble settlers throughout Togo and West Africa: they are transients who have resettled often several times previously.³⁴ In most cases, transients do not have land tenure rights. As one transient settler remarked, "It is best to be in your own home. I am not born here. My ancestors are not here. There are good relations here, but the land is not mine." This settler is transient and holds little interest in defining a land contract with autoctones. In these cases, land conflict is bypassed due to settler predecision to defect.

In sum, obstacles in Mo have proven inadequate to induce settler defection. Rather, slow, gradual growth and development is transpiring in Mo, with government assistance of limited cadence. This moderate pace has nurtured (perhaps inadvertently and unintentionally) a favorable environment enabling consistent, sustainable long-term growth. Local farmers have been both engines and recipients of gradual changes

³⁴ Of Mo settlers, 60.5 percent of Mo settlers have had at least one prior settlement other than their home compared to 56 percent in FED.

in the area. Where people feel they have a stake in building the society in which they live, they are more prone to invest and remain.

Indications of Slow Growth and Permanency

Walking through Tindjasse, the largest settler village of Mo, one cannot help but notice the large number of houses only partially built. Throughout the Mo plain, I was struck by the sparse, limited, barren appearance of many settler houses and villages. This is not mere coincidence, my assistant and key informant explained, but rather a conscious and calculated approach to investment through incremental steps. It is, he described, a risk-proof settlement strategy.

In his analysis of the informal economy of Peru, De Soto (1989) eloquently describes how sufficient security and stability over land and housing will provide the necessary incentives to invest large sums of money (1989:25). He writes that greater security will stimulate greater investment, and vice versa. De Soto argues that, "Wealth comes from knowing how to use resources, not from owning them" (1989:243). In Mo, where resources are meager, settlers are resourceful and exploitative of available resources (such as land, labor, fluctuating market prices).

Ownership of resources, specifically land, is the next step toward permanency in Mo. Like De Soto's Peruvian shanty dwellers, Mo settlers' security over land will generate their investment in land, as well as the region at large.

Indications of investment and permanence already exist; one example is the resettlement of extended family members.³⁵ Numerous examples of family "trains" of settlers exist in Mo (see Chapter 5). Family presence appears to play a central role in encouraging greater settler permanence on site. By transferring their own roots, people feel less like "strangers" and are more inclined to remain in the region. Although the true "chez" is revered spiritually and ceremoniously by most settlers and can never be replaced, it is eclipsed by the secular, practical demands of their lives. To migrate is a pragmatic, survivalist strategy. Once resettled, however, settlers' social, political, psychological, and emotional needs also must be fulfilled and developed to ensure permanence. Retaining relations back home, soliciting family members, and initiating new social networks simultaneously provide settlers a social landscape encompassing past and present, security and risk, stability and aspiration.

Creation and development of new networks in the settlements are exemplified through settler-initiated informal associations, such as locally-founded credit banks, informal rotating money associations, labor associations, church groups and related projects. These groups are incipient indications of members' long-term perspectives in the settlement.³⁶ For a committed and enduring associational membership, farmer interaction and problem-solving is required. These relations are fostered over time through participants' dedicated and invested interest. Further, associations offer

³⁵ Eighteen percent of Mo settlers sampled said already they have solicited other family members to join them in the settlement (21.9 percent in FED).

³⁶ Seventy-eight percent of Mo farmers engage in some type of association, compared to only 47 percent of FED farmers (Table 5-2).

members short- and long-term opportunities, such as access to resources and projects, which encourage farmer permanence and further investment.³⁷

As associations proliferate and expand, donor attention increases, and Mo plain's integration into existing institutions of the state and non-government organizations also evolves. In this light, greater access to outside resources is secured, promoting further growth and development for the region.³⁸ One example typifying the grassroots development linkage to outside sources is the Djarapanga village committee, currently working to acquire an ambulance with assistance from the local health clinic, among other activities.

In sum, Mo settlers are creatively striving to solve problems, despite modest outside assistance. In comparison, heavily-supported aid in FED has not curbed widespread strife and high defection. One Mo settler's remark summarizes the most effective journey toward sustainable development: "better to be a weaker child who survives, than a stronger child who does not."

Role of Autonomy

Autonomy as a Measurement

In this study I have examined notions of farmer autonomy through quantitative and qualitative data presentation. These analyses are integral components to

³⁷ Projects such as improved roads, bridges, market centers, health services and schools are underway in Mo with the aid of donors such as the Ministry of Planning, churches, and FED.

³⁸ This notion is similar to Massaro's (1994) argument of farmers' need to capture and integrate with the state.

comparing degrees of settler autonomy between sites. To complement these findings, I also conducted statistical analyses by means of the t-test and Wilcoxon Rank Sum test (described in detail in Chapter 3). After briefly reviewing the findings, I discuss their significance in terms of local empowerment and future participatory development.

To measure autonomy, I created a compound variable based on eleven questions of scaled ratings (see Table 8-11 and Appendix B). Selection of these variables from the questionnaire was based on their relation to or expression of autonomy, including opinion of independence from government, self-determination, and degree of inter-dependency or association with others enabling capacity to resolve one's own problems and manage one's own life.

Results from this test clearly suggest that Mo farmers are more autonomous than FED farmers. According to the scale constructed, the mean score of Mo farmers, 19.65 is 2.3 values higher than FED's score of 17.62.³⁹ Autonomy was one t-test among nine conducted in the overall statistical analysis. When combined with the other eight compound variables, autonomy shows a p-value of 0.0190 (not significant according to the predetermined alpha-level of 0.011 significance). Given the exceptionally high predetermined level of significance (98 percent confidence level for each variable), the results suggest that the difference between sites is considerable and a strong indicator of variation between sites. Furthermore, considering that all

³⁹ In both cases, the results are slightly skewed to the right, indicating the probability that a few farmers from each site measured unusually higher than others in the sample.

Table 8-11. Comparative analysis of compound variables using both t-test and Wilcoxon Rank Sum test. Both agree, therefore the t-test can be used for all variables.

| variable | site | N | mean | t | p-value |
|------------------------------------|------|----|--------|--------|----------|
| Autonomy | Mo | 31 | 19.645 | 2.41 | 0.0190 |
| | FED | 29 | 17.621 | | |
| Perceived environmental management | Mo | 33 | 3.667 | -4.77 | 0.0001** |
| | FED | 32 | 5.750 | | |
| Actual environmental management | Mo | 33 | 3.273 | -10.31 | 0.0001** |
| | FED | 32 | 6.437 | | |
| Available infrastructure | Mo | 33 | 13.788 | -6.71 | 0.0001** |
| | FED | 32 | 20.031 | | |
| Men's quality of life | Mo | 29 | 16.655 | -3.16 | 0.0025** |
| | FED | 32 | 19.656 | | |
| Men's wealth | Mo | 33 | 10.242 | -2.62 | 0.0110* |
| | FED | 32 | 11.875 | | |
| Women's labor burden | Mo | 33 | 4.061 | 1.24 | 0.2179 |
| | FED | 32 | 3.625 | | |
| Women's quality of life | Mo | 28 | 15.036 | -2.96 | 0.0046** |
| | FED | 30 | 17.067 | | |
| Women's wealth | Mo | 33 | 8.849 | 1.17 | 0.2453 |
| | FED | 32 | 8.188 | | |

** statistically significant at the 0.011 α -level

* marginally statistically significant at the 0.011 α -level

variables in the overall t-test results suggest a favorable environment in FED, the one difference, in autonomy, appears even more meaningful (see Table 8-11).⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Other variables, including use and availability of services, quality of life (for men and women separately), and environmental opinion and action, all show statistically significant differences

Overall, t-test results correspond with and reinforce data collected by use of other methods in this study. Only in autonomy and women's labor and wealth do Mo farmers score higher than FED (and higher labor implies more work). According to these data, therefore, autonomy is in opposition to all other variables tested. In sum, this statistical analysis illustrates that despite apparent improved, stellar conditions in FED based on services available, wealth indicators, environmental conditions, and measures of quality of life, autonomy remains higher in Mo than in FED. According to this research finding, improved conditions does not correspond with autonomy.

Conclusion

Settler satisfaction, forecasts for the future, defection, and autonomy are key interdependent factors that reinforce or weaken settler investment and long-term sustainability in the settlements. In analyzing how these factors influence settler decision-making, findings of this research reveal that initial "favored" conditions in FED have lead settlers to appear more successful and better off than Mo settlers. Favorable conditions (notably infrastructural, sociopolitical and environmental), however, are rapidly declining due to governmental withdrawal. Although initially satisfied with their surroundings, FED settlers are more recently speculative and mistrusting of their futures, and perceive life as worsening. Failure to adequately prepare settlers for assuming responsibility over the project zone has been the legacy

in favor of FED. The variable of wealth shows a marginal significant difference in favor of FED, and women's wealth and labor show no significant difference between sites, although both variables are slightly higher in Mo (implying more work, not less for women in Mo).

left from FED's dominant control. This has been detrimental to the sustainability of the settlement, illustrated by an intensification of conflicts, and high numbers of defection.

Mo settlers have been endowed with significantly less government support than FED settlers, and thus have endured much harsher conditions. Having adapted to a challenging climate, Mo settlers possess a complex mosaic of powerlessness and survivalism. Overall, autonomy has compelled them to be self-reliant, holding few expectations of outside (state) support (unlike their FED counterparts). Recently, however, government and donor intervention has slowly penetrated the region and facilitated steady, slow growth and development. Settlers are optimistic and encouraged by this assistance. They are not as dependent upon external support as FED settlers, however, precisely because they were not nurtured by this patronage from the start.

Mo settlers opt for permanency; nonetheless, in search for betterment in life in a difficult and erratic environment, they are cautious in their investments and proceed in small exploratory increments rather than large predetermined leaps. As current conditions prevail and improve, the Mo population increases and family members from elsewhere join earlier settled kin. Settlers courageously solve their own problems and social conflicts through trial and error and mediation. Questions of degrees of investment and permanency, rather than defection, more often confront Mo settlers.

Evidence gathered from my fieldwork research shows that too much support offered to farmers without proper avenues for participation, maintenance or future responsibility, leaves farmers in a dependent, reliant position. They will be accustomed to a given set of conditions hardly sustainable without external support. Expectant, unmotivated and defeatist attitudes shade their otherwise capable potential for development. In disappointment, many opt to leave, while others continue to exploit what benefits may remain.

In contrast, responsibility and self-reliance are critical qualities fostering settler permanence and sustainability. Gradual growth centered on and initiated by farmers' own needs and concerns promotes appropriate and enduring development. In consequence, farmer satisfaction and confidence will lead to investment and permanence. Analyses of findings presented in this chapter provide evidence strongly predicting that FED's initial stellar results are ephemeral and fleeting, while Mo conditions are improving gradually through incremental steps and trial and error. In both cases, a balance between farmer needs and government support must be attained and monitored in order to create a sustainable environment. In Mo, already this equilibrium is in an evolutionary process, by a learning rather than rigidly planned and predetermined approach.

CHAPTER 9

COMMITMENT TO SUCCESS

If you give birth to child who is strong then dies, and to a child who is weak but lives, who is better off (Naboukoura settler in the Mo plain, 1992)?

Society does not carry out our obligations to others for us, but instead creates the possibility that we can carry those obligations out ourselves. If we choose not to do so, we deny what is social about us and are left only with something resembling the state of nature. In that case, it ought not to be surprising why modern liberal democrats, for all the wealth their economies have generated and stability their governments have delivered, sometimes wonder what it all means (Alan Wolfe, *Whose Keeper?: Social Science and Moral Obligation*, 1989:23).

Capturing the Obvious

Seemingly obvious everyday events: a typical argument over land boundary infraction in Agounde, farmers' complaints of over-priced mill-grinding fees in Tindjasse, daily queues for conflict-resolution by the Zonal Director in Broukou, or a usual village meeting in the settler village of Tindjasse, which occur in the settlement areas of the Mo plain and the FED project take on greater-than-life qualities if placed in the context of understanding the effects and outcomes of the role of the state on rural development in Africa today. Types of issues, activities, challenges, and perceptions and beliefs (both obvious and obscure) facing farmers in both the

spontaneous and planned settlements overlap and diverge. These similarities and differences provide insight to the complex relationship between the effects of varying degrees of state assistance on farmer livelihoods in rural Africa. Outcomes of these analyses offer vital lessons not only furthering the important current theoretical research concerning the dynamics of state-society relations, but also informing policymakers engaged in Third World development.

Theories of African development (and their implementation) have provided residues of knowledge that combined, yield a wealth of information toward shaping an effective state-society framework that ensures sustainable development. The result, according to this study, is a participatory approach combining principles of freedom and sustainability in which schools and approaches founded on principles of modernization, dependency, Marxist socialism, and Western liberalism are interwoven. Fundamental to this approach are concepts of farmer autonomy, independence, self-reliance (ironically including locally generated self-help associations), and innovation.

Emerging from this research is evidence favoring the use of a participatory approach to sustainable community development incorporating farmer stewardship and responsibility toward natural and social environments. Compared to conventional top-down approaches, this approach encourages more effective local problem-solving leading to greater investment and permanence in the social and environmental landscape (Friedmann 1992; Hirschman 1984; Massaro 1995). In response, the quality of state intervention necessarily changes from one of authoritarian control and

dirigisme to partnership, facilitation, and guiding assistance (Korten 1980; McMillan 1995; Rothchild and Chazan 1988). A marriage of liberal and democratic principles emerges, laying groundwork and, in fact, requiring interactive, open, flexible relations between partners to ensure a sustainable future (Wolfe 1989).

Summary of Research Findings

Mo Plain

Analysis of the effects of differing degrees of state control over farmers in a spontaneous settlement (Mo plain) compared with a planned settlement project (FED) begins with settler entry. Mo plain settlers relocated independently to a remote, highly enclaved, "forgotten" zone of Togo bearing minimal government support of any kind. They settled in Mo with assistance solely from family and friends gaining formal traditional approval of the existing autocthonous. Settlers approached agriculture in their new land-abundant surroundings through extensive practices incorporating innovation and experimentation.

Where ample and fertile land exists (compared to their home areas), Mo farmers have disbanded the former land-protective technologies of their previous intensive farming system in the mountains in favor of "mining" the resource base impulsively by means of slash-and-burn agriculture. Despite alleged "intentions" toward permanency, settlers approach their environment with indiscretion, rather than caution and care. By contrast, as pioneers in a region receiving little government

support, Mo settlers are cautious in their investments and proceed in increments through trial and error.

As population expands in Mo, government presence also increases in the zone. Incremental improvements implemented in gradual steps with local decision-making underlies the current approach to development of infrastructural and agricultural conditions in Mo. Government representatives operate in collaboration with the local population, rather than authoritatively. Government assistance and partnership replaces formerly control-based, top-down, government-provided development (this shift is due primarily to regional enclavement, limited funds, national political uncertainty, and lessons learned). Moderate government assistance of limited cadence has nurtured a favorable environment enabling consistent, sustainable growth in Mo. Local farmers have been both engines and recipients of these gradual changes. Where people feel they have a stake in building the society in which they live, they are more prone to invest and remain permanently.

Ethnicity functions as the key source of identity and allegiance for settlers and autochthones in Mo. These indigenous groups function as essential social, cultural and economic resources. Patterns of sociopolitical activities, specifically regarding conflict resolution as well as informal associations, between ethnic groups and between settlers and autochthones, overall have been dynamic and effective. In the absence of outside arbiters, locally generated indigenous courts, in which all factions participate, provide an accountable, operative form of mediation. Conformity to a normative sociopolitical order incorporating both settlers and autochthones is essential for Mo farmers under the

challenging conditions in which they live. Mutual respect, assistance, and community participation among people is not an option, but rather a survival strategy to overcome obstacles toward growth.

One cost of settler interdependency with autocthonous in Mo has been "social levelling" (based on power and control). This has caused a deferment and limitation of regional growth and development. Autocthone-settler tensions exist in Mo, recently attested by public display of vying for power between the two major villages of Tindjasse (settler) and Djarapanga (autocthone). Regional development, ironically, is reinforcing these tensions as settler villages enjoy unprecedented outside aid due to their growing populations. As settlers increase in numbers, autocthonous are forced to contend with a sharing of power in the zone and recognize new limitations of their authority. Given positive responses to recent breezes of change and development in Mo, prospects for adjustment appear secure.

FED Settlement

In stark contrast to the spontaneous settlement, settlers of the planned settlement were escorted from their home villages by government administrators into a preformulated blueprint-designed isolated zone of development. They were efficiently placed in prefabricated housing and provided with all essential infrastructural supports, including cleared land, agricultural support, social services, and so on, and catered to by a dense network of expatriate and civil servants. The settlers had no participation in or knowledge of the planning, design or operations of

the settlement, but rather, only implemented and executed mandatory guidelines emanating from the top (according to the French colonial model of "faire passer," or "let it pass"). The initial planning and administrative structure of the project prohibited dialogue with and involvement of local farmers. Top-down and authoritative management style, combined with overly rigid rules and intolerance of flexibility, led to resentment and defection, creating a social environment of increasing hostility (latent then overt) and rejection of project guidelines (Gu-Konu [1983] describes this period as a climate of war).

Compulsory compliance to a strict agricultural package of intensification, replete with Western technologies and concepts (animal traction, inputs, and credit) fell short of project goals and is questionable in terms of actual results (Painter 1990). Despite stellar results during initiation and the early years, extensive project support has been indispensable to sustain technologies and practices (elegantly illustrated in the failure of the reforestation program). Through time, despite attempts at cajolment and coercion, FED underwent declines in production. It also experienced the misuse, "reinterpretation," or, in some cases, total abandonment by settlers of recommended technologies, specifically animal traction, a disturbance of the natural resource base, and a loss of attempted control over commercialization and settler organizations.

Throughout the project lifetime, an absence of dialogue and open exchange between settlers and the administration characterized the sociopolitical environment in FED. This distance and rigidity inhibited initiative problem-solving among settlers, prevented income diversity, and fostered intense settler dependency on the project. All

problems, conflicts, and needs (ranging from social to agricultural) were referred to the top (and most often promptly solved). Through time, my research shows that most FED settlers have remained loyal to the principle and expectation of government problem-solving and handouts. One key legacy left by FED has been the persistence of a culture of dependency.

As an afterthought in the final project phase, FED initiated settler organizations to manage operations and maintenance of project services following project closure. Settlers recognized at once the transparent futility of a committee that would never be effective or respected by farmers within or outside the project zone. External inception, members' inexperience in mediation and management, and lack of regional integration negate its chances for meaningful and sustainable success; "Il est douteux qu'il [le colon] soi en position d'assumer, demain, une attitude participative consciente à l'égard de la mise en valeur sur la zone" (Gu-Konu 1983:991).¹ As a result, despite substantial investments of time, money, land, people, and other precious and rare resources, following project closure the initial "favored zone of FED" is in decay in terms of project objectives and realizations. Regardless of stellar results in agricultural and infrastructural outcomes during the project lifetime, the success and sustainability of FED appears precarious.

A hazy transfer of direction and uncertain sociopolitical conditions have resulted in project closure. Ambiguities may cause limitations to or total loss of initial modernization goals. According to my research findings, settlers are quite aware of

¹ Likewise, they resented, then protested and boycotted, payment of the solidarity tax intended for long-term infrastructural maintenance.

their worsening situation, and speculative and mistrustful of their futures. Moreover, current confusion over leadership in the zone further reinforces barriers to improving their condition and delays recovery from disturbances provoked by FED interventions.

Changes since project closure have unleashed a host of formerly muffled and concealed tensions and hostilities experienced by autocthonous throughout the project lifetime (the smoke of the fire). Autocthone anger over denial in sharing many project advantages until late in the project lifetime ignited a loosening and expansion of formerly concentrated and isolated project benefits exclusively targeting settlers. This was a prelude to further autocthone protests over control of economic, sociopolitical, and environmental institutions and resources which they considered under their rightful auspices and authority, specifically the market and land areas.

Confusion over land use and land rights has provoked aggressive events and threats of eviction, causing settler fear and desertion and provoking hostilities among autocthonous themselves. These weapons have also targeted the natural resource base, thus undermining and threatening both project outcome and overall environmental sustainability. Insecurity and uncertainty over land may be the most enduring ill-fated legacy of FED.

Summary

Perhaps the most telling variable indicating the degree of FED's success is the current population composition. Increased autocthone population combined with high defection rates of initial settlers exposes unmet initial goals. Given these outcomes,

are continuing investment in settlement worth the effort? The problem lies, I believe, more in the type of planning and degree of participation and integration of the population, than in the degree of investment of financial, administrative, and natural resources.

Mo settlers are not as dependent upon external support as FED settlers precisely because they were not nurtured by this patronage from the start. In its absence, settlers courageously solve their own problems and social conflicts through mediation and participation. Evidence gathered from my fieldwork shows that too much support offered to farmers without proper avenues for participation, maintenance or future responsibility, leaves farmers in a dependent, reliant position, incapable of solving their own problems.

A balance between farmer needs and government support appears to buttress the most sustainable social and physical environment. In Mo, this equilibrium is in an evolutionary process, by a learning rather than rigidly planned and predetermined approach. In contrast, in a large-scale development project such as FED, farmers have become accustomed to a given set of favored conditions hardly sustainable without external support. In disappointment over decay, many opt to leave, while others continue to exploit what benefits may remain. As a result, FED settlers are raising questions of defection, while Mo settlers are measuring and calculating degrees of investment.

Critical qualities fostering settler permanence and sustainability, responsibility, self-reliance, empowerment, and problem-solving are developed by action, "by

doing." Through interactive conflict negotiations and bargaining (occurring in Mo), trust between people develops, which encourages confidence (Rothchild, panel discussion, African Studies Association conference, 1995). My research suggests that farmer satisfaction (encompassing the range of social, economic, and environmental determinants) and confidence lead to social and economic investment and permanence in their surroundings. Securities over land, traditional social structures, and cultural customs and practices have proven to be important and determining factors in settlement success.

Greater farmer freedom over the planning and management of their lives leads to this permanence. Adaptation to uncertain conditions is a key ingredient to sustainable development in rural Africa, where climatic, political, and economic events are highly volatile (Chambers and Conway 1992; Lele 1975; Rondinelli 1982). To successfully endure these erratic circumstances, adaptation requires flexibility (Wildavsky 1979). Correlatively, flexibility encourages and strengthens autonomy.

Developper devrait signifier d'abord créer les conditions de cette libération des énergies internes, de la recréation de la capacité d'organisation autonome des communautés et du renforcement de cette capacité autonome (Gu-Konu 1986:5).

As illustrated in this study, there is much "internal energy" in traditional lifestyles among rural farmers in Africa that contributes to the processes of adaptation and growth. I agree with Massaro that "perhaps it is time to end the question of how the state can capture the peasantry and ask instead how and when the peasants, with their insights and energy, can capture the state" (Massaro 1994). This does not at all preclude the importance of state support. The role of the state as partner, instead of

authority, allows for farmer-first (people-centered) long-term identification of goals with state assistance for implementation.

Autonomy coincides with responsibility and empowerment. As defined by Kupfer:

Autonomy clearly includes the ability to reason, make deliberate choices, and be responsible for our actions and their consequences. It is the ability and disposition to make plans and decide for oneself what to do (Kupfer 1992:42).

These attributes encourage long-term investment in the social and physical landscape, particularly acute under conditions of uncertainty and risk such as in settlement (Korten 1980; Lindblom 1977).

In turn, sustainability encourages greater freedom. Where farmers perceive themselves as permanent, rather than transient, research findings from this study show that they are forthright in expressing their concerns, solving their problems, and planning for their environment. Further, they are apt to work as a community through participation, in full awareness of the importance of nurturing social relations as long-term investments. Despite indications of a mining of the environment in Mo, potential for realignment of these practices appears much higher than in FED.

By contrast, where permanence and sustainability are less secure, such as in FED, settlers seem passive, obsequious, and responsive. They are less invested in the social and physical landscape, exploiting what resources remain without reference to resource renewal and replacement. They are trapped in deconstruction, a declining spiral toward destruction. As conditions worsen, they perceive entrapment and initiate

little effort to seize opportunities or create solutions to remedy their situations.

Rather, as Hyden (1980) says, they assume the exit option.

Conclusions

Over-centralized, dirigiste approaches traditionally applied in development have produced "administrative pathologies" (Chazan 1988; Friedmann 1992; Wunsch and Olowu 1990; Young 1986) engendering destructive outcomes that limit farmer freedom and sustainability. Results of this study indicate that rather than suppressing autonomy, farmer initiative and participation should be the foundation of any development effort aiming toward long-term success and sustainability.

As scholars have noted (Aron 1967; Chambers 1983; Chazan 1988; Hayek 1944, 1960; Hirschman 1967; Korten 1984; Leonard 1986; Massaro 1994; Moris 1981; Wolfe 1989), allowance for greater degrees of freedom and involvement releases individuals' energies toward creating a better society. Innovation and productivity are heightened by a sharing of a diversity of views through open dialogue and flexibility, and by encouraging fair competition through underlying principles of liberal democracy. Courage, openness to risk, and strength are essential ingredients to overcoming traditional and ineffective conventional habits with which we have been comfortable. But comfort can be stagnating. In order to attain more successful and sustainable results from our own development efforts, a fundamental decision is required: a commitment to success.

APPENDIX A

OUTLINE OF SEMI-STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE

The semi-structured questionnaire was based on seven separate domains or areas of inquiry. The seven domains included:

- (1) Migration history
- (2) Agroeconomic activities
 - (a) farming
 - (b) animal production
 - (c) other income-generating activities
- (3) Perceptions toward natural resource base
- (4) Infrastructural conditions and maintenance
- (5) Attitudes toward: general conditions and welfare in settlement, changes since in settlement, and future improvements
- (6) Problem resolution
- (7) Opinions concerning development and growth in settlement region: the role of external (government) assistance, responsibility and degree of participation of population

Within each domain, I collected the following data from settlers, including data separately collected from settlers' wives:

(1) family background, ethnicity, village of origin, reasons for migration, entry into settlement, chain migration, contact with home village, current investments in home village, land acquisition, land use and tenure agreements.

(2a) farm layout (number, size, location of fields), crop production (types, surface area and planting patterns of crops), labor patterns, labor investments, production levels, household consumption and commercialization, differences in farming practices (technologies) and production levels between settlement and home villages, use and conditions of agricultural credit, both formal and informal, inputs (specifically fertilizer), nature and degree of interaction with extension service, general problems and obstacles incurred, mapping of settlers' farms (verification through visit to fields).

(2b) number and type of animals raised in household, animal-raising responsibilities, average income earned from animal sales annually, differences in levels of animal production and sales between settlement and home village, general problems and obstacles incurred.

(2c) type, frequency and conditions of income-earning activities, income earned annually, investments of earnings, responsibility between spouses for household expenses, including food, clothing, medical, and school costs.

(3) perceptions of: land availability, conditions and changes from home villages and since on site of soils, forest cover, wood and water sources, application of agricultural practices incorporating environmental conservation.

(4) conditions of roads, differences in road conditions between home village and settlement, and since on site, participation in road maintenance, distance and

number of markets attended, frequency and reasons for attendance, distance to school, attendance by family members, distance to health clinics, frequency and cost of average visit, primary health problems, distance, frequency, and cost (weekly) of grinding mills, general conditions and problems confronted concerning above-mentioned infrastructure and services. For Mo settlers only: frequency and reasons for visiting Ghana, perceived advantages and disadvantages of living at the Ghana-Togo border, problems and obstacles confronted due to border proximity.

(5) comparison of general conditions in settlement to home village and since living on site: primary changes, comparison of family health, agricultural production, overall income, household possessions, infrastructural conditions, settlers' comparison of themselves to other Togolese in terms of overall welfare, changes and reasons for population fluctuations in settlement over time, opinions of future conditions and population conditions, estimation and reasons for own permanence or defection.

(6) Primary and secondary problems confronted in settlement, approaches to problem-solving, types and degree of alliances in settlements (specifically ethnic cohesion), types and conditions of conflict resolution in settlements, perceptions of autonomy, human rights, democracy, and freedom.

(7) Primary agents responsible for regional development, opinion of type, degree and effectiveness of external assistance already existing, purposes and degree of participation of local organizations in settlement, nascent efforts toward autonomy, self-empowerment and development. For FED only: opinions regarding the effectiveness, continuation, and problems of the solidarity fund.

APPENDIX B

QUESTIONS DEFINING COMPOUND VARIABLE OF AUTONOMY

The compound variable of autonomy was built from questions selected from the semi-structured questionnaire that may indicate incipient forms of settler autonomy and self-development. As stated in Chapter 8, questions selected concerned types and degrees of settler organization, such as self-help associations and informal credit and assistance, which suggest settler capacity for problem resolution and long-term management of obstacles that they confront.

Questions included:

1. Annual number of transactions of informal credit exchanges.
2. Amount of money lent annually through informal credit.
3. Amount of money borrowed annually through informal credit.
4. Settler participation in rotating-fund associations.
5. Exchange of food crops for household subsistence.
6. Type of organization (government-based, non-governmental, none) in which settler participates.
7. Degree of participation in hada labor associations.
8. Average number of persons participating in hada.
9. Degree of participation (person/days annually) in egbare labor associations.

10. Opinion of who is responsible for settlement improvements.
11. Primary source (among themselves, a local third party, government officials) for mediation and conflict resolution.

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
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH


Pamela F. Pozarny, a native of Buffalo, New York, graduated with a Bachelor of Arts degree in anthropology from Reed College, Portland, Oregon. She then spent three years as a Peace Corps volunteer working in agricultural education in Togo, West Africa. Following her service, she earned her Master of Arts degree in anthropology and farming systems research at the University of Florida, Gainesville, under Ronald Cohen and supported by the FLAS Title VI program. She conducted her doctoral fieldwork in Togo under the auspices of the Fulbright program. During her graduate studies, she taught introductory courses on Africa as a Teaching Fellow for the Center for African Studies, and also was a Teaching Assistant for the Department of Anthropology. She has worked for and interned with various overseas agencies in Washington, New York, Gainesville, the Caribbean, and Africa as well, notably, UNDP and USAID. Pozarny is an avid cyclist and outdoorswoman.

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.




Ronald Cohen, Chair
Professor of Anthropology

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
Art Hansen, Cochair
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
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Chris O. Andrew
Professor of Food and Resource Economics

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This thesis was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Anthropology in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

May 1995

Dean, Graduate School

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